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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Necker, Sarah; Le Maux, Benoit; Masclet, David |
| Abstract: | We study theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others' behavior affects dishonesty. We ran a laboratory experiment with 560 participants inspired by the "observed game" developed by Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017). We find that the extensive (the fraction of liars) and intensive (the size of the lie) margin of dishonesty decrease when stakes are very high. On average, information about others slightly increases the fraction of liars but has no effect on the size of the lie. Distinguishing subjects by their belief on others' behavior, we find that information decreases the fraction of liars among over-estimators and increases the fraction among under-estimators. This pattern is the same across payoff levels. |
| Keywords: | Laboratory experiment,theory,cheating,incentives,information,moral costs,lying costs |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D78 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224578&r=all |
| By: | Bašic, Zvonimir (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Simone Quercia (University of Verona) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the influence of self and social image concerns as potential sources of lying costs. In a standard die-rolling experiment, we exogenously manipulate self-awareness and observability, which mediate the focus of a person on their private and public selves, respectively. First, we show that an increase in self-awareness has no effect on reporting private information. This suggests that self-image concerns may be less important than previously hypothesized in the literature on lying costs. Second, we show that increasing subjects' observability, while still maintaining private information, significantly decreases the subjects' reports. We finally show in a survey experiment that respondents believe that the likelihood of a lie increases with the reported outcome and attribute negative traits to people who make high reports. This further supports reputational concerns as the explanation behind the results of our social image treatment. |
| Keywords: | honesty, truth-telling, lying, private information, self-image concerns, social image concerns, reputation |
| JEL: | C91 D63 D82 D91 |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_18&r=all |
| By: | Beck, Tobias |
| Abstract: | I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized to lie about the true value of an optimal investment and, secondly, an investor with incomplete information (i.e., the receiver) who is incentivized to invest optimally and therefore must rely on the alleged optimum reported by the advisor. Due to its continuous message space, this experiment allows observing more differentiated behavior and therefore enables testing of more sophisticated theoretical predictions. I find that the senders lie by overstating the true value of the optimum to an average extent of about 148%, while the receivers suspect them to do so by only 56%. Moreover, my results indicate that the senders make strategic considerations about their potential to manipulate others when deciding about the sizes of their lies. However, I find that the size of the lie and the size of mistrust do not only matter from a strategic perspective but also have an impact on how people perceive their own behavior. Consistent with previous studies, my findings support the conjecture that lying costs increase with the size of the lie. Beyond that, I provide evidence for some endogenous preference for trust. Both players’ behaviors and beliefs are consistent over time. In addition, my classification of both players’ strategies is consistent with their self-assessment of their behavior within the experiment. |
| Keywords: | Size of the lie,Size of mistrust,Honesty,Deception Game,Investments,Asymmetric information,Experimental design |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D82 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224530&r=all |
| By: | Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman; Szech, Nora |
| Abstract: | Contests are well-established mechanisms for political lobbying, innovation, rentseeking, incentivizing workers, and advancing R&D. A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases investments of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through strict bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce discouragement and increase the designer's revenue. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment. Our data confirm that placing bid-caps and using favorable tie-breaking rules significantly diminishes discouragement in weaker contestants. The impact on revenue is more intricate. In contrast to theory, a strict bid-cap does not increase revenue, but a mild bid-cap can increase revenue even when not predicted by theory. Our data also show that tie-breaking rules seem to have little impact on the designer's revenue: the encouragement of weaker contestants is offset by stronger contestants competing less aggressively. We discuss deviations from the Nash predictions in light of different behavioral approaches. |
| Keywords: | all-pay auction,rent-seeking,lobbying,bid-caps,tie-breaks,contest design |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224585&r=all |
| By: | Cloos, Janis; Greiff, Matthias; Rusch, Hannes |
| Abstract: | We examine geographical concentration, scientific quality, and editorial favoritism in the field of experimental economics. We use a novel data set containing all original research papers (𝑁 = 583) that exclusively used laboratory experiments for data generation and were published in the American Economic Review, Experimental Economics or the Journal of the European Economic Association between 1998 and 2018. The development of geographical concentration is examined using data on authors' affiliations at the time of the respective publication. Results show that research output produced by US-affiliated economists increased slower than overall research output, leading to a decrease in geographical concentration. Several proxies for scientific quality indicate that experiments conducted in Europe are of higher quality than experiments conducted in North America: European experiments rely on a larger total number of participants as well as participants per treatment, and receive more citations compared to experiments conducted in North America. Examining laboratory experiments published in the AER more closely, we find that papers authored by economists with US-affiliations receive significantly fewer citations in the first 5 and 10 years after publication compared to papers by authors from the rest of the world. |
| Keywords: | laboratory experiments,favoritism,geographical concentration,methodological standards,network effects |
| JEL: | A11 A14 C90 I23 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224565&r=all |
| By: | Cécile Bourreau-Dubois (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UL - Université de Lorraine - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Myriam Doriat-Duban (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UL - Université de Lorraine - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Bruno Jeandidier (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UL - Université de Lorraine - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Jean Ray (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UL - Université de Lorraine - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | We study decision-making of judges in an experimental settingresembling real world judicial decision making.We gave to 312 future judges48 vignettes built from real datarelated to divorce cases involving children. Wecompare two different subject pools: judges who were asked to set child support awards with a guideline andjudgeswho were asked to set child support awardswithout any guideline.We foundthat the introductionof a guideline contributes to reduce the disparity between judges (i.e. the variance for like cases is lower when the subjects have the opportunity to use the guideline) but this effect is not systematic, an increase in heterogeneity being observed for some specific cases. |
| Keywords: | Controlled experiment,Field experiment,Judicial sentencing,Child support |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02978348&r=all |
| By: | Schneider, Sebastian O.; Sutter, Matthias |
| Abstract: | Higher order risk preferences are well-known for their relation with precautionary saving or portfolio allocation. Theoretically, they are also connected with other important behavior, such as health-related or eco-friendly behavior, but these relations have never been investigated with field data. In a large-scale experiment with 658 adolescents, we relate experimental measures of higher order risk preferences with field behavior. Field behavior is collected in an extensive survey, where we focus on general risk taking, the environmental and the health domain, particularly on addictive behavior. Using a novel method allowing the experimental elicitation of intensities of prudence and temperance, we find females behaving more risk averse, prudent and temperant, and high-ability students behaving less risk averse and temperant. We confirm previous findings on financial decision making and higher order risk preferences, and find that prudence is a strong predictor for health-related behavior: An index capturing the obsessive use of smartphones is predicted significantly by prudence, but not by risk aversion or temperance. |
| Keywords: | Higher order risk,prudence,temperance,field behavior,adolescents,health,addictive behavior,smartphone addiction |
| JEL: | C93 D81 D91 J13 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224643&r=all |
| By: | Grüner, Sven |
| Abstract: | Informed decisions are the cornerstone of a functioning democracy. The goal of this paper is twofold. First, to explore who is good at distinguishing between true and false, and, second, to learn something about mechanisms to debunk false news stories. In an experimental study, subjects were shown several news studies and asked to rate them as true or false. After this exercise, the subjects received systematically varied information about the correctness of the news stories depending on the experimental condition they had been assigned to. After a delay of three weeks, the subjects were shown the news studies again to find out which one works best. Our main findings are (i) The perceived familiarity with news stories increases the propensity to accept them as true. Actively open-minded thinking helps to distinguish between true and false. But the willingness to think deliberately does not seem to be important. (ii) By repeating false news stories, subjects are more likely to adequately identify them later (i.e., no evidence for a familiarity backfire effect). However, it decreased the ability to adequately identify correct news stories. A somewhat reverse, but weaker effect occurs when true stories are repeated: the correct identification of correct news stories is more successful, but the opposite holds for the identification of false news stories. Detailed explanations of why the false news stories contain false content increases the correct identification of false news stories, but the ability to correctly identify correct news stories is detrimental. |
| Keywords: | False news stories,narratives,cognitive reflection test,actively open-minded thinking,environmental economics,experimental economics |
| JEL: | C91 D91 Q50 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224621&r=all |
| By: | Gerhard Riener (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics); Sebastian Schneider (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Valentin Wagner (University of Mainz) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we systematically analyze the empirical importance of standard conditions for the validity and generalizability of field experiments: the internal and external overlap and unconfoundedness conditions. We experimentally varied the degree of overlap in disjoint sub-samples from a recruitment experiment with more than 3,000 public schools, mimicking small scale field experiments. This was achieved by using different techniques for treatment assignment. We applied standard methods, such as pure randomization, and the novel minMSE treatment assignment method. This new technique should achieve improved overlap by balancing covariate dependencies and variances instead of focusing on individual mean values. We assess the relevance of the overlap condition by linking the estimation precision in the disjoint sub-samples to measures of overlap and balance in general. Unconfoundedness is addressed by using a rich set of administrative data on institution and municipality characteristics to study potential self-selection. We find no evidence for the violation of unconfoundedness and establish that improved overlap, and balancedness, as achieved by the minMSE method, reduce the bias of the treatment effect estimation by more than 35% compared to pure randomization, illustrating the importance of, and suggesting a solution to, addressing overlap also in (field) experiments. |
| Keywords: | External validity, field experiments, generalizability, treatment effect, overlap, balance, precision, treatment assignment, unconfoundedness, self-selection bias, site-selection bias |
| JEL: | C9 C90 C93 D04 |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_16&r=all |
| By: | Sebastian Schneider (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | We use a novel method to elicit and measure higher order risk preferences (prudence and temperance) in an experiment with 658 adolescents. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that higher order risk preferences – particularly prudence – are strongly related to adolescents' field behavior, including their financial decision making, eco-friendly behavior, and health status, including addictive behavior. Most importantly, we show that dropping prudence and temperance from the analysis of students' field behavior would yield largely misleading conclusions about the relation of risk aversion to these domains of field behavior. Thus our paper puts previous work that ignored higher order risk preferences into an encompassing perspective and clarifies which orders of risk preferences can help understand field behavior of adolescents. |
| Keywords: | Higher order risk preferences, prudence, temperance, risk aversion, field behavior, adolescents, health, addictive behavior, smartphone addiction, experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D81 D91 J13 |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_22&r=all |
| By: | Georgia E. Buckle (University of Portsmouth); Sascha Füllbrunn (Radboud University); Wolfgang J. Luhan (University of Portsmouth) |
| Abstract: | We extend the experimental design by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to examine lying behavior on behalf of others, eliminating all possible incentives apart from social preferences. We compare the prevalence of misreporting in situations where the monetary gain either goes to the decision-maker or to an anonymous other participant. Overall we observe lower levels of lying for others compared to for oneself, however, a significant number of participants were willing to lie to increase another participant’s payoff, with no economic incentive to do so. We find no partial lying for others but rather two extremes: either complete honesty or maximal lying. |
| Keywords: | lying aversion, decision making for others, prosocial lying, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D63 D82 |
| Date: | 2020–11–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pbs:ecofin:2020-12&r=all |
| By: | Engelmann, Dirk; Koch, Alexander K.; Frank, Jeff; Valente, Marieta |
| Abstract: | Winning bidders in online auctions frequently fail to complete the transaction. Because enforcing bids usually is too costly, auction platforms often allow sellers to make a "secondchance" offer to the second highest bidder, to buy at the bid price of this bidder, and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who fail to pay. We show theoretically that, all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces amounts bid in auctions where there is a probability that a bidder defaults. Nevertheless, we show that it is not optimal for a seller to exclude a buyer who is likely to default. In addition, buyer reputation systems create a strategic effect that rewards bidders who have a reputation for defaulting, counter to the idea of creating a deterrent against such behavior. Actual bidding in experimental auctions support these predictions and provide insights on their practical relevance. |
| Keywords: | Auctions,Default,Reputation,Second-Chance Offers |
| JEL: | D44 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224641&r=all |
| By: | Momsen, Katharina; Ohndorf, Markus |
| Abstract: | We investigate if people exploit moral wiggle room in markets when revelation is stochastic and the revealed information is potentially erroneous. In our laboratory experiment, subjects purchase products associated with co-benefits represented as a contribution to carbon offsets purchased by the experimenters. Information on the size of this contribution is unobservable at first, but can be actively revealed by the consumer. In seven treatments, we alter the information structure as well as the perceived revelation costs. We find strong evidence of self-serving information avoidance in treatments with simple stochastic revelation and reduced reliability of the information, representing potentially 'fake' news. The propensity to avoid information increases with the introduction of nominal information costs, which are in fact not payoff-relevant. We conclude that, generally, self-serving information avoidance can arise in market situations if specific situational excuses are present, which could explain the demand for products associated with 'green-washing'. |
| Keywords: | Information avoidance,experiment,carbon offsets,moral wiggle room,green consumption,fake news |
| JEL: | C91 D12 D64 D89 Q50 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224637&r=all |
| By: | Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Michael Weyland; Anna Untertrifaller; Manuel Froitzheim |
| Abstract: | We present the results of a randomized intervention in schools to study how teaching financial literacy affects risk and time preferences of adolescents. Following more than 600 adolescents, aged 16 years on average, over about half a year, we provide causal evidence that teaching financial literacy has significant short-term and longer-term effects on risk and time preferences. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that teaching financial literacy makes subjects more patient, less present-biased, and slightly more risk-averse. Our finding that the intervention changes economic preferences contributes to a better understanding of why financial literacy has been shown to correlate systematically with financial behavior in previous studies. We argue that the link between financial literacy and field behavior works through economic preferences. In our study, the latter are also related in a meaningful way to students’ field behavior. |
| Keywords: | Financial literacy, randomized intervention, risk preferences, time preferences, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D14 I21 |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_17&r=all |
| By: | Jauernig, Johanna; von Grundherr, Michael; Uhl, Matthias |
| Abstract: | Hypocrisy is the act of claiming moral standards to which one's own behavior does conform. Instances of hypocrisy, such as supposedly green car manufacturer Volkswagen's emissions-related scandal, are frequently reported in the media. In a controlled and incentivized experiment, we find that observers do, indeed, condemn hypocritical behavior strongly. The aversion to deceptive behavior is, in fact, so strong that even purely self-deceptive behavior is regarded as blameworthy. Observers who score high in the moral identity test have particularly strong reactions to acts of hypocrisy. The moral condemnation of hypocritical behavior, however, fails to produce a proportional amount of punishment. Punishment seems to be driven more by the violation of the norm of fair distribution than by moral pretense. If a broad societal consensus exists with regard to the moral reprehensibility of hypocrisy, it may be necessary to implement institutional sanctions, given the widespread behavioral reluctance to punish hypocrites. |
| JEL: | C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224558&r=all |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Eric Helland (Claremont McKenna College) |
| Abstract: | Oliver Williamson has coined the term “fundamental transformation”. It captures the following situation: before they strike a deal, buyer and seller are protected by competition. Yet thereafter they find themselves in a bilateral monopoly. With common knowledge of standard preferences, both sides conclude the contract regardless if its expected value exceeds their outside options. We run an experiment to test whether additional behavioral reasons deter mutually beneficial trade. If the risk materializes, another individual makes a windfall profit. She does so by intentionally exploiting the first individual. The first individual is let down, although she has knowingly exposed herself to this risk. Participants sell the opportunity to enter the contractual relationship at a price below its expected value. This effect is driven by risk aversion, and already present if the risk is stochastic. Behavioral effects are heterogeneous. About a quarter of participants exhibit the hypothesized additional deterrent effect. |
| Keywords: | fundamental transformation, bilateral monopoly, sunk cost, Oliver Williamson, windfall profit, exploitation, let down aversion |
| JEL: | B21 C91 D22 D43 K12 L12 L14 |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_23&r=all |
| By: | Shan, Xiaoyue |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how the gender composition in university study groups affects education expectations, beliefs about gender equality, and short-run academic outcomes. I conduct a field experiment in a large introductory economics course where I randomly assign students to study groups. Results show that women assigned to male-dominated groups form more pessimistic education expectations, more egalitarian gender beliefs, and have worse academic performance than other women. Being the minority gender in a group reduces women's education expectations by 0.41 standard deviations, strengthens their gender-equality beliefs by 0.24 standard deviations, and increases their dropout rate by 9.7 percentage points. In contrast, gender-balanced groups raise female expectations and weaken their beliefs about gender-equality. Gender balance also significantly increases students' exam scores by 0.19 standard deviations. I present suggestive evidence for inter-gender contact as an underlying mechanism. Gender-balanced groups increase social interactions among students and narrow gender gaps in education expectations and gender stereotypes. Further analysis on personality traits and socioeconomic preferences suggests that peer gender has especially strong effects on students - both men and women - with socially female characteristics. |
| JEL: | I21 J16 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224610&r=all |
| By: | Ifcher, John (Santa Clara University); Zarghamee, Homa (Barnard College) |
| Abstract: | Experiments have demonstrated that men are more willing to compete than women in stereotypically male tasks. We examine whether nominations close this gender gap. For example, are male nominators more willing than female nominators to enter nominees into competitions. Further, we consider the interaction between nominator and nominee gender. For example, do men shy away from entering women into competitions, or do they make them compete too much? We find a gender gap in neither nominators' willingness to enter nominees into competitions, nor in nominees' likelihood to be entered into competitions. Interestingly, male and female nominators willingness to enter nominees into competitions is statistically indistinguishable from women's willingness to enter themselves into competitions. We also find that men are significantly more likely to enter themselves than others into competitions; this suggests that a nominating process that excludes self-nominations could have an equalizing effect on the proportion of men and women who enter competitions. Our results also reinforce the assertion that the gender gap in competitive preferences is driven by the "thrill or fear of performing in a competitive environment (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007)," as this motivation is absent in decision-making for others. |
| Keywords: | nominations, preference for competition, willingness to compete, gender gap, decision making for others, DMfO |
| JEL: | H1 H5 P1 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13852&r=all |
| By: | Sylvain Chassang; Lucia Del Carpio; Samuel Kapon |
| Abstract: | Limits on a government’s capacity to enforce laws can result in multiple equilibria. If most agents comply, limited enforcement is sufficient to dissuade isolated agents from misbehaving. If most agents do not comply, overstretched enforcement capacity has a minimal impact on behavior. We study the extent to which divide-and-conquer enforcement strategies can help select a high compliance equilibrium in the presence of realistic compliance frictions. We study the role of information about the compliance of others both in theory and in lab experiments. As the number of agents gets large, theory indicates that providing information or not is irrelevant in equilibrium. In contrast, providing individualized information has a first order impact in experimental play by increasing convergence to equilibrium. This illustrates the value of out-of-equilibrium information design. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C92 D73 D82 D86 H26 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28042&r=all |
| By: | Oehler, Andreas; Horn, Matthias; Wendt, Stefan |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes investors' perception of placebic information and its impact on stock price estimates. We initiate a questionnaire-based stock price forecast competition among 196 undergraduate students in business administration. We show that placebic information increases the perceived amount of relevant information. Individual participants' characteristics, such as gender, financial knowledge or overconfidence, do not affect these findings. Placebic information does not alter participants' stock price estimates and their accuracy, but it has an impact on individual expectations about the stock price forecast competition itself. The findings indicate that placebic information leads to information illusion. As reaction to the illusion, less overconfident investors decrease their expectations with regard to payoff and chances to win a prize in the competition. More overconfident participants do not show the latter behavior. Our findings provide implications for practitioners and researchers alike. Since the participants in our study serve as a proxy for economically educated young adults who are likely to invest in stocks in the future, both regulators and policy makers should consider that placebic information can significantly impact investors' perception and, therefore, regulation on information that is provided to retail investors should focus on relevant and avoid irrelevant information. Researchers should be aware that placebic information asymmetrically influences expectations of participants in experiments who show different levels of overconfidence. |
| Keywords: | Placebic information,information illusion,information overload,financial decision making,experiments,forecasting,investor survey |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224575&r=all |
| By: | Fest, Sebastian; Kvaloy, Ola; Nieken, Petra; Schöttner, Anja |
| Abstract: | An increasing number of workers participate in online labor markets. In contrast to traditional employment relationships within firms, the interaction between online workers and their employers are short and impersonal, which makes motivating online workers more challenging. We present results from two large-scale real-effort experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk investigating the effects of monetary and non-monetary motivational instruments. In the first experiment, we study the effects of performance pay and simple upfront messages (praise or reference points) on performance. The second experiment concentrates on the effects of communication techniques used by charismatic leaders. Performance pay increases output significantly. Sending simple messages, however, can have a significantly negative effect on output. The results from the second experiment show that charismatic communication techniques can also backfire when only a subset of them is used, whereas using a broad set including quantitative goals increases output significantly. Neither intervention had any effect on the quality of work. |
| Keywords: | Online Labor Market,Performance Pay,Motivation,Charismatic Leadership |
| JEL: | C93 M52 J33 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224586&r=all |
| By: | Andre Veiga (Imperial College London); Tommaso Valletti (Imperial College London) |
| Abstract: | We conduct an experiment where 1,000 individuals read online news articles and are shown ads for branded goods next to those articles. Using eye-tracking technology, we measure the attention that each individual devotes to reading each article and viewing each ad. Then, respondents choose between cash or vouchers for branded goods. We find that attention is a predictor both of willingness-to-pay for brands, and for brand recall. We also give suggestive evidence of the main drivers of attention. These include the type of news, and the match between individual political preferences and the media outlet. |
| Keywords: | Online Advertising, Experiments, Attention, E-commerce, Targeting |
| JEL: | M37 C91 L86 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:2015&r=all |
| By: | Balafoutas, Loukas (University of Innsbruck); Fornwagner, Helena (University of Regensburg); Kerschbamer, Rudolf (University of Innsbruck); Sutter, Matthias (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Tverdostup, Maryna (University of Innsbruck) |
| Abstract: | Credence goods markets – like for health care or repair services – with their informational asymmetries between sellers and customers are prone to fraudulent behavior of sellers and resulting market inefficiencies. We present the first model that considers both diagnostic uncertainty of sellers and the effects of insurance coverage of consumers in a unified framework. We test the model's predictions in a laboratory experiment. Both in theory and in the experiment diagnostic uncertainty decreases the rate of efficient service provision and leads to less trade. In theory, insurance also decreases the rate of efficient service provision, but at the same time it also increases the volume of trade, leading to an ambiguous net effect on welfare. In the experiment, the net effect of insurance coverage on efficiency turns out to be positive. We also uncover an important interaction effect: if consumers are insured, experts invest less in diagnostic precision. We discuss policy implications of our results. |
| Keywords: | credence goods, diagnostic uncertainty, insurance coverage, welfare, model, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C72 D82 G22 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13848&r=all |
| By: | Ye Zhang |
| Abstract: | This paper examines discrimination based on startup founders' gender, race, and age by early-stage investors, using two randomized controlled trials with real venture capitalists. The first experiment invites U.S. investors to evaluate multiple randomly generated startup profiles, which they know to be hypothetical, in order to be matched with real, high-quality startups from collaborating incubators. Investors can also donate money to randomly displayed startup teams to show their anonymous support during the COVID-19 pandemic. The second experiment sends hypothetical pitch emails with randomized startups' information to global venture capitalists and compares their email responses by utilizing a new email technology that tracks investors' detailed information acquisition behaviors. I find three main results: (i) Investors are biased towards female, Asian, and older founders in "lower contact interest" situations; while biased against female, Asian, and older founders in "higher contact interest" situations. (ii) These two experiments identify multiple coexisting sources of bias. Specifically, statistical discrimination is an important reason for "anti-minority" investors' contact and investment decisions, which was proved by a newly developed consistent decision-based heterogeneous effect estimator. (iii) There was a temporary, stronger bias against Asian founders during the COVID-19 outbreak, which started to fade in April 2020. |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2010.16084&r=all |
| By: | Felipe Barrera-Osorio; Paul Gertler; Nozomi Nakajima; Harry Patrinos |
| Abstract: | Parental involvement programs aim to increase school-and-parent communication and support children’s overall learning environment. This paper examines the effects of low-cost, group-based parental involvement interventions in Mexico using data from two randomized controlled trials. The first experiment provided financial resources to parent associations. The second experiment provided information to parents about how to support their children’s learning. Overall, the interventions induced different types of parental engagement in schools. The information intervention changed parenting behavior at home – with large effects among indigenous parents who have historically been discriminated and socially excluded – and improved student behavior in school. The grants did not impact parent or student behaviors. Notably, we do not find impacts of either intervention on educational achievement. To understand these null effects, we explore how social ties between parents and teachers evolved over the course of the two interventions. Parental involvement interventions led to significant changes in perceived trustworthiness between teachers and parents. The results suggest that parental involvement interventions can backfire if institutional rules are unclear about the expectations of parents and teachers as parents increase their involvement in schools. |
| JEL: | I20 I25 O15 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28040&r=all |
| By: | Guillen, Pablo; Kesten, Onur; Kiefer, Alexander; Melatos, Mark |
| Abstract: | The majority of undergraduate university applications in the state of New South Wales – Australia’s largest state – are processed by a clearinghouse, the Universities Admissions Centre (UAC). Applicants submit an ordered list of course preferences to UAC which applies a matching algorithm to allocate university places to eligible applicants. The algorithm incorporates the possibility of a type of “early action” through which applicants receive guaranteed enrolments. Applicants receive advice on how to construct their course preference list from multiple sources (including individual universities). This advice is often confusing, inconsistent with official UAC advice or simply misleading. To investigate the implications, we run an experiment in a choice environment that mimics the UAC application process and in which truth telling is a dominant strategy. We vary the advice received across treatments: no advice, UAC advice only, (inaccurate) university advice only, and both UAC and university advice together. Overall, 75.5% of participants fail to use the dominant strategy. High rates of applicant manipulation persist even when applicants are provided with accurate UAC advice. We find that students who attend non-selective government schools are more prone to use strictly dominated strategies than those who attend academically selective government schools and private schools. |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:syd:wpaper:2020-13&r=all |
| By: | Mark Kassis; Sascha L. Schmidt; Dominik Schreyer; Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we show that the right to determine the sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament improves the chances of winning the contest. Because studying dynamic team tournaments – like R&D races – with interim feedback is difficult with company data, we examine decisions of highly paid professionals in soccer penalty shootouts and show that teams whose captains can decide about the shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout. So, managerial decisions matter for outcomes of dynamic tournaments and we discuss potential reasons for this finding. |
| Keywords: | Dynamic tournament, sports professionals, psychological pressure, value of decision rights, penalty shoot-outs, behavioral economics |
| JEL: | C93 D00 D81 D91 Z20 |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_21&r=all |
| By: | Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia |
| Abstract: | We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the multiplier, both the expected frequency of investments and repayments as well as the expected payoffs of both players are higher compared to a situation where the multiplier is public knowledge. We test this result in a laboratory experiment. The data cannot confirm the predicted welfare dominance of private information about the multiplier. We discuss potential reasons for the deviation between theory and experimental data. |
| Keywords: | reputation,trust,incomplete information,experiment |
| JEL: | C73 C92 D82 D83 M13 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224518&r=all |
| By: | Ferman, Bruno; Lima, Lycia; Riva, Flavio |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates how technologies that use different combinations of artificial and human intelligence are incorporated into classroom instruction, and how they ultimately affect students' outcomes. We conducted a field experiment to study two technologies that allow teachers to outsource grading and feedback tasks on writing practices. The first technology is a fully automated evaluation system that provides instantaneous scores and feedback. The second one uses human graders as an additional resource to enhance grading and feedback quality in aspects in which the automated system arguably falls short. Both technologies significantly improved students' essay scores, and the additional inputs from human graders did not improve effectiveness. Furthermore, the technologies similarly helped teachers engage more frequently on nonroutine tasks that supported the individualization of pedagogy. Our results are informative about the potential of artificial intelligence to expand the set of tasks that can be automated, and on how advances in artificial intelligence may relocate human labor to tasks that remain out of reach of automation. |
| Keywords: | artificial intelligence; technological change; automated writing evaluation; routine and nonroutine tasks |
| JEL: | I21 I22 I25 |
| Date: | 2020–11–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:103934&r=all |
| By: | Kölle, Felix |
| Abstract: | Many situations in the social and economic life are characterized by rivalry and conflict between two or more competing groups. Warfare, socio-political conflicts, political elections, lobbying, and R&D competitions are all examples of inter-group conflicts in which groups spend scarce and costly resources to gain an advantage over other groups. Here, we report on an experiment that investigates the impact of political institutions within groups on the development of conflict between groups. We find that relative to the case in which group members can decide individually on their level of conflict engagement, conflict significantly intensifies when investments are determined democratically by voting or when a single group member (the dictator) can decide on behalf of the group. These results hold for both symmetric and asymmetric contests, as well as for situations in which institutions are adopted exogenously or endogenously. Our findings thus suggest that giving people the possibility to vote is not the main reason for why democracies seem to engage in less wars than autocracies. Nevertheless, when giving participants the possibility to choose which institution to adopt, we find that democracy is the by far most popular one as it combines the desirable features of autonomy and equality. |
| Keywords: | Conflict,competition,institutions,democracy,groups,experiment |
| JEL: | D72 C72 C92 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224515&r=all |
| By: | Feldhaus, Christoph; Rockenbach, Bettina; Zeppenfeld, Christopher |
| Abstract: | Successful coordination is key for economic and societal wealth. The rich literature on the minimum-effort game (MEG) has provided valuable insights into coordination, both theoretically and empirically. Yet, although real-world scenarios often involve asymmetric benefits and/or costs from coordination, most previous studies rely on symmetric MEGs. We investigate the effect of unequal equilibrium pay-offs in the MEG. In two experiments, we observe that players are better able to coordinate on an equal rather than an unequal Pareto-dominant equilibrium. We find that the ability to coordinate on the unequal Pareto-dominant equilibrium critically hinges on the costs of miscoordination for the player who benefits most from successful coordination: when her costs are low, she seems able to stabilize the Pareto-dominant equilibrium even if payoffs are highly unequal, whereas coordination success worsens substantially when her costs are high. |
| Keywords: | minimum effort game,coordination,social comparison,potential games,lab experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224650&r=all |
| By: | Marco Reuter; Carl-Christian Groh |
| Abstract: | We study optimal mechanisms for a utilitarian designer who seeks to assign multiple units of an indivisible good to a group of agents with unit demand. The agents have heterogeneous marginal utilities of money, which implies that utility is not perfectly transferable between them. Heterogeneous marginal utilities of money may naturally arise in environments where agents have different wealth endowments. We show that the ex post efficient allocation rule is not optimal in our setting. Firstly, a high willingness to pay may stem from a low marginal utility of money. Moreover, the transfer rule does not only facilitate implementation of the desired social choice function in our setting, but also directly affects social welfare. In the optimal mechanism, rationing may occur, which entails a conflict between ex ante and ex post efficiency. In an extension, we show that it is still not utilitarian optimal to allocate the good solely based on willingness to pay even when redistribution is not possible. Finally, we highlight how our mechanism can be implemented as an auction with minimum bids and bidding subsidies. |
| Keywords: | optimal mechanism design, redistribution, inequality, auctions |
| JEL: | D44 D47 D61 D63 D82 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_228&r=all |
| By: | Hermes, Henning; Huschens, Martin; Rothlauf, Franz; Schunk, Daniel |
| Abstract: | Relative performance feedback (RPF) has often been shown to improve effort and performance in the workplace and educational settings. Yet, many studies also document substantial negative effects of RPF, in particular for low-achievers. We study a novel type of RPF designed to overcome these negative effects of RPF on low-achievers by scoring individual performance improvements. With a sample of 400 children, we conduct a class-wise randomized-controlled trial using an e-learning software in regular teaching lessons in primary schools. We demonstrate that this type of RPF significantly increases motivation, effort, and performance in math for low-achieving children, without hurting high-achieving children. Among low-achievers, those receiving more points and moving up in the ranking improved strongest on motivation and math performance. In addition, we document substantial gender differences in response to this type of RPF: improvements in motivation and learning are much stronger for girls. We argue that using this new type of RPF could potentially reduce inequalities, especially in educational settings. |
| Keywords: | relative performance feedback,rankings,randomized-controlled trial,education,gender differences |
| JEL: | I20 I24 C93 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224532&r=all |
| By: | Brünner, Tobias; Levinsky, Rene |
| Abstract: | The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency of prices, but this comes at the expense of reduced gains from trade. The model further implies that in the presence of insider information the call auction performs worse than continuous double auction. Testing these hypotheses in the lab we find that insider information increases informational efficiency of call auction prices but does not decrease the realized gains from trade. Contrary to the theoretical prediction, the call auction does not perform worse than the continuous double auction. In fact, when the probability of insider information is high, the call auction has the most informative prices and highest realized gains from trade. Our experiment provides new evidence, from markets with very asymmetrically dispersed information, that lends support to the decision by many stock exchanges to use call auctions when information asymmetries are severe and the need for accurate prices is large, e.g., at the open or close of the trading day. |
| Keywords: | call market,call auction,double auction,asymmetric information,experiment,informational efficiency |
| JEL: | D82 C92 G14 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224618&r=all |
| By: | Béatrice Boulu-Reshef (LEO - Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orleans - UO - Université d'Orléans - Université de Tours - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nina Rapoport (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Voluntary contributions are often solicited in sequential and public settings where information on the quality of the fundraising project unfolds with the sequence of decisions. This paper examines how the different sources of information available to potential donors in such settings influence their decision-making. Contrary to most of the leadership literature, neither leaders nor followers in these settings have certainty about the quality of the fundraising project. We explore whether leaders remain influential, the extent to which they use their influence strategically, and the consequences on followers when leaders are misinformed. We combine an information cascade method with a modified public goods game to create a "Voluntary Contributions in Cascades" paradigm. Participants sequentially receive private signals about the state of the world, which determines the potential returns from the public good, and take two public actions: an incentivized prediction about the state of the world and a contribution to the public good. We find that participants' predictions mostly align with Bayesian predictions, and find no evidence for strategic or misleading predictions. Leaders' contributions are positively correlated with followers', suggesting they remain influential despite their limited informational advantage. This influence takes a tragic turn when leaders happen to be misinformed, as most misinformed leaders end up unintentionally misleading followers. We find that having a misleading leader is associated with a reduction in gains from contributions roughly twice as large as the reduction that stems from dividing the marginal-per-capita-return by two. Our results stress the significance of having well-informed leaders. |
| Keywords: | voluntary contribution,information cascade,fundraising,sequential public good game,leadership |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02977853&r=all |
| By: | Gutsche, Gunnar; Wetzel, Heike; Ziegler, Andreas |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the determinants of socially responsible investing (SRI) at the individual investor level. We examine data from an incentivized framed field experiment, which was part of a survey among a representative sample of financial decision makers in German households. Thus, we provide a new approach to elicit preferences for SRI. We further extend the set of potential determinants of SRI and consider all economic preferences according to Falk et al. (2018) and the Big Five personality traits. The analysis reveals that these factors are only of minor relevance in comparison to financial literacy, environmental values, and social norms. |
| Keywords: | Socially responsible investing,economic preferences,personality traits,framed field experiment |
| JEL: | G11 Q56 G02 A12 A13 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224542&r=all |
| By: | Rasch, Alexander; Thöne, Miriam; Wenzel, Tobias |
| Abstract: | Drip pricing is the business practice of decomposing the price into multiple components which are presented sequentially to buyers. We experimentally examine the effects of this practice on seller strategies and buyer behavior as well as the implications for regulation. Sellers set two prices: a base price and a drip price. At first, buyers only observe the base prices and make a tentative purchase decision. Revealing the sellers' drip prices, however, comes at a cost. We find that sellers only compete in base prices and set the highest possible drip price. This makes the base price a reliable indicator for the lowest total price, and few consumers invest in drip-price search. A comparison with Bertrand competition reveals significant effects: With drip pricing, consumer surplus is lower, and seller profits are higher. When there is uncertainty over possible drip sizes, sellers also compete over drips, and consumers more frequently fail to identify the cheapest offer. Bertrand competition also leads to higher consumer surplus and lower firm profits in this case. Hence, our results point to positive effects of drip-price regulation. |
| Keywords: | Drip pricing,Search,Regulation |
| JEL: | L13 M3 C9 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224638&r=all |
| By: | AKIN, ZAFER |
| Abstract: | This paper theoretically and experimentally investigates the behavior of asymmetric players in guessing games. The asymmetry is created by introducing k>1 replicas of one of the players. Two-player and restricted N-player cases are examined in detail. Based on the model parameters, the equilibrium is either unique in which all players choose zero or mixed in which the weak player (k=1) imitates the strong player (k>1). A series of experiments involving two and three-player repeated guessing games with unique equilibrium is conducted. We find that equilibrium behavior is observed less frequently and overall choices are farther from the equilibrium in two-player asymmetric games in contrast to symmetric games, but this is not the case in three-player games. Convergence towards equilibrium exists in all cases but asymmetry slows down the speed of convergence to the equilibrium in two, but not in three-player games. Furthermore, the strong players have a slight earning advantage over the weak players, and asymmetry increases discrepancy in choices (defined as the squared distance of choices from the winning number) in both games. |
| Keywords: | Guessing game, asymmetry, convergence, game theory, experimental economics |
| JEL: | C72 C92 |
| Date: | 2020–10–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:103871&r=all |
| By: | Brian Quistorff; Gentry Johnson |
| Abstract: | Restricting randomization in the design of experiments (e.g., using blocking/stratification, pair-wise matching, or rerandomization) can improve the treatment-control balance on important covariates and therefore improve the estimation of the treatment effect, particularly for small- and medium-sized experiments. Existing guidance on how to identify these variables and implement the restrictions is incomplete and conflicting. We identify that differences are mainly due to the fact that what is important in the pre-treatment data may not translate to the post-treatment data. We highlight settings where there is sufficient data to provide clear guidance and outline improved methods to mostly automate the process using modern machine learning (ML) techniques. We show in simulations using real-world data, that these methods reduce both the mean squared error of the estimate (14%-34%) and the size of the standard error (6%-16%). |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2010.15966&r=all |
| By: | Becker, Johannes; Hopp, Daniel; Süß, Karolin |
| Abstract: | Indirect reciprocity is defined as a specific kind of behavior: An agent rewards or penalizes another agent for having behaved kindly or unkindly toward a third party. This paper analyzes the question of what drives indirect reciprocity: Does the agent reward or penalize because she (altruistically) cares for the third party? Or does she take the other agent's behavior as a signal of how the latter would treat her if they met? In order to measure the relative importance of the altruism motive versus the signaling motive, we consider a gift-exchange game with three players: an employer pays wages to a worker and a coworker, before the worker (but not the coworker) may reciprocate by exerting effort. We offer a theoretical framework to analyze both motives for indirect reciprocity and run a series of lab experiments. The treatments manipulate the worker's information on wages. We find that, if only the coworker's wage is observable, the worker's effort increases in the coworker's wage. In contrast, if the worker can observe her own wage, the coworker's wage does not affect worker effort at all. We interpret this as support for the signaling motive: Indirect reciprocity is rather a byproduct of direct reciprocity than an act of altruism. |
| Keywords: | gift-exchange,indirect reciprocity,signaling |
| JEL: | A13 C92 D91 J31 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224592&r=all |
| By: | Ortiz, Santiago; Castelblanco, Geraldine; Mantilla, Cesar |
| Abstract: | Perishable products traded in informal markets might be subject to price variations in two opposite directions. Whereas the absence of posted prices opens the door for price discrimination based on some buyers' attributes, the reduction in quality over time might decrease prices to secure a transaction. We use an audit experiment to detect these pricing patterns in the informal flower markets nearby the cemeteries of Bogotá, Colombia. We analyze 441 price quotations. We interpret the lower prices in the afternoon than in the morning as evidence of dynamic pricing. Regarding price discrimination, we find that women are quoted a higher price than men, whereas attire (formal versus informal) does not affect prices. The price variations associated with the time of the day and the gender of the buyer appear to be independent of each other. |
| Date: | 2020–11–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:pv5kz&r=all |
| By: | Lotti, Lorenzo |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of prolonged social distancing on generosity by analyzing the responses of 1255 US citizens to dictator games spread out over eight weeks of the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the isolation and the negative effects on employment and household finances, individuals became more generous over this time period. There is significant heterogeneity in the effect of additional regressors,such as perceived contagion risk, on the likelihood and amount donated to strangers,family members, or the government. At the same time, significant effects of the position of games with respect to the others highlight the significant role of framing on generous behaviours. |
| Keywords: | Generosity, Dictator Game, Social Preferences, Framing, Altruism, Covid-19 |
| JEL: | C71 D63 D64 D71 D91 I14 |
| Date: | 2020–10–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:103826&r=all |
| By: | Jonah Deutsch; Naihobe Gonzalez; Nan Maxwell |
| Abstract: | This report provides intervention and evaluation designs for two behavioral intervention (BI) trials that, if implemented, would test whether webinar registrations increase when behavioral strategies are applied to emails targeting a given industry. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral intervention, behavioral trial, randomized controlled trial, email intervention, labor regulations, labor standards, compliance assistance, compliance |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:06a692b5221d43d3acd9baee98806299&r=all |
| By: | Andrej Gill; Matthias Heinz; Heiner Schumacher; Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | The financial industry has been struggling with widespread misconduct and public mistrust. Here we argue that the lack of trust into the financial industry may stem from the selection of subjects with little, if any, trustworthiness into the financial industry. We identify the social preferences of business and economics students, and follow up on their first job placements. We find that during college, students who want to start their career in the financial industry are substantially less trustworthy. Most importantly, actual job placements several years later confirm this association. The job market in the financial industry does not screen out less trustworthy subjects. If anything the opposite seems to be the case: Even among students who are highly motivated to work in finance after graduation, those who actually start their career in finance are significantly less trustworthy than those who work elsewhere. |
| Keywords: | Trustworthiness, Financial Industry, Selection, Social Preferences, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 G20 M51 |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2020_19&r=all |
| By: | Günther, Isabel |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes the impact of gender and ethnic discrimination on redistributive preferences and productivity using a large online experiment with US citizens on Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Participants are randomly allocated to different payment schemes for a real-effort task. Four payment schemes discriminate against women, men, whites, or people of color. Men's productivity slightly increases when they are discriminated against whereas productivity slightly decreases for women and people of color when they are discriminated against. After the task and revealing earnings, participants are given the chance to redistribute earnings by voting on a tax rate for the group. Discrimination against women highly increases preferred tax rates and discrimination against whites or people of color moderately increases the demand for redistribution. The results indicate that different forms of economic discrimination - even if financially indistinguishable - lead to very different reactions amongst the entire population and sub-groups. The results also indicate that brute luck of gender or ethnicity occurring at birth is perceived as different from brute luck experienced later in life. |
| Keywords: | luck,gender,ethnicity,discrimination,inequality,productivity,tax rate,demand for redistribution |
| JEL: | J71 D63 D91 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224633&r=all |
| By: | Boltz, Marie (Université de Strasbourg); Cockx, Bart (Ghent University); Diaz, Ana Maria (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana); Salas, Luz (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana) |
| Abstract: | We conducted an experiment in which we hired workers under different types of contracts to evaluate how flexible working time affects on-the-job productivity in a routine job. Our approach breaks down the global impact on productivity into sorting and behavioral effects. We find that all forms of working-time flexibility reduce the length of workers' breaks. For part-time work, these positive effects are globally counterbalanced. Yet arrangements that allow workers to decide when to start and stop working increase global productivity by as much as 50 percent, 40 percent of which is induced by sorting. |
| Keywords: | flexible work arrangements, part-time work, productivity, labor market flexibility, work–life balance |
| JEL: | J21 J22 J23 J24 J33 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13825&r=all |