|
on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2022‒05‒30
nineteen papers chosen by |
| By: | Lauber, Arne; March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco |
| Abstract: | We report results from the first experimental study of round-robin tournaments. In our experiment, we investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fairness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize equal to either 0%, 50%, or 100% of the first prize. While theory predicts the 50%-treatment to be most intense, we find that aggregate effort is highest in the 0%-treatment. In contrast, our evidence supports the predictions that the 50%-treatment is fairest (though not perfectly fair), whereas the late mover is advantaged in the 100%-treatment and disadvantaged in the 0%-treatment. Also in line with the theory, we identify a strategic (reverse) momentum: after winning the first match, a player increases (decreases) effort in the second match of the 0%-treatment (100%-treatment). Additional findings suggest that dynamic behavior is also subject to a psychological momentum. |
| Keywords: | Sequential Round-Robin Tournament,All-pay Auction,Fairness,Intensity,Strategic Momentum,Experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 Z20 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bamber:176&r= |
| By: | Uri Gneezy; Moshe Hoffman; Mark A. Lane; John List; Jeffrey Livingston; Michael J. Seiler |
| Abstract: | Recent theoretical work shows that the better-than-average effect, where a majority believes their ability to be better than average, can be perfectly consistent with Bayesian updating. However, later experiments that account for this theoretical advance still find behavior consistent with overconfidence. The literature notes that overoptimism can be caused by either overconfidence (optimism about performance), wishful thinking (optimism about outcomes), or both. To test whether the better-than-average effect might be explained by wishful thinking instead of overconfidence, we conduct an experiment that is similar to those used in the overconfidence literature, but removes performance as a potential channel. We find evidence that wishful thinking might explain overconfidence only among the most optimistic subjects, and that conservatism is possibly more of a worry; if unaccounted for, overconfidence might be underestimated. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00753&r= |
| By: | Yiting Guo (Economics & Management School, Wuhan University); Jason Shachat (Durham University); Matthew J. Walker (Newcastle University Business School); Lijia Wei (Wuhan University) |
| Abstract: | Recent technological advances enable the implementation of online, field and hybrid experiments using mobile devices. Mobile devices enable sampling of incentivized decisions in more representative samples, consequently increasing the generalizability of results. Generalizability might be compromised, however, if the device is a relevant behavioural confound. This paper reports on a battery of common economic games and decision-making tasks in which we systematically randomize the decision-making device (computer versus mobile phone) and the laboratory setup (physical versus online). The results offer broad support for conducting decision experiments using mobile devices. For six out of eight tasks, we find robust null results in terms of average treatment effects and variability. This should give researchers confidence to conduct studies out-of-laboratory via mobile phones. However, we find two caveats. First, with respect to decisions, subjects using a mobile phone are significantly more risk averse and offer less during bargaining. Second, decision response times and the time taken to read instructions are significantly shorter for the online-mobile treatment. These caveats suggest the importance of ensuring device consistency across treatments in the digital age of experimentation. |
| Keywords: | mobile phone, digitization, methodology, experiment, generalizability |
| JEL: | C90 C93 C70 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:22-05&r= |
| By: | P. Battiston; L. Chollete; S. Harrison |
| Abstract: | Evidence in the applied literature indicates that policies intended to stimulate positive externalities via coercion can backfire. For example, Davis (2008) finds that when in 1989, the government of Mexico City tried to control air pollution by banning most drivers from driving their vehicle one weekday per week, many drivers bought another, used, high emissions car, which ended up worsening pollution. In order to test for such effects, we run a repeated public goods experiment where subjects are randomly forced to contribute. All group members are informed about forcing after it happens. We find that when random forcing is present, intended contributions are significantly larger in absolute terms. Moreover, contributions decrease significantly after being forced to contribute, and tend to increase after another group member is forced to contribute. Hence, our results indicate that forcing mechanisms have indirect effects that must be taken into account when assessing the overall impact of policies aimed at stimulating positive externalities. |
| Keywords: | unintended consequences, public good game, laboratory experiment, reciprocity |
| JEL: | C92 D04 H41 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:par:dipeco:2022-ep01&r= |
| By: | Andrej Woerner; Giorgia Romagnoli; Birgit M. Probst; Nina Bartmann; Jonathan N. Cloughesy; Jan Willem Lindemans |
| Abstract: | This paper theoretically and empirically investigates the effects of letting people choose from a menu of increasingly challenging incentive schemes. We derive the conditions under which a policy maker profits from leaving the choice to the individuals by leveraging their private information about the expected benefits from the targeted behavior. We test the theoretical predictions in a field experiment in which we pay participants monetary rewards for completing daily meditation sessions. We randomly assign some participants to one of two incentive schemes and allow others to choose between the two schemes. As predicted, participants sort into schemes in (partial) agreement with the objectives of the policy maker. In contrast to our theoretical predictions, participants who could choose complete significantly fewer meditation sessions than participants that were randomly assigned. Since the results are not driven by poor selection, we infer that letting people choose between incentive schemes may bring in psychological effects that discourage adherence. |
| Keywords: | monetary incentives, dynamic incentives, field experiment, mental health |
| JEL: | C90 D03 D80 I10 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9494&r= |
| By: | Krieger, Tim; Meemann, Christine; Traub, Stefan |
| Abstract: | In most OECD countries, pension reform policy has decreased the level of intragenerational redistribution over the last three decades, that is, redistribution among members of the same generation with high and low pension entitlements. This trend has occurred despite heterogeneity in life expectancy linked to socioeconomic status having a regressive impact on outcomes. This paper contributes to solving this puzzle by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We study the causal relationship between inequality of entitlements, mortality risk, and the size of redistribution in a stylized social security system. We find that mortality risk, when negatively correlated with entitlements, significantly lowers subjects' willingness to redistribute payoffs from high-entitlement to low-entitlement subjects. We explain this finding with efficiency preferences and an alienation effect. The alienation effect is the tendency to attach a lower social weight to the short-lived poor. |
| Keywords: | Inequality,Life Expectancy,Risk,Redistribution,Pension Reform,Efficiency Preferences,Alienation Effect,Experiment |
| JEL: | D63 D81 H55 I14 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wgspdp:202202&r= |
| By: | Jérôme Hergueux (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Stéphane Luchini (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jason Shogren (UW - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Public good games are at the core of many environmental challenges. In such social dilemmas, a large share of people endorse the norm of reciprocity. A growing literature complements this finding with the observation that many players exhibit a self-serving bias in reciprocation: "weak reciprocators" increase their contributions as a function of the effort level of the other players, but less than proportionally. In this paper, we build upon a growing literature on truth-telling to argue that weak reciprocity might be best conceived not as a preference, but rather as a symptom of an internal trade-off at the player level between (i) the truthful revelation of their private reciprocal preference, and (ii) the economic incentives they face (which foster free-riding). In truth-telling experiments, many players misrepresent private information when this is to their material benefit, but to a significantly lesser extent than what would be expected based on the profit-maximizing strategy. We apply this behavioral insight to strategic situations, and test whether the preference revelation properties of the classic voluntary contribution game can be improved by offering players the possibility to sign a classic truth-telling oath. Our results suggest that the honesty oath helps increase cooperation (by 33% in our experiment). Subjects under oath contribute in a way which is more consistent with (i) the contribution they expect from the other players and (ii) their normative views about the right contribution level. As a result, the distribution of social types elicited under oath differs from the one observed in the baseline: some free-riders, and many weak reciprocators, now behave as pure reciprocators. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation,Reciprocity,Social preferences,Public goods,Truth-telling oath |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-03666626&r= |
| By: | Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hehenkamp, Burkhard; Kokot, Johanna |
| Abstract: | We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both, their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients' responsiveness to quality is decisive. |
| Keywords: | physician competition,patient characteristics,heterogeneity in quality responses,fee-for-service,laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | I11 D43 C91 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hcherp:202227&r= |
| By: | Christopher Blattman (Department of Political Science, University of Chicago); Sebastian Chaskel (Instiglio); Julian C. Jamison (Department of Economics, University of Exeter); Margaret Sheridan (Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina) |
| Abstract: | In most societies, a small number of people commit most of the serious crimes and violence. Short-term studies have shown that cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) can reduce such antisocial behaviors. There are some signs that these behavior changes may be temporary, however, especially from therapy on its own. This is unsettled, however, for there has been little randomized and long-term research on the question. We follow 999 high-risk men in Liberia 10 years after randomization into one of four arms: 8 weeks of a low-cost therapy; a $200 cash grant; both therapy and cash; or a control group. Together, the two interventions cost just $530 to deliver. We find that, a decade later, both therapy alone and therapy with economic assistance produce dramatic reductions in antisocial behaviors. Reported drug-selling and participation in thefts and robberies, for example, fall by about half. These impacts are greatest among the very highest-risk men. The effects of therapy alone, however, are somewhat smaller and more fragile. The effects of therapy plus economic assistance are more sustained and precise. Since the cash did not increase earnings for more than a few months after the grants, we hypothesize that the grant, and those few months of legitimate business activity, reinforced the learning-by-doing and habit formation embodied in CBT. Overall, the results suggest that highly-targeted CBT plus economic assistance could be an inexpensive and effective way to prevent violence, especially when policymakers are searching for alternatives to aggressive policing and incarceration. |
| Keywords: | cognitive behavior therapy, cash transfers, crime, violence, mental health, Africa, field experiments |
| JEL: | K42 O15 O17 D83 |
| Date: | 2022–05–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exe:wpaper:2203&r= |
| By: | Sönke Ehret; Sara M. Constantino; Elke U. Weber; Charles Efferson; Sonja Vogt |
| Abstract: | Social tipping can accelerate beneficial changes in behaviour in diverse domains from equality and social justice to climate change. Hypothetically, however, group identities might undermine tipping in ways policy makers do not anticipate. To examine this, we implemented an experiment around the 2020 U.S. elections. Participants faced consistent incentives to coordinate their choices. Once participants had established a coordination norm, an intervention created pressure to tip to a new norm. Our control treatment used neutral labels for choices. Our identity treatment used partisan political images. This simple payoff-irrelevant relabelling generated extreme differences. Control groups developed norms slowly before intervention but transitioned to new norms rapidly after intervention. Identity groups developed norms rapidly before intervention but persisted in a state of costly disagreement after intervention. Tipping was powerful but fragile. It supported striking cultural changes when choices and identity were unlinked, but even a trivial link destroyed tipping entirely. |
| Keywords: | social tipping, cultural evolution, behaviour change, coordination |
| JEL: | Z10 Z13 Z18 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9737&r= |
| By: | Ahmed, Akhter; Coleman, Fiona; Ghostlaw, Julie; Hoddinott, John F.; Menon, Purnima; Parvin, Aklima; Pereira, Audrey; Quisumbing, Agnes R.; Roy, Shalini; Younus, Masuma |
| Abstract: | A growing body of evidence indicates that agricultural development programs can potentially improve production diversity and diet quality of poor rural households; however, less is known about which aspects of program design are effective in diverse contexts and feasible to implement at scale. We address this issue through an evaluation of the Agriculture, Gender, and Nutrition Linkages (ANGeL) project. ANGeL is a randomized controlled trial testing what combination of trainings focused on agricultural production, nutrition behavior change communication, and gender sensitization were most effective in improving production diversity and diet quality among rural farm households in Bangladesh. We find that trainings focused on agriculture improved production diversity in terms of greater production of fruits and vegetables grown on the homestead, eggs, dairy, and fish; adding trainings on nutrition and gender did not significantly change these impacts. Trainings focused on both agriculture and nutrition showed the largest impacts on diet quality, with evidence indicating that households in this arm also significantly increased consumption out of homestead production for fruits and vegetables, eggs, dairy, and fish. Findings indicate that agricultural training that promotes production of diverse, high-value, nutrient-rich foods can increase production diversity, and this can improve diet quality, but diet quality impacts are larger when agricultural training is combined with nutrition training. Relative to treatments combining agriculture and nutrition training, we find no significant impact of adding the gender sensitization on our measures of production diversity or diet quality. |
| Keywords: | BANGLADESH; SOUTH ASIA; ASIA; production; diversification; diet; agriculture; gender; nutrition; agricultural production; dietary diversity; nutrition-sensitive agriculture; randomized controlled trials; diet quality |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:2112&r= |
| By: | Miwa Nakai (Fukui Prefectural University); Victor von Loessl (University of Kassel); Heike Wetzel (University of Kassel) |
| Abstract: | We evaluate a stated choice experiment on dynamic electricity tariffs based on two representative household surveys from Germany and Japan. Our results indicate significant differences between German and Japanese respondents’ preferences towards dynamic tariffs, with the latter generally being more open to dynamic pricing. Furthermore, our unique experimental design allows to disentangle preferences for inter- and intraday price changes, which are two essential tariff characteristics. In this respect, our results suggest that households need significant compensation in order to accept frequently changing price patters. In contrast, they are mostly indifferent with respect to the number of price changes per day. Besides the implementation of an environmental treatment message, we additionally investigate tariff characteristics, which aim at overcoming household acceptance barriers. To this end, a restrictive use of households’ consumption data, price caps, as well as highlighting the environmental benefits associated to dynamic tariffs present themselves as suitable tools to reduce households’ aversions against dynamic electricity tariffs. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic electricity tariffs, Stated choice experiment, Household acceptance barriers, Tariff design |
| JEL: | C35 D12 Q41 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202213&r= |
| By: | Stephanie A. Heger; Robert Slonim |
| Abstract: | Guided by Bem’s (1972) self-perception theory, we design an experiment to ask whether morally-motivated behaviour, e.g., charitable giving, is history-dependent. Using a popular policy nudge, the default option, we exogenously vary altruism “now” and show that giving “now” causes a 66%- 200% increase in the probability of giving “later”; that is, altruism begets altruism. We further show that, consistent with self-perception theory, the choice to behave altruistically “now”, rather than the nudge itself, is the crucial element in the causal relationship. These findings are consistent with a model of positive path-dependence, which we interpret as moral consistency. |
| Keywords: | altruism, nudge, moral consistency |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9522&r= |
| By: | Banerjee, Sanchayan; Galizzi, Matteo M.; John, Peter; Mourato, Susana |
| Abstract: | Nudges have been increasingly deployed to deliver climate policies in the last decade. Recent evidence shows nudges are hard to scale–up. So can we use nudges more effectively, or should we rely on other tools of behaviour change? We argue that reflective strategies can enhance nudges by encouraging agency and ownership in citizens. We test this by systematically comparing nudges to reflective interventions like thinks, boosts, and nudge+ over orders of low-carbon meals using an online experiment with 3,074 participants in the United Kingdom. We find all behavioural interventions increase intentions for climate-friendly diets, but encouraging reflection prior to nudging (“nudge+”) strengthens these treatment effects. There is no evidence of negative behavioural spillovers as measured by participants’ donations to pro-social charities. There is potential for reflective policies in promoting climate citizenship. |
| Keywords: | nudge; think; boost; nudge+; climate-friendly diets; climate citizenship; Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science; Department of Political Economy; Department of Geography and Environment |
| JEL: | C90 D91 I12 Q18 Q58 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:115032&r= |
| By: | Aparajita Dasgupta (Ashoka University); Ashokankur Datta (Shiv Nadar University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we examine how traditional institutions like caste interact with socioeconomic status to mediate the perception of gender roles and attitudes around female labour force participation. We use third party vignettes to directly test the validity of the hypothesis that lower castes have more egalitarian gender norms and lower acceptance of restrictions on female autonomy. We find that the relationship between conservative gender norms and caste are in turn influenced by the class status of households, measured by land or asset ownership. Lastly, we conduct a simple social experiment to test for ‘pluralistic ignorance’ and confirm the presence of systematic overestimation of conservative attitude that varies by caste and class identities. |
| Date: | 2022–04–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ash:wpaper:80&r= |
| By: | Mohamed Didi Alaoui (UCA - Université Côte d'Azur, IAE Nice - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Nice - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) - COMUE UCA - COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur, GRM - Groupe de Recherche en Management - EA 4711 - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) - COMUE UCA - COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019) - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur); Pierre Valette-Florence (UGA INP IAE - Grenoble Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes); Véronique Cova (AMU IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Aix-en-Provence - AMU - Aix Marseille Université) |
| Abstract: | Psychological distance is pervasive in consumers' minds and affects their hedonic consumption patterns. However, the literature regarding the effects of psychological distance on hedonic consumption is inconsistent. Three experiments demonstrate that the need to justify is an important moderator. Experiments 1 and 2 show that when the need to justify is not salient, psychological distance negatively impacts hedonic consumption. However, when the need to justify is salient, the effect of psychological distance disappears statistically. Experiment 3 shows that when the need to justify is not salient, the effect of psychological distance on hedonic consumption is explained by two conflicting mechanisms (i.e., positive emotional intensity and the difficulty in justifying) which respectively represent the indirect negative and positive effect. Nevertheless, when the need to justify is salient, the effect of psychological distance can only be explained by the difficulty in justifying the hedonic option, resulting in an indirect positive effect. |
| Keywords: | psychological distance,construal level theory,cognitive-experiential self-theory,hedonic consumption,need to justify |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03627681&r= |
| By: | Angino, Siria; Secola, Stefania |
| Abstract: | Political science research has established that trust in institutions, including central banks, is shaped by socio-economic and demographic factors, as well as by the assessment of institutional features and by slow-moving components such as culture. However, the role of cognitive processes has largely been neglected, especially in the analysis of central bank trust. In this paper we aim to address this gap focusing on the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). We introduce the concepts of “instinctive trust”, which captures an on-the-spot judgement on the institution’s trustworthiness, and of “reflective trust”, which refers to a more pondered opinion on the matter. Using a survey experiment, we find that deeper consideration about the ECB promotes less trust in the institution compared to an on-the-spot judgement. This result is mainly driven by women, and in particular by those who say they possess a low understanding of the central bank’s policies. JEL Classification: C83, D83, E58, Z13 |
| Keywords: | central bank, Institutional trust, survey experiment |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20222660&r= |
| By: | Arnaud Tognetti (EM - emlyon business school, Karolinska Institutet [Stockholm], IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse); Valérie Durand (UMR ISEM - Institut des Sciences de l'Evolution de Montpellier - EPHE - École pratique des hautes études - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UM - Université de Montpellier - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Institut de recherche pour le développement [IRD] : UR226); Dimitri Dubois (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro); Melissa Barkat-Defradas (UMR ISEM - Institut des Sciences de l'Evolution de Montpellier - EPHE - École pratique des hautes études - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UM - Université de Montpellier - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Institut de recherche pour le développement [IRD] : UR226); Astrid Hopfensitz (EM - emlyon business school, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Camille Ferdenzi (CRNL - Centre de recherche en neurosciences de Lyon - Lyon Neuroscience Research Center - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon) |
| Abstract: | Several physical features influence the perception of how cooperative a potential partner is. While previous work focused on face and voice, it remains unknown whether body odours influence judgements of cooperativeness and if odour-based judgements are accurate. Here, we first collected axillary odours of cooperative and uncooperative male donors through a public good game and used them as olfactory stimuli in a series of tasks examining whether and how they influence cooperative decision-making in an incentivized economic game and ratings of cooperativeness. Our results show that having access to the donor's body odours provided a strategic advantage to women during economic decisions (but not to men): with age, women were more likely to cooperate with cooperative men and to avoid interacting with uncooperative men. Ratings of cooperativeness were nonetheless unrelated to the donors' actual cooperativeness. Finally, while men with masculine and intense body odours were judged less cooperative, we found no evidence that donors' actual cooperativeness was associated with less masculine or less intense body odour. Overall, our findings suggest that, as faces and voices, body odours influence perceived cooperativeness and might be used accurately and in a non-aware manner as olfactory cues of cooperativeness, at least by women. |
| Keywords: | body odours,chemosensory cues,economic games,partner choice |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03654936&r= |
| By: | Eugen Dimant (University of Pennsylvania, CESifo, Munich); Shaul Shalvi (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | Achieving successful behavior change via nudging is hard. This is particularly true when choice architects attempt to change behavior that is collectively harmful but individually beneficial. In this paper, we review the state-of-the-art of the behavior change literature to assess both robust evidence on the motives for lying and promising interventions to curb lying. Existing literature points to combining simple behavioral interventions (e.g., norm-nudging) with interventions that contain pecuniary consequences (e.g., norm enforcement via punishment). In this context, we also discuss the idea of `meta-nudging': rather than pursuing the classical approach to nudge targeted behavior directly, one may instead want to nudge behavior indirectly by targeting those who are in positions of power and have the ability to enforce norm adherence of others. Research suggests that delegating the enforcement of norm prescriptions can be a promising approach to nudge honesty. |
| Keywords: | Behavior Change, Honesty, Lying, Nudging |
| JEL: | C9 D01 D9 |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:163&r= |