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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Casella, Alessandra; Friedman, Evan; Perez Archila, Manuel |
| Abstract: | Mechanism design teaches us that a mediator can strictly improve the chances of peace between two opponents even when the mediator has no independent resources, is less informed than the two parties, and has no enforcement power. We test the theory in a lab experiment where two subjects negotiate how to share a resource; in case of conflict, the subjects' privately known strength determines their payoffs. The subjects send cheap talk messages about their strength to one another (in the treatment with direct communication) or to the mediator (in the mediation treatment), before making their demands or receiving the mediator's recommendations. We find that, in line with the theory, messages are significantly more sincere when sent to the mediator. However, contrary to the theory, peaceful resolution is not more frequent, even when the mediator is a computer implementing the optimal mediation program. While the theoretical result refers to the best (i.e. most peaceful) equilibrium under mediation, multiple equilibria exist, and the best equilibrium is particularly vulnerable to small deviations from full truthfulness. Subjects are not erratic and their deviations induce only small losses in payoffs, and yet they translate into significant increases in conflict. |
| Keywords: | Conflict resolution; Laboratory experiments; mechanism design; mediation |
| JEL: | C78 C92 D74 D82 D86 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15483&r= |
| By: | Pablo Brañas-Garza (Universidad Loyola); Diego Jorrat (Universidad Loyola); Antonio Espín (Universidad de Granada); Angel Sánchez (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) |
| Abstract: | The use of hypothetical instead of real decision-making incentives remains under debate after decades of economic experiments. Standard incentivized experiments involve substantial monetary costs due to participants' earnings and often logistic costs as well. In time preferences experiments, which involve future payments, real payments are particularly problematic. Since immediate rewards frequently have lower transaction costs than delayed rewards in experimental tasks, among other issues, (quasi)hyperbolic functional forms cannot be accurately estimated. What if hypothetical payments provide accurate data which, moreover, avoid transaction cost problems? In this paper, we test whether the use of hypothetical - versus real - payments affects the elicitation of short-term and long-term discounting in a standard multiple price list task. One-out-of-ten participants probabilistic payment schemes are also considered. We analyze data from three studies: a lab experiment in Spain, a well-powered field experiment in Nigeria, and an online extension focused on probabilistic payments. Our results indicate that paid and hypothetical time preferences are mostly the same and, therefore, that hypothetical rewards are a good alternative to real rewards. However, our data suggest that probabilistic payments are not. |
| Keywords: | Time preferences hypothetical vs real payoffs lab field online experiments BRIS |
| JEL: | C91 C93 |
| Date: | 2021–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:54&r= |
| By: | Nieken, Petra; Schmitz, Patrick W. |
| Abstract: | We investigate contract negotiations in the presence of externalities and asymmetric information in a controlled laboratory experiment. In our setup, it is commonly known that it is always ex post efficient for player A to implement a project which has an external effect on player B. Yet, player A has private information about whether or not it is in player A's self-interest to implement the project even when no agreement with player B is reached. Theoretically, an ex post efficient agreement can always be reached if the externality is large, whereas this is not the case if the externality is small. We vary the size of the externality and the bargaining process. The experimental results are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions. Yet, even when the externality is large, the players fail to achieve ex post efficiency in a substantial fraction of the observations. This finding holds in the case of ultimatum game bargaining as well as in the case of unstructured bargaining with free-form communication. |
| Keywords: | Bargaining; communication; Contracts; Externalities; Laboratory experiments |
| JEL: | C78 C92 D62 D82 D86 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15492&r= |
| By: | Bruhin, Adrian; Goette, Lorenz; Haenni, Simon; Jiang, Lingqing |
| Abstract: | We test whether asking individuals to donate blood leads to a persistent change in prosocial behavior, and what the underlying mechanisms are. In a large-scale field experiment, we randomize asking blood donors to turn out, and follow them over up to 18 months. We observe significant behavioral persistence over at least one year. We use naturally occurring rainfall as a second instrument for donor turnout to test whether persistence is due to habit formation (Stigler and Becker, 1977) or a persistent increase in motivation independent of past donation. Our results strongly favor habit formation as the underlying mechanism. |
| Keywords: | field experiment; Habit formation; Natural Experiment; prosocial behavior |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15642&r= |
| By: | Blesse, Sebastian |
| Abstract: | Taxpayers often view tax rules and filing processes as complicated. In this paper I study whether the perceived tax uncertainty among peers leads to a reduction of voluntary tax compliance. I find strong supportive evidence for this hypothesis using a survey experiment for a large representative sample of the German population. Providing randomized information that others are uncertain about how to file their taxable income decreases individual tax morale. This suggests that subjects use negative peer signals as an excuse in order to opt-out of tax compliance. Studying related heterogeneous treatment effects, I find that both older and left-wing subjects are more responsive to tax uncertainty of others. I also show persistent treatment effects among very honest taxpayers in a follow-up survey. |
| Keywords: | Tax Complexity,Taxpayer Uncertainty,Tax Morale,Survey Experiments |
| JEL: | H26 Z13 K42 C9 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21040&r= |
| By: | Sievert, Martin (University of Mannheim); Vogel, Dominik (University of Hamburg); Reinders, Tim; Ahmed, Waqar |
| Abstract: | The authors examine whether conformity towards prevailing public opinions and pre-existing blame influences citizens’ attribution of blame for public service failure, by using a between-group experimental design with five groups. Two groups received information cues mentioning different public opinions. Two additional groups received information on pre-existing blame or the absence of such blame. One control group did not receive any information. The empirical analysis reveals that public opinion in favor of blame leads to increased blame attribution, while a contrary public opinion decreases citizens’ blame. Likewise, the expected increase in citizens’ blame resulting from pre-existing blame is supported. However, the absence of blame has no effect. Overall, the experiment supports the impact of conformity on citizens' blame. In addition, the literature on citizens’ blame is extended by utilizing a citizen-centered perspective and taking social psychological theory into account. |
| Date: | 2019–09–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:qbjsh&r= |
| By: | Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. |
| Abstract: | This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders' and receivers' interests are not in conflict. We obtain this even though, as in previous literature, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. We argue our findings could be attributed to distributional preferences of senders who lie to avoid the receiver getting a higher payoff than herself. |
| Keywords: | cheap talk; Conflicts of interest; Deception; Experiments; social preferences |
| JEL: | C72 D83 G14 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15711&r= |
| By: | Hernán Bejarano (Centro de Investigación y Docencia en Economía de México/Chapman University); Joris Gillet (Middlesex University); Ismael Rodríguez-Lara (Chapman University/Universidad de Granada) |
| Abstract: | We investigate experimentally the effect of a negative endowment shock in a trust game to assess whether different causes of inequality have different effects on trust and trustworthiness. In our trust game there may be inequality in favor of the second mover and this may (or may not) be the result of a negative random shock (i.e., the outcome of a die roll) that decreases the endowment of the first-mover. Our findings suggest that inequality leads to differences in behavior. First-movers send more of their endowment and second-movers return more when there is inequality. However, we do not find support for the hypothesisthat the cause of the inequality matters. Behavior after the occurrence of a random shock is not significantly different from the behavior when the inequality exists from the outset. Our results highlight that we have to be cautious when interpreting the effects on trust and trustworthiness of negative random shocks that occur in the field (e.g., natural disasters). Our results suggest that these effects are largely driven by the inequality caused by the shock and not by any of the additional characteristics of the shock like saliency or uncertainty. |
| Keywords: | Trust game endowment heterogeneity random shocks inequality aversion experimental economics |
| JEL: | C91 D02 D03 D69 |
| Date: | 2021–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:50&r= |
| By: | Pablo Brañas-Garza (Universidad Loyola); Diego Jorrat (Universidad Loyola); Antonio Alfonso-Costillo (Universidad Pablo de Olavide); Antonio Espín (Universidad de Granada); Teresa García (Universidad de Granada); Kovárík Jaromír (Universidad del País Vasco) |
| Abstract: | We report data from an online experiment, which allow us to study whether generosity has changed during the early Covid-19 pandemic. We have gathered data from Spanish participants over a six-day period in which Covid-19-associated deaths in Spain, one of the most affected countries, increased fourfold. In our experiment, participants could donate a fraction of a €100 prize to a charity. Our data are particularly rich in the age distribution and we complement them with daily public information about the Covid-19-related deaths, infections, and hospital admissions. We find that donations decreased in the period under study and scale down with the public information about the life and health impact of the pandemic. The effect is particularly pronounced among older subjects. Our analysis of the mechanisms behind the detected decrease in solidarity highlights the key—but independent—role of expectations about others’ behavior, perceived mortality risk, and (alarming) information in behavioral adaptation. |
| Keywords: | Generosity Covid-19 Experiments Social Preferences |
| Date: | 2021–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:59&r= |
| By: | Subhasish M. Chowdhury (Department of Economics. University of Bath); Anwesha Mukherjee (School of Management. Technische Universitat M¨unchen); Theodore L. Turocy (School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science University of East Anglia, Norwich.) |
| Abstract: | We characterise the strategic equivalence among k-winner contests using the simultaneous selection rule proposed by Berry (1993). We test the prediction of strategic equivalence using a series of laboratory experiments, contrasting 1-winner contests with 2-winner contests, varying in the latter whether the outcome is revealed sequentially or in a single stage. We find that in the long run, average bidding levels are similar across strategically-equivalent contests. However, adaptation in 2-winner contests is slower and less systematic, which is consistent with the property that Berry’s rule results in outcomes that are more random than in the 1-winner case. |
| Keywords: | lottery contest, multi-winner contests, learning, experiment, strategic equivalence. |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:21-01&r= |
| By: | Alejandro J. Ganimian; Karthik Muralidharan; Christopher R. Walters |
| Abstract: | Despite growing interest in improving early-childhood education in developing countries, there is little evidence on cost-effective ways of doing so at scale. We use a large-scale randomized experiment to study the impact of adding an extra worker focused on pre-school education (for children aged 3-5) in the world’s largest public early-childhood program: India’s Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS). Adding a worker doubled net instructional time and led to 0.29 and 0.46 standard deviation increases in math and language test scores after 18 months for children who remained enrolled in the program. Rates of stunting and severe malnutrition were also lower in the treatment group, likely reflecting the effect of freeing up time of the incumbent worker to focus more on nutrition-related tasks. A cost-benefit analysis suggests that the benefits of the program are likely to significantly exceed its costs even under conservative assumptions. |
| JEL: | C93 I21 I22 I25 O15 |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28780&r= |
| By: | Pablo Brañas-Garza (Universidad Loyola); Lorenzo Estepa Mohedano (Universidad Loyola); Diego Jorrat (Universidad Loyola); Victor Orozco (The World Bank); Ericka Rascón Ramírez (Middlesex University London) |
| Abstract: | Measuring risk preferences in the field is critical for policy, however, it can be expensive and maygenerate unequal payoffs due to bad luck. For instance, the commonly used measure of Holt andLaury (2002) relies on a dozen of lottery choices and payments which makes it time consuming andcostly, but also raises moral concerns as a result of the unequal payments generated by the lotteries.We propose a short version of the Holt and Laury (2002) which produces in the lab (Spain) thesame results as the long HL. Using the short HL in the field (Honduras and Nigeria), we observethat paying or not for the measurement of risk preferences produces the same findings. Our low-costapproach makes the measurement of risk preferences simpler, faster and cheaper in the lab and field. |
| Keywords: | Risk preferences, Holt Laury, Field Experiments, Monetary Payoffs, Incentives. |
| JEL: | D81 C91 C93 |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:67&r= |
| By: | Breza, Emily; Kanz, Martin; Klapper, Leora |
| Abstract: | How do inexperienced consumers learn to use a new financial technology? We present results from a field experiment that introduced payroll accounts in a population of largely unbanked factory workers in Bangladesh. In the experiment, workers in a treatment group received monthly wage payments into a bank or mobile money account while workers in a control group continued to receive wages in cash, with a subset also receiving an account without automatic wage payments. We find that exposure to payroll accounts leads to increased account use and consumer learning. Those receiving accounts with automatic wage payments learn to use the account without assistance, begin to use a wider set of account features, and learn to avoid illicit fees, which are common in emerging markets for consumer finance. The treatments have real effects, leading to increased savings and improvements in the ability to cope with unanticipated economic shocks. We conduct an additional audit study and find suggestive evidence of market externalities from consumer learning: mobile money agents are less likely to overcharge inexperienced customers in areas with higher levels of payroll account adoption. This suggests potentially important equilibrium effects of introducing accounts at scale. |
| Keywords: | financial consumer protection; financial inclusion; learning |
| JEL: | G5 G51 G53 O16 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15565&r= |
| By: | Aluma Dembo; Shachar Kariv; Matthew Polisson; John K.-H. Quah |
| Abstract: | The Allais critique of expected utility theory (EUT) has led to the development of theories of choice under risk that relax the independence axiom, but which adhere to the conventional axioms of ordering and monotonicity. Unlike many existing laboratory experiments designed to test independence, our experiment systematically tests the entire set of axioms, providing much richer evidence against which EUT can be judged. Our within-subjects analysis is nonparametric, using only information about revealed preference relations in the individual-level data. For most subjects we find that departures from independence are statistically signifficant but minor relative to departures from ordering and/or monotonicity. |
| Date: | 2021–05–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:uobdis:21/745&r= |
| By: | Carlos Alós-Ferrer; Johannes Buckenmaier; Georg Kirchsteiger |
| Abstract: | When alternative market institutions are available, traders have to decide both where and how much to trade. We conducted an experiment where traders decided first whether to trade in an (efficient) double-auction institution or in a posted-offers one (favoring sellers), and second how much to trade. When sellers face decreasing returns to scale (increasing production costs), fast coordination on the double-auction occurs, with the posted-offers institution becoming inactive. In contrast, under constant returns to scale, both institutions remain active and coordination is slower. The reason is that sellers trade off higher efficiency in a market with dwindling profits for biased-up profits in a market with vanishing customers. Hence, efficiency alone might not be sufficient to guarantee coordination on a single market institution if the surplus distribution is asymmetric. Trading behavior approaches equilibrium predictions (market clearing) within each institution, but switching behavior across institutions is explained by simple rules of thumb, with buyers chasing low prices and sellers considering both prices and trader ratios. |
| Keywords: | Market selection; Market clearing |
| Date: | 2021–04–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/322288&r= |
| By: | Cristina Bicchieri; Eugen Dimant; Erte Xiao |
| Abstract: | Research examining the effect of weak punishment on conformity indicates that punishment can backfire and lead to suboptimal social outcomes. We examine whether this effect is due to a lack of perceived legitimacy of rule enforcement, which would enable agents to justify selfish behavior. We address the question of legitimacy by shedding light upon the importance of social norms and their interplay with weak punishment in the context of a trust game. Across six conditions, we systematically vary the combination of existence of weak punishment and norm information. Norm information may refer either to what most others do (empirical) or to what most others deem appropriate (normative). We show that in isolation, neither weak punishment nor empirical/normative information increase prosocial, reciprocal behavior. We instead find that reciprocity significantly increases when normative information and weak punishment are combined, but only when compliance is relatively cheap. When compliance is more costly, we find that the combination of punishment and generic empirical information about others’ conformity can have detrimental effects. In additional experiments, we show that this negative effect can be attributed to the punishment being perceived as unjustified, at least in some individuals. Our results have important implications for researchers and practitioners alike. |
| Keywords: | conformity, punishment, social norms, trust |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D73 H26 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9067&r= |
| By: | Kazi Iqbal; Asad Islam; John List; Vy Nguyen |
| Abstract: | Whether, and to what extent, behavioral anomalies uncovered in the lab manifest themselves in the field remains of first order importance in finance and economics. We begin by examining behavior of retail traders/investors making investment decisions in constructed laboratory markets. Our results show that the behaviors of the traders are consistent with myopic loss aversion. We combine the lab results with a unique individual-level matched dataset on daily stock market transactions and portfolio positions over a two year period. We find that lab behaviors help to predict, but do not fully capture, the essential real-world trading analogs of retail traders. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:000730&r= |
| By: | Bhatia, Sudeep; Crawford, Megan M (University of Strathclyde); McDonald, Rebecca Louise; Moreno, Miguel A.; Read, Daniel |
| Abstract: | We test the hypothesis of inconsistent planning proposed by Strotz (1955). In the laboratory, participants allocated time between ‘work’ and ‘leisure’ tasks, and were offered a commitment device. Original plans tended to delay leisure, and to involve a moderate degree of spreading between work and leisure tasks. Most participants preferred commitment over flexibility. Although most were denied commitment, few altered their plans. Those that did make changes tended to further postpone leisure. We find limited evidence of discounting or impatience, contrary to the predictions of most theoretical models of inconsistent planning. Instead, our results imply a preference for improving sequences. |
| Date: | 2021–05–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:b4mg7&r= |
| By: | Casey, Katherine; Kamara, Abou Bakarr; Meriggi, Niccolo |
| Abstract: | Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the American primary system lets citizens choose, most democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. The consequences of these distinct design choices are unclear: while officials are often better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits-like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination-at odds with identifying the best performer. We partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say voters have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. Estimates suggest that more democratic procedures increase the likelihood that parties select voters' most preferred candidates and favor candidates with stronger records of public goods provision. |
| Keywords: | Information provision; Political selection; primaries |
| JEL: | D72 H1 P16 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15695&r= |
| By: | Siniscalchi, Marciano; Veronesi, Pietro |
| Abstract: | We propose an overlapping-generation model wherein researchers belong to two groups, M or F, and established researchers evaluate new researchers. Group imbalance obtains even with group-neutral evaluations and identical productivity distributions. Evaluators' self-image bias and mild between-group heterogeneity in equally productive research characteristics lead the initially dominant group, say M, to promote scholars with characteristics similar to theirs. Promoted F-researchers are few and similar to M-researchers, perpetuating imbalance. Candidates' career concerns and institutions' hiring practices exacerbate talent loss. Mentorship reduces group imbalance, but increases F-group talent loss. Affirmative action reduces both. Our mechanism explains existing evidence and suggests different policies. |
| Keywords: | affirmative action; Gender Discrimination; mentorship; self-image bias |
| JEL: | A11 J16 J7 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15621&r= |
| By: | Felix Chopra; Ingar K. Haaland; Christopher Roth |
| Abstract: | Using a large-scale online experiment with more than 8,000 U.S. respondents, we examine how the demand for a politics newsletter changes when the newsletter content is fact-checked. We first document an overall muted demand for fact-checking when the newsletter features stories from an ideologically aligned source, even though fact-checking increases the perceived accuracy of the newsletter. The average impact of fact-checking masks substantial heterogeneity by ideology: fact-checking reduces demand among respondents with strong ideological views and increases demand among ideologically moderate respondents. Furthermore, fact-checking increases demand among all respondents when the newsletter features stories from an ideologically non-aligned source. |
| Keywords: | fact-checking, news consumption, information, media bias, belief polarization |
| JEL: | D83 D91 L82 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9061&r= |
| By: | Bagues, Manuel; Roth, Christopher |
| Abstract: | We study the long-run effects of contact with individuals from other regions on beliefs, preferences and national identity. We combine a natural experiment, the random assignment of male conscripts to different locations throughout Spain, with tailored survey data. Being randomly assigned to complete military service outside of one's region of residence fosters contact with conscripts from other regions, and increases sympathy towards people from the region of service, measured several decades later. We also observe an increase in identification with Spain for individuals originating from regions with peripheral nationalism. Our evidence suggests that intergroup exposure in early adulthood can have long-lasting effects on individual preferences and national identity. |
| Keywords: | beliefs; identity; Intergroup Exposure; Interregional Contact; preference formation |
| JEL: | D91 R23 Z1 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15576&r= |
| By: | Chopra, Felix (University of Bonn); Haaland, Ingar (University of Bergen and CESifo); Roth, Christopher (University of Warwick, briq, CESifo, CEPR, CAGE) |
| Abstract: | Using a large-scale online experiment with more than 8,000 U.S. respondents, we examine how the demand for a politics newsletter changes when the newsletter content is fact-checked. We first document an overall muted demand for factchecking when the newsletter features stories from an ideologically aligned source, even though fact-checking increases the perceived accuracy of the newsletter. The average impact of fact-checking masks substantial heterogeneity by ideology: factchecking reduces demand among respondents with strong ideological views and increases demand among ideologically moderate respondents. Furthermore, factchecking increases demand among all respondents when the newsletter features stories from an ideologically non-aligned source |
| Keywords: | Fact-checking ; News Consumption ; Information ; Media Bias ; Belief Polarization JEL Classification: D83 ; D91 ; L82 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1357&r= |
| By: | Agranov, Marina; Dianat, Ahrash; Samuelson, Larry; Yariv, Leeat |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure, supermodular or submodular. Several insights emerge. First, while markets often culminate in efficient matchings, stability is more elusive, reflecting the difficulty of arranging attendant transfers. Second, incomplete information and submodularity present hurdles to efficiency and especially stability; their combination drastically diminishes stability's likelihood. Third, matchings form "from the top down" in complete-information supermodular markets, but exhibit many more and less-obviously ordered offers otherwise. Last, participants' market positions matter far more than their dynamic bargaining styles for outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Experiments; incomplete information; Matching; stability |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15637&r= |
| By: | Ho Fai Chan; David A. Savage; Benno Torgler |
| Abstract: | Sporting events can be seen as controlled, real-world, miniature laboratory environments, approaching the idea of holding other things equal when exploring the implications of decisions, incentives, and constraints in a competitive setting (Goff and To llison 1990, Torgler 2009). Thus, a growing number of studies have used sports data to study decision making questions that have guided behavioural economics literature. Creative application of sports data can offer insights into behavioural aspects with implications beyond just sports. In this chapter, we will discuss the methodological advantages of seeing sport as a behavioural econom ics lab, concentrating on the settings, concepts, biases, and challenging areas. Beyond that, we will discuss que stions that have not yet been analysed, offering ideas for future studies using sports data. We will fu rther reflect on how AI has evolved; focusing, for example, on chess, which provides insights into the mechanism and machinery of decision-making. |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2021-20&r= |
| By: | Jialan Wang; Kathleen Burke |
| Abstract: | Inspired by the field experiment in Bertrand and Morse (2011), the state of Texas adopted an information disclosure for consumers taking out payday loans starting in January, 2012. The disclosure compares the cost of payday loans with other credit products, and presents their likelihood of renewal in easy-to-understand terms. Simultaneously, Austin and Dallas implemented stricter supply restrictions through city ordinances. We analyze both types of regulations, and find that the statewide disclosures led to a significant and persistent 13% decline in loan volume in the first six months after implementation. The city ordinances led to a 62% decline in loan volume in Austin and a 20% decline in Dallas, with the timing of the effect driven by the start of enforcement rather than the effective date of regulation. The results show that both behaviorally-motivated disclosures and city-level supply restrictions can have a significant impact on equilibrium loan quantities, with no effect on prices or evidence of evasive income falsification. |
| JEL: | D12 D14 G23 G28 G41 G51 |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28765&r= |
| By: | Hamory, Joan; Miguel, Edward; Walker, Michael; Kremer, Michael; Baird, Sarah |
| Abstract: | Estimating the impact of child health investments on adult living standards entails multiple methodological challenges, including the lack of experimental variation in health status, an inability to track individuals over time, and accurately measuring living standards and productivity in low-income settings. This study exploits a randomized school health intervention that provided deworming treatment to Kenyan children, and uses longitudinal data to estimate impacts on economic outcomes up to 20 y later. The effective respondent tracking rate was 84%. Individuals who received two to three additional years of childhood deworming experienced a 14% gain in consumption expenditures and 13% increase in hourly earnings. There are also shifts in sectors of residence and employment: treatment group individuals are 9% more likely to live in urban areas, and experience a 9% increase in nonagricultural work hours. Most effects are concentrated among males and older individuals. The observed consumption and earnings benefits, together with deworming's low cost when distributed at scale, imply that a conservative estimate of its annualized social internal rate of return is 37%, a high return by any standard. |
| Keywords: | Kenya, child health, deworming, long-run impacts |
| Date: | 2021–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt1mv5691c&r= |
| By: | Ekta Srivastava (Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode) |
| Abstract: | This exploratory research studies the relationship between social taboos and sustainability (particularly sustainable health and hygiene), and evaluate the role of social media. It uses social contagion effect and theory of reasoned action to explain the adoption of sustainable health and hygiene product related to taboo subject and promoted through social media. Mixed method approach is suggested with in-depth interviews, netnography and experimental research.Length: 3 pages |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iik:wpaper:454&r= |