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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Mickael Beaud (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Mathieu Lefebvre (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Julie Rosaz (CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether and how an individual giving decision is affected in risky environments in which the recipient's wealth is random. We demonstrate that, under risk neutrality, the donation of dictators with a purely ex post view of fairness should, in general, be affected by the riskiness of the recipient's payoff, while dictators with a purely ex ante view should not be. Furthermore, we observe that some influential inequality aversion preferences functions yield opposite predictions when we consider ex post view of fairness. Hence, we report on dictator games laboratory experiments in which the recipient's wealth is exposed to an actuarially neutral and additive background risk. Our experimental data show no statistically significant impact of the recipient's risk exposure on dictators' giving decisions. This result appears robust to both the experimental design (within subjects or between subjects) and the origin of the recipient's risk exposure (chosen by the recipient or imposed on the recipient). Although we cannot sharply validate or invalidate alternative fairness theories, the whole pattern of our experimental data can be simply explained by assuming ex ante view of fairness and risk neutrality. |
| Keywords: | Laboratory experiments,Dictator games,Background risk |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03559598&r= |
| By: | Daniel L. Dench; Theodore J. Joyce |
| Abstract: | The rapid increase in online instruction in higher education has heightened concerns about cheating. We use a randomized control design to test whether informing students that we can detect plagiarism reduces cheating. We further test whether informing students they have been caught cheating reduces subsequent cheating. We find informing students about our capability to detect plagiarism has little effect on cheating. Notifying students that they have been caught cheating and are on a watch list reduces subsequent cheating attempts by at least 65 percent depending on the class and sample. We test for peer effects but conclude we cannot credibly identify peer effects distinct from own-cheating propensities. |
| JEL: | I23 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29755&r= |
| By: | Kodjo Aflagah (University of Maryland [College Park] - University of Maryland System); Tanguy Bernard (BSE - Bordeaux Sciences Economiques - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Angelino Viceisza (Spelman College) |
| Abstract: | Most developing-country farms are small and engage in cooperative agriculture. Prior literature has argued that mechanisms aimed at facilitating smallholder coordination such as cooperatives are central to stimulating market participation. At the same time, cooperatives have not always been able to engage in collective action. In this paper, we conduct neutrally framed coordination games and a natural field experiment to test the effect of cheap talk among members of groundnut-producing cooperatives in Senegal. In both experiments, we ask farmers how much they intend to contribute to the group prior to them actually doing so and then, confidentially reveal aggregate intentions to other cooperative members. Based on survey and administrative data, we find that (1) revealing farmers' intentions improves collective commercialization and this effect increases with group size and (2) learning in the lab transfers to behavior in the day-to-day environment. Implications for policy and future work are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Cooperatives,Collective commercialization,Coordination,Cheap talk,Field experiments,Development |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03564999&r= |
| By: | Giuseppe De Arcangelis (Sapienza University of Rome); Dean Yang (University of Michigan) |
| Abstract: | We conducted a randomized experiment of the impact of remittance labeling among Filipino migrant workers in the UAE. The ability to label remittances with the migrantÕs intended uses leads migrants with low levels of baseline (pre-treatment) remittances to increase their remittance levels. There is no effect of labeling for migrants with initially higher remittance levels. We also examined impacts of remittance labeling on household expenditures in treated migrantsÕ remittance-recipient households in the Philippines. The labeling treatment does not lead to higher expenditures on uses that migrants report as priority items (in the full sample or in subsamples split by baseline remittances). There is only weak or mixed evidence that labeling leads to actual changes in household expenditures towards the purposes preferred by migrants. |
| Keywords: | RCT, Philippines, remittances |
| JEL: | F24 O15 D19 C9 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mie:wpaper:684&r= |
| By: | Ryo Takahashi (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishiwaseda Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan.) |
| Abstract: | This study empirically examines gender differences in tolerance for opinions and identifies how social norms for gender equality mitigate gender differences in tolerance for women’s opinions by conducting online randomized experiments in Japan. In this experiment, we asked the participants to evaluate the agreement score for ten anonymous statements and implemented two types of random interventions: disclosing the gender of the statement poster and providing information on social norms for gender equality. The results of both cross-sectional and panel data analyses showed that people significantly reduced the agreement score for women’s opinions compared to men’s and non-gender-disclosure opinions. Meanwhile, the negative impact of female gender disclosure was neutralized when participants were provided with information on gender norms. These results suggest that people are likely to be less tolerant of women’s opinions in general, while such gender differences are mitigated through social norms. |
| Keywords: | Social norms, gender bias, online randomized experiment, Japan |
| JEL: | C91 J16 D91 C99 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wap:wpaper:2123&r= |
| By: | Silvia Angerer (UMIT - Private University for Health Sciences, Medical Informatics and Technology,Hall in Tirol); Daniela Glätzle-Rützler (University of Innsbruck); Philipp Lergetporer (Technical University of Munich and ifo Institute); Thomas Rittmannsberger (University of Innsbruck) |
| Abstract: | Peoples’ willingness to vaccinate is critical to combating the COVID-19 pandemic. We devise a representative experiment to study how the design of the vaccine approval procedure affects public attitudes towards vaccination. Compared to an Emergency Use Authorization, choosing the more thorough Accelerated Authorization approval procedure increases vaccination intentions by 13 percentage points. Effects of increased duration of the approval procedure are positive and significant only for Emergency Use Authorization. Treatment effects are homogenous across population subgroups. Increased trust in the vaccine is the key mediator of treatment effects on vaccination intentions. |
| Keywords: | vaccination, COVID-19, approval procedure, experiment. |
| JEL: | I12 I18 C93 D83 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aiw:wpaper:20&r= |
| By: | Kirsten Rohde (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Job van Exel (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Merel van Hulsen (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies intertemporal social preferences. We introduce intertemporal dictator and ultimatum games where players decide on the timing of monetary payoffs. The setting is two-dimensional rather than one-dimensional, in the sense that inequalities can arise in the time as well as in the social dimension. The results of our experiment show that for equal monetary payoffs, decisions regarding waiting time show similar patterns as decisions regarding monetary payoffs in the standard games. Moreover, decisions regarding waiting time depend on inequalities in monetary payoffs in a systematic way, with this dependence being more pronounced in ultimatum than in dictator games. |
| Keywords: | Social preferences, time preferences, dictator game, ultimatum game |
| Date: | 2022–03–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220023&r= |
| By: | Tim P. Morrison; Art B. Owen |
| Abstract: | \begin{abstract} Tie-breaker designs (TBDs), in which subjects with extreme values are assigned treatment deterministically and those in the middle are randomized, are intermediate between regression discontinuity designs (RDDs) and randomized controlled trials (RCTs). TBDs thus provide a convenient mechanism by which to trade off between the treatment benefit of an RDD and the statistical efficiency gains of an RCT. We study a model where the expected response is one multivariate regression for treated subjects and another one for control subjects. For a given set of subject data we show how to use convex optimization to choose treatment probabilities that optimize a prospective $D$-optimality condition (expected information gain) adapted from Bayesian optimal design. We can incorporate economically motivated linear constraints on those treatment probabilities as well as monotonicity constraints that have a strong ethical motivation. Our condition can be used in two scenarios: known covariates with random treatments, and random covariates with random treatments. We find that optimality for the treatment effect coincides with optimality for the whole regression, and that the RCT satisfies moment conditions for optimality. For Gaussian data we can find optimal linear scorings of subjects, one for statistical efficiency and another for short term treatment benefit. We apply the convex optimization solution to some real emergency triage data from MIMIC. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2202.10030&r= |
| By: | Chapkovski, Philipp |
| Abstract: | The popularity of online behavioral experiments grew steadily even before the COVID-19 pandemic. With the start of lockdowns, online studies were often the only available option for the behavioral economists, sociologists and political scientists. The usage of most well-known platforms such as mTurk was so intensive that it harmed the quality of data. But even before the pandemics-induced quality crisis, online studies were limited in scope, since real-time interactions between participants were hard to achieve due to the large proportion of drop-outs and issues with creating stable groups. Using the crowdsourcing platform Toloka, we successfully ran several multi-round interactive experiments. Toloka’s large online audience, relatively low exposure of participants to sociological surveys and behavioral studies, and a convenient application programming interface makes it a perfect tool to run behavioral studies that require real-time interactions of participants. |
| Keywords: | Crowdsourcing, mTurk, online research, survey research |
| JEL: | B41 C81 C88 C90 C92 |
| Date: | 2022–02–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:111980&r= |
| By: | Vanessa MICHEL(OLTRA) |
| Abstract: | Modern economic approaches of empathy and sympathy aim at adding an altruistic dimension to the standard economic decision theory. The purpose of the introduction of another regarding dimension, in addition to the sole personal interest, is to try to explain prosocial preferences or behaviours. In this article, we show how and why the economic literature tries to grasp those concepts, but in a way that is very far from the original Smithian sympathy developed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (TSM). We argue that, by remaining in the framework of methodological individualism and instrumental rationality, economic approaches, particularly in the field of experimental and behavioural economics, tend to reduce and to intrumentalize the concepts of sympathy and empathy. Such approaches seem to us not consistent with the Smithian social philosophy of human nature and interpersonal relationships. |
| Keywords: | Smithian sympathy, Empathy, Theory of moral snetiments, behavioural economics |
| JEL: | B12 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grt:bdxewp:2022-03&r= |
| By: | Gilles Grandjean (CEREC - Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles); Mathieu Lefebvre (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marco Mantovani (University of Milan, Department of Economics, University of Milan Bicocca) |
| Abstract: | In finitely repeated public goods games, contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two main explanations are consistent with this pattern: (i) the population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well; (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper analyzes experimentally these explanations, by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both the preference and the strategic ability dimensions. Our results highlight the role of strategic ability in sustaining contributions, and suggest that the interaction between the two dimensions also matters: we find that groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and also have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Voluntary contribution,public goods,conditional cooperation,free riding,strategic sophistication |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03547809&r= |
| By: | Jorge M. Agüero (University of Connecticut); Francisco B. Galarza (Universidad del Pacífico); Gustavo Yamada (Universidad del Pacífico) |
| Abstract: | We study the employment opportunity of a college scholarship for high-achieving, low-income students in a labor market where disadvantaged groups are discriminated against. Using a correspondence audit-study we find that including information of being a scholarship recipient in a resume increases the likelihood of getting a callback for a job interview by 20%. However, the effects are much smaller in jobs and careers where the poor are under-represented. We show that this is consistent with the scholarship also sending a negative signal to employers and helps explain why actual beneficiaries almost never mention the scholarship in their resumes. |
| Keywords: | Employment, inclusive education, correspondence study, discrimination |
| JEL: | C93 I23 J7 J15 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2022-07&r= |
| By: | Roche, Christopher David |
| Abstract: | Citations Divided by Researchers + 1 (CDR+1) is a new metric which allows fair recognition of experimental research output complementing other metrics and avoiding some of their pitfalls. |
| Date: | 2021–10–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:64f9r&r= |
| By: | Antoinette Baujard (Univ Lyon, UJM Saint-Etienne, GATE UMR 5824, F-42023 Saint-Etienne, France); Isabelle Lebon (University Caen Normandy, UNICAEN, CREM-UMR 6211, F-14000 Caen, France) |
| Abstract: | An experiment carried out in situ during the 2017 French presidential election provides the natural conditions in which to disentangle the motivations of expressive voting and strategic voting as determinants of voters’ choice. Under the two-round plurality rule, when voters vote for a single candidate in the first round, they may wish primarily to express which is their favorite candidate, or, rather, to influence the outcome of the second-round outcome by strategic voting. These two motives may coincide or conflict. We show that insincere strategic voting is relatively low in this context since it represents less than 7% of the votes cast. When the expressive and the strategic motives conflict with each other, i.e., where expression requires giving up any influence on the outcome of the election, we show that voters are twice as likely to eschew strategic voting as to vote strategically. |
| Keywords: | In Situ Experiment, Strategy vs. Expression dilemma, Expression of preferences, Voting behavior, Strategic behavior, Two-round plurality vote |
| JEL: | D72 C93 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2201&r= |
| By: | Chin, Alycia; Hagmann, David (Harvard University); Loewenstein, George |
| Abstract: | Many situations involving search, such as commuters trying out new routes or organizations testing new procedures, can subject the explorer to the potential for subjective losses – situations that are worse than the status quo. How does the potential for experiencing losses during the course of a search affect individuals’ appetite for exploration? In three incentivized studies, we manipulate search outcomes by presenting participants either with a gain-only environment or a gain-loss environment. The gain-loss environment offers identical relative incentives for exploration, but payoffs are shifted down and participants receive an initial endowment to offset the difference. In both conditions, participants engage in a novel search task in which they decide how to explore a one-dimensional environment, receiving payoffs based on their location in each period. Payoffs between neighboring options are correlated, and movement is restricted in each turn to immediately adjacent locations. We predict and find that participants are motivated to avoid losses, which increases exploration when they are incurring losses, but decreases exploration when they face the prospect of losses. We conclude that exploration is driven by hope of anticipated gains, constrained by fear of anticipated losses, and motivated by avoidance of experienced losses. |
| Date: | 2021–10–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:x2cv8&r= |
| By: | Roland Bénabou (Princeton University); Armin Falk (University of Bonn); Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse Capitole) |
| Abstract: | We study the production and circulation of arguments justifying actions on the basis of morality. By downplaying externalities, exculpatory narratives allow people to maintain a positive image while acting selfishly. Conversely, responsibilizing narratives raise both direct and reputational stakes, fostering prosocial behavior. These rationales diffuse along a linear network, through both costly signaling and strategic disclosure. The norms that emerge reflect local correlation in agents’ incentives (reputation versus influence concerns), with low mixing generating both a polarization of beliefs across groups and less moral behavior on average. Imperatives (general precepts) constitute an alternative mode of moral influence. We analyze their costs and benefits relative to those of narratives, and when the two will be used as substitutes or complements. |
| Keywords: | Moral behavior, narratives, imperatives, rules, excuses, responsibility, networks, viral transmission, influence, reputation, disclosure, communication, social norms |
| JEL: | D62 D64 D78 D83 D85 D91 H41 K42 L14 Z13 |
| Date: | 2020–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2020-49&r= |