nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2020‒10‒19
24 papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Endogenous Monitoring through Gossiping in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Experimental Evidence By Kenju Kamei; Artem Nesterov
  2. Transfer Paradox in a General Equilibrium Economy: a First Experimental Investigation By Kenju Kamei
  3. Does mining fuel bubbles? An experimental study on cryptocurrency markets By Lambrecht, Marco; Sofianos, Andis; Xu, Yilong
  4. Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the United States Social Supplementary Income Program By C. Yiwei Zhang; Jeffrey Hemmeter; Judd B. Kessler; Robert D. Metcalfe; Robert Weathers
  5. Nudging Demand for Academic Support Services: Experimental and Structural Evidence from Higher Education By Pugatch, Todd; Wilson, Nicholas
  6. What are you calling intuitive? Subject heterogeneity as a driver of response times in an impunity game By Paolo Crosetto; Werner Güth
  7. Consumer Search and Stock-out: A Laboratory Experiment By Yuta KITTAKA; Ryo MIKAMI
  8. Mental health and the response to financial incentives: evidence from a survey incentives experiment By Kung, Claryn S. J.; Johnston, David W.; Shields, Michael A.
  9. Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships By Kenju Kamei
  10. How much you talk matters: cheap talk and collusion in a Bertrand oligopoly game By Lee, Jun Yeong; Hoffman, Elizabeth
  11. Who Debates, Who Wins? At-Scale Experimental Evidence on the Supply of Policy Information in a Liberian Election By Bowles, Jeremy; Larreguy, Horacio
  12. Who Debates, Who Wins? At-Scale Experimental Evidence on the Supply of Policy Information in a Liberian Election By Larreguy, Horacio; Bowles, Jeremy
  13. Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests By Subhasish M. Chowdhury; Patricia Esteve-González; Anwesha Mukherjee
  14. To pay or not to pay: Measuring risk preferences in lab and field By Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Estepa Mohedano, Lorenzo; Jorrat, Diego; Orozco, Víctor; Rascon-Ramirez, Ericka
  15. Changing environmental conservation attitudes: Evidence from a framed field experiment among small-scale coffee farmers in Colombia By Reitmann, Ann-Kristin
  16. Preferences for wealth taxation: Design, framing and the role of partisanship By Chirvi, Malte; Schneider, Cornelius
  17. When do firms highlight their effective tax rate? By Flagmeier, Vanessa; Müller, Jens; Sureth, Caren
  18. Hidden inefficiency: Strategic inflation of project schedules By Lorko, Matej; Servátka, Maroš; Zhang, Le
  19. Worker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture By W. Bentley MacLeod; Victoria Valle Lara; Christian Zehnder
  20. Do workers discriminate against their out-group employers? Evidence from the gig economy By Asad, Sher Afghan; Banerjee, Ritwik; Bhattacharya, Joydeep
  21. Saving Neonatal Lives for a Quarter By Valente, Christine; Sievertsen, Hans Henrik; Puri, Mahesh C.
  22. An Intensive, School-Based Learning Camp Targeting Academic and Non-Cognitive Skills Evaluated in a Randomized Trial By Hvidman, Charlotte; Koch, Alexander K.; Nafziger, Julia; Nielsen, Søren Albeck; Rosholm, Michael
  23. Measuring Gender Attitudes Using List Experiments By Asadullah, M Niaz; De Cao, Elisabetta; Khatoon, Fathema Zhura; Siddique, Zahra
  24. A Test System for ERCOT Market Design Studies: Development and Application By Battula, Swathi; Tesfatsion, Leigh; McDermott, Thomas E.

  1. By: Kenju Kamei (Durham University Business School); Artem Nesterov (Durham University Business School)
    Abstract: Exogenously given reputational information is known to improve cooperation. This paper experimentally studies how people create such information through reporting of partner’s action choices, and whether the endogenous monitoring helps sustain cooperation, in an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. The experiment results show that most subjects report their opponents’ action choices, thereby successfully cooperating with each other, when reporting does not involve a cost. However, subjects are strongly discouraged from reporting when doing so is costly. As a result, they fail to achieve strong cooperation norms when the reported information is privately conveyed only to their next-round interaction partner. Costly reporting occurs only occasionally, even when there is a public record whereby all future partners can check the reported information. However, groups can then foster cooperation norms aided by the public record, because reported information gets gradually accumulated and becomes more informative over time. These findings suggest that the efficacy of endogenous monitoring depends on the quality of platforms that store reported information.
    Keywords: experiment, cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma game, reputation, reporting, infinitely repeated game.
    JEL: C92 C73 D70 H41
    Date: 2020–09
  2. By: Kenju Kamei (Durham University Business School)
    Abstract: The transfer paradox, whereby a transfer of resources that influences the equilibrium price benefits the donor while harming the recipient, is a classic paradox in general equilibrium theory. This paper pursues an experimental investigation of the transfer paradox using a theoretical framework of a three-agent pure exchange economy that is predicted to have such a paradox. Two treatments were conducted. In the first treatment, there was one subject for each agent role in the experimental economy. In the other treatment, there were five subjects for each agent role (a total of 15 subjects) in the experimental economy. The experiment results indicate that a transfer of endowments among agents influenced the market clearing price, and consequently the donors benefited from this transfer, consistent with the competitive equilibrium theory. The equilibrium effects were strongest in the treatment with larger group size, resonating with the idea that having a larger number of market participants encourages them to behave competitively. Further, when given an option to make a transfer, the majority of the donor agents endogenously decide to adjust the endowment distribution. A detailed analysis found that the subjects’ decisions to transfer were mainly driven by the equilibrium effects on prices, and their decisions were largely unaffected by their measured level of cognitive ability.
    Keywords: experiments, transfer paradox, general equilibrium, equilibrium effects
    JEL: C92 D51
    Date: 2020–09
  3. By: Lambrecht, Marco; Sofianos, Andis; Xu, Yilong
    Abstract: Recent years have seen an emergence of decentralized cryptocurrencies that were initially devised as a payment system, but are increasingly being recognized as investment instruments. The price trajectories of cryptocurrencies have raised questions among economists and policymakers, especially since such markets can have spillover effects on the real economy. We focus on two key properties of cryptocurrencies that may contribute to their pricing. In a controlled lab setting, we test whether pricing is influenced by costly mining, as well as entry barriers to the mining technology. Our mining design resembles the proof-of-work mechanism employed by the vast majority of permissionless cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin. In our second condition, half of the traders have access to the mining technology, while the other half can only participate in the market. This is designed to model high concentration in cryptocurrency mining. In the absence of mining, no bubbles or crashes occur. When costly mining is introduced, assets are traded at prices more than 200% higher than fundamental value and the bubble peaks relatively late in the trading periods. When only half of the traders can mine, prices surge much earlier and reach values of almost 400% higher than the fundamental value at the peak of the market. Overall, the proof-of-work mechanism seems to fuel overpricing, which is further intensified by concentration in mining.
    Keywords: cryptocurrency; financial market experiment; Bitcoin; bubbles
    Date: 2020–09–28
  4. By: C. Yiwei Zhang; Jeffrey Hemmeter; Judd B. Kessler; Robert D. Metcalfe; Robert Weathers
    Abstract: We study a large-scale (n=50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration that was aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. Sending a letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total amount of earnings reported, though this effect decays slightly over time. However, the specific letter content—providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties—had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings on average per dollar spent for the U.S. government.
    JEL: D04 H2
    Date: 2020–09
  5. By: Pugatch, Todd; Wilson, Nicholas
    Abstract: More than two of every five students who enroll in college fail to graduate within six years. Prior research has identified ineffective study habits as a major barrier to success. We conducted a randomized controlled advertising experiment designed to increase demand for academic support services among more than 2,100 students at a large U.S. public university. Our results reveal several striking findings. First, the intervention shifted proxies of student attention, such as opening emails and self-reported awareness of service availability. However, the experimental variation indicates that approximately one-third of students are never attentive to student services. Second, advertising increased the use of extra practice problems, but did not affect take-up of tutoring and coaching, the other two services. Structural estimates suggest that transaction costs well in excess of plausible opportunity costs explain the differences in service use. Third, the characteristics of advertising messages matter. Several common nudging techniques—such as text messages, lottery-based economic incentives, and repeated messages—either had no effect or in some cases reduced the effectiveness of messaging.
    Keywords: email,higher education,incentives,nudges,text,randomized control trial
    JEL: A22 D91 I23 M31
    Date: 2020
  6. By: Paolo Crosetto (GAEL [2020-....] - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble [2020-....] - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA [2020-....] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2020-....] - Grenoble INP [2020-....] - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology [2020-....] - UGA [2020-....] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2020-....]); Werner Güth (LUISS - Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli [Roma], Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods - Partenaires INRAE)
    Abstract: We study choices and reaction times of respondents in an impunity game with unfair offers. The non-private impunity game features two roles, proposer and respondent, who are both aware whether the pie size is small or large. Proposers decide among three more or less unfair offers; respondents can accept or reject the offer, in which case it is lost for them. Whatever the responder decides is communicated to the proposer. 240 proposers took part in a traditional laboratory; 24 respondents were in an fMRI setup where they confronted all 240 proposals elicited from proposers. Responses were sent via email to proposers. Proposers revealed little concern for respondents. Respondents overwhelmingly rejected small offers, especially from a large pie. Surprisingly and in contrast with most of the literature and the Social Heuristic Hypothesis, we find that on average acceptances took longer than rejections. This result is driven by individual heterogeneity. The rich response data allow us to distinguish different respondent types, finding a remarkable consistency: subjects mainly accepting (rejecting) take more time to reject (accept). We attribute this finding to heterogeneity in self-priming. Our results suggest a primary role for individual heterogeneity in experiments testing the intuitive or deliberate status of cooperation and altruism.
    Keywords: Impunity game,Social heuristic hypothesis,Response time,JEL codes: C72,C78,C91,D87
    Date: 2020–09
  7. By: Yuta KITTAKA; Ryo MIKAMI
    Abstract: We investigate the overall impact of stock-out on individual consumers' information search behavior through both search-theoretic and experimental approaches. As the probability of stock-out increases, search intensity decreases, while the expected number of searches may increase. Such increases in stock-out probability also deter consumers from participating in the market.
    Date: 2020–10
  8. By: Kung, Claryn S. J.; Johnston, David W.; Shields, Michael A.
    Abstract: Although mental health disorders such as anxiety and depression are common, there is little research on whether individuals in poor mental health react differently from others to financial incentives. This paper exploits an experiment from the UK Understanding Society Innovation Panel to assess how the participation response to randomly-assigned financial incentives differs by mental health status. We find that individuals in good mental health are more likely to respond when offered a higher financial incentive, whereas those in poor mental health are indifferent to the increased incentive. We find no comparable differences for physical health.
    Keywords: mental health; financial incentives; survey incentives experiment
    JEL: C93 I10
    Date: 2018–11–01
  9. By: Kenju Kamei (Durham University Business School)
    Abstract: Clientelism is frequently observed in our societies. Various mechanisms that help sustain incomplete political contracts (e.g., monitoring and punishment) have been studied in the literature to date. However, do such contracts emerge in elections with secret ballots when the interactions are one-shot? How does repetition affect the evolution of incomplete political contracts? Using an incentivized experiment, this paper finds that even during one-shot interactions where monitoring is not possible, candidates form incomplete contracts through vote buying and promise-making. The candidates’ clientelistic behaviors are heterogeneous: some target swing voters, whereas others offer the most to loyal voters, or even opposition voters. These tactics distort voting behaviors as well as election outcomes. Repeated interactions significantly magnify candidates’ offers and deepen clientelistic relationships. These results underscore the possibility that clientelism evolves due to people’s strategic behaviors and interdependent preferences, without relying on alternative mechanism
    Keywords: experiment, cooperation, vote buying, election, clientelism
    JEL: C92 D72
    Date: 2020–09
  10. By: Lee, Jun Yeong; Hoffman, Elizabeth
    Abstract: This study investigates the impact of cheap talk on price in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly experiment. Each participant plays 20 rounds. Participants are placed in three-person bidding groups where the lowest bid wins. During the first 10 rounds, participants are not allowed to communicate with each other. All three-person groups converged to the zero-profit equilibrium in the first 10 periods. We then play another 10 rounds where participants can text with one another using an instant message system. Some groups were allowed to text before every round, some to text before every other round, some to text every third round, some to text every fourth round, and some to text only every fifth round. When texting is allowed, All groups attempt to collude to raise the price after being allowed to text, but the only groups who can maintain the higher price and converge over time to the joint-profit maximum are the groups who can text before every period. Hence, cheap talk is only effective when subjects can continuously monitor or converse.
    Date: 2020–05–01
  11. By: Bowles, Jeremy; Larreguy, Horacio
    Abstract: We examine how candidate selection into the supply of policy information determines its electoral effects. In a nationwide debate initiative designed to solicit and rebroadcast policy promises from Liberian legislative candidates, we randomized the encouragement of debate participation across districts. The intervention substantially increased the debate participation of leading candidates but led to uneven electoral returns for these candidates, with incumbents benefiting at the expense of challengers. These results are driven by differences in compliance: complying incumbents, but not challengers, positively selected into debate participation based on the alignment of their policy priorities with those of their constituents.
    Keywords: accountability, information, selection
    JEL: D72 O12
    Date: 2020–10
  12. By: Larreguy, Horacio; Bowles, Jeremy
    Abstract: We examine how candidate selection into the supply of policy information determines its electoral effects. In a nationwide debate initiative designed to solicit and rebroadcast policy promises from Liberian legislative candidates, we randomized the encouragement of debate participation across districts. The intervention substantially increased the debate participation of leading candidates but led to uneven electoral returns for these candidates, with incumbents benefiting at the expense of challengers. These results are driven by differences in compliance: complying incumbents, but not challengers, positively selected into debate participation based on the alignment of their policy priorities with those of their constituents.
    Keywords: accountability, information, selection
    Date: 2020–10
  13. By: Subhasish M. Chowdhury (Department of Economics, University of Bath); Patricia Esteve-González (Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford); Anwesha Mukherjee (School of Management, Technical University of Munich)
    Abstract: The heterogeneous abilities of the players in various competitive contexts often lead to undesirable outcomes such as low effort provision, lack of diversity, and inequality. A range of policies are implemented to mitigate such issues by enforcing competitive balance, i.e., by leveling the playing field. Some of those policies, known as affirmative action (AA) policies, are practiced in an ethical response to historical discrimination against particular social groups, and are also aimed at increasing competition. This survey summarizes the rapidly growing literature of contest theory on AA and other policies that level the playing field. Using a general theoretical structure, we outline research on contest outcomes under a multitude of such policy mechanisms; and discuss the theoretical, experimental, and empirical findings in relation to some of the common debates surrounding AA.
    Keywords: Survey, Affirmative Action, Contest, Heterogeneity
    JEL: A31 C72 D74 D82
    Date: 2020–10
  14. By: Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Estepa Mohedano, Lorenzo; Jorrat, Diego; Orozco, Víctor; Rascon-Ramirez, Ericka
    Abstract: Measuring risk preferences in the field is critical for policy, however, it can be expensive and may generate unequal payoffs due to bad luck. For instance, the commonly used measure of Holt and Laury (2002) relies on a dozen of lottery choices and payments which makes it time consuming and costly, but also raises moral concerns as a result of the unequal payments generated by the lotteries. We propose a short version of the Holt and Laury (2002) which produces in the lab (Spain) the same results as the long HL. Using the short HL in the field (Honduras and Nigeria), we observe that paying or not for the measurement of risk preferences produces the same findings. Our low-cost approach makes the measurement of risk preferences simpler, faster and cheaper in the lab and field.
    Keywords: Risk preferences, Holt Laury, Field Experiments, Monetary Payoffs, Incentives.
    JEL: C91 C93 D81
    Date: 2020–09–23
  15. By: Reitmann, Ann-Kristin
    Abstract: This paper evaluates the effect of training and extension services on environmental conservation attitudes among small-scale coffee farmers in Colombia. Post-harvest coffee processing is traditionally very water-intensive and poses a threat to the environment, which is why it is of particular importance to improve the coffee farmers' environmental attitudes. Theory predicts that improved attitudes towards a certain behavior will under certain circumstances also translate into behavioral changes - hence, in this context, an increase in environmental conservation. Two different measures of attitudes on environmental conservation are assessed: stated attitudes (self-reported survey questions) and revealed attitude (elicited via a framed field experiment). For the latter, farmers were offered to donate an endowment to a local reforestation project, where the farmers' willingness to donate is assumed to correlate with the valuation of environmental conservation. Based on the lower bound estimates, I do not find significant impacts of training participation on stated or revealed attitudes towards environmental conservation. Yet, at the upper bound, a positive and statistically significant effect on stated attitudes can be detected. This paper also makes a methodological contribution by critically reflecting on the suitability of both attitude measures to proxy for environmental conservation attitudes.
    Keywords: stated attitudes,revealed attitudes,environmental conservation,framed field experiment,Colombia
    JEL: D91 O13 O22 Q12 Q20
    Date: 2020
  16. By: Chirvi, Malte; Schneider, Cornelius
    Abstract: Empirical literature on preferences for wealth taxation almost exclusively focuses on either the emotionally loaded estate tax or rather general concepts of redistributive preferences. Yet, it remains unclear whether the exceptional opposition towards the estate tax is applicable to other instruments of net wealth taxation. This study presents, to our knowledge, the first investigation of how individuals want to tax wealth - across a variety of tangible wealth tax instruments. In doing so, we particularly test for the presence of framing effects, incidence concentration and the role of wealth characteristics within the different tax configurations. For this, we conducted a factorial vignette survey experiment with over 3,200 respondents on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Each respondent was randomized into one of four burden-equivalent wealth tax instruments: an estate tax, a one-time wealth tax, a decennial wealth tax or a yearly wealth tax. Subsequently we asked each respondent to state her preferred overall lifetime tax burden for a set of hypothetical individuals. Our findings yield several interesting insights. First, we find that the exceptional opposition towards the estate tax is not applicable to other instruments of wealth taxation and is only valid for certain subgroups. In general, our empirical findings provide preferred tax rates between 12.8 to 14.9 percent of overall lifetime tax burden. Second, we document an exceptional opposition towards the mere name "estate tax" in relation to equivalent wealth tax instruments for certain subgroups. Republicans particularly reject the estate tax with a lower proposed effective tax rate of around 3.1 percentage points compared to all other wealth taxes - even the perfectly congruent one-time wealth tax. Third, we uncover the influence of normative preferences for specific design features on the support for a wealth tax. Proposed effective tax rates of the estate tax and the one-time wealth tax show a significant progressivity, whereas no progressivity can be observed for both periodical taxes. The presence of children has an especially significant negative effect in one-off wealth taxes at the end of the lifetime.
    Keywords: Wealth taxation,Preferences for taxation,Misinformation,Randomized experiment
    JEL: C90 D31 D72 H2
    Date: 2020
  17. By: Flagmeier, Vanessa; Müller, Jens; Sureth, Caren
    Abstract: This study examines the visibility of the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) in firms' financial statements as a distinct disclosure choice. Applying a game-theory disclosure model for voluntary disclosure strategies of firms to a tax setting, we argue that firms face a trade-off in their ETR disclosure decisions. On the one hand, firms have an incentive to enhance their ETR disclosure when the ratio offers shareholders "favourable conditions", for example in terms of higher expected after-tax cash-flows. On the other hand, the disclosure of a favourable low ETR could attract the attention of tax auditors and the public and ultimately result in disclosure costs. We empirically test disclosure behaviour by examining the relation between disclosure visibility and different ETR conditions that reflect different stakeholder-specific costs and benefits. While we find that unfavourable ETR conditions are not highlighted, we observe higher disclosure visibility for favourable ETRs (smooth, close to the industry average, decreasing). Additional analyses reveal that this high visibility is characteristic of firm-years with only moderately decreasing ETRs at usual ETR levels, while extreme ETRs are not highlighted. Interestingly and in contrast to our main results, a subsample of family firms do not seem to highlight favourable ETRs.
    Keywords: Effective tax rate,Cost-benefit trade-off,Disclosure decision,Reputational costs,Tax disclosure
    Date: 2020
  18. By: Lorko, Matej; Servátka, Maroš; Zhang, Le
    Abstract: Establishing realistic project plans and completing the resulting business projects on schedule is crucial for organizations striving to effectively utilize their resources. However, incentivizing on-time project delivery may introduce moral hazard, as people may respond to estimation accuracy incentives by strategically inflating project duration estimates and subsequently prolonging the project execution. While the project is delivered on time, the resources are underutilized. We conjecture that these perverse effects can be mitigated by introducing incentives to complete the project as soon as possible (speed incentives) in addition to the schedule accuracy incentives. We conduct a diagnostic test of the effect of accuracy and speed incentives on the process of project estimation and delivery. Our study presents direct empirical evidence that the incentive structure rewarding solely the estimation accuracy can result in hidden inefficiency due to inflated estimates and deliberately prolonged project execution. However, when speed incentives are implemented alongside estimation accuracy incentives, the estimates are significantly lower and the project is completed more quickly, without compromising the schedule accuracy. Aligning the objectives of a project owner with those of planners, by incentivizing the planners for both estimation accuracy and quick project completion, can therefore foster more compressed but still accurate and reliable project schedules and accelerated project delivery. In summary, our study contributes to the economic analysis of incentive structures in project management by identifying a hidden inefficiency that could be present in projects delivered “on time” and by pointing out a mechanism that mitigates the risk of moral hazard.
    Keywords: project management, project planning, time management, duration estimation, strategic overrepresentation, moral hazard
    JEL: C91 D82 D83 O21 O22
    Date: 2020–09–20
  19. By: W. Bentley MacLeod; Victoria Valle Lara; Christian Zehnder
    Abstract: Although conflicts typically lead to a waste of resources, organizations may still benefit from a corporate culture that tolerates or even encourages conflicts. The reason is that coordinated conflicts may help to enforce informal contracts and foster cooperation. In this paper we report results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to explore whether and under what conditions an efficiency-enhancing conflict culture can emerge. Using a principal-worker setup with subjective performance evaluation, we show that establishing a functional conflict culture is a delicate matter. If conflicts are encouraged in a careless, hands-off manner, the destructive side of conflicts is likely to dominate. To be successful a conflict culture requires a careful management of fairness norms. In our experiment we find that conflicts have positive net effects on efficiency only if an explicit code of conduct is established and conflicts are institutionalized through a grievance process. Thus, providing workers with more power may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving productivity when performance evaluations are subjective.
    JEL: D02 D03 J33 J41 M5 M52
    Date: 2020–09
  20. By: Asad, Sher Afghan; Banerjee, Ritwik; Bhattacharya, Joydeep
    Abstract: We study possible worker-to-employer discrimination manifested via social preferences in an online labor market. Specifically, we ask, do workers exhibit positive social preferences for an out-race employer relative to an otherwise-identical, own-race one? We run a well-powered, model-based experiment wherein we recruit 6,000 workers from Amazon’s M-Turk platform for a real-effort task and randomly (and unobtrusively) reveal to them the racial identity of their non-fictitious employer. Strikingly, we find strong evidence of race-based altruism – white workers, even when they do not benefit personally, work relatively harder to generate more income for black employers. Self-declared white Republicans and Independents exhibit significantly more altruism relative to Democrats. Notably, the altruism does not seem to be driven by race-specific beliefs about the income status of the employers. Our results suggest the possibility that pro-social behavior of whites toward blacks, atypical in traditional labor markets, may emerge in the gig economy where associative (dis)taste is naturally muted due to limited social contact.
    Date: 2020–02–23
  21. By: Valente, Christine (University of Bristol); Sievertsen, Hans Henrik (University of Bristol); Puri, Mahesh C. (Center for Research on Environment, Health and Population Activities)
    Abstract: Over 400,000 children die annually from neonatal sepsis, despite several RCTs finding that this can be prevented by chlorhexidine cord care (CHX) for only US$0.23 per dose. Unresolved heterogeneity in findings and other RCT scalability concerns contribute to slow CHX adoption. Studying the first national CHX roll-out — in Nepal — we find that CHX reduces neonatal mortality by 56 percent for births predicted to take place at home. We find no effect for predicted health facility births, which is consistent with heterogeneity in prior experimental estimates. Conditional on predicted place of delivery, there is little significant treatment effect heterogeneity.
    Keywords: neonatal mortality, chlorhexidine, Nepal
    JEL: I18 J13 O15
    Date: 2020–09
  22. By: Hvidman, Charlotte (Aarhus University); Koch, Alexander K. (Aarhus University); Nafziger, Julia (Aarhus University); Nielsen, Søren Albeck (Aarhus University); Rosholm, Michael (Aarhus University)
    Abstract: We evaluate two variants of a school-based, intensive learning camp for pupils who are assessed 'not ready' for further education after compulsory school, using a stratified cluster randomized trial involving 15,559 pupils in 264 schools in Denmark. Next to training pupils in Danish and mathematics, the main variant targets non-cognitive skills, while the alternative variant instead uses this time for more training in Danish and math. In the short-run, in the academic areas that are targeted in the camp, we find small positive effects in math and weak evidence for positive effects in Danish. Yet, we find no evidence of lasting effects and we do not find short-run effects on non-targeted areas in math and Danish or on non-cognitive skills. Further, we find no evidence that training of non-cognitive skills affects academic outcomes. These results provide a perspective on recent evidence regarding the effects of training non-cognitive skills in schools - by running such an intervention with older pupils and in a comparatively high-resource school system.
    Keywords: randomized trial, remedial education program, non-cognitive skills
    JEL: I21 C21 D91 I28
    Date: 2020–10
  23. By: Asadullah, M Niaz; De Cao, Elisabetta; Khatoon, Fathema Zhura; Siddique, Zahra
    Abstract: We elicit adolescent girls’ attitudes towards intimate partner violence and child marriage using purposefully collected data from rural Bangladesh. Alongside direct survey questions, we conduct list experiments to elicit true preferences for intimate partner violence and marriage before age eighteen. Responses to direct survey questions suggest that very few adolescent girls in the study accept the practises of intimate partner violence and child marriage (5% and 2%). However, our list experiments reveal significantly higher support for both intimate partner violence and child marriage (at 30% and 24%). We further investigate how numerous variables relate to preferences for egalitarian gender norms in rural Bangladesh.
    Keywords: list experiment,indirect response survey methods,intimate partner violence,child marriage,Bangladesh
    JEL: I15 O10 C13 C83
    Date: 2020
  24. By: Battula, Swathi; Tesfatsion, Leigh; McDermott, Thomas E.
    Abstract: The ERCOT Test System developed in this study is an open-source library of Java/Python software classes, together with a synthetic grid construction method, specifically designed to facilitate the study of ERCOT market operations over successive days. In default form, these classes permit a high-level modeling of existing ERCOT market operations. Users can conduct a broad range of computational experiments under alternative parameter settings. In addition, users can readily extend these classes to model additional existing or envisioned ERCOT market features to suit different research purposes. An 8-bus test case is used to illustrate the capabilities of the test system. Ongoing studies making use of the test system to model larger-scale transmission components for integrated transmission and distribution systems are also reported.
    Date: 2019–12–23

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