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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Luciano Andreozzi; Marco Faillo; Ali Seyhun Saral |
| Abstract: | When decisions are made before roles are assigned, the Dictator Game is strategically equivalent to a linear Public Goods Game. This suggests that, when played between individuals with the same income, the prosocial behavior observed may be attributed at least in part to reciprocal altruism. Dictators transfer money only because they believe Recipients would transfer money as well, if roles were reversed. By contrast, when the game is played between individuals with different background income, the generosity of the rich towards the poor is more easily attributed to pure, non-reciprocal altruism. We test this hypothesis by eliciting conditional preferences for giving in a Dictator Game in two treatments. In the first students are matched with other students, while in the second students are matched with subjects living in a refugee camp in Uganda. We find that our predictions are only partially borne out by the data. Whether giving is directed to a person with similar or lower socioeconomic status, most subjects reveal conditionally altruistic preferences. Unconditional altruism is virtually absent in both treatments. These counter-intuitive results have important implications for the experimental elicitation of social preferences. |
| Keywords: | altruism, dictator game, reciprocity, social preferences, socioeconomic status |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:2101&r= |
| By: | Prissé, Benjamin; Jorrat, Diego |
| Abstract: | We ran an experiment to study whether lack of control has an effect on experimental results. Subjects who were recruited following standard procedures completed the experiment online or in the laboratory. The experimental design is otherwise identical between conditions. Results suggest that there are no differences between conditions, except for a larger percentage of laboratory subjects donating nothing in the Dictator Game. |
| Keywords: | Time Preferences, CTB, Experiments. |
| JEL: | B41 C99 |
| Date: | 2021–09–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:109918&r= |
| By: | Bernabe, Angelique; Hossain, Tanjim; Yu, Haomiao |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate how introducing the concept of truth in the natural context of a game affects player behavior using two games. Two players simultaneously make reimbursement claims for a damaged product, where players' payoffs depend only on their claims but not on the true price. Both games are dominance-solvable, and one of them has a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium, which many participants easily identified. Yet, claims in our experiments are significantly affected by the price. Analyzing the role of truth on participants' choices, we show that one needs strategic considerations and preferences for honesty to explain the results. |
| Keywords: | Preference for Honesty, Truth-telling in Games, Traveler's Dilemma, Dominance-solvable Games, Strictly Dominant Strategy, Level-k thinking |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2021–09–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:109968&r= |
| By: | Asad Islam (Centre for Development Economics and Sustainability and Department of Economics, Monash University); Debayan Pakrashi (Department of Economic Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur); Soubhagya Sahoo (Department of Economic Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur); Liang Choon Wang (Department of Economics, Monash University); Yves Zenou (Department of Economics, Monash University) |
| Abstract: | Using a field experiment in India where patients are randomly assigned to rank among a set of physicians of the same gender but with different castes and years of experience, we show that the differences in patients’ physician choices are consistent with gender-based statistical discrimination. Labor market experience cannot easily overcome the discrimination that female doctors suffer. Further, we find that gender discrimination is greater for lower caste doctors, who typically suffer from caste discrimination. Given the increasing share of professionals from a lower caste background, our results suggest that the 'intersectionality' between gender and caste leads to increased gender inequality among professionals in India. |
| Keywords: | gender discrimination, statistical discrimination, caste discrimination, intersectionality, affirmative action |
| JEL: | J16 J15 I15 O12 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2021-07&r= |
| By: | John List |
| Abstract: | This review summarizes results of field experiments examining individual behaviors across several market settings from - open-air markets to rideshare markets to tax-compliance markets - where people sort themselves into market roles wherein they make consequential decisions. Using three distinct examples from my own research on the endowment effect, left-digit bias, and omission bias, I showcase how field experiments can help researchers understand mediators, heterogeneity, and causal moderation involved in judgment biases in the field. In this manner, the review highlights that economic field experiments can serve an invaluable intellectual role alongside traditional laboratory research. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00738&r= |
| By: | Cibik, Ceren Bengu (University of Warwick); Sgroi, Daniel (University of Warwick & IZA) |
| Abstract: | We provide the rst investigation of the relationship between self-awareness and dishonesty in a multi-wave pre-registered experiment with 1,260 subjects. In the first wave we vary the level of awareness of subjects' past dishonesty and explore the impact on behaviour in tasks that include the scope to lie. In the second wave we vary the degree of competitiveness in one of our core tasks to further explore the interactions between self-awareness, (dis)honesty and competition. We also test for the experimental demand effect in order to rule it out. Our results suggest that in non-interactive tasks, self-awareness helps to lower dishonesty in the future. However, in tasks that are competitive in nature becoming more aware of past dishonesty raises the likelihood of dishonesty in the future. In other words, we show when making people aware of their own past dishonesty can help to reduce dishonesty and when it might backfire. We are also careful to test for any possible demand e ect, and perform text analysis to provide independent veri cation of the success of our treatments. |
| Keywords: | lying ; honesty ; truth-telling ; cognitive dissonance ; social norms ; competition ; experiment JEL Classification: D03 ; D82 ; C91 ; C92 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1373&r= |
| By: | Danková, Katarína; Morita, Hodaka; Servátka, Maroš; Zhang, Le |
| Abstract: | How does job assignment to positions with different surplus affect fairness concerns? We experimentally examine agents’ fairness concerns in a three-person ultimatum game in which all agents are asked to complete a general knowledge quiz before being assigned to a high-stake or low-stake position. We disentangle two possible channels through which job assignment impacts fairness concerns, wage differences and the principal’s intentions, by comparing cases in which the job assignment is determined randomly or by the principal. The knowledge quiz, which mimics performance evaluation, signifies the distinction between the two cases as it provides a basis on which the principal can make the assignment decision. We find that the principal’s intentions significantly impact fairness concerns of the agents assigned to the low-stake position, but wage differences themselves do not. We elaborate on managerial implications of our findings. |
| Keywords: | job assignment, fairness concerns, experiment, ultimatum game, wage differences, intentions |
| JEL: | C91 C92 J31 J71 |
| Date: | 2021–09–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:109962&r= |
| By: | Xiu Chen (College of Business, Southern University of Science and Technology); Xiaojian Zhao (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | The paper identifies a potential gap between intertemporal choices and time preference: The elicited intertemporal decisions could be partly driven by a biased perception of time and thus may not completely reveal the actual time preference. To test this, we explore the causal relationship between time perception and intertemporal choices by conducting a laboratory experiment, in which cognitive load is used as a stimulating instrument to induce differences in time perception. We establish that the perceived time lengths for subjects with high cognitive load are shorter than those with low cognitive load and that individuals who underestimate time appear more patient in their intertemporal decisions. The mediation analyses show that time perception mediates a significant part of the cognitive load’s effect on intertemporal choices. Our study thus demonstrates that the time preference identified by intertemporal choices might be confounded by the potentially biased perception of how time flies. |
| Keywords: | time perception, intertemporal choice, time preference, cognitive load |
| JEL: | C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2021-09&r= |
| By: | Shira Haderlein |
| Abstract: | This article presents evidence from an online survey experiment exploring how parents evaluate and select schools. Results suggest that achievement matters most to parents and that student demographics affect both parents’ perception of school quality and their likelihood of selecting into a school. |
| Keywords: | experimental survey methods, parent preferences, school choice |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:ecd4ea96d3ae4d10844a1f6963006c7a&r= |
| By: | Rudolf Kerschbamer; Regine Oexl |
| Abstract: | Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on effort provision in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on the agent's effort provision than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect and a noise-canceling effect is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on effort provision. |
| Keywords: | Gift exchange, principal agent model, incomplete contracts, random shocks, reciprocity, laboratory experiments, long-term contracts |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D81 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2021-27&r= |
| By: | Jacquelyn Humphrey; Shimon Kogan; Jacob Sagi; Laura Starks |
| Abstract: | We design an experiment to understand how social preferences affect investment decisions through stock allocations and probability assessments. The major preference channel is asymmetric in social outcomes – although negative and positive responsible investment (RI) externalities have the same magnitudes, negative externalities have greater impact on investment choices. The effect is persistent, but heterogenous. We also find asymmetries in belief formation and learning constitute a secondary channel. Overall, our results are consistent with important stylized empirical facts and the predictions of recent RI theories that social preferences lead to different investment choices, but our analyses also suggest important future modeling directions. |
| JEL: | C91 G11 G41 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29288&r= |
| By: | Camille Cornand (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France); Paul Hubert (Banque de France & Sciences Po – OFCE, 31 rue Croix des Petits Champs, 75001 Paris, France) |
| Abstract: | We compare disagreement in expectations and the frequency of forecast revisions among five categories of agents: households, firms, professional forecasters, policymakers and participants to laboratory experiments. We provide evidence of disagreement among all categories of agents. There is however a strong heterogeneity across categories: while policymakers and professional forecasters exhibit low disagreement, firms and households show strong disagreement. This translates into a heterogeneous frequency of forecast revision across categories of agents, with policymakers revising more frequently their forecasts than firms and professional forecasters. Households last revise less frequently. We are also able to explore the external validity of experimental expectations. |
| Keywords: | inflation expectations, information frictions, disagreement, forecast revisions, experimental forecasts, survey forecasts, central bank forecasts |
| JEL: | E3 E5 E7 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2116&r= |
| By: | Philip Solimine; Luke Boosey |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we examine behavior in a voluntary resource sharing game that incorporates endogenous network formation; an incentive problem that is increasingly common in contemporary digital economies. Using a laboratory experimental implementation of repeated play in this information-rich decision setting, we examine the effects of a simple reputation feedback system on patterns of linking and contribution decisions. Reduced-form estimates find significant effects of the information treatment on a number of key outcomes such as efficiency, complementarity, and decentralization. To further understand the driving causes of these observed changes in behavior, we develop and estimate a discrete-choice framework, using computationally efficient panel methods to identify the structure of social preferences in this setting. We find that the information treatment focuses reciprocity, and helps players coordinate to reach more efficient outcomes. |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2109.14204&r= |
| By: | M. Mehrab Bakhtiar; Raymond Guiteras; James A. Levinsohn; Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak |
| Abstract: | Addressing public health externalities often requires community-level collective action. Each person’s sanitation behavior can affect the health of neighbors. We report on a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted with 19,000 households in rural Bangladesh where we randomized (1) either group financial incentives or a non-financial “social recognition” reward, and (2) asking each household to make either a private pledge or a public pledge to maintain hygienic latrines. The group financial reward has the strongest impact in the short term (3 months), inducing a 7.5-12.5 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership. Getting people to publicly commit to maintaining and using a hygienic latrine in front of their neighbors induced a 4.2-6.1 percentage point increase in hygienic latrine ownership in the short term. In the medium term (15 months), the effect of the financial reward dissipates while the effect of the public commitment persists. Neither social recognition nor private commitments produce effects statistically distinguishable from zero. |
| JEL: | O1 Q56 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29294&r= |
| By: | Ash, Elliott (ETH Zurich and ESRC CAGE Centre); Sgroi, Daniel (University of Warwick, ESRC CAGE Centre and IZA Bonn); Tuckwell, Anthony (University of Warwick, ESRC CAGE Centre and Alan Turing Institute); Zhuo, Shi (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Mindfulness meditation has been found to influence various important outcomes such as health, stress, depression, productivity, and altruism. We report evidence from a randomised controlled trial on a previously untested effect of mindfulness: information avoidance. We find that a relatively short mindfulness treatment (two weeks, 15 minutes a day) is able to induce a statistically significant reduction in information avoidance – that is, avoiding information that may cause worry or regret. Supplementary evidence supports mindfulness’s effects on emotion regulation as a possible mechanism for the effect. |
| Keywords: | mindfulness ; information avoidance ; randomized controlled trial JEL Classification: D91 ; I31 ; C91 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1372&r= |
| By: | Barbosa, Daniel AC (PUC-Rio, Brazil); Fetzer, Thiemo (University of Warwick); Soto, Caterina (London School of Economics); Souza, Pedro CL (Queen Mary University) |
| Abstract: | We provide experimental evidence that monitoring of the police activity through body-worn cameras reduces use-of-force, handcuffs and arrests, and enhances criminal reporting. Stronger treatment effects occur on events classified ex-ante of low seriousness. Monitoring effects are moderated by officer rank, which is consistent with a career concern motive by junior officers. Overall, results show that the use of body-worn cameras de-escalates conflicts. |
| Keywords: | police citizen interaction ; use-of-force ; technology ; field experiment JEL Classification: C93 ; D73 ; D74 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1371&r= |
| By: | Alex Armand; Alexander Coutts; Pedro C. Vicente; Ines Vilela |
| Abstract: | Corruption is often harmful for economic development, yet it is difficult to measure due to its illicit nature. We propose a novel corruption game to characterize the interaction between actual political leaders and citizens, and implement it in Northern Mozambique. Contrary to the game-theoretic prediction, both leaders and citizens engage in corruption. Importantly, corruption in the game is correlated with real-world corruption by leaders: citizens send bribes to leaders whom we observe appropriating community money, and these leaders are likely to reciprocate the bribes. In corrupt behavior, we identify an important trust dimension captured by a standard trust game. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, game, trust, lab-in-the-field, citizen, political leader, incentives, behavior, elite capture |
| JEL: | D10 D70 D72 D73 C90 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:novafr:wp2112&r= |
| By: | Evan Munro; Stefan Wager; Kuang Xu |
| Abstract: | In evaluating social programs, it is important to measure treatment effects within a market economy, where interference arises due to individuals buying and selling various goods at the prevailing market price. We introduce a stochastic model of potential outcomes in market equilibrium, where the market price is an exposure mapping. We prove that average direct and indirect treatment effects converge to interpretable mean-field treatment effects, and provide estimators for these effects through a unit-level randomized experiment augmented with randomization in prices. We also provide a central limit theorem for the estimators that depends on the sensitivity of outcomes to prices. For a variant where treatments are continuous, we show that the sum of direct and indirect effects converges to the total effect of a marginal policy change. We illustrate the coverage and consistency properties of the estimators in simulations of different interventions in a two-sided market. |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2109.11647&r= |
| By: | Pascale Bazoche (SMART-LERECO - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - AGROCAMPUS OUEST - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Nicolas Guinet (ALISS - Alimentation et sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Sylvaine Poret (ALISS - Alimentation et sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Sabrina Teyssier (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes) |
| Abstract: | A widespread transition towards diets based on plant proteins as substitutes for animal proteins would contribute to food system sustainability. Such changes in consumer food choices can be fostered by public policy. We conducted an online experiment to test whether providing consumers with information regarding the negative consequences of meat consumption on the environment or health increases the substitution of animal-based proteins with plant-based proteins. The consumers had to make three meal selections, the first without exposure to information and the latter two after exposure to environmental or health information. One group of consumers served as the control and received no information. The results show that half of the consumers chose meals with animal proteins in all three cases. The information intervention had a limited impact on the average consumer. However, a latent class analysis shows that the information intervention impacted a sub-sample of the consumers. Information policy does not appear to be sufficient for altering consumer behaviour regarding the consumption of animal proteins. |
| Abstract: | Une transition généralisée vers des régimes alimentaires basés sur les protéines végétales comme substituts des protéines animales contribuerait à la durabilité du système alimentaire. De tels changements dans les choix alimentaires des consommateurs peuvent être encouragés par les politiques publiques. Nous avons mené une expérimentation en ligne pour tester si l'information des consommateurs sur les conséquences négatives de la consommation de viande sur l'envi- ronnement ou la santé augmente la substitution des protéines d'origine animale par des protéines d'origine végétale. Les consommateurs devaient faire trois choix de repas, le premier sans exposition à l'information et les deux derniers après exposition à l'information environnementale ou sanitaire. Un groupe de consommateurs a servi de témoin et n'a reçu aucune information. Les résultats montrent que la moitié des consommateurs ont choisi des repas à base de protéines animales dans les trois cas. L'apport d'information a eu un impact limité sur le consommateur moyen. Cependant, une analyse de classe latente montre que l'intervention informationnelle a eu un impact sur un sous-échantillon de consommateurs. La politique d'information n'apparaît pas suffisante pour modifier le comportement des consommateurs vis-à-vis de la consommation de protéines animales. |
| Keywords: | Experiment,Information,Food consumption,Alternative proteins,Environment,Health,Expérience,Consommation alimentaire,Protéines alternatives,Environnement,Santé |
| Date: | 2021–09–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03350356&r= |
| By: | Gharad T. Bryan; Dean Karlan; Adam Osman |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study the impact of substantially larger enterprise loans, in collaboration with an Egyptian lender. Larger loans generate small average impacts, but machine learning using psychometric data reveals dramatic heterogeneity. Top-performers (i.e., those with the highest predicted treatment effects) substantially increase profits, whereas profits for poor-performers drop. The magnitude of this difference implies that an individual lender’s credit allocation choices matter for aggregate income. Evidence on two fronts suggests large loans would be misallocated: top-performers are predicted by loan officers to have higher default rates; and, top-performers grow less than others when given small loans, implying that allocating larger loans based on prior performance is not efficient. Our results have important implications for credit expansion policy and our understanding of entrepreneurial talent: on the former, the use of psychometric data to identify top-performers suggests a pathway towards better allocation that revolves around entrepreneurial type more than firm type; on the latter, the reversal of fortune for poor-performers, who do well with small loans but not large, indicates a type of entrepreneur that we call a “go-getter” who performs well when constrained but poorly when not. |
| JEL: | D22 D24 L26 M21 O12 O16 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29311&r= |
| By: | Pauline Lecole (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Raphaële Préget (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Sophie Thoyer (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | The 2014 CAP introduced the Small Farmers Scheme (SFS), offering small farms the option of an unconditional annual lump-sum payment per farm replacing the standard first pillar direct payments. This paper assesses the acceptability in France of an extended version of the 2014 SFS for the post-2020 CAP: it includes conditions on farmers' environmental efforts and on salaried employment. The results of a discrete choice experiment conducted at the scale of France with 608 farmers receiving less than 15,000€ in first pillar payments show that an SFS with an environmental certification prerequisite is attractive to French small farmers, notably in the market gardening sector. We provide simulated results of the uptake rate and budgetary impacts of different SFS scenarii on the population of non-retired French farmers based on the last agricultural census.. |
| Keywords: | CAP,small farms,Discrete choice experiments |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03349120&r= |
| By: | So Kubota (Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishiwaseda Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan.) |
| Abstract: | In this note, I investigate the circulation of money in small communities. I build a two-player repeated gift-giving game and then show that players can sustain coopera- tion by using money. An ecient outcome is obtained when players are able to hold multiple units of currency. |
| Keywords: | primitive money, repeated game. |
| JEL: | C73 E42 N10 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wap:wpaper:2118&r= |
| By: | Margaux Lapierre (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Gwenolé Le Velly (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Douadia Bougherara (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Raphaële Préget (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Alexandre Sauquet (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | One of the factors that discourages farmers from enrolling in agro-environmental schemes (AES) is the uncertainty of the costs and benefits associated with the adoption of the new practices. In this study, we distinguish between the "internal uncertainty" that is related to the characteristics of the farmer and his/her parcels and "external uncertainty", which is related to the occurrence of external events. We propose three innovations to better account for uncertainty in AES design and test their attractiveness through a choice experiment. We find that proposing contracts that allow suspending the conditions of the contract for one year enhances participation. |
| Keywords: | Agri-environmental Measures,Uncertainty,Flexibility,Choice Experiment,Herbicides,Cover Crops,Winegrowing |
| Date: | 2021–09–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03349026&r= |
| By: | Ifcher, John; Zarghamee, Homa; Goff, Sandra H. |
| Abstract: | The recent surge in analyses of subjective well-being (SWB) and the economics of happiness using large observational datasets has generated stylized facts about the relationship between SWB and various correlates. Because such studies are mostly concerned with the determinants of SWB, the modeling utilized assumes SWB to be the dependent variable. Often, selection effects, reverse causality, and omitted variable bias cannot adequately be controlled for, calling many of the stylized facts into question. This chapter explores the important contributions that happiness-in-the-lab experiments can make to the debates about stylized facts by testing the causality of the relationship between SWB and its correlates. A distinction is made between happiness-in-the-lab experiments in which SWB is a dependent versus independent variable, and methods for both types of experiments are discussed, along with a discussion of the limitations inherent in such experiments. The extant happiness-in-the-lab literature is reviewed and future directions for happiness-in the-lab research are proposed. The important role that happiness-inthe- lab experiments can play in the development of national SWB accounting is emphasized. |
| Keywords: | Subjective Well-Being,Happiness,Positive Affect,Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT),Economic Experiments & Causation |
| JEL: | C9 I31 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:943&r= |