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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Federico Belotti (CEIS & DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Eloisa Campioni (CEIS & DEF, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Vittorio Larocca (Luiss Guido Carli); Francesca Marazzi (CEIS, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Luca Panaccione (University of Rome "La Sapienza"); Andrea Piano Mortari (CEIS, University of Rome "Tor Vergata") |
| Abstract: | We run a laboratory experiment to investigate how the size of the group affects coordination in a bank-run game played repeatedly by participants facing different fellow depositors. For comparability purposes, we keep the coordination tightness constant across different sizes. Participants exhibit an adaptive behavior, since the main drivers of their decisions to withdraw are: previous-round outcomes and own initial choice. Moreover, they mainly adopt the best response to previous-round feedback. However, a sizeable share of participants adopts the opposite mode of behavior, that we refer to as experimentation. The analysis of the determinants of experimentation suggest that subjects adopt this behavior when the probability to lead the group toward the efficient outcome is higher. Finally, our analysis shows that the size of the bank has a significant effect on participants’ decisions, since they withdraw more and experiment less in large banks. |
| Keywords: | Coordination Games, Experimental Studies, Bank Runs |
| JEL: | C70 C92 D80 G21 |
| Date: | 2021–12–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:529&r= |
| By: | Michal Bauer; Jana Cahlíková; Julie Chytilová; Gérard Roland; TomᚠŽelinskı |
| Abstract: | This paper provides experimental evidence showing that members of a majority group systematically shift punishment on innocent members of an ethnic minority. We develop a new incentivized task, the Punishing the Scapegoat Game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one’s own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander (“a scapegoat†). We manipulate the ethnic identity of the scapegoats and study interactions between the majority group and the Roma minority in Slovakia. We find that when no harm is done, there is no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority. In contrast, when a member of one’s own group is harmed, the punishment †passed†on innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group. These results illuminate how individualized tensions can be transformed into a group conflict, dragging minorities into conflicts in a way that is completely unrelated to their behavior. |
| Keywords: | punishment, minority groups, inter-group conflict, discrimination, scapegoating, lab-in-field experiments |
| JEL: | C93 D74 D91 J15 |
| Date: | 2021–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2021-11&r= |
| By: | Blacklow, Paul (Tasmanian School of Business & Economics, University of Tasmania); Sibly, Hugh (Tasmanian School of Business & Economics, University of Tasmania); Corman, Amy Beth (Department of Economics, University of Melbourne) |
| Abstract: | We present an experiment designed to identify whether repeated interactions between people, relative to one-shot interactions, influences the extent they undertake costly actions to improve their social image. We expected these actions to be reduced in repeated interaction but, in contrast, we find they were increased. Gender differences are critical to our findings, with females more likely to spend some money to improve their social image than males irrespective of treatment, but those males who spend, spend significantly more when interactions are repeated. Repeating interactions, and gender, also influence the formation of feedback participants provide to one another. |
| Keywords: | social image, esteem seeking, experimental economics |
| JEL: | C92 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tas:wpaper:39479&r= |
| By: | Haeckl, Simone (University of Stavanger); Kartal, Melis (WU Vienna) |
| Abstract: | We design a novel real-effort experiment to investigate gender differences and stereotypes regarding perseverance and how these affect employment decisions. We find that women are more persistent than men and that the subjects anticipate this difference. While it pays off, in expectation, to hire a female over a male candidate in our experimental employment setting, employers are not more likely to hire a female candidate. Thus, even in a setting where female candidates are statistically better workers and employers hold a positive stereotype about women, employers do not hire women more often than men. This finding contrasts with studies showing that men do benefit from positive stereotypes associated with them, and suggests that stereotypes might be more beneficial for men than for women. |
| Keywords: | non-cognitive skills; perseverance; conscientiousness; gender and stereotypes; labor market experiment |
| JEL: | C91 J16 J71 |
| Date: | 2021–12–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:stavef:2021_005&r= |
| By: | Hager, Anselm (Humboldt University); Hensel, Lukas (Peking University); Roth, Christopher (University of Cologne, ECON tribute, briq, CESifo, CAGE Warwick, CEPR, MPI Bonn); Stegmann, Andreas (University of Warwick, briq, Cage, CEPR,) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a natural field experiment with a major European party to test whether giving party supporters the opportunity to voice their opinions increases their engagement in the party’s electoral campaign. In our experiment, the party asked a random subset of supporters for their opinions on the importance of different topics. Giving supporters more opportunities to voice their opinions increases their engagement in the campaign as measured using behavioral data from the party’s smartphone application. Survey data reveals that our voice treatments also increase other margins of campaign effort as well as perceived voice. Our evidence highlights that parties can increase their supporters’ investment in the democratic process by implementing policies that increase their voice. |
| Keywords: | Political engagement ; Inclusion ; Voice ; Agency ; Natural Field Experiment ; Canvassing JEL Classification: D8 ; P16 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1390&r= |
| By: | Francesco Fallucchi; Daniele Nosenzo; Ernesto Reuben |
| Abstract: | We validate experimentally a new survey item to measure the preference for competition.The item, which measures participants’ agreement with the statement “Competition brings the best out of me”, predicts individuals’ willingness to compete in the laboratory after controlling for their ability, beliefs, and risk attitude (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). We further validate the explanatory power of our survey item outside of the laboratory, by comparing responses across two samples with predicted differences in their preference for competition: professional athletes and non-athletes. As predicted, we find that athletes score higher on the item than non-athletes. |
| Keywords: | competition; survey question; experiment validation |
| JEL: | D90 D91 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irs:cepswp:2021-12&r= |
| By: | Georgios Gerasimou |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the elicitation of a decision maker's strict preferences and their possible indifference or incomparability/indecisiveness. Every subject in both treatments of an incentivized lab experiment could choose multiple alternatives from each of the 50 distinct menus of popular gift-card pairs that they saw. Subjects in the non-forced-choice treatment could, in addition, avoid/delay making an active choice at those menus. Applying a non-parametric optimization method on data collected from 273 subjects, we find that nearly 60% of them are well-approximated by an indifference-permitting model of complete- or incomplete-preference maximization. Most recovered preferences are unique, have a non-trivial indifference part and, where relevant, a distinct indecisiveness part. The two kinds of distinctions between indifference and indecisiveness uncovered by this method are theory-guided and documented empirically for the first time. These findings suggest that accounting for possible indifferences and/or incomparabilities in the data-collection process and analysis can be useful in eliciting transitive weak preferences. Two aspects of the experimental design, finally, allow for interpreting an additional 10% of subjects as revealing a systematic preference for randomization or satisficing. |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2111.14431&r= |
| By: | Anselm Hager (Humboldt University); Lukas Hensel (Peking University); Christopher Roth (University of Cologne, ECONtribute, briq, CESifo, CAGE Warwick, CEPR, MPI Bonn); Andreas Stegmann (University of Warwick, briq, Cage, CEPR) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a natural field experiment with a major European party to test whether giv-ing party supporters the opportunity to voice their opinions increases their engagement in the party’s electoral campaign. In our experiment, the party asked a random subset of supporters for their opinions on the importance of different topics. Giving supporters more opportunities to voice their opinions increases their engagement in the campaign as measured using behavioral data from the party’s smartphone application. Survey data reveals that our voice treatments also increase other margins of campaign effort as well as perceived voice. Our evidence highlights that parties can increase their supporters’ investment in the democratic process by implementing policies that increase their voice. |
| Keywords: | Political engagement, Inclusion, Voice, Agency, Natural Field Experiment, Canvassing |
| JEL: | D8 P16 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:133&r= |
| By: | Biljana Meiske |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the consequences of productivity shocks on conflict behavior in the presence of loss aversion. In a first step, I incorporate expectation based loss preferences `a la KË oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) into a Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game and show that negative productivity shocks entail larger conflict investments if agents are loss averse (and smaller investments if agents are gain-seeking); the reverse holds in case of a positive productivity shock. In a second step, a lab experiment (N=496) was conducted with participants playing repeated guns-and-butter conflict game under changing productivity regimes. The experimental results reveal that while negative productivity shocks (channeled through loss aversion) have the predicted effects, positive productivity shocks lead to the predicted increase in conflict investment among gain-seeking, but fail to reduce conflict investment among loss-averse participants. Furthermore, absent any changes in productivity level, conflict investments are shown to increase in the level of loss aversion. |
| Keywords: | conflict rent-seeking loss aversion reference dependence productivity shocks |
| JEL: | D91 C92 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2021-18&r= |
| By: | Lata Gangadharan (Monash University); Philip J. Grossman (Monash University); Nina Xue (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | We propose a new means of identifying self-image concerns by eliciting beliefs, and design a giving experiment to compare different incentive mechanisms in the presence of a self-signalling motive to distort beliefs. Self-image biases are pronounced for non-donors both when beliefs are not incentivised and with a simple incentive. A variation of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure appears to "debias" beliefs. We introduce a novel procedure to measure the strength of altruism and find that individuals with weaker altruistic motives are more prone to motivated beliefs. We report a correlation between revealed preferences and beliefs that is independent of elicitation timing. |
| Keywords: | self-image, motivated beliefs, incentive mechanisms, altruism, experiment |
| JEL: | C90 D90 H40 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2021-17&r= |
| By: | Diya Elizabeth Abraham (Vienna University of Economics and Business & Masaryk University); Luca Corazzini (University of Venice, "Ca' Foscari"); Miloš Fišar (Vienna University of Economics and Business & Masaryk University); Tommaso Reggiani (Cardiff University, Masaryk University & IZA) |
| Abstract: | Experimental studies have modeled individual funding of social projects as contributions to a threshold public good. We examine donors’ behavior when they face multiple threshold public goods and the possibility of coordinating their contributions via an intermediary. Employing the experimental design developed in Corazzini, Cotton, and Reggiani (2020), we vary both the size of a ‘destination rule’, which places restrictions on the intermediary’s use of a donor’s funds, as well as the overhead cost of the intermediary, modeled as a sunk cost incurred by the intermediary whether or not any of the public goods are successfully funded. We show that subjects behave in line with equilibrium predictions with regard to the size of the destination rule, only increasing their contributions in the presence of a relatively high destination rule that prevents expropriation by the intermediary. However, we find that the positive effect of a high destination rule is undone in the presence of overhead sunk costs on the intermediary, thus providing evidence in favor of the sunk-cost bias and ‘overhead aversion’ that are commonly exhibited by donors when selecting charities. |
| Keywords: | overhead aversion, threshold public goods, delegation, fundraising |
| JEL: | C91 C92 H40 H41 L31 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2021-14&r= |
| By: | Ana B. Galvão; James Mitchell |
| Abstract: | Economic statistics are commonly published without any explicit indication of their uncertainty. To assess if and how the UK public interprets and understands data uncertainty, we conduct two waves of a randomized controlled online experiment. A control group is presented with the headline point estimate of GDP, as emphasized by the statistical office. Treatment groups are then presented with alternative qualitative and quantitative communications of GDP data uncertainty. We find that most of the public understands that uncertainty is inherent in official GDP numbers. But communicating uncertainty information improves understanding. It encourages the public not to take estimates at face-value, but does not decrease trust in the data. Quantitative tools to communicate data uncertainty - notably intervals, density strips, and bell curves - are especially beneficial. They reduce dispersion of the public’s subjective probabilistic expectations of data uncertainty, improving alignment with objective estimates. |
| Keywords: | Experiments; Data Uncertainty; Uncertainty Communication; Data Revisions |
| JEL: | C82 E01 D80 |
| Date: | 2021–12–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedcwq:93544&r= |
| By: | Philip; Roessler; Peter; Carroll; Flora; Myamba; Cornel; Jahari; Blandina; Kilama; Daniel; Nielson |
| Abstract: | We study the causal impact of reducing the mobile gender gap. Leveraging one of the first large-scale experimental studies on women’s mobile phone ownership, we find that in Tanzania over thirteen months smartphones increased households’ annual consumption per capita by 20% compared to control. Consumption gains operated through women’s control and use of the smartphones. However, treatment effects were attenuated by handset turnover. By endline only 34% in the smartphone condition still possessed their handsets. This highlights the economic benefits of closing the mobile gender gap but also the tenuous nature of productive asset ownership for women in low-income households. |
| Keywords: | finance and microfinance; climate change; anticipatory humanitarian action |
| JEL: | J16 L96 O12 O33 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2021-05&r= |
| By: | Cevat Giray Aksoy; Antonio Cabrales; Mathias Dolls; Ruben Durante; Lisa Windsteiger |
| Abstract: | We conduct a large-scale survey experiment in nine European countries to study how priming a major crisis (COVID-19), common economic interests, and a shared identity influences altruism, reciprocity and trust of EU citizens. We ï¬ nd that priming the COVID-19 pandemic increases altruism and reciprocity towards compatriots, citizens of other EU countries, and non-EU citizens. Priming common European values also boosts altruism and reciprocity but only towards compatriots and fellow Europeans. Priming common economic interests has no tangible impact on behaviour. Trust in others is not affected by any treatment. Our results are consistent with the parochial altruism hypothesis, which asserts that because altruism arises out of inter-group conflict, humans show a tendency to favor members of their own groups. |
| Keywords: | COVID-19, Europe, altruism, reciprocity, survey experiment |
| JEL: | D72 H51 H53 H55 O52 P52 |
| Date: | 2021–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2021-07&r= |
| By: | Rachel Glennerster; Joanna Murray; Victor Pouliquen |
| Abstract: | Mass media can spread information and disinformation, but its impact is hard to rigorously measure. Using a two-level randomized controlled trial covering 5 million people, we test both exposure to mass media (with 1,500 women receiving radios) and the impact of a high-quality, intensive 2.5 year, family planning mass media campaign in Burkina Faso (8 of 16 local radio stations received the campaign). We find women who received a radio in noncampaign areas reduced contraception use by 5.2 percentage points (p=0.039) and had more conservative gender attitudes. In contrast, modern contraceptive use rose 5.9 percentage points (p=0.046) in campaign areas and 5.8 percentage points (p=0.030) among those given radios in campaign areas. Births fell 10%. The campaign changed beliefs about contraception but not preferences, and encouraged existing users to use more consistently. We estimate the nationwide campaign scale-up led to 225,000 additional women using modern contraception, at a cost of US$7.7 per additional user. |
| Keywords: | Mass Media Campaign; Radio; Modern Contraception; Family Planning; RCT. |
| JEL: | J13 J16 L82 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2021-04&r= |
| By: | Masaki Aoyagi; Guillaume Frechette; Sevgi Yuksel |
| Abstract: | This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study beliefs and their relationship to action and strategy choices in finitely and indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games. We find subjects' beliefs about the other player's action are accurate despite some systematic deviations corresponding to early pessimism in the indefinitely repeated game and late optimism in the finitely repeated game. The data reveals a close link between beliefs and actions that differs between the two games. In particular, the same history of play leads to different beliefs, and the same belief leads to different action choices in each game. Moreover, we find beliefs anticipate the evolution of behavior within a supergame, changing in response to the history of play (in both games) and the number of rounds played (in the finitely repeated game). We then use the subjects' beliefs over actions in each round to identify their beliefs over supergame strategies played by the other player. We find these beliefs correctly capture the different classes of strategies used in each game. Importantly, subjects using different strategies have different beliefs, and for the most part, strategies are subjectively rational given beliefs. The results also suggest subjects tend to overestimate the likelihood that others use the same strategy as them, while underestimating the likelihood that others use less cooperative strategies. |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1119r&r= |
| By: | Pushkar Maitra (Monash University); Sandip Mitra (Indian Statistical Institute); Dilip Mookherjee (Boston University); Sujata Visaria (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a field experiment in India comparing two approaches to appointing a local commission agent to select eligible smallholder farmers for a subsidized credit program: a private trader in TRAIL, versus a political appointee in GRAIL. Both schemes had similar loan take-up, repayments and similar treatment effects on borrowing and farm output, but farmers' profits increased significantly only in the TRAIL scheme. This is explained by a larger reduction in the unit costs of production. While there is evidence that the TRAIL agent selected farmers of higher productivity, differences in selection (on productivity or other relevant attributes) is unable to explain much of the observed differences in average treatment effects on farmer profits. We explain the larger treatment effects in TRAIL conditional on selection, as the result of the TRAIL agents' superior motivation and their capacity to offer treated farmers' business advice and lower their production costs. |
| Keywords: | Targeting, Intermediation, Decentralization, Community Driven Development, Agricultural Credit |
| JEL: | H42 I38 O13 O16 O17 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2021-19&r= |
| By: | José J. Domínguez (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.); Natalia Montinari (Department of Economics, University of Bologna.) |
| Abstract: | In response to the slow progress toward gender equality observed in the last decades, organizations and policy makers in many countries are increasingly looking at implementing quotas to close the gender gap. However, the expected benefits and potential drawbacks of such interventions are widely debated. We ran a laboratory experiment to investigate how gender quotas in hiring affect the allocation of workers into different tasks within an organization. 128 participants in the role of employers were asked to hire a team of six workers from a pool of 15 and assign them to one of two tasks which differed in complexity and profitability. Employers had information about workers’ age, gender, and university major as well as a signal of performance. Workers assigned to the Simple Task had to complete additions, while workers assigned to the Challenging Task had to solve mathematical problems. Although no gender difference was observable in the performance of either task, in the absence of quotas, high-ability women were both less likely to be hired and less likely to be assigned to the Challenging Task compared to high-ability men. With a quota of 50% female workers imposed on hiring, the number of women assigned to the Simple Task increased, while the number of those assigned to the Challenging Task remained significantly lower compared to men. Our findings suggest that gender quotas to increase the number of women hired may backfire, resulting in their more likely assignment to less-challenging, low-promotability tasks compared to men, and impairing their chances of career advancement. Moreover, we find that in the presence of a gender quota employers’ earnings are significantly lower, and that this is because they are more likely to hire lowability women. One explanation could be that gender quotas convey a message which suggests the overall low quality of the pool of female workers. |
| Keywords: | Affirmative action, gender quotas, gender gap, task assignment, laboratory experiments. |
| JEL: | D03 C91 J71 |
| Date: | 2021–12–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gra:wpaper:21/13&r= |
| By: | Marco Piovesan (Dept. of Economics, University of Verona); Helene Willadsen (Dept. of Economics and Copenhagen Center for Social Data Science, University of Copenhagen); Sarah Zaccagni (Dept. of Economics and CEBI, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) measures the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. As cognitive reflection is a form of cognitive ability, the CRT may be used in substitution of Intelligence Quotient (IQ) tests. We test this idea by asking 686 children enrolled in Danish schools to answer both a CRT and an IQ test. We compare the children's performances in these tests and find that CRT is highly correlated with IQ. In our analysis of the correlation, we control for gender and age. Our results confirm that a short CRT can substitute for the more extensive IQ test. In addition to the proof of the interchangeability between IQ and CRT, we show that both measures of cognitive abilities are a significant predictor of behavioral inconsistency when we measure children's time and risk preferences. |
| Keywords: | Intelligence Quotient, Cognitive Reflection, Cognitive Skills, Inconsistent behavior, Time preference, Risk preference, Field Experiment, |
| JEL: | C93 D91 J13 J24 |
| Date: | 2021–12–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kucebi:2121&r= |
| By: | Jade Siu; Olivier Sterck; Cory Rodgers |
| Abstract: | Should cash transfer programmes restrict consumer choice? For example, should food assistance delivered in cash be restricted to food and exclude temptation goods? Theoretically, if transfers are extra-marginal, restrictions induce (1) a substitution effect away from restricted goods and (2) a negative wealth effect if transfer recipients resell unrestricted goods at a loss to access restricted goods. The welfare impact on transfer recipients is negative. We test and corroborate these predictions by exploiting a natural experiment in a refugee settlement in Kenya, where some refugees receive monthly cash transfers restricted to food while others get unrestricted cash transfers. |
| Keywords: | Cash transfers; Vouchers; Restrictions; Debt |
| JEL: | O12 O15 I38 G51 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2021-14&r= |
| By: | Takahashi, Ryo (Waseda University, Graduate School of Economics); Otsuka, Keijiro (Kobe University, Institute of Developing Economies); Tilahun, Mesfin (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Birhane, Emiru (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Holden, Stein T. (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences) |
| Abstract: | In this study, we argue that while community forest management is effective in protecting forest resources as argued by Ostrom, it may fail to provide proper incentives to take care of such resources because of collective sharing of benefits of forest management. This study proposes a mixed private and community management system as a desirable arrangement for timber forest management in Ethiopia, which is characterized by communal protection of community-owned forest area and individual management of individually owned trees. By conducting a randomized experiment in Ethiopia, we found that the mixed management system significantly stimulated intensive forest management activities, including pruning, guarding, and watering. Furthermore, the treated members extracted more timber trees and forest products, which are byproducts of tree management (thinned trees and pruned branches). In contrast, the extracted volumes of nontimber forest products unrelated to tree management (fodder and honey) did not change by the intervention. |
| Keywords: | property regimes; individual rights commons; community forest management; RCT |
| JEL: | O13 P48 Q23 Q24 |
| Date: | 2021–12–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nlsclt:2021_006&r= |
| By: | Pedro Naso; Tania Theoduloz; Nicholas Tyack; Dambala Gelo; Mare Sarr; Timothy Swanson |
| Abstract: | We run an experiment in five countries with 7,132 participants to study how information on the contribution of others influences contributions to climate change mitigation. Participants receive artificially generated information on the average contribution of others, on the ranking of contributions and endowments of others, and on others’ nationalities. We show that (i) participants from developed countries free ride on the average of others, whereas participants from developing countries follow the lead of the majority; (ii) information on the ranking of contributions increases participants’ contributions as compared to information on the average of others; and (iii) participants dislike to be in the first and last position of the contribution ranking. Our results suggest that a country’s contribution to climate change mitigation can be promoted by using information on the contributions of other countries. |
| Date: | 2021–12–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gii:ciesrp:cies_rp_72&r= |
| By: | Jana Cahlíková; Lubomir Cingl; KateÅ™ina Chadimová; Miroslav ZajíÄ ek |
| Keywords: | tax compliance; natural experiment; deterrence; simplicity; QR code |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D02 H24 H26 |
| Date: | 2021–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2021-12&r= |
| By: | Deep Mukhopadhyay |
| Abstract: | An iconoclastic philosopher and polymath, Charles Sanders Peirce (1837-1914) is among the greatest of American minds. In 1872, Peirce conducted a series of experiments to determine the distribution of response times to an auditory stimulus, which is widely regarded as one of the most significant statistical investigations in the history of nineteenth-century American mathematical research (Stigler, 1978). On the 150th anniversary of this historic experiment, we look back at Peirce's view on empirical modeling through a modern statistical lens. |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2111.08054&r= |
| By: | Pangallo, Marco; Heinrich, Torsten; Jang, Yoojin; Scott, Alex; Tarbush, Bassel; Wiese, Samuel; Mungo, Luca |
| Abstract: | We analyze the performance of the best-response dynamic across all normal-form games using a random games approach. The playing sequence—the order in which players update their actions—is essentially irrelevant in determining whether the dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium in certain classes of games (e.g. in potential games) but, when evaluated across all possible games, convergence to equilibrium depends on the playing sequence in an extreme way. Our main asymptotic result shows that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in a vanishingly small fraction of all (large) games when players take turns according to a fixed cyclic order. By contrast, when the playing sequence is random, the dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium if one exists in almost all (large) games. |
| Keywords: | Best-response dynamics, equilibrium convergence, random games |
| JEL: | C62 C72 C73 D83 |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amz:wpaper:2021-23&r= |
| By: | Ferdinand M. Vieider (-) |
| Abstract: | I present a model generating delay-discounting from noisy mental representations of time delays. The optimal combination of noisy signals about time delays with prior information results in a stochastic model predicting discounting to exhibit present-bias, but to be stationary and delaydependent once up-front delays are introduced. The derivation from an optimal encoding-decoding process sidesteps arbitrariness concerns voiced about earlier models. Data collected in an experiment support the need for separate but interacting parameters to capture present-bias and delaydependence. The account explains why non-trivial discounting is routinely observed in experiments using monetary rewards instead of consumption. |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:21/1036&r= |