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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Te Bao; Brice Corgnet; Nobuyuki Hanaki; Yohanes E. Riyanto; Jiahua Zhu |
| Abstract: | We investigate how individuals use measures of apparent predictability from price charts to predict future market prices. Subjects in our experiment predict both random walk times series, as in the seminal work by Bloomfield & Hales (2002) (BH), and stock price time series. We successfully replicate the experimental findings in BH that subjects are less trend-chasing when there are more reversals in the first task. We find that subjects also overreact less to the trend when there is less momentum in the stock price in the second task, though the momentum factor that is significant is the autocorrelation instead of the number of reversals per se. Our subjects also appear to use other variables such as amplitude and volatility as measures of predictability. However, as random walk theory predicts, relying on apparent patterns in past data does not improve their prediction accuracy. |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1181&r= |
| By: | Ivan Soraperra; Joël van der Weele; Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Shaul Shalvi |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study the social transmission of "inconvenient" information about the externalities generated by one's own decision. In the laboratory, we pair uninformed decision makers with informed senders. Compared to a setting where subjects can choose their information directly, we find that social interactions increase selfish decisions. On the supply side, senders suppress almost 30 percent of "inconvenient" information, driven by their own preferences for information and their beliefs about the decision maker's preferences. On the demand side, about one-third of decision makers avoids senders who transmit inconvenient information ("shooting the messenger"), which leads to assortative matching between information-suppressing senders and information-avoiding decision makers. Having more control over information generates opposing effects on behavior: selfish decision makers remain ignorant more often and donate less, while altruistic decision makers seek out informative senders and give more. We discuss applications to information sharing in social networks and to organizational design. |
| Keywords: | Social interactions,information avoidance,assortative matching,ethical behavior |
| Date: | 2022–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03725590&r= |
| By: | Nasim, Sanval (LUMS); Stegmann, Andreas (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a field experiment to study whether concerns to preserve an anti-liberal self-image affect low cost, private school owners' willingness to explore a collaboration with a liberal Pakistani NGO. While explicitly revealing the NGO's liberal motivation to school owners has a significant impact on beliefs about the NGO's objectives, on average, we find only limited evidence that treated school owners are less willing to explore a collaboration with our partner NGO. However, heterogeneous treatment effects suggest that differences in political identity cause negative reactions among the minority of school owners expressing conservative beliefs during a seemingly unrelated follow-up survey. |
| Keywords: | Aid efficacy ; political identity JEL Classification: O20 ; P16 ; D03 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1415&r= |
| By: | Thijs Brouwer (Department of economics, Tilburg University - Tilburg University [Netherlands]); Fabio Galeotti; Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We examine the educative role played by parents in social norm transmission. Using a field experiment, we study whether parents enforce and comply more with norms when their children are present compared to when they are not. We compare similar parents when or after they bring or pick up their children at school. We find that parents accompanying children, in contrast to parents alone, are more likely to punish norm violators and to provide help to strangers when there is no violation. They also tend to substitute more direct punishment with withholding help as a means of indirect punishment. |
| Keywords: | Field Experiment,Social Norms,Transmission,Parenting |
| Date: | 2022–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03725575&r= |
| By: | Davies, Clem; Franke, Marcel; Kuang, Lida; Neumärker, Karl Justus Bernhard |
| Abstract: | Homann's method is a sophisticated theoretical model. As a result, it contains a normative foundation upon which Homann bases his endeavor, as well as numerous conclusions following his positive analysis. We propose extensions to both the normative and positive aspects of Homann's theory in this article. On a normative basis, we recommend taking into account our approach of New Ordoliberalism. In addition to the prisoner's dilemma, we consider the moral dilemma of the hawk-dove game on a positive footing. Additionally, we also present an experimental design. |
| Keywords: | constitutional economics,game theory,New Ordoliberalism,social contract experiment,strategy-proofness,renegotiation-proofness,Ordnungsökonomie,Spieltheorie,Neuer Ordoliberalismus,Sozialvertragsexperiment,Manipulationssicherheit,Nachverhandlungsstabilität |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cenwps:012022&r= |
| By: | Ijaz, Arusha; Yu, Jisang; Schwab, Benjamin |
| Keywords: | Research Methods/Statistical Methods, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Marketing |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea22:322336&r= |
| By: | Jones, Sam (UNU-WIDER); Sen, Kunal (University of Manchester) |
| Abstract: | Can digital labour market platforms reduce search frictions in formal or informal labour markets? We study this question using a randomized experiment embedded in a tracer study of the work transitions of graduates from technical and vocational colleges in Mozambique. We implement an encouragement design, inviting graduates by SMS to join established digital platforms: Biscate, a site to find freelancers for informal manual tasks; and Emprego, a conventional formal jobs website. In contrast to positive estimates of the contribution of both platforms to job outcomes from naïve (per-treatment) estimates, both intent-to-treat and complier average treatment effects are consistently zero in the full sample, while the impact on life satisfaction is negative. However, use of the informal jobs platform leads to better work outcomes for women, especially those with manual qualifications, for whom earnings rise by over 50%. |
| Keywords: | digital labour platforms, search frictions, technical and vocational education, unemployment, Mozambique |
| JEL: | J64 J68 O15 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15409&r= |
| By: | Reich, Charlotte-Elena; Musshoff, Oliver |
| Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Agricultural Finance |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea22:322371&r= |
| By: | Erica M. Field; Natalia Rigol; Charity M. Troyer Moore; Rohini Pande; Simone G. Schaner |
| Abstract: | Do information frictions limit the benefits of financial inclusion drives for the rural poor? We evaluate an experimental intervention among recently banked poor Indian women receiving government cash transfers via direct deposit. Treated women were provided automated voice calls confirming details of transactions posted to their accounts. The intervention increased women's knowledge of account balances and trust in their local banking agent. Indicative of improved consumption-smoothing by income-constrained women, administrative data show that treated women accessed government transfers faster when the service was active, with treatment effects dissipating after the notifications were discontinued. On average, other aspects of account use remained unchanged. However, consistent with account information benefiting those with high transaction costs more, the intervention increased account use among women who lived more than an hour from the kiosk. |
| JEL: | G21 O12 |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30289&r= |
| By: | Qianjun Lyu; Wing Suen |
| Abstract: | An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent preferences that will determine the sender's optimal experiment, and give sufficient conditions for information design to be valuable or not under different payoff structures. These conditions depend more on marginal incentives -- how payoffs vary with the state -- than on the alignment of sender's and receiver's rankings over actions within a state. |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2207.04929&r= |
| By: | Alejandro Hirmas (University of Amsterdam); Jan Engelmann (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | Does attention have a causal impact on risky decisions? We address this question in a preregistered experiment in which participants accept or reject a series of mixed gambles while exogenously varying how information can be sampled. Specifically, in each trial participants observe the outcomes of a mixed-gamble with gains and losses presented sequentially. To isolate the causal role of attention on the decision process, we manipulate for how long each outcome is presented before showing the next one. Our results partially confirm our preregistered hypotheses that longer exposure to an outcome increases its weight on the decision. We find specific effects in the domain of losses, but not gains. A longer presentation duration of losses leads to increased sensitivity for losses, such that lotteries with higher losses are rejected more often when losses are presented for longer. To our surprise, when gains are presented for longer, the participants show increased sensitivity to both gain and loss values in their decision. Further analyses show that specifically participants with higher impulsiveness become more sensitive to outcome values when gains are presented for longer. Attentional impulsiveness is the strongest driver of this effect. Jointly, these results support the notion that attention has a causal impact on risky choice. Moreover, our results underline the moderating role of impulsiveness on the relationship between attention and choice. |
| Keywords: | Attention, Impulsiveness, Loss Aversion, Random Utility Models |
| JEL: | D91 D81 D83 D87 |
| Date: | 2022–07–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220046&r= |
| By: | Loïck Simon; Philippe Rauffet; Clément Guérin; Cédric Seguin |
| Abstract: | Human-machine cooperation is more and more present in the industry. Machines will be sources of proposal by giving human propositions and advice. Humans will need to make a decision (comply, i.e., agree, or not) with those propositions. Compliance can be seen as an objective trust and experiments results unclear about the role of risk in this compliance. We wanted to understand how transparency on reliability, risk or those two in addition will impact this compliance with machine propositions. With the use of an AI for predictive maintenance, we asked participants to make a decision about a proposition of replanification. Preliminary results show that transparency on risk and total transparency are linked with less compliance with the AI. We can see that risk transparency has more effect on creating an appropriate trust than reliability transparency. As we see, and in agreement with recent studies, there is a need to understand at a finer level the impact of transparency on human-machines interaction |
| Keywords: | Transparency,Human-machine interaction,Compliance,Trust |
| Date: | 2022–07–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03536524&r= |
| By: | Sarasty, Oscar; Amin, Modhurima |
| Keywords: | Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Health Economics and Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea22:322237&r= |
| By: | Susan Athey; Kristen Grabarz; Michael Luca; Nils C. Wernerfelt |
| Abstract: | During the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, a common strategy for public health organizations around the world has been to launch interventions via advertising campaigns on social media. Despite this ubiquity, little has been known about their average effectiveness. We conduct a large-scale program evaluation of campaigns from 174 public health organizations on Facebook and Instagram that collectively reached 2.1 billion individuals and cost around $40 million. We report the results of 819 randomized experiments that measured the impact of these campaigns across standardized, survey-based outcomes. We find on average these campaigns are effective at influencing self-reported beliefs, shifting opinions close to 1% at baseline with a cost per influenced person of about $3.41. There is further evidence that campaigns are especially effective at influencing users’ knowledge of how to get vaccines. Our results represent, to the best of our knowledge, the largest set of online public health interventions analyzed to date. |
| JEL: | D0 I0 M0 |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30273&r= |
| By: | Luigi Butera; Philip J Grossman; Daniel Houser; John A List; Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social sciences, arguing that a component of Fischer (1935)'s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. The importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, but researchers and journals' incentives are not sufficient to encourage replications. We analyze a novel, decentralized approach promoting replications through beneficial gains between scholars and editors. We highlight the trade-offs involved in seeking independent replications before submission to journals, and demonstrate the operation of this method via an investigation of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on cooperation in public goods games, a pervasive feature but largely unexplored in the literature. |
| Keywords: | Replication,science,public goods,uncertainty |
| Date: | 2022–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03725592&r= |
| By: | Ridolfo, Heather; Biagas, David Jr.; Abayomi, Emilola J.; Rodhouse, Joseph |
| Abstract: | In 2016, cognitive testing of the Agricultural Labor Survey’s computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) script detected a number of issues with the questions used to categorize workers. As a result, revisions were made to the CATI script and a field test was conducted to compare performance of the revised script to the original CATI script. Behavior coding was also performed on a subset of interviews conducted using the original and revised versions of the survey. The goal of the behavior coding was to evaluate interviewer behavior across the two versions of the survey. Results of the behavior coding showed that neither of the instruments were administered appropriately at an acceptable rate. However, questions designed to categorize agricultural workers into major categories and subcategories were administered as worded more often when interviewers used the revised instrument. |
| Keywords: | Labor and Human Capital, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:unasrr:322827&r= |
| By: | Weingarten, Nina; Lagerkvist, Carl Johan |
| Keywords: | Marketing, Research Methods/Statistical Methods, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea22:322280&r= |
| By: | Anujit Chakraborty; Guidon Fenig (Department of Economics, University of California Davis) |
| Abstract: | What kind of incentives optimize a worker's motivation and performance, especially in remote work settings? We recruit online workers to work for up to 45 minutes on tedious tasks over three days. We randomly assign them to individualistic (Solo) or one of two team incentives. Under our Cooperative team incentive, workers equally share the team's earnings. Under our Competitive team incentive, the best performer gets an additional bonus proportional to the team's total productivity. We find that workers under the Cooperative team incentives are most likely to participate on all three days, exhaust all 45 minutes of work, and complete more tasks. Workers under Competitive team incentives also outperform the Solo workers, but the effect is insignificant. When workers can additionally observe their team member's effort from previous days (observability condition), they increase their own effort in response to their partner's high effort. This escalation effect is strongest under Competitive incentives, and under the observability condition, both team incentives outperform the individualistic incentive. |
| JEL: | C9 C72 C92 D9 |
| Date: | 2022–08–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cda:wpaper:350&r= |