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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Hans Bonesrønning; Henning Finseraas; Ines Hardoy; Jon Marius Vaag Iversen; Ole Henning Nyhus; Vibeke Opheim; Kari Vea Salvanes; Astrid Marie Jorde Sandsør; Pål Schøne |
| Abstract: | We report results from a large-scale, pre-registered randomized field experiment in 159 Norwegian schools over four years. The intervention includes students aged 7-9 and consists of pulling students from their regular mathematics classes into small, homogenous groups for mathematics instruction for 3 to 4 hours per week, for two periods of 4-6 weeks per school year. All students, not only struggling students, are pulled out. We find that students in treatment schools increased their performance in mathematics by .16 standard deviations at the end of the school year and by .06 standard deviations in national tests 1-2 years later, with no differential effect by pre-ability level or gender. Our study is particularly relevant for policy-makers seeking to use additional teaching resources to target a heterogeneous student population efficiently. |
| Keywords: | education economics, small group instruction, tutoring, tracking, class size, field experiment, intervention, randomized controlled trial, teacher-student ratio, mathematics instruction |
| JEL: | C93 H52 I21 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9443&r= |
| By: | Patrick Bajari; Brian Burdick; Guido W. Imbens; Lorenzo Masoero; James McQueen; Thomas Richardson; Ido M. Rosen |
| Abstract: | In this study we introduce a new class of experimental designs. In a classical randomized controlled trial (RCT), or A/B test, a randomly selected subset of a population of units (e.g., individuals, plots of land, or experiences) is assigned to a treatment (treatment A), and the remainder of the population is assigned to the control treatment (treatment B). The difference in average outcome by treatment group is an estimate of the average effect of the treatment. However, motivating our study, the setting for modern experiments is often different, with the outcomes and treatment assignments indexed by multiple populations. For example, outcomes may be indexed by buyers and sellers, by content creators and subscribers, by drivers and riders, or by travelers and airlines and travel agents, with treatments potentially varying across these indices. Spillovers or interference can arise from interactions between units across populations. For example, sellers' behavior may depend on buyers' treatment assignment, or vice versa. This can invalidate the simple comparison of means as an estimator for the average effect of the treatment in classical RCTs. We propose new experiment designs for settings in which multiple populations interact. We show how these designs allow us to study questions about interference that cannot be answered by classical randomized experiments. Finally, we develop new statistical methods for analyzing these Multiple Randomization Designs. |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2112.13495&r= |
| By: | Adena, Maja; Hager, Anselm |
| Abstract: | Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? Using the Facebook advertising tool, we implemented a natural field experiment across Germany, randomly assigning almost 8,000 postal codes to Save the Children fundraising videos or to a pure control. We studied changes in the volume and frequency of donations to Save the Children and other charities by postal code. Our design circumvents many shortcomings inherent in studies based on click-through data, especially substitution and measurement issues. We found that (i) video fundraising increased donation frequency and value to Save the Children during the campaign and in the subsequent five weeks; (ii) the campaign was profitable for the fundraiser; and (iii) the effects were similar independent of video content and impression assignment strategy. However, we also found non-negligible crowding out of donations to other similar charities or projects. Finally, we demonstrated that click data are an inappropriate proxy for donations and recommend that managers use careful experimental designs that can plausibly evaluate the effects of advertising on relevant outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Charitable giving,field experiments,fundraising,social media,competition |
| JEL: | C93 D64 D12 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2020302r&r= |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham, IZA Bonn); Chris Starmer (University of Nottingham); Christian Thoeni (University of Lausanne); Fabio Tufano (University of Nottingham); Till O Weber (Newcastle University) |
| Abstract: | Experimental research has shown that ordinary people often perform remarkably well in solving coordination games that involve no conflicts of interest. While most experiments in the past studied such coordination games among socially distant anonymous players, here we study behaviour in a set of two player coordination games and compare the outcomes depending on whether the players are socially close or socially distant. We find that social closeness influences prospects for coordination, but whether it helps, harms or has no impact on coordination probabilities, depends on the structure of the game. |
| Keywords: | Coordination; Lab-in-the-field experiment; Oneness; Salience; Social closeness; Social distance |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2021-09&r= |
| By: | Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew; Claire Guerin |
| Abstract: | Why does human cooperation often unravel in economic experiments despite a promising start? Previous studies have interpreted the decline as the reaction of disappointed cooperators retaliating in response to lesser cooperators (conditional cooperation). This interpretation has been considered evidence of a uniquely human form of cooperation, motivated by altruistic concerns for fairness and requiring special evolutionary explanations. However, experiments have typically shown individuals information about both their personal payoff and information about the decisions of their groupmates (social information). Showing both confounds explanations based on conditional cooperation with explanations based on individuals learning how to better play the game. Here we experimentally decouple these two forms of information, and thus these two learning processes, in public goods games involving 616 Swiss university participants. We find that payoff information leads to a greater decline, supporting a payoff-based learning hypothesis. In contrast, social information has small or negligible effect, contradicting the conditional cooperation hypothesis. We also find widespread evidence of both confusion and selfish motives, suggesting that human cooperation is maybe not so unique after all. |
| Keywords: | altruism, behavioral economics, confusion, reciprocity, social preferences |
| JEL: | D01 |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.17&r= |
| By: | Basteck, Christian; Mantovani, Marco |
| Abstract: | In school choice problems, the widely used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA) disadvantages unsophisticated applicants, but may ex-ante Pareto dominate any strategy-proof alternative. In these cases, it may be preferable to aid applicants within IA, rather than to abandon it. In a laboratory experiment, we first document a substantial gap in strategy choices and outcomes between subjects of higher and lower cognitive ability under IA. We then test whether disclosing information on past applications levels the playing field. The treatment is effective in partially reducing the gap between applicants of above- and below-median cognitive ability and in curbing ability segregation across schools, but may leave the least able applicants further behind. |
| Keywords: | laboratory experiment,school choice,immediate acceptance,strategy-proofness,cognitive ability,mechanism design |
| JEL: | C78 C91 D82 I24 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2021203&r= |
| By: | Matthias Kasper (University of Vienna); James Alm (Tulane University) |
| Abstract: | This study uses a laboratory experiment to investigate two behavioral explanations for taxpayers’ tendency to reduce their compliance after an audit (the “bomb crater effect”): the tendency to make up for losses incurred in the past (loss repair), and the incorrect assumption that experiencing an audit decreases the risk of a future audit (misperception of risk). Our findings suggest that audits do not have a strong effect in the aggregate. However, behavioral responses depend on the audit outcome. While taxpayers who were found to report all income correctly are substantially less compliant in their subsequent tax declaration, taxpayers who were found to evade their entire income show the opposite response. These results suggest that audits do not induce a general tendency for loss repair or a general misperception of the risk of a subsequent audit. Moreover, when comparing these changes in reporting behavior to the behavior of taxpayers who did not experience an audit, we find that audits do in fact not induce strong behavioral responses in general, and they do not induce a “bomb crater effect” in particular. Rather, our findings suggest that taxpayers reporting compliance in the laboratory is volatile, even absent any audits. We conclude that experimental studies should use control groups of unaudited taxpayers to identify the causal effect of audits on post-audit tax compliance. |
| Keywords: | Tax compliance; Bomb crater effect; Laboratory experiments |
| JEL: | C9 H26 H83 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tul:wpaper:2118&r= |
| By: | Štěpán Mikula (Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University); Josef Montag (Department of Economics, Faculty of Law, Charles University) |
| Abstract: | This paper tests for discriminatory treatment of the Roma minority by public officials in the Czech Republic. Our focus is on public servants at local job centers whose job is to advise unemployed individuals and process applications for unemployment benefit. Our experimental design facilitates testing for the presence of each of two key (but intertwined) drivers of discrimination: ethnic animus and socioeconomic status prejudice. We find substantial evidence for the presence of discrimination based on both of these sources. Since Roma tend to have lower socioeconomic status, the two sources of discrimination compound for them. |
| Keywords: | Discrimination, Roma, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, public services, social security, field experiment. |
| JEL: | J15 D73 H55 |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2022-01&r= |
| By: | Martin Halla; Christopher Kah (Department of Economic Theory, Policy and History, University of Innsbruck); Rupert Sausgruber |
| Abstract: | To test for ethnic discrimination in access to outpatient health care services, we carry out an email-correspondence study in Germany. We approach 3,224 physician offices in the 79 largest cities in Germany with fictitious appointment requests and randomized patients’ characteristics. We find that patients’ ethnicity, as signaled by distinct Turkish versus German names, does not affect whether they receive an appointment or wait time. In contrast, patients with private insurance are 31 percent more likely to receive an appointment. Holding a private insurance also increases the likelihood of receiving a response and reduces the wait time. This suggests that physicians use leeway to prioritize privately insured patients to enhance their earnings, but they do not discriminate persons of Turkish origin based on taste. Still, their behavior creates means-based barriers for economically disadvantaged groups |
| Keywords: | Discrimination, immigrants, ethnicity, health care markets, health insurance, inequality, correspondence experiment, field experiment |
| JEL: | I11 J15 I14 I18 H51 C93 |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2021-15&r= |
| By: | Bulent Guler (Indiana University); Volodymyr Lugovskyy (Indiana University); Daniela Puzzello (Indiana University); Steven Tucker (University of Waikato) |
| Abstract: | We report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of trading institutions in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets. We employ three trading institutions: Call Market, Double Auction and Tâtonnement. The results show that bubbles are significantly smaller in uniform-price institutions than in Double Auction. We reproduce this and other critical patterns of the data by calibrating a heterogeneous agent model with fundamental and myopic-noise traders. The model produces larger bubbles under Double Auction because multiple trades occur within a period, amplifying the impact of myopic traders with positive bias on transaction prices. |
| Keywords: | experimental asset markets; bubbles; traders' heterogeneity; trading institutions |
| JEL: | C90 C91 D03 G02 G12 |
| Date: | 2021–12–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wai:econwp:21/15&r= |
| By: | Brice Corgnet; Camille Cornand (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Nobuyuki Hanaki |
| Abstract: | We study the reaction of investors to tail events across trading institutions. We conduct experiments in which investors bid on a financial asset that delivers a small positive reward in more than 99% of the cases and a large loss otherwise. The baseline treatment uses a repeated BDM mechanism whereas the market treatment replaces the uniform draw of the BDM mechanism by a uniform draw over the bids of the other participants. Our design is such that bids should not differ across treatments in normal times while allowing for potential differences to emerge after tail events have occurred. We find that markets tend to exacerbate the reaction of investors to tail losses and we attribute this effect to emotions. |
| Keywords: | Tail events,trading institutions,experimental finance,emotions and risk |
| Date: | 2021–12–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03468913&r= |
| By: | Pëllumb Reshidi; Alessandro Lizzeri; Leeat Yariv; Jimmy H. Chan; Wing Suen |
| Abstract: | Many committees—juries, political task forces, etc.—spend time gathering costly information before reaching a decision. We report results from lab experiments focused on such information-collection processes. We consider decisions governed by individuals and groups and compare how voting rules affect outcomes. We also contrast static information collection, as in classical hypothesis testing, with dynamic collection, as in sequential hypothesis testing. Several insights emerge. Static information collection is excessive, and sequential information collection is non-stationary, producing declining decision accuracies over time. Furthermore, groups using majority rule yield especially hasty and inaccurate decisions. Nonetheless, sequential information collection is welfare enhancing relative to static collection, particularly when unanimous rules are used. |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D7 D8 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29557&r= |
| By: | Chloe Tergiman (Smeal College of Business, 334 Business Building, Penn State University); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR 5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France. IZA, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how individuals adapt the nature of their lies when settings allow for reputation-building. While some lies can be detected ex post by the uninformed party, others remain deniable. We find that traditional market mechanisms such as reputation generate strong changes in the way people lie and lead to strategies in which individuals can maintain plausible deniability: people simply hide their lies better by substituting deniable lies for detectable lies. Our results highlight the limitations of reputation to root out fraud when a Deniable Lie strategy is available. |
| Keywords: | Lying, Deniability, Reputation, Financial Markets, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D01 G41 M21 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2120&r= |
| By: | Xinkun Nie; Guido Imbens; Stefan Wager |
| Abstract: | The ability to generalize experimental results from randomized control trials (RCTs) across locations is crucial for informing policy decisions in targeted regions. Such generalization is often hindered by the lack of identifiability due to unmeasured effect modifiers that compromise direct transport of treatment effect estimates from one location to another. We build upon sensitivity analysis in observational studies and propose an optimization procedure that allows us to get bounds on the treatment effects in targeted regions. Furthermore, we construct more informative bounds by balancing on the moments of covariates. In simulation experiments, we show that the covariate balancing approach is promising in getting sharper identification intervals. |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2112.04723&r= |
| By: | Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew; Victoire D'Amico; Claire Guerin |
| Abstract: | The strategy method is often used in public goods games to measure individuals’ willingness to cooperate depending on the level of cooperation by others (conditional cooperation). However, while the strategy method is informative, it risks being suggestive and inducing elevated levels of conditional cooperation that are not motivated by concerns for fairness, especially in uncertain or confused participants. Here we make 845 participants complete the strategy method two times, once with human and once with computerized groupmates. Cooperation with computers cannot rationally be motivated by concerns for fairness. Worryingly, 69% of participants conditionally cooperated with computers, whereas only 7% conditionally cooperated with humans while not cooperating with computers. Overall, 83% of participants cooperated with computers, contributing 89% as much as towards humans. Results from games with computers present a serious problem for measuring social behaviors. |
| Keywords: | Confusion, fairness, inequity-aversion, strong reciprocity |
| JEL: | H41 C91 C72 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.18&r= |
| By: | DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni,; DUFWENBERG, Martin; PAPA, Stefano |
| Abstract: | Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we however argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises. |
| Keywords: | Promises, Partner-switching, Expectations, Commitment, Guilt, Informal agreements |
| JEL: | A13 C91 D01 D64 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ant:wpaper:2021005&r= |
| By: | Agnès Festré (GREDEG CNRS; Université Côte d'Azur, France); Stein Østbye (University of Tromsø, Norway) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we revisit Michael Polanyi's overall contribution to the understanding of tacit knowledge and its implications in philosophy of science with a focus on experimental research in social sciences. We first review and discuss Polanyi's references to experiments in general. An extensive number of these experiments are summarised in tabular form in the Appendix, distinguishing between experiments on the phenomenon of tacit knowledge, discussed in Subsection 2.1, and experiments on the epistemological implications of tacit knowledge, discussed in Subsection 2.2 Secondly, we discuss tacit knowledge as a confounding factor and limitation to replicability in social science experiments (Subsection 3.1) and tacit knowledge as a phenomenon to be elicitated through controlled variation in experimental design (Subsection 3.2). In the concluding section, we call for rejuvenation of the study of social epistemology and the social construction of science, suggested to start with Polanyi and his generation, where attention now should be directed to social science rather than hard science. |
| Keywords: | philosophy of science, tacit knowledge, methodology, experiments, replication |
| JEL: | B25 B31 B41 B5 C9 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2021-40&r= |
| By: | Barbosa, Daniel AC (PUC-Rio, Brazil); Fetzer, Thiemo (University of Warwick); Soto, Caterina (London School of Economics); Souza, Pedro CL (Queen Mary University) |
| Abstract: | We provide experimental evidence that monitoring of the police activity through body-worn cameras reduces use-of-force, handcuffs and arrests, and enhances criminal reporting. Stronger treatment effects occur on events classified ex-ante of low seriousness. Monitoring effects are moderated by officer rank, which is consistent with a career concern motive by junior officers. Overall, results show that the use of body-worn cameras de-escalates conflicts. |
| Keywords: | police citizen interaction, use-of-force, technology, field experiment JEL Classification: C93, D73, D74 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:581&r= |
| By: | Christine Laudenbach; Annika Weber; Johannes Wohlfart |
| Abstract: | We survey retail investors at an online bank to study beliefs about the autocorrelation of aggregate stock returns, and how these beliefs shape investment decisions measured in administrative account data. Individuals’ beliefs exhibit substantial heterogeneity and predict trading responses to market movements. We inform a random half of our respondents that historically the autocorrelation of aggregate returns was close to zero, which persistently changes their beliefs. Among those initially believing in mean reversion, treated respondents buy significantly less equity during the COVID-19 crash four months later. Our results highlight how heterogeneity in subjective models causally drives trade in asset markets. |
| Keywords: | expectation formation, information, updating, retail investors, trading |
| JEL: | D14 D83 D84 D91 E71 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9427&r= |
| By: | Camille Cornand (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Paul Hubert |
| Abstract: | We compare disagreement in expectations and the frequency of forecast revisions among five categories of agents: households, firms, professional forecasters, policymakers and participants to laboratory experiments. We provide evidence of disagreement among all categories of agents. There is however a strong heterogeneity across categories: while policymakers and professional forecasters exhibit low disagreement, firms and households show strong disagreement. This translates into a heterogeneous frequency of forecast revision across categories of agents, with policymakers revising more frequently their forecasts than firms and professional forecasters. Households last revise less frequently. We are also able to explore the external validity of experimental expectations. |
| Keywords: | inflation expectations,information frictions,disagreement,forecast revisions,experimental forecasts,survey forecasts,central bank forecasts |
| Date: | 2021–12–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03468918&r= |
| By: | Cairo, Sofie (Copenhagen Business School); Mahlstedt, Robert (University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We study how the transparency of welfare systems affects labor market outcomes of unemployed workers in a large-scale field experiment. Our low-cost information intervention uses a personalized online tool that informs benefit recipients about their personal risk of a benefit reduction when not complying with a work requirement. We find disparate effects reflecting individuals' job search status. Providing personalized information improves labor market outcomes by mitigating the pressure to accept unstable part-time jobs among active job seekers with a low sanction risk. Inactive persons with a high sanction risk leave welfare and rely on alternative income support more frequently. |
| Keywords: | unemployment, transfer programs, transparency, sanctions, uncertainty, work requirements, field experiments, information treatment |
| JEL: | J68 D83 C93 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14940&r= |
| By: | Menkveld, Albert J.; Dreber, Anna; Holzmeister, Felix; Huber, Jürgen; Johannesson, Magnus; Kirchler, Michael; Neusüss, Sebastian; Razen, Michael; Weitzel, Utz |
| Abstract: | In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data-generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in sample estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence-generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty: non-standard errors. To study them, we let 164 teams test six hypotheses on the same sample. We find that non-standard errors are sizeable, on par with standard errors. Their size (i) co-varies only weakly with team merits, reproducibility, or peer rating, (ii) declines significantly after peer-feedback, and (iii) is underestimated by participants. |
| Keywords: | non-standard errors,multi-analyst approach,liquidity |
| JEL: | C12 C18 G1 G14 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:327&r= |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Marta Ballatore (GREDEG CNRS; Université Côte d'Azur, France); Michela Chessa (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Agnès Festré (GREDEG CNRS; Université Côte d'Azur, France; The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway); Chris Ouangraoua (GREDEG CNRS; Université Côte d'Azur, France) |
| Abstract: | This study proposes an analysis of behavioral factors (attitudes toward risk, ambiguity and reduction of compound lotteries) as choice determinants of a blockchain-based car insurance smart contract (henceforth, BCT-based SC) vs. an ambiguous expert-based one. In a laboratory experiment, we develop a toy model representing such a choice and complement it with a questionnaire in order to collect data concerning participants’ demographics, personality traits, and car use experience. Our results can inform policies aimed at improving the understanding of BCT-based SC in the case of car insurance services. In particular, they advocate for designing ad hoc policies depending on user’s experience with cars. |
| Keywords: | Laboratory experiments, Blockchain, Smart contracts, Technology adoption, Risk, Ambiguity, Compound lottery |
| JEL: | C81 C83 C91 D81 D91 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2021-41&r= |
| By: | de Barros, Andreas; Fajardo-Gonzalez, Johanna; Glewwe, Paul; Sankar, Ashwini |
| Abstract: | In a cluster-randomized trial, two treatment arms promoted activity-based instruction by providing teaching materials and teacher training. One of these arms also promoted community engagement through community-led student contests. A third arm remained untreated. After 13 months, the version without contests improved teaching quality and learning among girls. Both versions improved student attitudes towards math. Yet, the addition of contests—which are intended to put pressure on teachers to increase their students’ performance—worsened instructional quality (especially classroom culture), and we can rule out that the contests added even small improvements in learning. |
| Keywords: | Community/Rural/Urban Development, Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:umaesp:316747&r= |
| By: | Anup Malani (University of Chicago); Phoebe Holtzman; Kosuke Imai (Harvard University); Cynthia Kinnan (Tufts University); Morgen Miller (University of Chicago); Shailender Swaminathan (Sai University); Alessandra Voena (The University of Chicago); Bartosz Woda (University of Chicago); Gabriella Conti (University College London) |
| Abstract: | We report on a large randomized controlled trial of hospital insurance for above-poverty-line Indian households. Households were assigned to free insurance, sale of insurance, sale plus cash transfer, or control. To estimate spillovers, the fraction of households offered insurance varied across villages. The opportunity to purchase insurance led to 59.91% uptake and access to free insurance to 78.71% uptake. Access increased insurance utilization. Positive spillover effects on utilization suggest learning from peers. Many beneficiaries were unable to use insurance, demonstrating hurdles to expanding access via insurance. Across a range of health measures, we estimate no significant impacts on health. |
| Keywords: | randomized control trials, hospital insurance, India, peer effects, Spillover effects |
| JEL: | I13 C93 I14 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2021-055&r= |
| By: | Kelishomi, Ali Moghaddasi (Loughborough University); Sgroi, Daniel (University of Warwick, ESRC CAGE Centre, IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Iran has the world’s only government-regulated kidney market, in which around 1000 individuals go through live kidney-removal surgery annually. We report the results of the first field study of donor behavior in this unique and controversial market. Those who enter the market have low income, typically entering to raise funds. They have lower risk tolerance and higher patience levels than the Iranian average. There is no difference in rationality from population averages. There is evidence of altruism among participants. This might shed light on the sort of people likely to participate if other nations were to operate such markets. |
| Keywords: | kidney donation, Iranian kidney market, risk, patience, rationality, altruism, generalized axiom of revealed preference, field experiment JEL Classification: I11, I12, I18, C93, D03 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:592&r= |
| By: | Faisal Bari; Kashif Malik; Muhammad Meki; Simon Quinn |
| Abstract: | We conduct a field experiment offering graduated microcredit clients the opportu-nity to finance a business asset worth four times their previous borrowing limit. We implement this using a hire-purchase contract; our control group is offered a zero-interest loan. We find large, significant and persistent effects from asset finance con¬tracts: treated microenterprise owners run larger businesses and enjoy higher profits; consequently, household consumption increases, particularly on food and children’s education. A dynamic structural model with non-convex capital adjustment costs ra¬tionalises our results; this highlights the potential for welfare improvements through large capital injections that are financially sustainable for microfinance institutions. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2021-03-02&r= |
| By: | Monika Pompeo (University of Nottingham, University of Bologna); Nina Serdarevic (Norwegian School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | One of the most important determinants when it comes to climate change attitudes is political partisanship. While both Democrats and Republicans underestimate the share of their in-groups that believe climate change is happening, this perception gap is wider for Republicans. Using a sample of Republican respondents, we examine their beliefs about climate change and the perceived distribution of climate change attitudes of either other Americans or Republicans. Then, to generate exogenous variation in beliefs, we provide respondents in the treatment groups with the actual distribution of either American or Republican attitudes towards climate change. Our results highlight the importance of distinguishing between beliefs and behaviour when assessing the effect of information on issues that fall strongly along party lines. While information alters the respondents’ beliefs about the Republican Party’s stance on climate change, it is not enough to instigate a change in individual donation behaviour. |
| Keywords: | Republicans, partisanship, climate change, social norms, information, online experiment |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2021-08&r= |
| By: | Thomas Dudek; Eric R. Ulm; Ilan Noy |
| Abstract: | People often fail to insure against catastrophes, even when insurance is subsidized. Even when insuring homes, many homeowners still underinsure the full value of their assets. Some researchers have suggested using long-term insurance contracts to reduce these insurance gaps. We examine insurance decisions in a computer-administered experiment that makes several contributions to our understanding of insurance decisions. First, we provide additional evidence showing that many people prefer long-term insurance. Offering this type of insurance may thus increase insurance penetration. Second, we find that underinsurance can result from the reluctance to update the sum insured if there are costs involved with this updating. Long-term insurance contracts that automatically consider price changes over time can thus also deliver a reduction in the insurance gap. Third, we find that once people have made a decision, they tend to repeat it, demonstrating a strong preference for the status quo. Our research suggests that using this status quo bias may allow insurance companies to further increase insurance demand. As previously demonstrated, our results confirm that subsidies are ineffective in increasing insurance penetration. |
| Keywords: | individual decision-making, choice under risk, disaster insurance, underinsurance, status quo, subsidies |
| JEL: | C91 D81 G22 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9442&r= |