|
on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Tiziana Medda (University of Turin); Vittorio Pelligra (University of Cagliari); Tommaso Reggiani (Cardiff University, Masaryk University, IZA) |
| Abstract: | Experimental social scientists working at research-intensive institutions deal inevitably with subjects who have most likely participated in previous experiments. It is an important methodological question to know whether participants that have acquired a high level of lab-sophistication show altered pro-social behavioral patterns. In this paper, we focus both on the potential effect of the subjects’ lab-sophistication, and on the role of the knowledge about the level of lab-sophistication of the other participants. Our main findings show that while lab-sophistication per se does not significantly affect pro-social behaviour, for sophisticated sub-jects the knowledge about the counterpart’s level of (un)sophistication may systematically alter their choices. This result should induce caution among experimenters about whether, in their settings, information about labsophistication can be inferred by the participants, due to the characteristics of the recruitment mechanisms, the management of the experimental sessions or to other contextual clues. |
| Keywords: | Lab-sophistication; Experimental Methodology; External Validity; Pro-social behaviour; Cooperation |
| JEL: | D03 D83 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2021-06&r=all |
| By: | Alt, Marius; Gallier, Carlo |
| Abstract: | We test whether and, if so, how incentives to promote pro-social behavior affect the extent to which it spills over to subsequent charitable giving. To do so, we conduct a two-period artefactual field experiment to study repeated donation decisions of more than 700 participants. We vary how participants' first pro-social behavior is incentivized by a wide range of fundraising interventions ranging from soft to hard paternalism. Our design allows us to decompose spillover effects into a pure spillover effect, which identifies the impact of previous pro-social behavior on subsequent donation decisions and a crowding effect, which captures the extent to which the spillover effects are affected by the incentives exerted on the previous pro-social behavior. We find evidence for negative spillover effects. Participants donate less if they completed a pro-social task prior to the donation decision. Most importantly, we find that the spillover effects depend on how the initial pro-social behavior has been incentivized. Especially participants who are incentivized to donate through social comparisons are more willing to give to charity thereafter compared to participants whose initial pro-social behavior is incentivized by monetary rewards. The variations in spillover effects are driven by participants' perceived external pressure in the first pro-social decision. |
| Keywords: | Charitable giving,Social preferences,Experimental economics,Behavioral spillovers,Policy-making,Economic incentives |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D01 H41 D04 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21010&r=all |
| By: | Karmeliuk, Maria (LMU Munich); Kocher, Martin (University of Vienna) |
| Abstract: | Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we claim that the observed difference can be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams. |
| Keywords: | auctions; team decision-making; experiment; overbidding; |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D44 |
| Date: | 2021–02–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:279&r=all |
| By: | Difang Huang; Zhengyang Bao |
| Abstract: | We followed 58,345 borrowers from a peer-to-peer lending platform to study how females and males react to enforcement mechanisms differently. In the experiment, borrowers were randomized into treatments where they received different text messages urging for timely repayment if they had loans due the “next day”. Compared to a reminder message, the messages inducing social pressures and financial incentives reduced the overdue rate for both genders. However, females were more responsive to messages producing social pressures, while males were more responsive to financial incentives. The results imply the potential importance of a gender-dependent mechanism to enhance compliance. |
| Keywords: | Gender differences; Natural field experiment; Enforcement mechanism |
| JEL: | C93 D91 J16 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2020-08&r=all |
| By: | Adrian Bruhin; Lorenz Goette; Simon Haenni; Lingqing Jiang |
| Abstract: | We test whether asking individuals to donate blood leads to a persistent change in behavior, and examine the underlying mechanism. In a field experiment, we randomize a phone call, asking blood donors to turn out, and follow them over up to 18 months. We observe significant behavioral persistence for at least one year. We use naturally occurring rainfall as a second instrument for donor turnout to test whether behavioral persistence is due to habit formation (Stigler and Becker, 1977) or a persistent increase in motivation independent of past donation. Our results strongly favor habit formation as the underlying mechanism. |
| Keywords: | Prosocial behavior, Habit formation, Field experiment, Natural experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D04 D91 C36 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.01&r=all |
| By: | Armenak Antinyan (Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, China); Luca Corazzini (Department of Economics and VERA, University Of Venice Cà Foscari) |
| Abstract: | Little is known about the impact of policy interventions other than taxes and bans to reduce the demand for single use plastic bags. More specifically, the influence of environmental nudges and financial bonuses to curb the single use plastic bag purchase and consumption is largely understudied. To fill this gap, we run an RCT with loyalty card holders of one of the biggest supermarket chains in Yerevan (Armenia) to test and compare interventions based on environmental nudges and financial bonuses. We manipulate the type of the intervention – either a financial bonus or a nudge –, the presence of a reusable bag – either provided for free or not provided –, and the size of the bag – either small or big. Compared with the baseline setting with no intervention, both the financial bonus and the environmental nudge serve as effective policy instruments to reduce disposable plastic bag purchase. Moreover, reusable bags in combination with the environmental nudge or the financial bonus are more effective than the environmental nudge or the financial bonus alone. Finally, the financial bonus is substantially more effective than the environmental nudge, irrespective of the absence/presence of reusable bags. |
| Keywords: | Pro-environmental behavior, nudge, financial bonus, reusable plastic bag, randomized controlled trial |
| JEL: | C93 D12 D91 H23 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2021:08&r=all |
| By: | Zhengyang Bao; Andreas Leibbrandt |
| Abstract: | Workplace tournaments are one likely contributor to gender differences in labor market outcomes. Relative to men, women are often less eager to compete and thrive less under competitive pressure. We investigate a competitive workplace environment that may produce more gender-neutral outcomes: tournaments with safeguards. In our experiment, participants take part in a tournament with a real-effort task and choose whether they want to have a complementary safeguard that guarantees higher wages for the low ranked. As expected, we find that women are more likely than men to choose such a safeguard. However, obtaining a safeguard comes at a cost. On average, the safeguard causes lower performance, creates a gender wage gap, and over-proportionally disadvantages women. Thus, we provide novel evidence that easing women into tournaments can backfire. |
| Keywords: | Workplace tournaments, gender differences, tournament safeguards, incentive contracts |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2020-02&r=all |
| By: | Valeria Fanghella; Thi-Thanh-Tam Vu; Luigi Mittone |
| Abstract: | This paper studies whether and how differently projected information about the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic affects individuals' prosocial behavior and expectations on future outcomes. We conducted an online experiment with British participants (N=961) when the UK introduced its first lockdown and the outbreak was on its growing stage. Participants were primed with either the environmental or economic consequences (i.e., negative primes), or the environmental or economic benefits (i.e., positive primes) of the pandemic, or with neutral information. We measured priming effects on an incentivized take-and-give dictator game and on participants' expectations about future environmental quality and economic growth. Our results show that primes affect participants' expectations, but not their prosociality. In particular, participants primed with environmental consequences hold a more pessimistic view on future environmental quality, while those primed with economic benefits are more optimistic about future economic growth. Instead, the positive environmental prime and the negative economic prime do not influence expectations. Our results offer insights into how information affects behavior and expectations during the Covid-19 pandemic. |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2102.13538&r=all |
| By: | Abraham Diya (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Institute for Markets and Strategy, Austria, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic); Ben Greiner (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Institute for Markets and Strategy, Austria, University of New South Wales, School of Economics); Marianne Stephanides (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Institute for Markets and Strategy) |
| Abstract: | In order to decrease social distance and increase trust on their platforms, many online marketplaces allow traders to be represented by profile pictures or avatars. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the presence of seller avatars affects trading behavior in a market. We contrast markets without avatars with markets where avatars truthfully represent traders and markets where avatars can be freely changed at any time and may thus be chosen strategically. At the aggregate level, we find that the presence of truthful avatars increases the trustwothiness of sellers, but that this effect is undone when avatars can be chosen strategically. We do not detect aggregate effects on buyers´trusting choices. Female avatars are more trusted, and correspondignly in the treatment with free avatar choice men are more likely to represent themselves with a female avatar then vice versa. |
| Keywords: | online marketplaces, market design, trust and trustworthiness, avatars, strategic behavior |
| JEL: | C72 C90 D91 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2021-02&r=all |
| By: | Yan Peng (School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University); Jason Shachat (Durham University Business School; Economics and Management School, Wuhan University; Chapman University); Lijia Wei (School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University); S. Sarah Zhang (Alliance Manchester Business School, University of Manchester) |
| Abstract: | Using laboratory experiments, we illustrate that trading algorithms that prioritize low latency pose certain pitfalls in a variety of market structures and configurations. In hybrid double auctions markets with human traders and trading agents, we find superior performance of trading agents to human traders in balanced markets with the same number of human and Zero Intelligence Plus (ZIP) buyers and sellers only, thus providing a partial replication of Das et al. (2001). However, in unbalanced markets and extreme market structures, such as monopolies and duopolies, fast ZIP agents fall into a speed trap and both human participants and slow ZIP agents outperform fast ZIP agents. For human traders, faster reaction time significantly improves trading performance, while Theory of Mind can be detrimental for human buyers, but beneficial for human sellers. |
| Keywords: | Trading agents, Speed, Algorithmic trading, Laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C78 C92 D40 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:20-39&r=all |
| By: | Riccardo Ghidoni; Anna Lou Abatayo; Valentina Bosetti; Marco Casari; Massimo Tavoni |
| Abstract: | Climate geoengineering strategies can help reduce the economic and ecological impacts of global warming. However, governing geoengineering is challenging: since climate preferences vary across countries, excessive deployment relative to the socially optimal level is likely. Through a laboratory experiment on a public good-or-bad game, we study whether side-payments can address this governance problem. While theoretically effective, our experimental results show only a modest impact of side-payments on outcomes, especially in a multilateral setup. Replacing unstructured bilateral exchanges with a treaty framework simplifies the action space and performs moderately better. |
| Keywords: | climate governance, public good-or-bad, free-driving, transfers, promises, experiment, Coase theorem |
| JEL: | C70 C90 H40 Q50 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:461&r=all |
| By: | Antonio Cabrales (Dept. of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Irma Clots-Figueras (School of Economics, University of Kent); Roberto Hernán-González (Burgundy School of Business); Praveen Kujal (Dept. of Economics, Business School, Middlesex University) |
| Abstract: | Risk mitigating institutions have long been used by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. We know little about how they are demanded, who demands them or how they impact subsequent behavior. To study these questions, we run a large-scale online experiment where insurance can be purchased to safeguard against opportunistic behavior. We compare two different selection mechanisms for risk mitigation, the individual and the collective (voting). We find that, whether individual or collective, there is demand for riskmitigating institutions amongst high-opportunism individuals, while low-opportunism individuals demand lesser levels of insurance. However, high-opportunism individuals strategically demand lower insurance institutions when they are chosen collectively through voting. We also find that the presence of risk mitigating institutions crowds out reciprocity. Reciprocity is lower when the no-insurance option is chosen among other insurance options than when it is not available. Finally, we also observe higher gains from exchange in lowopportunism groups than in more opportunistic ones. |
| Keywords: | institutions; trust; trustworthiness; voting; insurance |
| JEL: | C92 D02 D64 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:21-05&r=all |
| By: | Maria De Paola (Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF, Università della Calabria); Francesca Gioia (Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche "Cesare Beccaria", Università di Milano); Vincenzo Scoppa (Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF, Università della Calabria) |
| Abstract: | We ran a field experiment to investigate whether individual performance in teams depended on the gender of the leader. About 430 students from an Italian University took an intermediate exam that was partly evaluated on the basis of teamwork. Students were randomly matched in teams of three and, in each team, we randomly chose a leader entrusted the task of coordinating the work of the team. We find a positive and significant effect of female leadership on team performance. This effect is driven by the higher performance of team members in female-led teams rather than by an improvement in leader performance, suggesting that female leaders altruistically devote their energies o improving teamwork. In spite of the higher performance of female-led teams, male members tended to evaluate female leaders as less effective, whereas female members have provided more favorable judgments. |
| Keywords: | Team, Leadership, Gender, Stereotypes, Randomized Experiment |
| JEL: | J16 M12 M54 C93 |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clb:wpaper:202103&r=all |
| By: | Riehm, Tobias; Fugger, Nicolas; Gillen, Philippe; Gretschko, Vitali; Werner, Peter |
| Abstract: | We test the importance of social norms for market interactions associated with negative real-world externalities in a large-scale experiment with a heterogeneous population sample from Germany. The majority of experimental participants refuses to trade, thus behaving in a moral way. Our data suggest the importance of norm conformity for the decision to trade as a significant share of buyers and sellers condition market entry on the decisions of others. Moreover, a majority of observers is willing to incur personal costs to sanction trading. Moral behavior is significantly linked to demographic characteristics and stated preferences and attitudes of the participants. |
| Keywords: | Markets,moral behavior,negative externalities,social norms,punishment,large population sample,experiment |
| JEL: | D01 D62 D64 C93 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21017&r=all |
| By: | Hongxing Liu (Department of Economics, Lafayette College); Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres (Department of Economics, Lafayette College; Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Danyi Qi (Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, Louisiana State University) |
| Abstract: | We use a combination of randomized field experiments and online surveys to test how the menu design affects food choices and food waste. In our field experiment, participants face one of two menus a narrow menu that only displays a small portion of food, or a broad menu that also contains bigger portions. While all options are equally available in both menus, they differ in how easy and fast the different choices can be made. Our results show that, compared to the broad menu, participants in the narrow menu ordered smaller portions of food. Importantly, food intake was similar across conditions, leading to significant food waste reduction under the narrow menu. Our online survey suggest that these results are consistent with a combination of anchoring and menu-dependent self-control theories. We discuss the implication of our results to menu design in real world settings. |
| Keywords: | food waste; food choice; menu design; nudge; anchoring; self-control |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:20-37&r=all |
| By: | Andreas Hefti; Peiyao Shen; King King Li |
| Abstract: | We conduct a large scale randomized field experiment to study whether providing recipients – 42,454 Chinese households in a rural area – with information on the costs of a real decision they make can help to improve the quality of their choices. The decisions are of high financial impact, as the objects of deliberation – air conditioners – have upfront prices exceeding the average monthly salary of a household. Besides providing nominal cost information, we conduct two additional treatments, where we either present the same information by making the real opportunity costs salient, or by administering the information via a quiz. The former aims at facilitating the comparison of effective costs, while the latter aims at enhancing attention and cognitive involvement. We find that providing cost information substantially affects the choices made, and reduces the decision mistakes, in particular in the two additional treatments. |
| Keywords: | Information provision, opportunity costs, decision mistakes, involvement, energy efficiency |
| JEL: | D12 D83 L68 Q41 Q48 |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:378&r=all |
| By: | Hakimov, Rustamdjan (University of Lausanne and WZB Berlin); Kübler, Dorothea (WZB Berlin and TU Berlin); Pan, Siqi (University of Melbourne) |
| Abstract: | Every year during school and college admissions, students and their parents devote considerable time and effort to acquiring costly information about their own preferences. In a market where students are ranked by universities based on exam scores, we explore ways to reduce wasteful information acquisition that is, to help students avoid acquiring information about their out-of-reach schools or universities using a market design approach. We find that, both theoretically and experimentally, a sequential serial dictatorship mechanism leads to less wasteful information acquisition and higher student welfare than a direct serial dictatorship mechanism. This is because the sequential mechanism informs students about which universities are willing to admit them, thereby directing their search. Additionally, our experiments show that the sequential mechanism has behavioral advantages because subjects deviate from the optimal search strategy less frequently under the sequential than under the direct mechanism. We also investigate the effects of providing historical cutoff scores under the direct mechanism. We find that the cutoff provision can increase student welfare, especially when the information costs are high, although the effect is weaker than that of a sequential mechanism. |
| Keywords: | matching market; deferred acceptance; information acquisition; game theory; lab experiment; |
| JEL: | C92 D47 |
| Date: | 2021–02–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:280&r=all |
| By: | Lata Gangadharan; Philip J. Grossman; Mana Komai; Joe Vecci |
| Abstract: | Antisocial behaviour can be observed in response to social comparisons with advantaged others. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine if social group affiliation mitigates or increases antisocial behaviour in the presence of inequality. While research has documented the harmful effects of inequality, less is known about how social identity may interact with income inequality to influence antisocial behaviour. In our experiment, participants play a modified version of an investment game in which they can reduce others’ payoff at a cost to themselves. Participants are identified by their income groups and/or social groups. We use naturally occurring, exogenous social groups to capture social identity and vary the combination of income identity and social identity. We find little difference in rates of antisocial behaviour across the environments. However, in a setting with revealed social identity and income identity we observe a redirection in antisocial behaviour relative to a setting in which social identity is not revealed. We find that low income participants are more likely to be antisocial towards someone from a different income or social group. In contrast, high income participants do not vary their behaviour. The targeting of antisocial behaviour by low income individuals is consistent with our theoretical framework and suggests that identity politics causes low income people who are already in conflict with one another to shift their blame culturally. Our findings suggest that the context in which inequality exists may have important effects on antisocial behaviour. Classification-JEL Codes: C91, D003, D6 |
| Keywords: | Social Identity, Income inequality, Antisocial behaviour, Experiment, Natural groups |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2018-01&r=all |
| By: | Md. Main Uddin; Liang Choon Wang; Russell Smyth |
| Abstract: | We conduct an Online randomized controlled experiment in Australia in order to examine whether government initiatives to encourage the use of energy comparison sites increase consumer search and result in lower prices. Despite significant price variations across energy retailers, our experiment indicates that while providing information about the potential gains from using the governmentowned Victoria Energy Compare (VEC) website encourages participants to visit the website, it is not effective in inducing them to contact, or switch, retailers who are providing better offers. Moreover, the availability of a $50 bonus associated with using the VEC website reduces the likelihood that lowincome participants contact, or switch retailers, in order to lower their electricity prices, leading to an increase in their electricity expenditure. Our findings imply that government-initiated comparison sites are not sufficient to promote competition and that providing consumers with financial incentives for using these sites in order to encourage competition may potentially backfire. |
| Keywords: | VEC, Financial incentive, Energy price, Field experiment, Australia |
| JEL: | H24 H31 Q43 Q48 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2020-11&r=all |
| By: | Oscar Becerra; José-Alberto Guerra |
| Abstract: | Are there gender differences in the willingness to pay (WTP) for safer jobs? Using a laboratory experiment, we elicit participants’ WTP for an early (perceived ‘safer’) on-site shift. We find that women forego larger earnings in order to secure an early shift more than men do, with a safety concern about the late shift being a key driver, explaining up to 20% of the estimated gender gap. We do not observe a gender gap if the job can be completed remotely. Results are robust to controlling for morning-types, household and demographic characteristics, attitudes toward risk and uncertainty, victimization, and information provision about crime. Controlling for crime exposure reduces the estimated gender gap. Thus, our results suggest that policies that reduce gender disparities in safety concerns may affect women’s labor supply. |
| Keywords: | Safety concerns, willingness to pay, gender gaps, experiment |
| JEL: | J16 C92 D03 |
| Date: | 2021–02–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:018900&r=all |
| By: | Ainoa Aparicio Fenoll (ESOMAS, University of Turin); Sarah Zaccagni (CEBI, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a randomized controlled trial to study the effect of gender composition of teams on performance, self-concept, working style, and individual satisfaction in endogenously and exogenously formed teams. We randomly divide a sample of high school students into two groups: we assign students in one group to teams of varying gender composition using random assignment and we allow the students in the other group to form teams freely. We find that students form disproportionately more male-predominant teams that those that would be formed under random assignment and that students in endogenously-formed gender-biased teams prefer even more gender-biased teams ex-post. Our results also show that female-predominant teams under-perform other types of teams but these differences disappear when teams are endogenously-formed. |
| Keywords: | team composition, gender, team formation, team dynamics, team performance, field experiment, decision-making |
| JEL: | J16 I21 I24 |
| Date: | 2021–02–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kucebi:2103&r=all |
| By: | Holger Herz; Christian Zihlmann |
| Abstract: | We conduct a field experiment with remote workers to assess potential adverse effects of monitoring. We find that monitoring reduces the average performance of workers, in particular among the intrinsically motivated workforce. Moreover, monitoring cultivates the average worker: There are fewer high performers and the variance in performance is significantly reduced. Importantly, we show that performance reductions primarily occur among challenging tasks. These performance reductions significantly increase unit costs in our setting. This effect is particularly severe when challenging tasks have high marginal value, as in high-performance work systems or when tasks are complementary inputs into the production function. |
| Keywords: | monitoring, hidden costs of control, remote work, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D21 J24 M50 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8890&r=all |
| By: | Gary Charness (University of California, Santa Barbara); Ramón Cobo-Reyes (American University of Sharjah); Erik Eyster (University of California, Santa Barbara); Gabriel Katz (University of Exeter and Universidad Catolica des Uruguay); Ángela Sánchez (NYU Abu Dhabi); Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, University of Cologne, University of Innsbruck, IZA, and CESifo) |
| Abstract: | We present a field experiment to study the effects of non-monetary incentives on healthy food choices of 282 children in elementary schools. Previous interventions have typically paid participants for healthy eating, but this often may not be feasible. We introduce a system where food items are graded based on their nutritional value, involving parents or classmates as change agents by providing them with information regarding the food choices of their children or friends. We find parents’ involvement in the decision process to be particularly beneficial in boosting healthy food choices, with very strong results that persist months after the intervention. |
| Keywords: | Healthy eating, children, parents, non-monetary incentives, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 I12 |
| Date: | 2020–12–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2021_01&r=all |
| By: | Youngseok Park; Jean Paul Rabanal; Olga A. Rud; Philip J. Grossman |
| Abstract: | We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjo¨str¨om, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that: (i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous- timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action. |
| Keywords: | Conflict game; Endogenous timing; Gender; Laboratory experiment; Type uncertainty |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D74 D82 D91 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2020-13&r=all |
| By: | Luigi Butera; Philip J. Grossman; Daniel Houser; John A. List; Marie Claire Villeval |
| Abstract: | Creation of empirical knowledge in economics has taken a dramatic turn in the past few decades. One feature of the new research landscape is the nature and extent to which scholars generate data. Today, in nearly every field the experimental approach plays an increasingly crucial role in testing theories and informing organizational deci- sions. Whereas there is much to appreciate about this revolution, recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social sciences, arguing that an important component of Fischer (1935)’s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. Indeed, while the importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, current incentives are not sufficient to encourage replications from the individual researcher’s perspective. We propose a novel mechanism that promotes replications by leveraging mutually benefi- cial gains between scholars and editors. We develop a model capturing the trade-offs involved in seeking independent replications before submission of a paper to journals. We showcase our method via an investigation of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on cooperation rates in public goods games, a pervasive and yet largely unexplored feature in the literature. |
| Keywords: | Replication, science, public goods, uncertainty, experiment. |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2020-03&r=all |
| By: | Kanay, Ayşegül; Hilton, Denis; Charalambides, Laetitia; Corrégé, Jean-Baptiste; Inaudi, Eva; Waroquier, Laurent; Cezera, Stéphane |
| Abstract: | We compared the effectiveness of basket goal-setting to product information strategies on sustainable consumption in a simulated online supermarket. Experiment 1 found a significant effect of basket goal setting techniques with carbon basket feedback in either numerical or graphical form on the carbon content of baskets purchased but no effect of numerical product information alone or in combination with basket CO2 information. Experiment 2 also found that basket goal setting was effective, but found no additional effect of introducing five-colour coding of the carbon footprints of either products or baskets. Experiment 3 replicated the effects of goal setting and found that repeated visits to the online supermarket led to improved learning about product carbon footprint in the basket goal setting condition. Our results suggest that goal setting techniques with feedback can reduce the carbon footprint of online shopping baskets and facilitate learning about product carbon footprint. |
| Keywords: | Sustainable consumption; Goal-setting; Decision-aiding; Carbon labels; Groceries |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:125315&r=all |
| By: | Abhijit Ramalingam; Brock V. Stoddard; James M. Walker |
| Abstract: | In a laboratory setting, we study team production of group-level public goods, where two teams compete for the resources of a common-member who can benefit from and provide effort in both teams. Intrinsically, the common-member faces divided loyalties. We examine such competition in settings in which the common-member has productive abilities equal to that of the other team members and in which he/she has greater relative potential. In the homogeneous setting, we find evidence that competition increases when the common-member must choose team membership across decision rounds, instead of sharing membership within a round. In the heterogeneous setting, we find the largest increase in team effort when the common-member has sufficient resources to match that of team members in both teams. When the common-member’s productivity increases, so his/her capabilities are equivalent to the setting where resources increase, team performance is not equally increased. Further treatments explore possible explanations for these latter findings. Key Words: public goods; experiment; divided loyalties; competition; group choice; heterogeneity |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:21-02&r=all |
| By: | Aydın, Deniz |
| Abstract: | I design a large-scale field experiment that constructs a randomized credit limit extension isolating selection, anticipation, wealth, and interest rate effects and study the impulse responses on spending, contract choice, and balance sheets. Participants borrow to spend 11 cents on the dollar in the quarter of the limit increase, with a cumulative difference of 28 cents by the third year. The effects extend to those far from the limit, those who had the new limits as available credit, and those with a meaningful buffer of liquid assets. Participants near their limits borrow and spend when limits are relaxed but put off spending and save out of constraints under the counterfactual when limits are tight. The findings provide strong support for a buffer-stock interpretation that emphasizes the importance of precautionary saving. |
| Keywords: | consumption,credit,MPC,randomized field experiment,precautionary saving |
| JEL: | D15 E21 E51 H31 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:231308&r=all |
| By: | Khadjavi, Menusch; Sipangule, Kacana; Thiele, Rainer |
| Abstract: | Following the 2007–8 global food crisis, agricultural producers have invested in large tracts of land in developing countries. We investigate how the arrival of large-scale farms changes inter-personal trust and reciprocity, important components of social capital, in traditional villages. We elicit trust and reciprocal behaviour in villages that lie near large-scale farms and compare them with villages at a distance. Our data reveal greater trust in villages close to large-scale farms. Reciprocity is more frequent after farm employment. These results are likely driven by communal coping and reputation building. A natural field measure shows that trust correlates with public good sharing. |
| Keywords: | social capital,market exposure,cooperation,large-scale agricultural investments,field experiment,smallholder agriculture,Zambia |
| JEL: | C93 O10 O13 P14 Q12 Q15 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:230937&r=all |
| By: | Martini, Christina; Ibañez Diaz, Marcela; Khadjavi, Menusch |
| Abstract: | We propose that community aspirations defined as the preferences for goals that increase communal well-being are an important determinant of cooperation in collective action problems. This paper conceptualizes community aspirations and investigates whether the proposed measure is associated with cooperation. The second part of the paper presents the results of a randomized controlled trial that aimed at lifting community aspirations by presenting real-world examples of successful collective action. Survey and experimental data from rural Zambia indicate that compared with current situation, individuals hold optimistic community aspirations. We find some supporting evidence for a positive correlation between community aspirations and cooperation measured using experimental and survey data. Exposure to the examples of cooperation increases cooperation, but has a negative effect on community aspirations. Instead, we find that the mechanism could be through a change in the perceived norm of cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Community/Rural/Urban Development |
| Date: | 2021–01–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:gagfdp:309651&r=all |
| By: | Wei Zhan; Catherine C. Eckel; Philip J. Grossman |
| Abstract: | Two protocols have been used in the lab to measure altruism using dictator games that vary both the endowment and the relative price of giving. In single-role games, subjects are designated either dictator or recipient and are paid for one decision in that role. In dual-role games, subjects are paid for two decisions, once in each role. It is unclear what is the effect of this change in procedure.The dual-role protocol may prompt dictators to empathize with their recipients and give more. Alternatively, feeling less responsibility for their partners, dictators may give less. We test whether the protocol affects altruistic preferences. Our results suggest that the dual-role design enhances the preference for efficiency at the expense of equality in allocations. Fur-thermore, only measures derived from the single-role data are correlated with subjects’ past giving behavior. This suggests that the single-role protocol is a more accurate measure of altruistic preferences. |
| Keywords: | : Dictator Game, Dual Role, Efficiency, Inequality; |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2020-05&r=all |
| By: | Zhengyang Bao; Kenan Kalayci; Andreas Leibbrandt; Carlos Oyarzun |
| Abstract: | We examine how traders react to two prominent stock market regulations. Under a constant fundamental value (FV) process, price limits and trading restrictions abate bubbles when traders are inexperienced, but inhibit price adjustments when traders gain experience. Under a Markov-process FV, these regulations always increase mispricing. Traders underreact to market news when the FV increases and do not react when the FV decreases. We find evidence of momentum trading and the delayed price discovery hypothesis of price limits. These findings emphasize stress-testing asset market interventions and suggest that price limits and trading restrictions do more harm than good. |
| Keywords: | Asset market experiment, price limits, the t+1 rule, fundamental values |
| JEL: | C92 D14 D81 D84 G01 G11 J16 |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2018-14&r=all |
| By: | Lina Moros; Maria Alejandra Vélez; Alexander Pfaff; Daniela Quintero |
| Abstract: | We implemented a decision experiment in the field with rural peasants in Colombia to test the effects of introducing then partially or totally removing Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES). We consider individual and collective payments and different rules for removal. We find that there is clearly no behavioral ‘crowding-out’ when a PES is created then ended. Even a simple pre-versus-post-PES comparison finds ‘crowding in’, if anything, with contributions higher after PES was removed than before PES was introduced. Comparing to a control, without PES, strengthens that conclusion. We discuss four possible mechanisms explaining these findings: recognition or gratitude; lack of negative emotions; pre-existing and persistent intrinsic motivations, and evocation of pro-environmental behavior. |
| Keywords: | lab in the field experiment, pro-environmental behavior, payment for ecosystem services, incentives, Colombia. |
| JEL: | Q Q Q57 Q |
| Date: | 2020–12–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:018590&r=all |
| By: | Ester Faia; Andreas Fuster; Vincenzo Pezone; Basit Zafar |
| Abstract: | How people form beliefs is crucial for understanding decision-making under uncertainty. This is particularly true in a situation such as a pandemic, where beliefs will affect behaviors that impact public health as well as the aggregate economy. We conduct two survey experiments to shed light on potential biases in belief formation, focusing in particular on the tone of information people choose to consume and how they incorporate this information into their beliefs. In the first experiment, people express their preferences over pandemic-related articles with optimistic and pessimistic headlines, and are then randomly shown one of the articles. We find that respondents with more pessimistic prior beliefs about the pandemic are substantially more likely to prefer pessimistic articles, which we interpret as evidence of confirmation bias. In line with this, respondents assigned to the less preferred article rate it as less reliable and informative (relative to those who prefer it); they also discount information from the article when it is less preferred. We further find that these motivated beliefs end up impacting incentivized behavior. In a second experiment, we study how partisan views interact with information selection and processing. We find strong evidence of source dependence: revealing the news source further distorts information acquisition and processing, eliminating the role of prior beliefs in article choice. |
| JEL: | D84 D91 E71 I12 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28484&r=all |
| By: | Robert Dur; Dimitry Fleming; Marten van Garderen; Max van Lent |
| Abstract: | A large fraction of households have very little savings buffer and are therefore vulnerable to financial shocks. This paper examines whether a social norm nudge can induce such households to save more. We ran a large-scale field experiment at a retail bank in the Netherlands. We find that households who are exposed to the social norm nudge click more often on a link to a personal web page where they can start or adjust an automatic savings plan. However, analyzing detailed bank data, we find no treatment effect on actual savings, neither in the short run nor in the long run. Our null findings are quite precisely estimated. A complementary small-scale survey experiment suggests that people did notice the social norm nudge and also that it had an impact on savings intentions. |
| Keywords: | household savings, field experiment, nudges, social norms |
| JEL: | C93 D14 D90 E21 G40 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8894&r=all |
| By: | Alem, Yonas; Dugoua, Eugenie |
| Abstract: | Interactions among peers of the same social network play significant roles in facilitating the adoption and diffusion of modern technologies in poor communities. We conduct a large-scale randomized controlled trial in rural India to identify the impact of information from friends on willingness to pay (WTP) for high-quality and multi-purpose solar lanterns. We offered solar lanterns to seed households from 200 non-electrified villages and randomly assigned three of their friends to two communication treatments (unincentivized and incentivized) that led to different exposure to their seed friend. We also introduce a second treatment to investigate whether the seed's gender impacts the magnitude of peer effects. We show that unincentivized communication increases WTP for solar lanterns by 90% and incentivized communication by 145%, but gender doesn't seem to matter. We also show that learning from others is the mechanism that drives the increase in WTP. Our findings have significant implications for policies that aim at promoting the diffusion of new technologies in developing countries. |
| Keywords: | Technology adoption,peer effects,information flow,solar lantern |
| JEL: | O33 D83 Q21 Q42 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:895&r=all |
| By: | Dasgupta, Utteeyo (Wagner College); Radoniqi, Fatos (Whittier College) |
| Abstract: | The success of a country's anti-corruption policies can crucially depend on the citizens' beliefs about the existing legal environment. We test this key idea of Basu (2020) using a novel design which systematically manipulates beliefs of participants in an experiment. Our results suggest that Basu's "Republic of Beliefs" idea provides a critical insight in policy formulation; Merely introducing an anti-corruption law is not sufficient in aiding the country towards the desired equilibrium, especially in developing countries, where the existing legal enforcement machinery has severe scopes of leakages. |
| Keywords: | republic of beliefs, asymmetric punishment, harassment bribery, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 K42 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14130&r=all |
| By: | Lukas Kiessling (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Shyamal Chowdhury (University of Sydney and IZA); Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) and IZA); Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, University of Cologne, University of Innsbruck, IZA, and CESifo) |
| Abstract: | We study whether and how parents interfere paternalistically in their children’s intertemporal decision-making. Based on experiments with over 2,000 members of 610 families, we find that parents anticipate their children’s present bias and aim to mitigate it. Using a novel method to measure parental interference, we show that more than half of all parents are willing to pay money to override their children’s choices. Parental interference predicts more intensive parenting styles and a lower intergenerational transmission of patience. The latter is driven by interfering parents not transmitting their own present bias, but molding their children’s preferences towards more time-consistent choices. |
| Keywords: | Parental paternalism, Time preferences, Convex time budgets, Present bias, Intergenerational transmission, Parenting styles, Experiment |
| JEL: | C90 D1 D91 D64 J13 J24 O12 |
| Date: | 2021–01–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2021_03&r=all |
| By: | Benno Torgler |
| Abstract: | In this paper I discuss how Law and Economics can benefit from incorporating some insights from Public Choice into their analyses. Within this argument, I examine the evolution of experimental methods by looking at laboratory, field, and natural experiments; and conducting a very simple scientometrics analysis on the relative frequency of experimental studies in journals such as Public Choice, Journal of Law and Economics , and Journal of Law, Economics and Organization in comparison to top economics journals such as American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Econometrica, or Review of Economic Studies . I also refer to the connectivity of Behavioral Law and Economics and Behavioral Public Choice. The paper then finishes with a discussion of a selected number of topics covering areas such as corruption, tax compliance, shitstorms/firestorms, constitutional choices, globalization and international organizations; all of which present scientific challenges when applying pure Law and Economics approaches without also implementing a Public Choice analysis. |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2021-04&r=all |
| By: | Alain de Janvry (Department of. Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley); Guojun He (Division of Social Science, Division of Environment and Sustainability, Department of Economics, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.); Elisabeth Sadoulet (Department of. Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley); Shaoda Wang (Corresponding Author, Department of Economics and EPIC, University of Chicago.); Qiong Zhang (School of Public Administration and Policy, Renmin University of China.) |
| Abstract: | Subjective performance evaluation is widely used by firms and governments to provide work incentives. However, delegating evaluation power to senior leadership could induce influence activities: agents might devote much efforts to please their supervisors, rather than focusing on productive tasks that benefit their organizations. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment among Chinese local government employees and provide the first rigorous empirical evidence on the existence and implications of influence activities. We find that state employees are able to impose evaluator-specific influence to affect evaluation outcomes, and that this process could be partly observed by their co-workers. Furthermore, introducing uncertainty in the identity of the evaluator, which discourages evaluator-specific influence activities, can significantly improve the work performance of state employees.Keywords: Alternative data, Satellite Imagery, Asset price impact, Macroeconomic Estimates |
| Keywords: | subjective evaluation, civil servants, work performance, incentive, favoritism |
| JEL: | M12 D73 F63 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hku:wpaper:201969&r=all |
| By: | Serge Garcia; Julien Jacob; Eve-Angéline Lambert |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate the relative performance of two liability sharing rules for managing environmental harms that are jointly caused by two firms which can make ex ante safety investments in order to reduce the magnitude of the harm. The investment levels are chosen non-cooperatively and assumed to be non-observable by the regulator. If one firm is unable to cover its part of the damages, third parties might not receive full compensation for their harm. Through an experiment, we analyze the investment choices under two widely used liability sharing rules and compare the decisions to theoretical predictions. In line with theory, we show that insolvency leads to under-investment. Moreover, we show that the relative performance of each rule depends on the firms’ relative degree of solvency. Our results indicate that the legislator should make the default liability sharing rule dependent upon the degree of capitalization of firms. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Regulation; Liability Sharing Rules; Multiple Tortfeasors; Firms’ Insolvency. |
| JEL: | K13 K32 Q53 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2021-07&r=all |
| By: | Stefania Bortolotti (University of Bologna, IZA); Thomas Dohmen (University of Bonn, IZA, Maastricht University, ROA, DIW); Hartmut Lehmann (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia, IZA, University of Bologna); Frauke Meyer (Forschungszentrum Julich); Norberto Pignatti (International School of Economics at Tbilisi State University (ISET), Tbilisi; IZA); Karine Torosyan (International School of Economics at Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi (ISET);) |
| Abstract: | We shed new light on the relationship between cognition and patience, by providing documenting that the correlation between cognitive abilities and delay discounting is weaker for the same group of individuals if choices are incentivized. We conjecture that the exertion of higher cognitive effort, which induces higher involvement of the cognitive system, moderates the relationship between patience and cognition. To test this hypothesis, we analyze the relationship between various measures of cognitive ability, including the cognitive reflection test (CRT), a symbol-correspondence test, a numeracy test, as well as self-reported math ability and the interviewer’s assessment of the respondent’s sharpness and understanding, and di↵erent measures of patience, including incentivized choices between smaller sooner and larger later monetary payments and hypothetical inter-temporal trade-offs, for 107 subjects drawn from the adult population in Tbilisi (Georgia). |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tbs:wpaper:21-001&r=all |
| By: | Arno Apffelstaedt (University of Cologne, Center for Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) and ECONtribute; Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50931 Cologne, Germany); Jana Freundt (University of Fribourg, Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania, School of Arts and Sciences; University of Fribourg, Boulevard de Perolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland); Christoph Oslislo (University of Cologne, Institute for Economic Policy; Pohligstraße 1, 50969 Cologne, Germany) |
| Abstract: | Can elections change people’s ideas about what is ethically right and what is wrong? A number of recent observations suggest that social norms can change rapidly as a result of election outcomes. We explore this conjecture using a controlled online experiment. In our experiment, participants rate the social appropriateness of sharing income with poorer individuals. We compare situations in which a rule has been elected that asks people to share or not to share, respectively, with situations in which no rule has been elected. In the absence of an election, sharing is widely considered socially appropriate, while not sharing is considered socially inappropriate. We show that elections can change this social norm: They shift the modal appropriateness perception of actions and, depending on the elected rule, increase their dispersion, i.e. erode previously existing consensus. As a result, actions previously judged socially inappropriate (not sharing) can become socially appropriate. This power prevails, albeit in weaker form, even if the election is subject to controversial practices such as vote buying or voter disenfranchisement. Drawing on behavioral data from another experiment, we demonstrate that election-induced norm shifts predict behavior change. |
| Keywords: | social norms, elections, prosocial behavior, rule compliance |
| JEL: | D02 D91 C91 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:068&r=all |
| By: | Ingela Alger (Department of economics, Tilburg University - Tilburg University [Netherlands]); Boris van Leeuwen (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | Recent theoretical work suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary foundations. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run laboratory experiments on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. Using a structural model, we estimate social preferences and morality concerns both at the individual level and the aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in social preferences and Kantian morality. A finite mixture analysis shows that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two types. One exhibits a combination of inequity aversion and Kantian morality, while the other combines spite and Kantian morality. |
| Date: | 2021–02–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03142431&r=all |
| By: | Hirt-Schierbaum, Linda; Ivets, Maryna |
| Abstract: | In this paper we develop a theoretical model concerning self-control, motivation and commitment. The model, based on Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), studies a two-period decision problem of an agent who faces a given menu and might experience temptation in the second period. In this case, the agent is tempted by a choice that is, from an ex ante normative point of view, inferior and has to exercise self-control to resist temptation. A random, time-variant degree of motivation is introduced to influence his cost of self-control. We introduce an investment-payoff combination as a commitment device that can help the agent pre-commit to his normative choice before he faces temptation. Depending on how accurately the agents predict their future self-control costs we distinguish between sophisticated and (partially) naive agents. The theoretical results show that our mechanism can help agents to commit successfully, and also can explain why certain agents with a preference for commitment might fail - behavior that is usually attributed to a preference reversal. This commitment failure is associated with underestimation of future self-control costs. |
| Keywords: | Self-Control,temptation model,motivation,heuristic bias,naiveté,sophistication,commitment device,health behavior |
| JEL: | D01 D11 D84 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:891&r=all |
| By: | Gosnell, Greer K.; List, John A.; Metcalfe, Robert D. |
| Abstract: | Increasing evidence indicates the importance of management in determining firms’ productivity. Yet causal evidence regarding the effectiveness of management practices is scarce, especially for skilled labor in the developed world. In a field experiment measuring commercial airline captains’ productivity, we test four distinct management practices: performance monitoring, performance feedback, target setting, and prosocial incentives. These practices—particularly monitoring and target setting—significantly increase captains’ productivity on the targeted fuel-saving dimensions, with positive spillovers on job satisfaction and CO 2 emissions. The study reveals an uncharted research opportunity to delve into the black box of firms to examine the determinants of productivity among skilled labor. |
| JEL: | D01 J30 Q50 R40 |
| Date: | 2020–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:102640&r=all |
| By: | Laura A. Outhwaite (Centre for Education Policy and Equaliising Opportunities, UCL Institute of Education, University College London) |
| Abstract: | This study reports a feasibility randomised control trial (RCT) of the Oliiki parenting app with 79 parents of children aged 0-6 months in the UK. Results showed, while controlling for pre-test scores, parents who were randomly allocated to the Treatment Group and used the Oliiki parenting app had significantly higher parental self-efficacy, after the 4-week intervention period, compared to the Active Control Group. Partial correlation analyses indicated that higher frequency of self-reported use of the Oliiki parenting app was associated with greater parental self-efficacy outcomes. This evidence establishes proof of concept that the Oliiki parenting app can have significant benefits on parental self-efficacy in the first 1000 days of child development. |
| Keywords: | parental self-efficacy, app-based support, early intervention, randomised controlled trial |
| JEL: | I20 I31 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucl:cepeow:21-01&r=all |
| By: | Peter J. Kuhn; Lizi Yu |
| Abstract: | We study the performance of small retail sales teams facing an incentive scheme that includes both a lump sum bonus and multiple accelerators (kinks where the piece rate jumps upward). Consistent with standard labor supply models, we find that the presence of an attainable bonus or kink on a work-day raises mean sales, and that sales are highly bunched at the bonus; inconsistent with those models we find that teams bunch at the kinks instead of avoiding them. Teams’ responses to the kinks are consistent with models in which the kinks are perceived as symbolic rewards, and inconsistent with reference point models where kinks induce loss aversion. |
| JEL: | J33 M52 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28487&r=all |
| By: | Catherine Eckel; Lata Gangadharan; Philip J. Grossman; Nina Xue |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2020-14&r=all |
| By: | Elijah Kipkech Kipchumba (BRAC); Catherine Porter (Lancaster University, Department of Economics); Danila Serra (Texas A&M University, Department of Economics); Munshi Sulaiman (BRAC) |
| Abstract: | We conducted a field experiment in Somali elementary schools, aimed at changing the education aspirations and gender attitudes of male and female students. We randomly selected schools to receive a role model treatment, consisting of a college student visiting the target classrooms. Within each treatment school, we randomly selected some grades to receive a visit from a female role model and some grades to receive a visit from a male role model. The college students talked about their study journeys, their challenges and their strategies to overcome such challenges. Data collected six months after the intervention show a significant and large impact of (only) female role models on boys' and girls' attitudes toward gender equality but no impact on students' aspirations to attend college. Data collected two years after the intervention only for the oldest, graduating cohort of students, who were grade 6 at the time of the intervention, produce comparable though imprecisely estimated treatment effect sizes. |
| Keywords: | Education aspirations, gender attitudes, role models, experiment, Somalia. |
| JEL: | A22 C93 I23 I24 J16 |
| Date: | 2021–02–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:txm:wpaper:20210224-001&r=all |
| By: | Roth, Christopher (University of Warwick, briq, CESifo, CEPR, CAGE Warwick); Sonja Settele (Department of Economics and CEBI, University of Copenhagen); Wohlfart, Johannes (Department of Economics and CEBI, University of Copenhagen, CESifo, Danish Finance Institute) |
| Abstract: | We conduct an experiment with a representative sample from the US to study households’ demand for macroeconomic information. Respondents who learn of a higher personal exposure to unemployment risk during recessions increase their demand for an expert forecast about the likelihood of a recession. This finding is consistent with macroeconomic models of endogenous information acquisition, according to which the demand for information depends on its expected benefits. Moreover, respondents’ updating about their personal unemployment risk suggests that households are imperfectly informed about their exposure to aggregate fluctuations, which may distort their beliefs about the benefits of acquiring macroeconomic information. |
| Keywords: | Risk Exposure ; Macroeconomic Conditions ; Information Acquisition ; Experiment JEL Classification: D12 ; D14 ; D83, D84 ; E32 ; G11 Creation date: 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1331&r=all |
| By: | Resnjanskij, Sven (ifo Institute); Ruhose, Jens (Kiel University); Wiederhold, Simon (Catholic University Eichstaett-Ingolstadt); Woessmann, Ludger (ifo Institute and LMU Munich) |
| Abstract: | We study a mentoring program that aims to improve the labor-market prospects of school-attending adolescents from disadvantaged families by offering them a university-student mentor. Our RCT investigates program effectiveness on three outcome dimensions that are highly predictive of adolescents later labor-market success: math grades, patience-social skills, and labor-market orientation. For low-SES adolescents, the one-to-one mentoring increases a combined index of the outcomes by half a standard deviation after one year, with significant increases in each dimension. Part of the treatment effect is mediated by establishing mentors as attachment figures who provide guidance for the future. The mentoring is not effective for higher-SES adolescents. The results show that substituting lacking family support by other adults can help disadvantaged children at adolescent age. |
| Keywords: | mentoring; disadvantaged youths; adolescence; school performance; patience; social skills; labor-market orientation; field experiment; |
| JEL: | I24 J24 H52 |
| Date: | 2021–02–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:277&r=all |
| By: | Ondřej Krčál (Masaryk University); Stefanie Peer (Vienna University of Economics and Business); Rostislav Staněk (Masaryk University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether the value of time (VOT) depends on when the corresponding preferences are measured: in advance, just before, or after the time period for which the time preferences are being evaluated. We find that the VOT is highest when elicited just before the time period. This is an indication of the VOT being affected by time-inconsistent, and more specifically, present-biased preferences. We argue that this result may explain why time valuations based on stated preference (SP) data are typically found to be lower than those based on revealed preference (RP) data: most RP surveys evaluate the preferences of respondents close to the time period for which the preferences are being measured, whereas the time instances for which preferences are evaluated in SP surveys tend to be more abstract, or referencing past or future time periods. |
| Keywords: | valuation of time, time inconsistency, present bias, hypothetical bias, lab experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D90 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2021-01&r=all |
| By: | Bucher-Koenen, Tabea; Alessie, Rob; Lusardi, Annamaria; van Rooij, Maarten |
| Abstract: | Women are less financially literate than men. It is unclear whether this gap reflects a lack of knowledge or, rather, a lack of confidence. Our survey experiment shows that women tend to disproportionately respond 'do not know' to questions measuring financial knowledge, but when this response option is unavailable, they often choose the correct answer. We estimate a latent class model and predict the probability that respondents truly know the correct answers. We find that about one-third of the financial literacy gender gap can be explained by women's lower confidence levels. Both financial knowledge and confidence explain stock market participation. |
| Keywords: | financial knowledge,gender gap,financial decision making,confidence,measurement error,latent class model,finite mixture model |
| JEL: | G53 C81 D91 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:21015&r=all |
| By: | Lee Elliot Major; Andrew Eyles; Stephen Machin |
| Abstract: | The unequal learning and labour market losses arising in the UK due to the Covid-19 pandemic are used to assess the consequences for social mobility. Labour market and learning losses have been more pronounced for people from poorer families and this is incorporated into a generalisation of the standard, canonical social mobility model. A calibration shows a significantly higher intergenerational elasticity - reflecting lower social mobility - because of the uneven nature of losses by family income, and from dynamic scarring. Results from a randomised information experiment incorporated in a bespoke Social Mobility Survey corroborate this, as participants become more sceptical about the social mobility prospects of the Covid generation when given information about the losses that have occurred in the crisis. |
| Keywords: | learning loss, labour market loss, crisis, social mobility, Covid-19 |
| JEL: | I24 J63 J21 J62 I24 J63 J21 J62 I24 J63 J21 J62 |
| Date: | 2021–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1748&r=all |