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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Ben Grodeck (Monash University, Department of Economics); Philipp Schoenegger (University of St Andrews, School of Economics and Finance & School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies) |
| Abstract: | What are the effects of confronting people with moral arguments and morally demanding statements to perform certain actions, such as donating to charity? To investigate this question, we conduct an online randomized experiment via Prolific (n=2500) where participants can donate to charity. Using a between-subject design, we provide some participants with a moral argument as to why they should donate. We then add a single sentence on top of the moral argument that expresses and varies moral demandingness at different levels. In a follow-up experiment (n=1200) we provide the moral argument and demandingness via an external party’s website—the non-profit Giving What We Can. In both experiments, we find that moral arguments significantly increase both the frequency and amount of donations compared to the control. However, we fail to find evidence that increasing the level of the moral demandingness affects donation behavior in either experiment. Our findings suggest that charities should employ moral arguments to increase giving, but not morally demanding statements. |
| Keywords: | Charitable Giving, Experiment, Morality, Obligation, Pro-Social Behavior |
| JEL: | D64 D91 H41 C90 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2022-03&r= |
| By: | Nobuyuki Hanaki; Takayuki Hoshino; Kohei Kubota; Fabrice Murtin; Masao Ogaki; Fumio Ohtake; Naoko Okuyama |
| Abstract: | This paper compares the results of an experiment conducted both in the laboratory and online with participants recruited from the same subject pool using the Trustlab platform. This platform has been used to obtain incentivized and internationally comparable behavioral economics measures of altruism, cooperation, reciprocity, trust, and trustworthiness, employing representative samples in many countries. We find no significant difference between the results from sessions conducted in the laboratory and online. While the existing literature shows that the choice between laboratory and online experiments can cause differences in results in some cases, our findings support the hypothesis that they do not cause differences in the behavioral economics measures when using the Trustlab platform. |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1168&r= |
| By: | Cano, Alexander; Cortés, Darwin; Mantilla, César; Prada, Laura; Restrepo, Medardo |
| Abstract: | We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in which 214 rural workers must choose between a cash or a voucher payment for completing a real-effort task. Participants face a twenty-percent chance of suffering a negative shock that will reduce their cash payment by roughly two-thirds. Opting for the voucher reduces the likelihood of the shock by one-half. We employ a multiple-price list with a varying voucher payment and a fixed cash payment to study this trade-off relevant for expanding the coverage and contributions of rural labor formalization. Voucher take-up rates go from 32% to 56%, from the least to the more generous voucher. In a sample of undergrad students from the same region, take-up rates went from 17% to 33%. We find that voucher redemption costs explain take-up among students but not among rural workers. Being a rural worker with land, and receiving government subsidies in cash, predict a higher voucher take-up. |
| Keywords: | agriculture; dual labor market; informal labor market |
| JEL: | C91 O17 R51 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rie:riecdt:88&r= |
| By: | Andreas Fuster; Basit Zafar |
| Abstract: | In this chapter, we discuss field experiments in surveys that are conducted with the purpose of learning about expectation formation and the link between expectations and behavior. We begin by reviewing the rationale for conducting experiments within surveys, rather than just relying on observational survey data. We then outline the most commonly used experimental paradigm, randomized information provision, along with some examples. Next, we outline a few methodological issues that are important to consider in the design of such experiments. We also provide a discussion of existing extensions of this paradigm, as well as of alternative approaches. |
| JEL: | C83 C93 D84 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29750&r= |
| By: | Bogliacino, Francesco (Universidad Nacional de Colombia); Grimalda, Gianluca; Pipke, David |
| Abstract: | The gift exchange hypothesis postulates that workers reciprocate above market-clearing wages with above-minimum effort. This hypothesis has received inconclusive support in dyadic employer-worker relationships. We present a field-experimental test to assess this hypothesis in the context of a triadic relationship in which only one out of two workers receives a pay increase. We conjecture that inequality aversion motivations may thwart positive reciprocity motivations and analyze the interaction between such motivations theoretically. Across different treatments, the pay increase is assigned to the more productive worker in the initial work session, to the needier worker, or arbitrarily. Two additional conditions in which either none or both workers receive a bonus serve as benchmarks. We find that pay increases lead to decreased productivity. Such a decrease is most sizable in the condition where both workers receive the bonus. A post-diction of this result is that workers interpret the monetary bonus as a signal of the employer’s contentment with their effort, making them feel entitled to reduce their effort. In other treatments, receiving the pay increase while the coworker does not receive a pay increase positively affects productivity, primarily when the pay increase is due to relative productivity. This result is consistent with status-seeking preferences rather than aversion against advantageous inequality. Conversely, not receiving the pay increase while the coworker does, leads to lower productivity, primarily when the pay increase is assigned based on relative needs. |
| Date: | 2021–11–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:xmjaq&r= |
| By: | Roland Bénabou (Princeton University); Armin Falk (Institute on Behavior and Inequality (briq) and University of Bonn); Luca Henkel (University of Bonn); Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse Capitole) |
| Abstract: | We examine to what extent a person’s moral preferences can be inferred from observing their choices, for instance via experiments, and in particular, how one should interpret certain behaviors that appear deontologically motivated. Comparing the performance of the direct elicitation (DE) and multiple-price list (MPL) mechanisms, we characterize in each case how (social or self) image motives inflate the extent to which agents behave prosocially. More surprisingly, this signaling bias is shown to depend on the elicitation method, both per se and interacted with the level of visibility: it is greater under DE for low reputation concerns, and greater under MPL when they become high enough. We then test the model’s predictions in an experiment in which nearly 700 subjects choose between money for themselves and implementing a 350e donation that will, in expectation, save one human life. Interacting the elicitation method with the decision’s level of visibility and salience, we find the key crossing effect predicted by the model. We also show theoretically that certain Kantian postures, turning down all prices in the offered range, easily emerge under MPL when reputation becomes important enough. |
| Keywords: | Morals, Choices, Decision-making |
| JEL: | D90 D91 |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2020-17&r= |
| By: | Natsumi Shimada |
| Abstract: | We study an experiment of the students-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) in matching markets where firms are matched with students. We investigated the two different situations: (i) Students know firms’ preferences and firms submit their true preference, (ii) Students know firms’ preferences and firms submit a higher ranking to students who give them higher ranking. This experiment confirms that the matching results under DA influence students’ preference formation, which decreases the degree of stability. If firms do not submit their true preferences, students also do not submit their true preferences. As a result, the situation induces instability. Moreover, we find the new pattern of submitted preferences – compromise strategy. If there is an extreme option, students will tend to prefer the in-between option. |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1169&r= |
| By: | Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University); Rong Feng (New York University) |
| Abstract: | Clinical trials following the "gold standard" of random assignment frequently use independent lotteries to allocate patients to treatment and control arms. Unfortunately, independent assignment can generate treatment and control arms that are unbalanced (i.e. treatment and control populations with significantly different demographics). This is regrettable since other assignment methods such as matched pair designs ensure balance across arms while maintaining randomization and permitting inference. This paper seeks to measure the cost of imbalance with respect to gender in a sample of roughly 2000 clinical studies. We document significant imbalance: 25% of experiments have at least 26% more men in one treatment arm than in the other. In addition, clinical trials with greater imbalance have more dispersed treatment effects, indicating that imbalance reduces the informativeness of experiments. A simple structural model suggests that for a typical experiment, using a balanced random design could deliver informativeness gains equivalent to increasing the sample size by 18%. |
| Keywords: | clinical trials, balance, gender, informativeness |
| JEL: | I11 I14 |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2020-12&r= |
| By: | Michele Fioretti (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Alexander Vostroknutov (Maastricht University [Maastricht]); Giorgio Coricelli (USC - University of Southern California) |
| Abstract: | In a stock market experiment, we examine how regret avoidance influences the decision to sell an asset while its price changes over time. Participants know beforehand whether they will observe the future prices after they sell the asset or not. Without future prices, participants are affected only by regret about previously observed high prices (past regret), but when future prices are available, they also avoid regret about expected after-sale high prices (future regret). Moreover, as the relative sizes of past and future regret change, participants dynamically switch between them. This demonstrates how multiple reference points dynamically influence sales. (JEL C91, G12, G41) |
| Keywords: | stock market behavior,behavioral finance,regret avoidance,dynamic regret,dynamic discrete choice,structural models,experiments,multiple reference points |
| Date: | 2022–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03562318&r= |
| By: | Kitamura, Shuhei; Kuroda, Toshifumi |
| Abstract: | This study examines the effect of media use on media trust and persuasion using a large-scale randomized field experiment, which was conducted in collaboration with the nation's most trusted media outlet. By randomly increasing the capacity for viewing its TV programs, we found that this treatment increased support for government policies by increasing program viewing time, which is, as we demonstrate, biased in favor of the government. Furthermore, we determined that the effect is driven mostly by those who trusted the outlet more than other broadcasters and that their levels of trust in the outlet were even *increased* by our treatment, which we call *endogenous persuasion*. By contrast, we did not discover heterogeneous effects with respect to political preferences. To better understand the mechanism underlying these findings, we developed a model of endogenous persuasion. |
| Date: | 2021–11–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:4h6qe&r= |
| By: | Callaghan, Bennett; Delgadillo, Quinton Michael; Kraus, Michael W. (Yale University) |
| Abstract: | A field experiment (N = 4,537) examined how signs of social class influence prosocial behavior. In the experiment, pedestrians were exposed to a target wearing symbols of relatively high or low social class in two major urban cities in the USA who was presumably requesting money to help the homeless. Pedestrians gave more than twice (2.55 times) as much to the target wearing high social class symbols than they did to the one wearing lower-class symbols. A follow-up perceptual study exposed participants to images of this panhandler wearing the same higher- or lower-class symbols, finding that higher-class symbols elicited perceptions of elevated competence, trustworthiness, similarity to the self, and perceived humanity compared to lower-class symbols. These results indicate that perceivers use visible signs of social class as a basis for judging others’ traits and attributes, and in decisions to directly share resources. (Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality Working Paper) |
| Date: | 2022–02–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:z8dn7&r= |
| By: | Marina Agranov (California Institute of Technology); Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | A growing literature has shown how people sometimes prefer to randomize between two options. We study how prevalent this behavior is in an experiment using a novel and simple method. We allow subjects to randomize between options in a series of questions in which one of the alternatives is fixed and the other varies, capturing the range of values for which subjects want to randomize. We find that most subjects choose to randomize in most questions. Crucially, they do so for ranges of values are ‘very large’: for example, when comparing a fixed amount $x with a lottery that pays $20 or $0 with equal chances, subjects typically randomize for all xs between $5.3 and $12. Large ranges are found in other questions as well, showing how prevalent the desire to randomization is. We connect ranges to standard choices, Certainty-Bias, and non-Monotonicity. |
| Keywords: | Preference for Randomization, Incomplete Preferences, Non-Expected Utility |
| JEL: | C91 D81 D90 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2021-72&r= |
| By: | Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University); Lucia Del Carpio (INSEAD); Samuel Kapon (New York University) |
| Abstract: | Limits on a government’s capacity to enforce laws can result in multiple equilibria. If most agents comply, limited enforcement is sufficient to dissuade isolated agents from misbehaving. If most agents do not comply, overstretched enforcement capacity has a minimal impact on behavior. We study the extent to which divide-and-conquer enforcement strategies can help select a high compliance equilibrium in the presence of realistic compliance frictions. We study the role of information about the compliance of others both in theory and in lab experiments. As the number of agents gets large, theory indicates that providing information or not is irrelevant in equilibrium. In contrast, providing individualized information has a first order impact in experimental play by increasing convergence to equilibrium. This illustrates the value of out-of-equilibrium information design. |
| Keywords: | government capacity, limited enforcement, divide and conquer, common knowledge enforcement priorities, tax collection, bounded rationality, information design |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C92 D73 D82 D86 H26 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2020-7&r= |
| By: | Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University); Lucia Del Carpio (INSEAD); Samuel Kapon (New York University) |
| Abstract: | Limits on a government’s capacity to enforce laws can result in multiple equilibria. If most agents comply, limited enforcement is sufficient to dissuade isolated agents from misbehaving. If most agents do not comply, overstretched enforcement capacity has a minimal impact on behavior. We study the extent to which divide-and-conquer enforcement strategies can help select a high compliance equilibrium in the presence of realistic compliance frictions. We study the role of information about the compliance of others both in theory and in lab experiments. As the number of agents gets large, theory indicates that providing information or not is irrelevant in equilibrium. In contrast, providing individualized information has a first order impact in experimental play by increasing convergence to equilibrium. This illustrates the value of out-of-equilibrium information design. |
| Keywords: | government capacity, limited enforcement, divide and conquer, common knowledge enforcement priorities, tax collection, bounded rationality, information design |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C92 D73 D82 D86 H26 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2020-07&r= |
| By: | Frederico Finan; Demian Pouzo |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a framework for how to incorporate prior sources of information into the design of a sequential experiment. These sources can include previous experiments, expert opinions, or the experimenter's own introspection. We formalize this problem using a multi-prior Bayesian approach that maps each source to a Bayesian model. These models are aggregated according to their associated posterior probabilities. We evaluate a broad of policy rules according to three criteria: whether the experimenter learns the parameters of the payoff distributions, the probability that the experimenter chooses the wrong treatment when deciding to stop the experiment, and the average rewards. We show that our framework exhibits several nice finite sample properties, including robustness to any source that is not externally valid. |
| JEL: | C11 C50 C90 O12 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29756&r= |
| By: | Pretto, Madeline (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | Do households comprehend the nature of price tail-risks inherent to real-time electricity pricing plans? Through an incentivised online experiment, we find that a probabilistic risk disclosure elicits greater demand for real-time pricing (RTP) products relative to a low-risk fixed-price alternative, without improving comprehension of tail-risk in RTP. Participants also show a tendency to place low value on tail-risk protection. Finally, the experience of a bill shock improves risk comprehension and drives choice away from RTP, suggesting that personal experience plays a greater role in self-imposed risk protection than does a probabilistic risk disclosure. We discuss the implications these findings may have for regulators with a consumer protection mandate. |
| Keywords: | Vietnam retail electricity market ; block rate pricing ; welfare effect ; electricity externalities ; demand function ; cash transfer ; quantity-based subsidy JEL Classification: D12 ; D63 ; Q41 ; Q48 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wrkesp:25&r= |
| By: | Faruk R. Gul (Princeton University); Paulo Natenzon (Washington University in St. Louis); Erkut Y. Ozbay (University of Maryland); Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | We report on an experiment that shows subjects prefer a gradual resolution of uncertainty when information about winning yields decisive bad news but inconclusive good news. This behavior is difficult to reconcile with existing theories of choice under uncertainty, including the Kreps-Porteus model. We show how the behavioral patterns uncovered by our experiment can be understood as arising from subjects’ special emphasis on their best (peak) and worst (trough) experiences along the realized path of uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | uncertainty |
| JEL: | D80 D81 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2020-8&r= |
| By: | Faruk R. Gul (Princeton University); Paulo Natenzon (Washington University in St. Louis); Erkut Y. Ozbay (University of Maryland); Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | We report on an experiment that shows subjects prefer a gradual resolution of uncertainty when information about winning yields decisive bad news but inconclusive good news. This behavior is difficult to reconcile with existing theories of choice under uncertainty, including the Kreps-Porteus model. We show how the behavioral patterns uncovered by our experiment can be understood as arising from subjects’ special emphasis on their best (peak) and worst (trough) experiences along the realized path of uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | uncertainty |
| JEL: | D80 D81 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2020-08&r= |
| By: | Lugtig, Peter; Toepoel, Vera; Emery, Tom (NIDI); Cabaço, Susana Laia Farinha (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute); Bujard, Martin; Naderi, Robert; Schumann, Almut; Lück, Detlev |
| Abstract: | Face-to-face interviews are still the standard in conducting cross-national surveys. Although web surveys have many advantages, so far they have rarely been used in cross-national surveys. The main problem of using web in cross-national surveys are coverage error of people without internet access and problems with the availability of sampling frames. This study reports on a large-scale experiment with a push-to-web survey design in Croatia, Germany and Portugal to overcome these problems. We experimentally assigned individuals to a face-to-face only condition or a push-to-web condition, in which non-respondents to the web-phase of the study were followed-up by face-to-face interviewers. We additionally conducted three within-country experiments to better understand how incentive structures (in Germany) and the spacing of reminders (In Croatia) affected response rates and nonresponse bias. In Portugal, we test different within-household selection procedures. We find that in Germany and Croatia the push-to-web design was equally or more successful than the face-to-face survey in terms of the response rate and nonresponse bias. In Portugal, the push-to-web design was not successful, leading to low response rates and problems in the respondent selection process. We also find that a mix of unconditional and conditional incentives works best, and that weekly reminders work better than two-weekly reminders. Overall, we conclude that it is possible to use a push-to-web design as long as a sampling frame of individuals is available. |
| Date: | 2022–02–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:mu8jy&r= |
| By: | Denis Shishkin (University of California San Diego); Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | With common models of updating under ambiguity, new information may increase the amount of relevant ambiguity: the set of priors may "dilate." We test experimentally one sharp case: agents bet on a risky urn and get information that is truthful or not based on the draw from an Ellsberg urn. Under typical models, the set of priors should dilate, ambiguity averse agents should lower their value of bets, ambiguity seeking should increase it. Instead, we find that ambiguity averse agents do not change it, ambiguity seeking ones increase it substantially. We also test bets on ambiguous urns and find sizable reactions to ambiguous information. |
| Keywords: | Updating, Ambiguous Information, Ambiguity Aversion, Ellsberg Paradox, Maxmin Expected Utility |
| JEL: | C91 D81 D90 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2020-53&r= |
| By: | Regina Anselm; Deepti Bhatia; Urs Fischbacher; Jan Hausfeld |
| Abstract: | How do people attribute responsibility when an outcome is not caused by a single person but results from a decision chain involving several people? We study this question in an experiment, in which five voters sequentially decide on how to distribute money between them and five recipients. The recipients can reward or punish each voter, which measures responsibility attribution. In the aggregate, we find that responsibility is attributed mostly according to the voters’ choices and the pivotality of the decision, but not for being the initial voter. On the individual level, we find substantial heterogeneity with three overall patterns: Little to no responsibility attribution, pivotality-driven, and focus on choices. These patterns are similar when praising voters for good outcomes and blaming voters for bad outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Responsibility Attribution, Collective Decision-Making, Voting, Decision Process |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0126&r= |
| By: | Gilligan, Daniel O.; Hidrobo, Melissa; Leight, Jessica; Tambet, Heleene |
| Abstract: | While indirect methods are increasingly widely used to measure sensitive behaviors such as intimate partner violence in order to minimize social desirability biases in responses, in developing countries the use of more complex indirect questioning methods raises important questions around how individuals will react to the use of a more unusual and complex question structure. This paper presents evidence from a list experiment measuring multiple forms of intimate partner violence within an extremely poor sample of women in rural Ethiopia. We find that the list experiment does not generate estimates of intimate partner violence that are higher than direct response questions; rather, prevalence estimates using the list experiment are lower vis-à -vis prevalence estimates using the direct reports, and sometimes even negative. We interpret this finding as consistent with “fleeing†behavior by respondents who do not wish to be associated with statements associated with intimate partner violence. |
| Keywords: | ETHIOPIA; EAST AFRICA; AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA; AFRICA; domestic violence; measurement; rural communities; intimate partner violence (IPV); list experiments |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:2094&r= |
| By: | Joseph P. Kaboski; Molly Lipscomb; Virgiliu Midrigan; Carolyn Pelnik |
| Abstract: | Theoretically, indivisible investments together with financial frictions can lower development, generate poverty traps, and lead agents to become risk-loving. Using experimental cash grants involving a choice between a safer, low payoff and a riskier, large payoff lottery, we find that 27 percent choose the riskier, larger lottery. Small grant winners invest in livestock and business inventory, while large grant winners invest in land, which exhibits high capital gains. Our quantitative model shows that the aggregate effects of financial deepening are sizable if the indivisible investment can be accumulated (e.g., capital) but not if it is in fixed supply (e.g., land). |
| JEL: | O11 O12 O16 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29773&r= |
| By: | Righi, Simone; , Francesca; Giardini, Francesca |
| Abstract: | Natural disasters put an enormous strain on civic capital, which can result in a decrease in trust and cooperation in the affected communities. However, the existing level of civic capital can buffer the effects of the disaster, determining completely different dynamics even in neighboring regions. In order to investigate the determinants of long-term resilience to natural disasters, we designed a 2x2 lab in the field experiments conducted in Marche and Emilia-Romagna, two Italian regions that were affected by major earthquakes in 2016 and 2012, respectively. We collected data in neighboring and comparable municipalities that were affected or not by earthquakes and we compared inhabitants’ prosocial choices in a Public Good Game and a Distribution game. Our results show that people affected by the earthquake were more prosocial in general, while at the individual level the effect of the earthquake is present only in people who suffered material damage via their increased desire for redistribution. We also show that civic capital was not different among regions or among people living inside or outside the earthquake area. |
| Date: | 2022–02–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:n49hv&r= |
| By: | Manuel Bagues (University of Warwick, J-Pal, CEPR, IZA); Christopher Roth (University of Cologne, briq, CESifo, CAGE, CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We study the long-run effects of contact with individuals from other regions in early adulthood on preferences, beliefs and national identity. We combine a natural experiment, the random assignment of male conscripts to different locations throughout Spain, with tailored survey data. Being randomly assigned to complete military service outside of one’s region of residence fosters contact with conscripts from other regions, and increases sympathy and trust towards people from the region of service, as measured decades later. We also observe a long-lasting increase in identification with Spain for individuals originating from regions with strong peripheral nationalism. |
| Keywords: | Interregional Contact, Intergroup Exposure, Beliefs, Preference Formation, Identity |
| JEL: | R23 D91 Z1 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:152&r= |
| By: | Marie Claire Villeval (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03504242&r= |
| By: | Vincenzo Galasso; Vincent Pons; Paola Profeta; Michael Becher; Sylvain Brouard; Martial Foucault |
| Abstract: | Millions of people refuse COVID-19 vaccination. Using original data from two surveys in nine OECD countries, we analyze the determinants of anti-vax intentions in December 2020 and show that half of the anti-vax individuals were vaccinated by summer 2021. Vaccinations were more likely among individuals aged 50+, exposed to COVID-19, compliant with public restrictions, more informed on traditional media, trusting scientists, and less concerned about vaccines’ side effects. We run a survey experiment with informational messages. In EU countries, a message about protecting health largely increases vaccinations, even among anti-vax individuals. In the U.K. and U.S., a message about protecting the economy generates similar effects. Our findings suggest that informational campaigns should adopt adequate narratives and address concerns about vaccines’ side effects. |
| JEL: | D83 I12 I18 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29741&r= |
| By: | Phu Nguyen-Van; Thierry Blayac; Dimitri Dubois; Sebastien Duchene; Ismael Rafai; Bruno Ventelou; Marc Willinger |
| Abstract: | We test the effectiveness of a social comparison nudge to enhance lockdown compliance during the Covid-19 pandemic, using a French representative sample (N=1154). Respondents were randomly assigned to a favourable/unfavourable informational feedback (daily road traffic mobility patterns, in Normandy - a region of France) on peer lockdown compliance. Our dependent variable was the intention to comply with a possible future lockdown. We controlled for risk, time, and social preferences and tested the effectiveness of the nudge. We found no evidence of the effectiveness of the social comparison nudge among the whole French population, but the nudge was effective when its recipient and the reference population shared the same geographical location (Normandy). Exploratory results on this subsample (N=52) suggest that this effectiveness could be driven by non-cooperative individuals. |
| Keywords: | COVID-19; Lockdown compliance; Social Comparison; Nudge; Risk preferences; Time preferences; Social preferences |
| JEL: | C90 D90 I10 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2022-5&r= |
| By: | Marina Agranov (California Institute of Technology); Ahrash Dianat (University of Essex); Larry Samuelson (Yale University); Leeat Yariv (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure, supermodular or submodular. Several insights emerge. First, while markets often culminate in efficient matchings, stability is more elusive, reflecting the difficulty of arranging attendant transfers. Second, incomplete information and submodularity present hurdles to efficiency and especially stability, their combination drastically diminishes stability's likelihood. Third, matchings form "from the top down" in complete-information supermodular markets, but exhibit many more and less-obviously ordered offers otherwise. Last, participants' market positions matter far more than their dynamic bargaining styles for outcomes. |
| Keywords: | matching, incomplete information, stability, experiments |
| JEL: | C78 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2021-74&r= |
| By: | Narayanaswamy Balakrishnan (McMaster University); Efe A. Ok (New York University); Pietro Ortoleva (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | Despite being the fundamental primitive of the study of decision-making in economics, choice correspondences are not observable: even for a single menu of options, we observe at most one choice of an individual at a given point in time, as opposed to the set of all choices she deems most desirable in that menu. However, it may be possible to observe a person choose from a feasible menu at various times, repeatedly. We propose a method of inferring the choice correspondence of an individual from this sort of choice data. First, we derive our method axiomatically, assuming an ideal dataset. Next, we develop statistical techniques to implement this method for real-world situations where the sample at hand is often fairly small. As an application, we use the data of two famed choice experiments from the literature to infer the choice correspondences of the participating subjects. |
| Keywords: | Choice Correspondences, Estimation, Stochastic Choice Functions, Transitivity of Preferences |
| JEL: | C81 D11 D12 D81 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2021-60&r= |
| By: | Dan Levin; Luyao Zhang |
| Abstract: | We introduce NLK, a model that connects the Nash equilibrium (NE) and Level-K. It allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less or as sophisticated as, she is, a view supported in psychology. We apply NLK to data from five published papers on static, dynamic, and auction games. NLK provides different predictions than those of the NE and Level-K; moreover, a simple version of NLK explains the experimental data better in many cases, with the same or lower number of parameters. We discuss extensions to games with more than two players and heterogeneous beliefs. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2202.12292&r= |
| By: | Peter Bergman (Columbia University); Eric Chan (Babson College); Adam Kapor (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | We randomized school quality information onto the listings of a nationwide housing website for low-income families. We use this variation and data on families’ search and location choices to estimate a model of housing search and neighborhood choice that incorporates imperfect information and potentially biased beliefs. We find that imperfect information and biased beliefs cause families to live in neighborhoods with lower-performing, more segregated schools. Families underestimate school quality conditional on neighborhood characteristics. If we had ignored this information problem, we would have estimated that families value school quality relative to their commute downtown by half that of the truth. |
| Keywords: | housing, school choice, residential choice |
| JEL: | I00 I21 I24 I30 R00 R21 R31 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2020-61&r= |
| By: | Klein, Nicholas J. (Conrell University); Brown, Anne; Thigpen, Calvin |
| Abstract: | Shared scooter programs often generate complaints about improper parking as a hazard to pedestrians and as unappealing clutter on sidewalks, yet previous research has found relatively low rates of misparking. What do people think constitutes misparking, and how much misparking do they think occurs? Can interventions further reduce misparking? We conducted field experiments in Washington DC and Auckland, New Zealand. We find evidence for the efficacy of three interventions. The introduction of in-app message reminders and the implementation of sidewalk decals both lowered rates of misparking. The largest improvement in misparking was brought about by the introduction of lock-to, thanks to a large shift from parking in the furniture zone to bike racks. In addition, we assess perceptions of scooter misparking with an intercept survey in the same cities and polls of transportation professionals at four conferences. Both the public and transportation professionals overestimate misparking of scooters and underestimate misparking of bicycles and cars. We find that respondents equate parking compliance with pedestrian accessibility and tidiness. Our results suggest that intuitive parking solutions that align with rider and non-rider understandings of orderly parking, such as bike racks or on-street parking corrals, improve rider compliance and may reduce public dissatisfaction with shared scooter parking. |
| Date: | 2022–02–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:su8wx&r= |