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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Gruener, Sven; Lehberger, Mira; Hirschauer, Norbert; Mußhoff, Oliver |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes whether there is a gap between agricultural students’ and non-students’ (farmers’) behaviors in economic experiments which are often used to measure risk aversion, impatience, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust. A further question is whether monetary incentives matter in this respect. We use the Holt and Laury procedure (2002) to elicit risk aversion, the procedure according to Laury et al. (2012) to measure impatience, a gift exchange game (Charness et al. 2004) to capture positive reciprocity, an ultimatum bargaining game (Güth et al. 1982) to assess negative reciprocity, a dictator experiment (Engel 2011) to gauge altruism, and a trust game (Kosfeld et al. 2005) to assess trust in others. We find no differences between agricultural students and farmers in their risk aversion, whereas the latter are fund to be considerably more impatient than the former. Positive and negative reciprocity is slightly more pronounced with farmers. Findings regarding altruism in the two groups are mixed and trust is somewhat more pronounced with farmers. The paper challenges approaches that assume that students can be used as standard experimental subjects whose behaviors can be generalized towards other populations. |
| Date: | 2021–06–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:psda5&r= |
| By: | DellaVigna, Stefano; List, John; Malmendier, Ulrike M.; Rao, Gautam |
| Abstract: | We design two field experiments to estimate the nature and magnitude of workers' social preferences towards their employers. Unlike previous gift-exchange field experiments, we vary piece rates in addition to gift treatments. This piece-rate design allows us to estimate the elasticity of effort to motivation and in turn identify aspects of the workers' social preferences. The first experiment measures productivity-units of output produced in a fixed amount of time. The second experiment measures a form of labor supply-the willingness to work for extra time. Using the piece-rate treatments, we document that productivity is rather unresponsive to motivation, while labor supply is very responsive. In terms of social preferences, we document, first, that workers provide effort for their employer, but are insensitive to the return to the employer. This result is consistent with models of 'warm glow' or social norms, rather than pure altruism towards the employer. Second, while we do not detect any effect of the gifts in the productivity experiment, we find sizable positive impacts in the labor-supply experiment. We show that, at least in part, this different response to gifts is explained by different elasticities of productivity and labor supply, highlighting the importance of the piece-rate design. |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14931&r= |
| By: | Buckley, P.; Roussillon, B.; Teyssier, S. |
| Abstract: | In this paper we compare the impact of a gain framing with a loss framing on a simple and repetitive task. Based on the expectation of higher reference points in the loss framing than in the gain framing, we expected to generate higher effort in the former. Instead, we find no evidence of loss framing effect on participants’ efforts over the experiment. Our results suggest that time pressure on a task kills the loss framing effect. However, experimental sessions without time pressure confirm that the potential effect of loss framing as a nudge is minimal in our context. Nowadays where nudges seem to be the king way for changing behavior we find that monetary incentives are still very powerful to incentive behaviour especially with students. |
| Keywords: | FRAMING EFFECTS;LOSS AVERSION;PROSPECT THEORY;REFERENCE DEPENDENCE;RISK AVERSION |
| JEL: | C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2021-02&r= |
| By: | Alison L. Booth; Patrick Nolen |
| Abstract: | Gender differences in paid performance under competition have been found in many laboratory-based experiments, and it has been suggested that these may arise because men and women respond differently to psychological pressure in competitive environments. To explore this further, we conducted a laboratory experiment comprising 444 subjects, and measured gender differences in performance in four distinct competitive situations. These were as follows: (i) the standard tournament game where the subject competes with three other individuals and the winner takes all; (ii) an anonymized competition in which an individual competes against an imposed production target and is paid only if s/he exceeds it; (iii) a ‘personified’ competition where an individual competes against a target based on the previous performance of one anonymised person of unknown gender; and (iv) a ‘gendered’ competition where an individual competes against a target based on the previous performance of one anonymised person whose gender is known. We found that only men respond to pressure differently in each situation; women responded the same to pressure no matter the situation. Moreover, the personified target caused men to increase performance more than under an anonymized target and, when the gender of the person associated with the target was revealed, men worked even harder to outperform a woman but strived only to equal the target set by a male. |
| Keywords: | psychological pressure, tournament, piece rate, gender, competitive behaviour, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C92 J16 J33 M52 |
| Date: | 2021–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:een:camaaa:2021-41&r= |
| By: | Marc Willinger (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Oussama Rhouma (UJ - Université de Jendouba); Klarizze Puzon (UNU - United Nations University, Umeå University) |
| Abstract: | We propose a five-player common-pool resource (CPR) game with endogenous coalition formation. We show that the level of extraction from the CPR depends on the size of each coalition that is formed and on the final coalition structure. These predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment. We consider two treatments: dictator vs. veto. In the dictator treatment, at each stage of the coalition formation game, a randomly chosen player imposes the coalition size and selected members cannot refuse to become a member. In the veto treatment, players have the right to refuse joining the current coalition if they want to and make counter-proposals. We observe that the formation of the grand coalition is more frequent in the dictator treatment. However, with the repetition of the coalition formation game, the grand coalition becomes more frequent under both treatment, and past experience of a grand coalition increases the likelihood that the current coalition structure is the grand coalition. Finally, the possibility to form coalitions is beneficial at reducing CPR extractions, compared to the singleton structure, in both treatments. |
| Keywords: | coalition formation,laboratory experiment,veto power,common pool resource |
| Date: | 2021–05–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03227335&r= |
| By: | Zvonimir Bašić; Parampreet C. Bindra; Daniela Glätzle-Rützler; Angelo Romano; Matthias Sutter; Claudia Zoller |
| Abstract: | Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation - direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment - emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, reciprocity, third-party punishment, reputation, children, parents, cognitive abilities, socioeconomic status, prisoner's dilemma game, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D01 D91 H41 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2021-18&r= |
| By: | Tamás Keller (Computational Social Science - Research Center for Educational and Network Studies, Centre for Social Sciences Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies TÁRKI Social Research Institute, Budapest); Károly Takács (The Institute for Analytical Sociology (IAS), Linköping University Computational Social Science - Research Center for Educational and Network Studies, Centre for Social Sciences); Felix Elwert (Department of Sociology & Department of Biostatistics and Medical Informatics, University of Wisconsin-Madison) |
| Abstract: | High school track choice determines college access in many countries. We hypothesize that some qualified students avoid the college-bound track simply because they overestimate admission requirements. To test this hypothesis, we designed a randomized field experiment that communicated the admission standards of local secondary schools on the academic track to students in Hungary before the application deadline. We targeted the subset of students (“seeds”) who occupied the most central position in the classroom-social networks, aiming to detect both direct effects on the track choice of targeted seeds and spillover effects on their untreated peers. We found neither a direct effect nor a spillover effect on students’ applications or admissions on average. Further analyses, however, revealed theoretically plausible heterogeneity in the direct causal effect of the intervention on the track choice of targeted seeds. Providing information about admission standards increased applications and admissions to secondary schools on the academic track among seeds who had a pre-existing interest in the academic track but were unsure of their chances of admission. This demonstrates that publicizing admissions standards can set students on a more ambitious educational trajectory. We discuss implications for theory and policy. |
| Keywords: | High school track choice; randomized field experiment; educational aspirations; spillover effect; Hungary. |
| JEL: | C93 I20 D91 J24 |
| Date: | 2021–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:2125&r= |
| By: | Johannes Buckenmaier; Eugen Dimant |
| Abstract: | In multiple pre-registered experiments, we examine the effect of sequences of positive and negative experiences on altruism, trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation. For non-social experiences, we find no effect on subsequent behavior in any of these social domains. However, when experiences are social in nature, we find more cooperation after gains than after losses. For neutral experiences with gains equalizing losses, we find no evidence for a differential effect of experiences irrespective of whether the experience is social or not. Our findings are in line with recent evidence on decision making under risk, showing that the effect of prior experiences depends on task similarity. Beyond that, we extend these findings to various forms of social decision making. Our results suggest that the overall valence of an experience (gain or loss) matters, whereas its dynamic trend (improving or deteriorating) does not. |
| Keywords: | altruism, cooperativeness, sequential decisions, trust |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D80 D90 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9097&r= |
| By: | Andreas Lange; Claudia Schwirplies |
| Abstract: | We report findings from a field experiment on giving to multiple charities. We complement donation decisions with an allocation task which asks participants to split a given amount of money between two charitable causes. This procedure provides a measure on the relative attractiveness of the two causes based on induced impact and potentially reduces warm-glow sensations from spending own money. We apply this method to investigate how the regional scope of charities affects decisions in both donation and allocation tasks. For the selected causes, refugee aid and support for renewable energies, donations to the charity decrease when highlighting the local rather than global provision, yet donors substitute towards the alternative cause. Within the allocation task, regionality has no effect. We draw conclusions on how donation and allocation tasks can be combined to inform public policy. |
| Keywords: | charitable giving, local public goods, fundraising, refugee aid, renewable energies, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D64 H41 L31 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9129&r= |
| By: | Mikhail Kunavin (Babkina); Tatiana Kozitsina (Babkina); Mikhail Myagkov; Irina Kozhevnikova; Mikhail Pankov; Ludmila Sokolova |
| Abstract: | Generally, people behave in social dilemmas such as proself and prosocial. However, inside social groups, people have a tendency to choose prosocial alternatives due to in-group favoritism. The bioelectrical activity of the human brain shows the differences between proself and prosocial exist even out of a socialized group. Moreover, a group socialization strengthens these differences. We used EEG System, "Neuron-Spectrum-4/EPM" (16 channels), to track the brain bioelectrical activity during decision making in laboratory experiments with the Prisoner's dilemma game and the short-term socialization stage. We compared the spatial distribution of the spectral density during the different experimental parts. The noncooperative decision was characterized by the increased values of spectral the beta rhythm in the orbital regions of prefrontal cortex. The cooperative choice, on the contrary, was accompanied by the theta-rhythm activation in the central cortex regions in both hemispheres and the high-frequency alpha rhythm in the medial regions of the prefrontal cortex. People who increased the cooperation level after the socialization stage was initially different from the ones who decreased the cooperation in terms of the bioelectrical activity. Well-socialized participants differed by increased values of spectral density of theta-diapason and decreased values of spectral density of beta-diapason in the middle part of frontal lobe. People who decreased the cooperation level after the socialization stage was characterized by decreased values of spectral density of alpha rhythm in the middle and posterior convex regions of both hemispheres. |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2105.14587&r= |
| By: | Cevat Giray Aksoy; Antonio Cabrales; Mathias Dolls; Ruben Durante; Lisa Windsteiger |
| Abstract: | We conduct a large-scale survey experiment in nine European countries to study how priming a major crisis (COVID-19), common economic interests, and a shared identity influences altruism, reciprocity and trust of EU citizens. We find that priming the COVID-19 pandemic increases altruism and reciprocity towards compatriots, citizens of other EU countries, and non-EU citizens. Priming common European values also boosts altruism and reciprocity but only towards compatriots and fellow Europeans. Priming common economic interests has no tangible impact on behaviour. Trust in others is not affected by any treatment. Our results are consistent with the parochial altruism hypothesis, which asserts that because altruism arises out of inter-group conflict, humans show a tendency to favor members of their own groups. |
| Keywords: | Covid-19, Europe, altruism, reciprocity, survey experiment |
| JEL: | D72 H51 H53 H55 O52 P52 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9112&r= |
| By: | Philipp Lergetporer; Ludger Woessmann |
| Abstract: | Higher education finance depends on the public’s preferences for charging tuition, which may be partly based on beliefs about the university earnings premium. To test whether public support for tuition depends on earnings information, we devise survey experiments in representative samples of the German electorate (N>15,000). The electorate is divided, with a plurality opposing tuition. Providing information on the university earnings premium raises support for tuition by 7 percentage points, turning the plurality in favor. The opposition-reducing effect persists two weeks after treatment. Information on fiscal costs and unequal access does not affect public preferences. We subject the baseline result to various experimental tests of replicability, robustness, heterogeneity, and consequentiality. |
| Keywords: | tuition, higher education, information, earnings premium, public opinion, voting |
| JEL: | H52 I22 D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9102&r= |
| By: | Felix Kölle (University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany); Simone Quercia (University of Verona ,via Cantarane 24, 37129 Verona, Italy) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate the joint influence of empirical and normative expectations on cooperative behavior. We conduct two experimental studies (n = 243) in which we separately elicit (i) behavior in a public goods game and (ii) social norms under the form of normative and empirical expectations. In a situation where individuals can decide conditionally on others' contributions, we find a strong norm of conditional cooperation whereby people find it socially appropriate to match others contribution and believe others to comply with such rule of behavior. In contrast, when there is strategic uncertainty regarding others' behavior, empirical and normative expectations diverge substantially. While individuals believe that contributing fully to the public good is the most appropriate action, they expect others to contribute only half of their resources. This renders normative expectations unpredictive for average behavior and underlines the importance of a close alignment of empirical and normative expectations for the influence of social norms on behavior. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, social norms, expectations, public goods, experiment |
| JEL: | H41 D63 C92 |
| Date: | 2021–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:099&r= |
| By: | Silvia Angerer; Jana Bolvashenkova; Daniela Glätzle-Rützler; Philipp Lergetporer; Matthias Sutter |
| Abstract: | We present direct evidence on the link between children’s patience and educational-track choices years later. Combining an incentivized patience measure of 493 primary-school children with their high-school track choices taken at least three years later at the end of middle school, we find that patience significantly predicts choosing an academic track. This relationship remains robust after controlling for a rich set of covariates, such as family background, school-class fixed effects, risk preferences, and cognitive abilities, and is not driven by sample attrition. Accounting for middle-school GPA as a potential mediating factor suggests a direct link between patience and educational-track choice. |
| Keywords: | patience, education, school track choice, children, lab-in-field experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D90 I21 J20 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9110&r= |
| By: | Lata Gangadharan (Monash University); Tarun Jain (Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad); Pushkar Maitra (Monash University); Joe Vecci (University of Gothenburg, Sweden) |
| Abstract: | This paper highlights the contributions made by lab-in-the-field experiments, which are also known as artefactual, framed and extra-lab experiments. We present a curated sample of lab-in- the-field experiments and discuss how they can be conducted on their own or combined with conventional laboratory experiments, natural experiments, randomised control trials and surveys to provide unique insights into the behaviour of a diverse population. Using our recent research on gender and leadership, we demonstrate how lab-in-the-field experiments have offered new perspectives about gender differences in decision-making. Finally, we outline the ethical and implementational challenges researchers may face while conducting these experiments, and share some of the strategies we employed to address them. |
| Keywords: | Lab-in-the-field experiments; Gender |
| JEL: | A10 |
| Date: | 2021–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2021-03&r= |
| By: | Llerena, D.; Roussillon, B.; Teyssier, S.; Buckley, P.; Delinchant, B.; Ferrari, J.; Laranjeira, T.; Wurtz, F. |
| Abstract: | To increase the share of intermittent renewable energy in our production mix, occupants of buildings can be called upon to lower, anticipate or postpone their consumption according to the network balance. This article presents a small-scale field experiment aimed at introducing demand response in the workplace. We test the impact of load-shedding signals assorted with incentives on energy consumption of workers in the tertiary sector. Two incentive schemes are tested: a honorary contest and a monetary tournament. The results show a reduction in workers’ power demand during the load-shedding periods when the incentives are based on the honorary contest. At the opposite, the monetary tournament where workers could win money according to their behavior seems to have had no impact. The results also suggest that few workers can be responsible for a large part of energy consumption while the building is partially automatically controlled. |
| Keywords: | FLEXIBILITY;LOAD SHEDDING SIGNAL;WORKING PLACE;LIVING LAB. |
| JEL: | C93 Q40 Q51 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2021-01&r= |
| By: | Afacan, Mustafa Oguz; Evdokimov, Piotr; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Turhan, Bertan |
| Abstract: | When applying to schools, students often submit applications to distinct school systems that operate independently, which leads to waste and distortions of stability due to miscoordination. To alleviate this issue, Manjunath and Turhan (2016) introduce the Iterative Deferred Acceptance mechanism (IDA); however, this mechanism is not strategy-proof. We design an experiment to compare the performance of this mechanism under parallel markets (DecDA2) to the classic Deferred Acceptance mechanism with both divided (DecDA) and unified markets (DA). Consistent with the theory, we find that both stability and efficiency are highest under DA, intermediate under DecDA2, and lowest under DecDA. We observe that some subjects use strategic reporting when predicted, leading to improved efficiency for all participants of the market. Our findings cast doubt on whether strategy-proofness should be perceived as a universal constraint to market mechanisms. |
| Date: | 2021–06–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genstf:202106130700001128&r= |
| By: | Luca Fumarco (Tulane University); S. Michael Gaddis (University of California, Los Angeles); Iain Snoddy (Analysis Group) |
| Abstract: | Correspondence audits are a popular method to examine discrimination in a causal framework. However, correspondence audits often require sending hundreds or thousands of emails to subjects. The Winmail3 package allows users to automatically send emails with Stata through PowerShell, which is open-source and cross-platform. Researchers can use this package to perform basic email tasks, such as contacting students or colleagues with standardized messages. Additionally, researchers can perform more complex tasks that entail sending randomized messages with multiple attachments from multiple accounts, tasks that are often necessary to conduct correspondence audit tests. This paper introduces the command and illustrates multiple examples of its application. We believe that researchers can apply this package to correspondence audit tests to save time and money. |
| Keywords: | correspondence audit tests, field experiments, automation, PowerShell, email |
| JEL: | C8 C93 |
| Date: | 2021–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tul:wpaper:2110&r= |
| By: | Ram Fishman (Tel Aviv University); Michal Eliezer (Tel Aviv University); Maya Oren (Tel Aviv University) |
| Abstract: | What are the effects of agricultural knowledge transfer on smallholder farmers? Experimental or quasi-experimental evaluations of agricultural extensions programs remain scant. Moreover, such programs are known to suffer from deep implementation flaws, making it difficult to assess whether low impacts are observed because of poor implementation or because knowledge is not in fact the binding constraint to adoption of improved practices. We utilize a unique natural experiment, in which Nepali smallholder farmers are selected by lottery to take part in an agricultural training and employment in Israel. The program is entirely commercially based, and immerses participants in modern Israeli farms for a year, where they receive classroom instructions about modern farming and employed by commercial farmers. Upon their return to Nepal, program participants are more likely to engage in agriculture for their income, operate an agricultural business and to invest in their farms. Their expenditures on inputs and market access, as well as their agricultural revenues, are substantially higher. However, we see limited evidence for dramatic shifts to modern farming methods. These results are in line with self-reported learnings from the program which are highlight managerial skills. |
| Keywords: | Agriculture; Extension; Technology Adoption; Skills |
| JEL: | O13 O14 |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2021-05&r= |
| By: | Dimitri Dubois (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Stefano Farolfi (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - AgroParisTech - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, Cirad-ES - Département Environnements et Sociétés - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement); Phu Nguyen-Van (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UL - Université de Lorraine - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Juliette Rouchier (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different information sharing mechanisms in a common-pool resource game, with a view to finding a mechanism that is both efficient and inexpensive for the managing agency. More precisely, we compare the observed extraction levels produced as a result of three mechanisms: a mandatory information sharing mechanism and two voluntary information sharing mechanisms that differ in the degree of freedom given to the players. Our main result is that a voluntary information sharing mechanism could help in reaching a lower average extraction level than that observed with the mandatory mechanism. |
| Date: | 2020–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03024197&r= |
| By: | Shusaku Sasaki (Faculty of Economics, Tohoku Gakuin University, and Center for Infectious Disease Education and Research (CiDER), Osaka University); Tomoya Saito (Center for Emergency Preparedness and Response, National Institute of Infectious Diseases); Fumio Ohtake (Center for Infectious Disease Education and Research (CiDER) and Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | Promoting vaccination is a crucial strategy to end the COVID-19 pandemic; however, individual autonomy should be respected at the same time. This study aimed to discover behavioral economics nudges that can reinforce people fs intention to receive the COVID-19 vaccine without impeding their autonomous decision-making. In March 2021, we conducted a pre-registered, online experiment with 1,595 Japanese nationwide sample, and randomly assigned them to one of a control group and three treatment groups that provided the following other-regarding messages: Message A ( gX out of 10 people in your age group answered they would receive this vaccine h), Message B ( gYour vaccination behavior can encourage the vaccination behavior of the people around you h), or Message C ( gIf you do not receive the vaccine, the people around you also may not do so h). By comparing the messages f effects on vaccination intention, autonomous decisionmaking, and emotional burden, we found that Message B was effective in increasing the number of older adults who newly decided to receive the vaccine. Messages A and C further reinforced the intention of older adults who had already planned to receive it. However, Message C, which conveys similar information to Message B with loss-framing, increased viewers f emotional burden. These three messages had no promoting effect for young adults with lower vaccination intentions at baseline. Based on the above findings, we propose that governments should use different messages depending on their purposes and targets, such as Message A instead of Message C, to encourage voluntary vaccination behavior. |
| Keywords: | Herd immunity, Behavioral public policy, Nudge, Framing effect, Autonomy |
| JEL: | I12 D91 C90 |
| Date: | 2021–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:2107&r= |
| By: | Bursztyn, Leonardo; Egorov, Georgy; Enikolopov, Ruben; Petrova, Maria |
| Abstract: | We study the causal effect of social media on ethnic hate crimes and xenophobic attitudes in Rus- sia and the mechanisms underlying this effect, using quasi-exogenous variation in social media penetration across cities. Higher penetration of social media led to more hate crimes in cities with a high pre-existing level of nationalist sentiment. Consistent with a mechanism of coordination of crimes, the effects are stronger for crimes with multiple perpetrators. Using a national survey experiment, we also find evidence of a mechanism of persuasion: social media led individuals (especially young, male, and less-educated ones) to hold more xenophobic attitudes. |
| Keywords: | Hate crime; Russia; social media; Xenophobia |
| JEL: | D7 H0 J15 |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14877&r= |
| By: | Ernst Fehr; Keyu Wu |
| Abstract: | In many markets, firms make their products complex through add-ons, thus making them difficult to evaluate and compare. How does this product obfuscation affect competition, sellers’ profits, and buyers’ welfare? We study these questions in a competitive experimental market in which sellers have the opportunity to obfuscate by add-on features, and buyers endogenously decide how much time to spend on searching for the best product. We show that stable obfuscation levels emerge that reduce buyers’ welfare by ensuring that total prices are substantially above marginal cost and by inducing buyers to make mistakes and to waste their time searching. Competition operates through lowering salient headline prices, but sellers are able to appropriate a considerable share of the surplus with expensive add-on features. In contrast, prices quickly converge to marginal cost if we remove obfuscation opportunities. We thus provide direct causal evidence that obfuscation mitigates competition and generates positive profits because buyers typically search only a small share of the product space. Our results also suggest that purely exploitative obfuscation tends to be much less stable than obfuscation by surplus-enhancing add-on features because buyers’ aversion to complicated products may have a non-negligible impact on sellers’ obfuscation decisions. |
| Date: | 2021–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:391&r= |
| By: | Till O. Weber (University of Newcastle); Benjamin Beranek (Missouri State University); Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham); Fatima Lambarraa-Lehnhardt (IZA, CESifo, ZALF, University of Goettingen); Jonathan F. Schulz (George Mason University) |
| Abstract: | We provide a framework to uncover behavioural mechanisms driving potential cross-societal differences in voluntary cooperation. We deploy our framework in one-shot public goods experiments in the US and the UK, and in Morocco and Turkey. We find that cooperation is higher in the US and UK than in Morocco and Turkey. Our framework shows that this result is driven mostly by differences in beliefs rather than in cooperative preferences, or peer punishment, which are both similar in the four subject pools. Our results highlight the central role of beliefs in explaining differences in voluntary cooperation within and across societies. |
| Keywords: | voluntary cooperation, experiments, public goods, cross-societal differences, behavioural framework |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2021-03&r= |
| By: | Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda University); Emmanuel Sol (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Marc Willinger (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UMR 5211 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | We study experimentally a three player sequential and symmetric coalition formation game with empty core. In each round a randomly chosen proposer must choose between a two players coalition or a three players coalition and decide about the payoff division among the coalition members. Players who receive a proposition can accept or reject it. In case of acceptance the game ends. If it is rejected, a new proposer is randomly selected. The game was played repeatedly, with randomly rematched groups. We observe that over 86% of the realized coalitions are two-players coalitions. Three players coalitions are often observed in early rounds but are frequently rejected. Equal splits are the most frequently observed divisions among coalition members, and their frequency increases sharply over time. We propose an extension of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)'s notion of stable set to account for our results. |
| Date: | 2021–05–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03227388&r= |
| By: | Mihut, Georgiana |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:rb202103&r= |
| By: | Craig McIntosh; Andrew Zeitlin |
| Abstract: | We benchmark a multi-dimensional child nutrition intervention against an unconditional cash transfer of equal cost. Randomized variation in transfer amounts allows us to estimate impacts of cash transfers at expenditure levels equivalent to the in-kind program, as well as to estimate the return to increasing cash transfer values. While neither the in-kind program nor a cost-equivalent transfer costing \$124 per household moves core child outcomes within a year, cash transfers create significantly greater consumption than the in-kind alternative. A larger cash transfer costing \$517 substantially improves consumption and investment outcomes and drives modest improvements in dietary diversity and child growth. |
| Date: | 2021–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2106.00213&r= |