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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2022‒09‒12
25 papers chosen by |
| By: | Grosch, Kerstin (WU Vienna University of Economics); Haeckl, Simone (University of Stavanger); Kocher , Martin G. (University of Vienna & University of Gothenburg) |
| Abstract: | We examine individual-level determinants of interest in STEM and analyze whether a digital web application for elementary-school children can increase children’s interest in STEM with a specific focus on narrowing the gender gap. Coupling a randomized-controlled trial with experimental lab and survey data, we analyze the effect of the digital intervention and shed light on the mechanisms. We confirm the hypothesis that girls demonstrate a lower overall interest in STEM than boys. Moreover, girls are less competitive and exhibit less pronounced math confidence than boys at the baseline. Our treatment increases girls’ interest in STEM and decreases the gender gap via an increase in STEM confidence. Our findings suggest that an easy-to-implement digital intervention has the potential to foster gender equality for young children and can potentially contribute to a reduction of gender inequalities in the labor market such as occupational sorting and the gender wage gap later in life. |
| Keywords: | STEM; digital intervention; gender equality; field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D91 I24 J16 J24 |
| Date: | 2022–08–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:stavef:2022_004&r= |
| By: | Kari Hämäläinen; Jouko Verho |
| Abstract: | The Finnish basic income experiment was an ambitious effort to study basic income in a Nordic welfare state. This paper describes the planning, implementation and scientific evaluation of the experiment. The randomized treatment group was paid a guaranteed monthly income, which had no impact on disposable income while a person was unemployed but provided a substantial increase in work incentives. We extend previous evaluations by examining the heterogeneity of incentive changes and employment responses across households. Our results reveal improvements in employment only for couples with children, providing an interesting contrast to other in-work credit programs. |
| Keywords: | employment, field experiment, social insurance, unemployment benefits |
| JEL: | C93 H55 I38 J65 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9875&r= |
| By: | Grimalda, Gianluca; Farina, Francesco; Conte, Anna; Schmidt, Ulrich |
| Abstract: | We provide an experimental test of theories to explain differences in redistribution preferences across countries. We involved participants in standardized situations of redistribution in four Western countries, varying the relevance of self-interest and uncertainty over initial earnings. Demand for redistribution is, on average, lower in the US and Italy than in Norway and Germany, regardless of whether self-interest is relevant. When self-interest matters, differences across countries are driven by a larger share of participants who earn (or expect to earn) below-median incomes behaving as "libertarians" - thus letting rich people keep their earnings - in the US and Italy than in Germany and Norway. Those earning (or expecting to earn) above the median behave similarly across countries. This result suggests that international differences in redistribution depend more on how the poor accept the rich's legitimacy to earn high incomes rather than the rich's solidarity toward the poor. US Americans and Italians are significantly more overconfident than Norwegians and Germans, thus further reducing their demand for redistribution under uncertainty. We find support for the "Prospect of Upward Mobility" hypothesis in all countries. Contrary to our hypotheses, US Americans do not reward individual merit more than others, particularly when self-interest is at stake. The reason is that luck is considered as important as merit for the rich's entitlement to high earnings. This result suggests revisiting common narratives on how meritocracy and tolerance of inequality are related. |
| Keywords: | Redistribution,Inequality,Experiment,Cross-country research |
| JEL: | C92 D63 H23 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:2230&r= |
| By: | Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Kataria, Mitesh (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Lampi, Elina (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Using an online experiment, we investigate the influence of sexual objectification in media on economic decision making. In the experiment, subjects are asked to evaluate advertisements in women’s magazines. In the treatment groups, the ads portray women in sexually objectifying poses, while the poses are neutral in the control group. The main research hypothesis is that sexual objectification tends to make women self-objectify, i.e., they internalize the view of the objectifying images, and as a result, they lower their reservation wage. We find that women in the treatment groups do self-objectify: Women who were exposed to the objectifying images described themselves with words related to body shape or size significantly more often than women in the control group. Adding a warning text about the fact that photoshopped images can create unrealistic body ideals did not mitigate the self-objectification. However, we do not find any effect of the sexual objectification on women’s reservation wages. If we take the results at face value, they do suggest that the objectification of women in media, while having important psychological and emotional effects, does not seem to affect women’s economic behavior, at least not directly. |
| Keywords: | online experiment; sexual objectification; media; economic decision making |
| JEL: | C91 J16 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0824&r= |
| By: | Lambrecht, Marco (Hanken School of Economics); Proto, Eugenio (University of Glasgow); Rustichini, Aldo (University of Minnesota); Sofianos, Andis (Heidelberg University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate in a laboratory setting whether revealing information on the intelligence of both players affects behavior in repeated games. We study the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) and Battle of Sexes (BoS) as they cover a large set of the interesting scenarios generated by repeated games of two actions two players symmetric stage games. Furthermore, in order to understand how cognitive skills disclosure interacts with different potential payoff allocations, we consider two versions of the BoS, with high and low payoff inequality. In PD, disclosure markedly hampers cooperation, as higher intelligence players trust their partners less when made aware that they play against someone of lower ability than themselves. Similarly, in BoS with low payoff inequality, disclosure disrupts coordination, as higher intelligence players try to force their most preferred outcome. However, in the BoS with high payoff inequality, this pattern of behavior changes substantially. Disclosure does not significantly affect coordination, while coordination is more often on outcomes that favor the less intelligent player. This result may indicate an intention to achieve a fairer division, or that the intelligent player anticipates that the other player will not concede. |
| Keywords: | repeated prisoners dilemma, cooperation, intelligence, IQ |
| JEL: | C73 C91 C92 D83 |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15438&r= |
| By: | Daniel Engler (University of Kassel); Gunnar Gutsche (University of Kassel); Amantia Simixhiu (University of Kassel); Andreas Ziegler (University of Kassel) |
| Abstract: | Based on the well-known observation that social norms can guide individual behavior, this paper empirically examines the causal effect of related information interventions on revealed climate protection activities, measured through incentivized donations. In our field-experimental setting, we differentiate between descriptive social norms by providing information about individual climate protection activities in Germany, injunctive social norms by providing information about what people in Germany think about the need for climate protection activities, and a combination of both social norms. Based on representative survey data for more than 1,600 individuals in Germany, our econometric analysis shows some weak evidence that information about both descriptive and injunctive social norms increases donations for climate protection. The decomposition of this estimated average treatment effects reveals that the corresponding treatment particularly has a significantly positive effect at the extensive margin, i.e. on the probability to donate for climate protection. These results suggest that a combined information intervention referring to both descriptive and injunctive social norms is at least able to stimulate the general willingness for climate protection. In addition, our analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects reveals that strong social preferences (in terms of altruism and trust) and high environmental attitudes (in terms of environmental awareness and ecological policy identification) induce significantly positive information treatment effects on donations for climate protection. This result suggests that individuals in Germany with a strong environmental and social orientation do not only behave directly more climate-friendly, but can also be better stimulated by information about descriptive and/or injunctive social norms. |
| Keywords: | Climate protection activities, descriptive and injunctive social norms, information interventions, heterogeneous treatment effects, framed field experiment |
| JEL: | Q54 D64 D83 D91 C93 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202230&r= |
| By: | Zachary Breig (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia); Allan Hernández-Chanto (School of Economics, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia); Declan Hunt (Reserve Bank of Australia) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally implement security-bid auctions, which are used around the world to sell projects that generate large future cash flows that are stochastic. Buyers make bids with debt and equity, linking payments to the project’s ex-post revenue. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, we find that debt auctions generate more revenue than equity auctions. This is explained by overbidding in debt auctions. Furthermore, we find that second-price equity auctions generate slightly more surplus than other treatments and that noisy bidding has differential effects depending on the format. We also implement informal auctions and find that buyers use equity more often than theory predicts and that sellers successfully choose dominant bids. |
| Keywords: | auctions; experiment; securities; debt; equity; risk preferences |
| JEL: | C70 C90 D44 D47 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qld:uq2004:657&r= |
| By: | Yuta Shimodaira; Kohei Shiozawa; Keigo Inukai |
| Abstract: | The convex time budget (CTB) method is a widely used experimental method for eliciting an individual’s time preference. Researchers adopting the CTB experiment usually assume quasi-hyperbolic discounting utility as a behavioural model and estimate the parameters of the utility function. However, few studies using the CTB method have examined parameter recovery. We conduct simulations and find that the estimation error of the present bias parameter is so large that its effect is difficult to detect. The large error is due to the improper combination of the experimental method and the utility model, and it is not a problem we can deal with after the data collection. This paper suggests the importance of running parameter recovery simulations to audit estimation errors in the experimental design. |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1185&r= |
| By: | Thomas Buser (University of Amsterdam); Roel van Veldhuizen (Lund University); Yang Zhong (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | Many professional and educational settings require individuals to be willing and able to perform under time pressure. We use a lab experiment to elicit preferences for working under time pressure in an incentivized way by eliciting the minimum additional payment participants require to complete a cognitive task under various levels of time pressure versus completing it without pressure. We make three main contributions. First, we document that participants are averse to working under time pressure on aggregate. Second, we show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of time pressure aversion across individuals and that these individual preferences can be partially captured by simple survey questions. Third, we include these questions in a survey of bachelor students and show that time pressure preferences correlate with future career plans. Our results indicate that individual differences in time pressure aversion could be an influential factor in determining labor market outcomes. |
| JEL: | J24 D9 C91 |
| Date: | 2022–08–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220054&r= |
| By: | Abel Brodeur, Nikolai M. Cook, Jonathan S. Hartley, Anthony Heyes |
| Abstract: | Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are increasingly prominent in economics, with pre-registration and pre-analysis plans (PAPs) promoted as important in ensuring the credibility of findings. We investigate whether these tools reduce the extent of p-hacking and publication bias by collecting and studying the universe of test statistics, 15,992 in total, from RCTs published in 15 leading economics journals from 2018 through 2021. In our primary analysis, we find no meaningful difference in the distribution of test statistics from pre-registered studies, compared to their non-pre-registered counterparts. However, pre-registered studies that have a complete PAP are significantly less p-hacked. These results point to the importance of PAPs, rather than pre-registration in itself, in ensuring credibility. |
| Keywords: | Pre-analysis plan, Pre-registration, p-Hacking, Publication bias, Research credibility |
| JEL: | B41 C13 C40 C93 |
| Date: | 2022–08–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wlu:lcerpa:am0132&r= |
| By: | Katharina Brütt (University of Amsterdam); Huaiping Yuan (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | Wage transparency regulation is widely considered and adopted as a tool to reduce the gender wage gap. We combine field and laboratory evidence to address how and when wage transparency can be effective and explore the role of belief adjustments as a mechanism. In the field, this paper studies a German wage transparency policy that allows employees to request wage information of comparable employees. Exploiting variation across firm size and time, we first provide causal evidence that this regulation does not affect the gender wage gap. In an online laboratory experiment, we study whether the failure of this policy hinges on two aspects: (1) the endogenous availability of wage information, and (2) the absence of performance information. Our data underline the importance of both factors. In contrast to endogenously acquired wage information, exogenously provided wage information does increase overall wages. So does the provision of performance information. However, none of these types of information reduce the gender wage gap. Wage information even deters women from entering negotiations. |
| Keywords: | Gender pay gap, Negotiations, Transparency |
| JEL: | J08 J16 J31 C91 |
| Date: | 2022–08–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220055&r= |
| By: | Grebe, Moritz; Tillmann, Peter |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of dissent in the ECB's Governing Council on uncertainty surrounding households' inflation expectations. We conduct a randomized controlled trial using the Bundesbank Online Panel Households. Participants are provided with alternative information treatments concerning the vote in the Council, e.g. unanimity and dissent, and are asked to submit probabilistic inflation expectations. The results show that the vote is informative. Households revise their subjective inflation forecast after receiving information about the vote. Dissenting votes cause a wider individual distribution of future inflation. Hence, dissent increases households' uncertainty about inflation. This effect is statistically significant once we allow for the interaction between the treatments and individual characteristics of respondents. The results are robust with respect to alternative measures of forecast uncertainty and hold for different model specifications. Our findings suggest that providing information about dissenting votes without additional information about the nature of dissent is detrimental to coordinating household expectations. |
| Keywords: | central bank communication,disagreement,inflation expectations,randomized controlled trial,survey |
| JEL: | E52 E43 E32 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:imfswp:169&r= |
| By: | Anujit Chakraborty; Chad W. Kendall |
| Abstract: | Rational agents must perform backwards induction by thinking contingently about future states and actions, but failures of backwards induction and contingent reasoning are ubiquitous. How do boundedly-rational agents make decisions when they fail to correctly forecast actions in the future? We construct an individual decision-making experiment to collect a rich dataset in which subjects must reason only about their own future actions. We demonstrate substantial mistakes relative to the rational benchmark, and use the rich dataset to estimate several possible models of boundedly-rational foresight. We find that a model in which subjects expect to make more mistakes when the payoff consequences of their future actions are more similar best explains behavior. |
| JEL: | D03 D90 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30333&r= |
| By: | Chloe Tergiman (Smeal College of Business - Penn State - Pennsylvania State University - Penn State System); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how individuals adapt the nature of their lies when settings allow for reputation-building. While some lies can be detected ex post by the uninformed party, others remain deniable. We find that traditional market mechanisms such as reputation generate strong changes in the way people lie and lead to strategies in which individuals can maintain plausible deniability: people simply hide their lies better by substituting deniable lies for detectable lies. Our results highlight the limitations of reputation to root out fraud when a Deniable Lie strategy is available. |
| Keywords: | Lying,Deniability,Reputation,Financial Markets,Experiment |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03721456&r= |
| By: | Thomas Meissner; David Albrecht |
| Abstract: | Debt aversion can have severe adverse effects on financial decision-making. We propose a model of debt aversion, and design an experiment involving real debt and saving contracts, to elicit and jointly estimate debt aversion with preferences over time, risk and losses. Structural estimations reveal that the vast majority of participants (89\%) are debt averse, and that this has a strong impact on choice. We estimate the ``debt-premium'' - the compensation a debt averse person would require to accept getting into debt - to be around 16\% of the principal for our average participant. |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2207.07538&r= |
| By: | Michela Chessa; Nobuyuki Hanaki; Aymeric Lardon; Takashi Yamada |
| Abstract: | We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC induces the Shapley value only on average, PC-W does so as a unique equilibrium outcome by introducing an additional bidding stage on top of H-MC. We investigate the effect of this additional bidding stage on the resulting outcomes such as the frequency of grand coalition formation, efficiency, and the distance between the realized allocation and the Shapley value. Our experiment shows that H-MC not only results in significantly greater efficiency than PC-W, but also that the average allocation is closer to the Shapley value for those groups that formed the grand coalition. This difference is because those proposers who won the bidding stage in PC-W tend to offer an allocation that favors themselves more than the randomly chosen proposers in H-MC, and such offers are more likely to be rejected. |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1176r&r= |
| By: | Toshi H. Arimura (Waseda University); Elke D. Groh (University of Kassel); Miwa Nakai (Fukui Prefectural University); Andreas Ziegler (University of Kassel) |
| Abstract: | Based on data for more than 2,400 citizens in Japan, this paper empirically examines the effect of climate-related identity in private and organizational contexts on revealed climate protection activities, measured through incentivized donations. To identify causal effects, we include the concept of priming in our framed field experiment. In line with previous studies, our econometric analysis reveals that environmental attitudes are strongly positively correlated with climate protection activities. However, we cannot confirm causal effects of climate-related attitudes since the private climate-related treatment has no significant effect. In contrast, the organizational climate-related treatment has a significantly positive effect on donations of employed persons for climate protection. This result is especially driven by a significant effect at the intensive margin. It suggests possible spillovers from organizational environmental and climate protection activities on individual climate protection activities so that climate protection in companies, institutions, or other organizations has the potential to increase private climate protection. Our results thus suggest that the stimulation of organizational climate protection activities by climate policy measures such as taxes or subsidies can lead to a double dividend, i.e. to direct climate protection and to climate protection activities of persons who are employed in these organizations. Our empirical analysis also reveals that the estimated effect of the organizational climate-related treatment is particularly strong in the small sub-group of executive officers, managers of firms, and self-employed persons. This result suggests that higher individual responsibility and decision-making authority as well as compe-tences, also in terms of climate-related decisions, lead to stronger causal effects of organizational on private climate protection activities. |
| Keywords: | Climate protection activities, climate-related identity, private and organizational contexts, priming, non-state actors, framed field experiment |
| JEL: | Q54 Q58 D91 C93 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202229&r= |
| By: | Abel Brodeur, Nikolai M. Cook, Anthony Heyes |
| Abstract: | Amazon Mechanical Turk is a very widely-used tool in business and economics research, but how trustworthy are results from well-published studies that use it? Analyzing the universe of hypotheses tested on the platform and published in leading journals between 2010 and 2020 we find evidence of widespread p-hacking, publication bias and over-reliance on results from plausibly under-powered studies. Even ignoring questions arising from the characteristics and behaviors of study recruits, the conduct of the research community itself erodes substantially the credibility of these studies’ conclusions. The extent of the problems vary across the business, economics, management and marketing research fields (with marketing especially afflicted). The problems are not getting better over time and are much more prevalent than in a comparison set of non-online experiments. We explore correlates of increased credibility. |
| Keywords: | online crowd-sourcing platforms, Amazon Mechanical Turk, p-hacking, publication bias, statistical power, research credibility |
| JEL: | B41 C13 C40 C90 |
| Date: | 2022–08–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wlu:lcerpa:am0133&r= |
| By: | Benjamin Enke; Thomas Graeber; Ryan Oprea |
| Abstract: | The influence of behavioral biases on aggregate outcomes like prices and allocations depends in part on self-selection: whether rational people opt more strongly into aggregate interactions than biased individuals. We conduct a series of betting market, auction and committee experiments using 15 classic cognitive bias tasks. We document that some cognitive errors are strongly reduced through self-selection, while others are not affected at all. A large part of this variation is explained by the quality of people's meta-cognition. In some cognitive tasks, confidence and performance are strongly positively correlated, while for others this link is absent or even negative. |
| JEL: | D01 D03 |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30262&r= |
| By: | Jürgen Huber (Institute of Banking and Finance, University of Innsbruck); Sabiou Inoua (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Rudolf Kerschbamer (Institute of Banking and Finance, University of Innsbruck); Christian König-Kersting (Institute of Banking and Finance, University of Innsbruck); Stefan Palan (Institute of Banking and Finance, University of Graz); Vernon L. Smith (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Peer-review is a well-established cornerstone of the scientific process, yet it is not immune to status bias. Merton identified the problem as one in which prominent researchers get disproportionately great credit for their contribution while relatively unknown researchers get disproportionately little credit (Merton, 1968). We measure the extent of this effect in the peer-review process through a pre-registered field experiment. We invite more than 3,300 researchers to review a paper jointly written by a prominent author -- a Nobel laureate -- and by a relatively unknown author -- an early-career research associate --, varying whether reviewers see the prominent author's name, an anonymized version of the paper, or the less well-known author's name. We find strong evidence for the status bias: while only 23 percent recommend “reject†when the prominent researcher is the only author shown, 48 percent do so when the paper is anonymized, and 65 percent do so when the little-known author is the only author shown. Our findings complement and extend earlier results on double-anonymized vs. single-anonymized review (Peters and Ceci, 1982; Blank, 1991; Cox et al., 1993; Okike et al., 2016; Tomkins et al., 2017; Card and Della Vigna, 2020) and strongly suggest that double-anonymization is a minimum requirement for an unbiased review process. |
| Date: | 2022–08–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpsses:2022-01&r= |
| By: | Simon Dato; Eberhard Feess; Petra Nieken |
| Abstract: | In the last decade, forced ranking systems where employees’ bonuses depend on their rank assigned by superiors have become less popular. Whereas the inherently competitive structure of ranking systems provides high effort incentives, it might also increase incentives for misconduct. Previous literature supports this view by demonstrating that, as compared to individual incentive schemes, highly competitive environments are associated with higher degrees of lying and cheating. However, it is not clear if this is driven by stronger financial incentives arising from the high marginal benefit from winning a competition, and/or the behavioral impacts of competition. Psychologically, a competitive environment alters incentives for misconduct via (i) the negative payoff externality that winning imposes on competitors, and (ii) a desire to win, i.e., succeeding in a competition is valuable per se. We design an experiment that allows us to disentangle financial and psychological incentives for misconduct and decompose the behavioral impacts. Our results provide clean evidence of a significant lying-enhancing desire-to-win-effect and an insignificant lying-reducing negative externality effect. |
| Keywords: | private information, lying, contest, competition, cheating |
| JEL: | C90 D82 D91 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9861&r= |
| By: | Othman Boulitama (UH2MC - Université Hassan II [Casablanca]); Karim Sabri (UH2MC - Université Hassan II [Casablanca]); Brahim Sabiri (UH2MC - Université Hassan II [Casablanca]) |
| Abstract: | According to the traditional economic approach, individual decisions are made in a way that reflects their own interests and is rational. Behavioral economics is a branch of economics that integrates economics and psychology in the analysis of human behavior. Indeed, opting for a risky financial choice is not always easy. For this, we seek to know the degree of difficulty related to the level of actions and behaviors of individuals faced with a risky financial choice. We developed an experimental framework in which the subject had to choose between two risky choices during a debt transaction. In addition, we conducted a two-level questionnaire (control and experimental situation) via the computer-assisted diffusion method. Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) with 114 anonymous Moroccan individuals, in which they had to answer risk-free questions (control situation) followed by risky shows (experimental financial situation). The study revealed that the time given by subjects to risk-free questions (M = 3.09 min) was less than that given to risky questions (M = 10.29 min). Similarly, gender impacts the duration of response to risky questions (p |
| Abstract: | Selon l'approche économique traditionnelle, les décisions individuelles sont prises d'une manière qui reflète leurs propres intérêts et qui est rationnelle. L'économie comportementale est une branche de l'économie qui intègre l'économie et la psychologie dans l'analyse du comportement humain. En effet, opter pour un choix financier risqué n'est pas toujours facile. Pour cela, nous souhaitons savoir le degré de difficulté lié au niveau des actions et des comportements des individus face à un choix financier risqué. Nous avons élaboré un cadre expérimental dans lequel le sujet devait choisir entre deux choix risqués lors d'une opération d'endettement. Par ailleurs, nous avons mené un questionnaire à deux niveaux (témoin et situation expérimentale) via la méthode de diffusion assistée par ordinateur Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) auprès de 114 individus marocains anonymes, dans lequel ils devaient répondre sans risque aux questions (situation témoin) suivies par des émissions risquées (situation financière expérimentale). L'étude a révélé que la durée accordée par les sujets aux questions sans risques (M = 3,09 min) est inférieure à celle qui a été accordée aux questions risquées (M = 10,29 min). De même, le genre impact la durée de réponse aux questions risquées (p |
| Keywords: | Financial Behavior,Risk,Loan,Comportement financier,Risque,Prêt |
| Date: | 2022–01–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03699024&r= |
| By: | Engelmann, Dirk (HU Berlin); Janeba, Eckhard (University of Mannheim); Mechtenberg, Lydia (University of Hamburg); Wehrhafter, Nils (Deutsche Bundesbank) |
| Abstract: | Mobility of high-income individuals across borders puts pressure on governments to lower taxes. A central tenet of the corresponding textbook argument is that mobile individuals react to tax differentials through migration, and in turn immobile individuals vote for lower taxes. We investigate to which extent this argument is complete. In particular, political ideology may influence voting on taxes. We vary mobility and foreign taxes in a survey experiment within the German Internet Panel (GIP), with more than 3,000 individuals participating. We find that while the treatment effects qualitatively confirm model predictions how voters take mobility of high-income earners into account when choosing domestic taxes, ideology matters: left-leaning high-income individuals choose higher taxes and emigrate less frequently than right-leaning ones. These findings are in line with the comparative- static predictions of a simple model of inequality aversion when the aversion parameters vary with ideology. |
| Keywords: | taxation; mobility; ideology; survey experiments; |
| JEL: | D72 F22 H21 |
| Date: | 2021–10–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:284&r= |
| By: | Dräger, Lena; Lamla, Michael; Pfajfar, Damjan |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of forward looking communication in an environment of rising inflation rates on German consumers' inflation expectations using a randomized control trial. We show that information about rising inflation increases short- and long-term inflation expectations. This initial increase in expectations can be mitigated using forward looking information about inflation. Among these information treatments, professional forecasters' projections seems to reduce inflation expectations by more than policymaker's characterization of inflation as a temporary phenomenon. |
| Keywords: | short-run and long-run inflation expectations,inflation surge,randomized control trial,survey experiment,persistent or transitory inflation shock |
| JEL: | E31 E52 E58 D84 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:imfswp:168&r= |
| By: | Wayne Aaron Sandholtz |
| Abstract: | Public service reform often entails broad benefits for society and concentrated costs for interest groups. Do the electoral benefits outweigh the costs for politicians who implement reform? This paper examines the electoral effects of a randomized Liberian school reform which increased student learning but antagonized teachers. The policy reduced ruling party vote share by 3 percentage points (10%). It also reduced teachers’ job satisfaction by 0.18s and political involvement by 0.22s. I use the evaluation’s pairwise randomization to show that the effect on vote share was positively correlated with student learning, and negatively correlated with teacher political disengagement. |
| Keywords: | Electoral returns, Policy feedback, Public service delivery, Policy experimentation, Education, Political economy, Elections, Randomized controlled trial, Liberia, Information |
| JEL: | O10 C93 D72 P16 H41 I25 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:novafr:wp2202&r= |