|
on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Jasmina Arifovic; Cars Hommes; Anita Kopányi-Peuker; Isabelle Salle |
| Abstract: | This paper provides experimental evidence on coordination within genuinely large groups that could proxy the atomistic nature of real-world markets and organizations. We use a bank-run game where the two pure-strategy equilibria “run” and “wait” can be ranked by payoff and risk-dominance and a random sequence of public announcements introduces stochastic sunspot equilibria. We find systematic group size differences that theory fails to predict. In the presence of strategic uncertainty, the behavior of small groups is uninformative of behavior in large groups: in contrast to groups of 10, large groups only coordinate on the safest but Pareto-inferior “run” strategy and never coordinate on sunspots. Our results entail a series of theoretical and experimental implications. |
| Keywords: | Financial markets; Financial stability |
| JEL: | C92 D90 G20 |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:20-30&r=all |
| By: | Jorrat, Diego |
| Abstract: | The aim of many experiments is to estimate the effect of different interventions on subjects' decision making. However, obtaining large samples and internal validity is challenging. This paper presents an alternative device at almost no cost that can easily provide a very large number of participants (700 in 5 hours). We asked 14 students to invite their WhatsApp contacts to participate in an online experiment. The students created a total of 80 diffusion groups with 25 contacts each. Using the diffusion groups as clusters, we ran a cluster randomization procedure in order to assign subjects to a framing experiment (treatment + control). We obtained the same level of attrition, duplicates and uninvited subjects across the treatment and control groups. Moreover, the experiment yielded consistent results in line with the framing literature. |
| Keywords: | Recruiting, Online Experiments, Prisoner's Dilemma, Randomization |
| JEL: | C8 C9 C99 D70 |
| Date: | 2020–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:101467&r=all |
| By: | Andreas Löschel; Matthias Rodemeier; Madeline Werthschulte |
| Abstract: | Non-pecuniary incentives motivated by insights from psychology (“nudges”) have been shown to be effective tools to change behavior in a variety of fields. An often unanswered question relevant for public policy is whether these promising interventions can be scaled up. In cooperation with a large public utility in Germany, we develop an energy savings application for mobile phones that can be used by the majority of the population. The app randomizes a goal-setting nudge prompting users to set themselves energy consumption targets. The roll-out of the app is promoted by a mass-marketing campaign and large financial incentives. Results document low demand for the energy app in the general population and a tightly estimated null effect of the nudge on electricity consumption among app users. A likely mechanism of the null effect is unfavorable self-selection into the app: users are characterized by an already low baseline energy consumption and exhibit none of the behavioral biases that typically explain why goal setting affects behavior. We also find that the nudge significantly decreases the likelihood to use the app over time. Structural estimates imply that the average user is willing to pay 7.41 EUR to avoid the nudge and the intervention would yield substantial welfare losses if implemented nationwide. |
| Keywords: | nudging, goal setting, scalability, field experiments, energy, behavioural welfare economics, mobile phones |
| JEL: | C93 D91 Q49 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8485&r=all |
| By: | Löschel, Andreas; Rodemeier, Matthias; Werthschulte, Madeline |
| Abstract: | Non-pecuniary incentives motivated by insights from psychology ("nudges") have been shown to be effective tools to change behavior in a variety of fields. An often unanswered question relevant for public policy is whether these promising interventions can be scaled up. In cooperation with a large public utility in Germany, we develop an energy savings application for mobile phones that can be used by the majority of the population. The app randomizes a goal-setting nudge prompting users to set themselves energy consumption targets. The roll-out of the app is promoted by a mass-marketing campaign and large financial incentives. Results document low demand for the energy app in the general population and a tightly estimated null effect of the nudge on electricity consumption among app users. A likely mechanism of the null effect is unfavorable self-selection into the app: users are characterized by an already low baseline energy consumption and exhibit none of the behavioral biases that typically explain why goal setting affects behavior. We also find that the nudge significantly decreases the likelihood to use the app over time. Structural estimates imply that the average user is willing to pay 7.41 EUR to avoid the nudge and the intervention would yield substantial welfare losses if implemented nationwide. |
| Keywords: | nudging,goal setting,scalability,field experiments,energy,behavioral welfare economics,mobile phones |
| JEL: | C93 D91 Q49 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:20039&r=all |
| By: | Kerstin Grosch; Stephan Müller; Holger A. Rau; Lilia Zhurakhovska |
| Abstract: | Leaders often have to weigh ethical against monetary consequences. Such situations may evoke psychological costs from being dishonest and dismissing higher monetary benefits for others. In a within-subjects experiment, we analyze such a dilemma. We first measure individual dishonest behavior when subjects report the outcome of a die roll, which determines their payoffs. Subsequently, they act as leaders and report payoffs for a group including themselves. In our main treatment, subjects can apply for leadership, whereas in the control treatment, we assign leadership randomly. Results reveal that women behave more dishonestly as leaders while men behave similarly in both the individual and the group decision. For female leaders, we find that sorting into leadership is not related to individual honesty preferences. In the control we find that female leaders do not increase dishonesty. A follow-up study reveals that female leaders become more dishonest after assuming leadership, as they align dishonest behavior with their belief on group members’ honesty preferences. |
| Keywords: | leadership, decision for others, lab experiment, gender differences, dishonesty |
| JEL: | C91 H26 J16 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8514&r=all |
| By: | Bertrand Jayles (LPT - Laboratoire de Physique Théorique - IRSAMC - Institut de Recherche sur les Systèmes Atomiques et Moléculaires Complexes - INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ramon Escobedo (CRCA - Centre de Recherches sur la Cognition Animale - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - ISCT - Institut des sciences du cerveau de Toulouse. - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - CHU Toulouse [Toulouse] - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Roberto Pasqua (LAAS - Laboratoire d'analyse et d'architecture des systèmes - Toulouse INP - Institut National Polytechnique (Toulouse) - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès); Christophe Zanon (LAAS - Laboratoire d'analyse et d'architecture des systèmes - Toulouse INP - Institut National Polytechnique (Toulouse) - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès); Adrien Blanchet (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Matthieu Roy (LAAS - Laboratoire d'analyse et d'architecture des systèmes - Toulouse INP - Institut National Polytechnique (Toulouse) - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès); Gilles Tredan (LAAS - Laboratoire d'analyse et d'architecture des systèmes - Toulouse INP - Institut National Polytechnique (Toulouse) - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès); Guy Théraulaz (IAST - Institute for Advanced Studies in Toulouse); Clément Sire (LPT - Laboratoire de Physique Théorique - IRSAMC - Institut de Recherche sur les Systèmes Atomiques et Moléculaires Complexes - INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Social media filters combined with recommender systems can lead to the emergence of filter bubbles and polarized groups. In addition, segregation processes of human groups in certain social contexts have been shown to share some similarities with phase separation phenomena in physics. Here, we study the impact of information filtering on collective segregation behavior. We report a series of experiments where groups of 22 subjects have to perform a collective segregation task that mimics the tendency of individuals to bond with other similar individuals. More precisely, the participants are each assigned a color (red or blue) unknown to them, and have to regroup with other subjects sharing the same color. To assist them, they are equipped with an artificial sensory device capable of detecting the majority color in their ``environment'' (defined as their k nearest neighbors, unbeknownst to them), for which we control the perception range, k=1,3,5,7,9,11,13. We study the separation dynamics (emergence of unicolor groups) and the properties of the final state, and show that the value of k controls the quality of the segregation, although the subjects are totally unaware of the precise definition of the ``environment''. We also find that there is a perception range k=7 above which the ability of the group to segregate does not improve. We introduce a model that precisely describes the random motion of a group of pedestrians in a confined space, and which faithfully reproduces and allows to interpret the results of the segregation experiments. Finally, we discuss the strong and precise analogy between our experiment and the phase separation of two immiscible materials at very low temperature. |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02923034&r=all |
| By: | Kayo MURAKAMI; Hideki SHIMADA; Yoshiaki USHIFUSA; Takanori IDA |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the different impacts of monetary and nonmonetary incentives on energy-saving behaviors using a field experiment conducted in Japan. We find that the average reduction in electricity consumption from rebate is 4%, while that from nudge is not significantly different from zero. Applying a novel machine learning method for causal inference (causal forest) to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects at the household level, we demonstrate that the nudge intervention’s treatment effects generate greater heterogeneity among households. These findings suggest that selective targeting for treatment increases the policy efficiency of monetary and nonmonetary interventions. |
| Keywords: | Causal Forest, Rebate，Nudge, Randomized Controlled Trial, Energy, Machine Learning |
| JEL: | D9 C93 Q4 |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kue:epaper:e-20-003&r=all |
| By: | Matthias Sutter; Michael Weyland; Anna Untertrifaller; Manuel Froitzheim |
| Abstract: | We present the results of a randomized intervention in schools to study how teaching financial literacy affects risk and time preferences of adolescents. Following more than 600 adolescents, aged 16 years on average, over about half a year, we provide causal evidence that teaching financial literacy has significant short-term and longer-term effects on risk and time preferences. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that teaching financial literacy makes subjects more patient, less present-biased, and slightly more risk-averse. Our finding that the intervention changes economic preferences contributes to a better understanding of why financial literacy has been shown to correlate systematically with financial behavior in previous studies. We argue that the link between financial literacy and field behavior works through economic preferences. In our study, the latter are also related in a meaningful way to students’ field behavior. |
| Keywords: | financial literacy, randomized intervention, risk preferences, time preferences, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D14 I21 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8489&r=all |
| By: | Tomoharu Mori; Hirofumi Kurokawa; Fumio Ohtake |
| Abstract: | We investigate the labor supply reaction to wage cuts and tax increases using a real-effort experiment. First, subjects perform a task and receive a reward with taxes deducted. Second, the wage cut treatment reduces the wage rate and the tax increase treatment increases the tax; wage and tax remain unchanged for the control group. The real wage is equal for both treatments, and both treatments had significantly smaller increases in effort levels than the control group. The effort level change did not differ between the treatments. Therefore, the net wage illusion and tax aversion identified in previous studies are absent. |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1100&r=all |
| By: | Mauro Caselli (School of International Studies & Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento); Paolo Falco (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark) |
| Abstract: | How does demand for migrant vs native workers change with price? We conduct an experiment with 56,000 Danish households (over 2 percent of all households in the country), who receive an advertisement from a cleaning company whose operators vary randomly across areas but meet the same quality standards and have equal customer ratings. When the operator has a migrant background, we find that demand is significantly lower than when the operator is a native. The gap, however, is highly sensitive to price, with demand for the migrant increasing steeply as the price falls. For an hourly pay close to the 25th percentile of the earnings distribution in similar occupations (24 USD per hour), demand for the migrant is one-fifth of the demand for the native. A 25 percent reduction in the price makes the gap in demand disappear. |
| Keywords: | Migrants, discrimination, experiment, labour market integration, consumer preferences |
| JEL: | C93 J23 J61 J71 |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:2006&r=all |
| By: | Mauro Caselli; Paolo Falco |
| Abstract: | How does demand for migrant vs native workers change with price? We conduct an experiment with 56,000 Danish households (over 2 percent of all households in the country), who receive an advertisement from a cleaning company whose operators vary randomly across areas but meet the same quality standards and have equal customer ratings. When the operator has a migrant background, we find that demand is significantly lower than when the operator is a native. The gap, however, is highly sensitive to price, with demand for the migrant increasing steeply as the price falls. For an hourly pay close to the 25th percentile of the earnings distribution in similar occupations (24 USD per hour), demand for the migrant is one-fifth of the demand for the native. A 25 percent reduction in the price makes the gap in demand disappear. |
| JEL: | C93 J23 J61 J71 |
| Date: | 2020–09–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csl:devewp:466&r=all |
| By: | Gianmarco Daniele; Andrea F.M. Martinangeli; Francesco Passarelli; Willem Sas; Lisa Windsteiger |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether the COVID-19 crisis has affected the way we think about (political) institutions, as well as our broader (policy) attitudes and values. We fielded large online survey experiments in Italy, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands, well into the first wave of the epidemic (May-June), and included outcome questions on trust, voting intentions, policies & taxation, and identity & values. With a randomised survey ow we vary whether respondents are given COVID-19 priming questions first, before answering the outcome questions. With this treatment design we can also disentangle the health and economic effects of the crisis, as well as a potential “rally around the ag” component. We find that the crisis has brought about severe drops in interpersonal and institutional trust, as well as lower support for the EU and social welfare spending financed by taxes. This is largely due to economic insecurity, but also because of health concerns. A rallying effect around (scientific) expertise combined with populist policies losing ground forms the other side of this coin, and suggests a rising demand for competent leadership. |
| Keywords: | COVID-19, social trust, institutional trust, survey experiment, European Union, welfare, health, taxation, accountability, populism, values |
| JEL: | D72 H51 H53 H55 O52 P52 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8517&r=all |
| By: | Crosetto, P.; Güth, W. |
| Abstract: | We study choices and reaction times of respondents in an impunity game with unfair offers. The non-private impunity game features two roles, proposer and respondent, who are both aware whether the pie size is small or large. Proposers decide among three more or less unfair offers; respondents can accept or reject the offer, in which case it is lost for them. Whatever the responder decides is communicated to the proposer. 240 proposers took part in a traditional laboratory; 24 respondents were in an fMRI setup where they confronted all 240 proposals elicited from proposers. Responses were sent via email to proposers. Proposers revealed little concern for respondents. Respondents overwhelmingly rejected small offers, especially from a large pie. Surprisingly and in contrast with most of the literature and the Social Heuristic Hypothesis, we find that on average acceptances took longer than rejections. This result is driven by individual heterogeneity. The rich response data allow us to distinguish different respondent types, finding a remarkable consistency: subjects mainly accepting (rejecting) take more time to reject (accept). We attribute this finding to heterogeneity in self-priming. Our results suggest a primary role for individual heterogeneity in experiments testing the intuitive or deliberate status of cooperation and altruism. |
| Keywords: | IMPUNITY GAME;SOCIAL HEURISTIC HYPOTHESIS;RESPONSE TIME |
| JEL: | C72 C78 C91 D87 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2020-09&r=all |
| By: | Sergio Currarini (University of Leicester); Francesco Feri (Royal Holloway, University of London and Università di Trieste); Bjoern Hartig (Royal Hollloway, University of London); Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez (University of Málaga) |
| Abstract: | We design an experiment to study how agents make use of information in networks. Agents receive payoff-relevant signals automatically shared with neighbors. We compare the use of information in different network structures, considering games in which strategies are substitute, complement and orthogonal. To study the incentives to share information across games, we also allow subjects to modify the network before playing the game. We find behavioral deviations from the theoretical prediction in the use of information, which depend on the network structure, the position in the network and the strategic nature of the game. There is also a bias toward oversharing information, which is related to risk aversion and the position in the network. |
| Keywords: | networks, experiment, information sharing, strategic complements, strategic substitutes, pairwise stability |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D82 D85 |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mal:wpaper:2020-6&r=all |
| By: | Aycinena, D; Blazsek, S; Rentschler, L; Sprenger, C |
| Abstract: | Intertemporal choice experiments are frequently implemented to make inference about time preferences, yet little is known about the predictive power of resulting measures. This project links standard experimental choices to a decision on the desire to smooth a large-stakes payment — around 10% of annual income — through time. In a sample of around 400 Guatemalan Conditional Cash Transfer recipients, we find that preferences over large-stakes payment plans are closely predicted by experimental measures of patience and diminishing marginal utility. These represent the first findings in the literature on the predictive content of experimentally elicited intertemporal preferences for large-stakes decisions. |
| Keywords: | Structural estimation, Out-of-sample prediction, Discounting, Convex Time Budget |
| JEL: | D1 D3 D90 |
| Date: | 2020–08–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000092:018357&r=all |
| By: | Stefan Penczynski; Stefania Sitzia; Jiwei Zheng |
| Abstract: | This study introduces the concept of “compound games†and investigates whether the decomposition of a game – when implemented – influences behaviour. For example, we investigate whether separating battle of the sexes games into a pure coordination component and the remaining battle of the sexes component changes coordination success. The literature attributes high coordination rates in pure coordination games with focal points to team reasoning and low coordination rates in related battle of the sexes games to level-k reasoning. We find that coordination success in compound games depends on the decomposition and order of component games. |
| Keywords: | Compound games, focal points, framing, collective interest |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D90 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:305138214&r=all |
| By: | ZHIXIN Dai; Jiwei Zheng; Daniel J. Zizzo |
| Abstract: | We present a coordination game experiment testing the robustness of the predictive power of level-k reasoning and team reasoning in a sample of Chinese tax administrators that is matched for likely socio-economic characteristics with our student sample. We show how the incidence of coordination game play is virtually identical between Chinese tax administrators and university students. However, relatively to non-students, students are comparatively more attracted by the focal point under team reasoning when this has equal payoffs and the other outcomes do not. |
| Keywords: | external validity, non-student sample, focal points, team reasoning, level-k, coordination games |
| JEL: | C72 C78 C91 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:305138067&r=all |
| By: | Mostafa Shahen (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Koji Kotani (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Tatsuyoshi Saijo (Research Institute for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology) |
| Abstract: | The intergenerational sustainability dilemma (ISD) is a situation of whether or not a person sacrifices herself for future sustainability. To examine the individual behaviors, one-person ISD game (ISDG) is instituted with strategy method where a queue of individuals is organized as a generational sequence. In ISDG, each individual chooses unsustainable (or sustainable) option with her payoff of X (X - D) and an irreversible cost of D (zero cost) to future generations in 36 situations. Future ahead and back (FAB) mechanism is suggested as resolution for ISD by taking the perspective of future generation whereby each individual is first asked to take the next generation’s standpoint and request what she wants the current generation to choose, and, second, to make the actual decision from the original position. Results show that individuals choose unsustainable option as previous generations do so or X/D is low (i.e., sustainability is endangered). However, FAB prevents individuals from choosing unsustainable option in such endangered situations. Overall, the results suggest that some new institutions, such as FAB mechanisms, which induce people to take the perspective of future generations, may be necessary to avoid intergenerational unsustainability, especially when intergenerational sustainability is highly endangered. |
| Keywords: | Intergenerational sustainability dilemma, future ahead and back mechanism, intergenerational sustainability index |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2020-12&r=all |
| By: | Kamei, Kenju |
| Abstract: | Clientelism is frequently observed in our societies. Various mechanisms that help sustain incomplete political contracts (e.g., monitoring and punishment) have been studied in the literature to date. However, do such contracts emerge in elections with secret ballots when the interactions are one-shot? How does repetition affect the evolution of incomplete political contracts? Using an incentivized experiment, this paper finds that even during one-shot interactions where monitoring is not possible, candidates form incomplete contracts through vote buying and promise-making. The candidates’ clientelistic behaviors are heterogeneous: some target swing voters, whereas others offer the most to loyal voters, or even opposition voters. These tactics distort voting behaviors as well as election outcomes. Repeated interactions significantly magnify candidates’ offers and deepen clientelistic relationships. These results underscore the possibility that clientelism evolves due to people’s strategic behaviors and interdependent preferences, without relying on alternative mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | experiment, cooperation, vote buying, election, clientelism |
| JEL: | C92 D72 |
| Date: | 2020–06–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:102341&r=all |
| By: | Björn Bartling; Ernst Fehr; Yagiz Özdemir |
| Abstract: | The widespread use of markets leads to unprecedented material well-being in many societies. We study whether market interaction, as a side effect, erodes moral values. An encompassing understanding of the virtues and vices of markets, including their possible impact on moral values, is necessary to make informed decisions on the spheres in society where the allocation and incentive functions of markets should exercise their power, and where this may not be desirable. In a seminal and highly influential paper, Falk and Szech (2013) provide experimental data that seem to suggest that “market interaction erodes moral values.” Although we replicate their main treatment effect, we show that additional treatments are necessary to corroborate their conclusion. These treatments, however, reveal that repeated play and not market interaction causes the erosion of moral values. Our paper thus shows that neither Falk and Szech’s data nor our data support the claim that market interaction erodes moral values. |
| Keywords: | Market interaction, moral values |
| JEL: | C91 D02 D62 D63 |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:360&r=all |
| By: | Ahamad, Mazbahul G (University of Nebraska–Lincoln); Tanin, Fahian |
| Abstract: | Improving the effectiveness of health interventions is a major challenge in public health research and program development. A large body of literature has found low or no impact of health education and promotional interventions. We aim to develop a conceptual framework in support of intervention designs for preventive health behavior improvement programs and outcomes. The proposed approach is based on a narrative review of empirical literature assessing the limitations of less effective or ineffective field experiments regarding preventive health education and promotion interventions. We found three major limitations regarding the mental model’s balance of treatment and comparison groups, treatment groups’ willingness to adopt suggested behaviors, and the type, length, frequency, intensity, and sequence of treatments. To minimize the influence of these concerns, we propose a mental model-based repeated multifaceted (MRM) intervention design framework to provide an intervention design for improving health education and promotional programs. |
| Date: | 2020–08–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:8bgqx&r=all |
| By: | Julien Benistant; Remi Suchon |
| Abstract: | We experimentally test whether the gap between expected and actual income impacts subsequent altruism. Participants first perform a real-effort task for a fixed wage and then play a dictator game. Between conditions, we vary the level and the timing of the revelation of the wage. In some conditions, participants know the wage before the real effort task and are not informed of the other potential levels. In some other conditions, they are informed of the distribution of wages before the real effort task, but the actual wage is only revealed afterward. Participants in the latter conditions can form expectations that may be higher or lower than their actual wage. Our model predicts that the gap between the expected and the actual wage impacts transfers in the subsequent dictator game. The results support this hypothesis: participants who get the low wage transfer less and are less likely to transfer when they are informed of the other potential levels than when they are not. Conversely, participants who get the high wage are more likely to transfer positive amounts when they are informed of the other potential levels. We use physiological (skin conductance response) and declarative data to discuss the role of emotions in our treatment effects. |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/312214&r=all |
| By: | Fischer, Greg; Karlan, Dean; McConnell, Margaret; Raffler, Pia |
| Abstract: | The way in which a product is distributed can have lasting effects on demand by influencing learning, anchoring price expectations, and shaping perceptions of product value. While these issues apply broadly, they are particularly important for health products in poor countries, where short-term subsidies are common, similar products are often available through both non-profit and for-profit organizations, and expanding access is an important public health goal. We implemented a field experiment in northern Uganda in which three curative health products were distributed door-to-door either free or for sale and by either an NGO or for-profit company. For all three products, subsequent purchase rates were lower after a free distribution. While we see no difference in subsequent purchase rates based on seller type, we find that contemporaneous demand for a newly introduced product is higher when the seller identifies as a not-for-profit organization. |
| Keywords: | subsidies; health; pricing; learning |
| JEL: | D11 D12 D83 I11 I18 O12 |
| Date: | 2019–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:91600&r=all |
| By: | Yonghong An; Pengfei Liu |
| Abstract: | This paper considers how to elicit information from sensitive survey questions. First we thoroughly evaluate list experiments (LE), a leading method in the experimental literature on sensitive questions. Our empirical results demonstrate that the assumptions required to identify sensitive information in LE are violated for the majority of surveys. Next we propose a novel survey method, called Multiple Response Technique (MRT), for eliciting information from sensitive questions. We require all of the respondents to answer three questions related to the sensitive information. This technique recovers sensitive information at a disaggregated level while still allowing arbitrary misreporting in survey responses. An application of the MRT provides novel empirical evidence on sexual orientation and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT)-related sentiment. |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2009.01430&r=all |
| By: | Gruener, Sven; Krüger, Felix |
| Abstract: | False news stories cause welfare losses and fatal health consequences. To limit its dissemination, it is essential to know what determines the ability to distinguish between true and false news stories. In our experimental study, we present the subjects corona-related stories taken from the media from various categories (e.g. social isolation, economic consequences, direct health consequences, and “bullshit”). The task is to evaluate the stories as true or false. Besides students with and without healthcare background, we recruit healthcare professionals to increase the external validity of our study. Our main findings are: (i) Healthcare professionals perform similar to students in correctly distinguishing between true and false news stories. (ii) The propensity to engage in analytical thinking and actively open-minded thinking is positively associated with the ability to distinguish between true and false. (iii) We find that the residence of the subjects (East- or West-Germany) plays only a minor role. (iv) If narratives contradict the content of a story, subjects tend to think that the stories are wrong. |
| Date: | 2020–08–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:86j5v&r=all |
| By: | Anselm Hager; Lukas Hensel; Johannes Hermle; Christopher Roth |
| Abstract: | How does a citizen’s decision to participate in political activism depend on the participation of others? We conduct a nation-wide natural field experiment in collaboration with a major European party during a recent national election. In a seemingly unrelated survey, we randomly provide canvassers with true information about the canvassing intentions of their peers. When learning that more peers participate in canvassing than previously believed, canvassers significantly reduce both their canvassing intentions and behavior as measured through a smartphone application. Treatment effects are larger for supporters with weaker social ties to the party and for supporters with higher career concerns within the party. |
| Keywords: | political activism, natural field experiment, strategic behaviour, beliefs |
| JEL: | D80 P16 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8459&r=all |
| By: | John List |
| Abstract: | Last year I put together a summary of data from my field experiments website that pertained to natural field experiments. Several people have asked me if I have an update. In this document I update all figures and numbers to show the details for 2020. I also include the description from the 2019 paper below. |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00714&r=all |
| By: | Louis Lippens; Stijn Baert; Pieter-Paul Verhaeghe; Eva Derous (-) |
| Abstract: | Scholars have gone to great lengths to chart the incidence of ethnic labour market discrimination. To effectively mitigate this discrimination, however, we need to understand its underlying mechanisms because different mechanisms lead to different counteracting measures. To this end, we reviewed the recent literature that confronts the seminal theories of taste-based and statistical discrimination against the empirical reality. First, we observed that the measurement operationalisation of the mechanisms varied greatly between studies, necessitating the development of a measurement standard. Second, we found that 20 out of 30 studies examining taste-based discrimination and 18 out of 34 studies assessing statistical discrimination produced supportive evidence for said mechanisms. However, (field) experimental research, which predominantly focuses on hiring outcomes, yielded more evidence in favour of taste-based vis-à-vis statistical discrimination, suggesting that the taste-based mechanism might better explain ethnic discrimination in hiring. |
| Keywords: | taste-based discrimination, statistical discrimination, ethnicity, race, labour market, systematic review |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:20/1001&r=all |
| By: | Premand,Patrick; Barry,Oumar |
| Abstract: | Signs of development delays and malnutrition are widespread among young children in low-income settings. Social protection programs such as cash transfers are increasingly combined with behavioral change promotion or parenting interventions to improve early childhood development. This paper disentangles the effects of behavioral change promotion from cash transfers to poor households through an experiment embedded in a government program in Niger. The study is also designed to identify within-community spillovers from the behavioral change intervention. The findings show that behavioral change promotion affects a range of practices related to nutrition, health, stimulation, and child protection. Local spillovers on parenting practices are also found. Moderate gains in children's socio-emotional development are observed, but there are no improvements in anthropometrics or cognitive development. Cash transfers alone do not alter parenting practices or improve early childhood development. Cash transfers improve welfare and food security at the household level, and the behavioral intervention induces intra-household reallocations toward children. |
| Keywords: | Disability,Services&Transfers to Poor,Access of Poor to Social Services,Economic Assistance,Health Care Services Industry,Social Protections&Assistance,Early Childhood Development,Reproductive Health,Nutrition,Early Child and Children's Health |
| Date: | 2020–08–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9368&r=all |
| By: | Yehouenou, Lauriane; Morgan, Stephen N.; Grogan, Kelly A. |
| Keywords: | Research Methods/Statistical Methods, Resource/Energy Economics and Policy, Community/Rural/Urban Development |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304627&r=all |
| By: | Roth, Yefim; Plonsky, Ori (Technion - Israel Institute of Technology); Shalev, Edith; Erev, Ido |
| Abstract: | The recent COVID-19 pandemic poses a challenge to policy makers on how to make the population adhere to the social distancing and personal protection rules. The current research compares two ways by which tracking smartphone applications can be used to reduce the frequency of reckless behaviors that spread pandemics. The first involves the addition of alerts that increase the users’ benefit from responsible behavior. The second involves the addition of a rule enforcement mechanism that reduces the users’ benefit from reckless behavior. The effectiveness of the two additions is examined in an experimental study that focuses on an environment in which both additions are expected to be effective under the assumptions that the agents are expected-value maximizers, risk averse, behave in accordance with cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), or behave in accordance with the Cognitive Hierarchy model (Camerer, Ho & Chong, 2004). The results reveal a substantial advantage to the enforcement application. Indeed, the alerts addition was completely ineffective. The findings align with the small samples hypothesis, suggesting that decision makers tend to select the options that led to the best payoff in a small sample of similar past experiences. In the current context the tendency to rely on a small sample appears to be more consequential than other deviations from rational choice. |
| Date: | 2020–08–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:zrx32&r=all |
| By: | Park, Sihyun; Kim, Sanghyo; Park, Misung |
| Keywords: | Demand and Price Analysis, Marketing, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304618&r=all |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham); Kyeongtae Lee (University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We examine the effect of payoff variations on cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemma games. We focus on three factors: risk, temptation, and efficiency, which we vary as orthogonal treatments. We find that temptation has the largest impact on cooperation. Temptation directly deters cooperation and indirectly harms cooperation by lowering beliefs about the opponent's cooperativeness. Efficiency indirectly affects cooperation through beliefs, but the magnitude of the effect is relatively small compared to temptation. Risk does not have a significant effect on cooperation. Our finding suggests that curbing the level of temptation is the most important way to improve cooperation in social dilemmas. |
| Keywords: | prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, temptation, efficiency, risk |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2020-15&r=all |
| By: | Alessandra Casella; Antonin Macé |
| Abstract: | Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, a practice indeed believed to be common. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling – the exchange of votes for votes, considering both explicit vote exchanges and implicit vote trades engineered by bundling issues in a single bill. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We cover competitive markets, strategic market games, decentralized bargaining, and more centralized mechanisms, such as quadratic voting, where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions – to trade votes with oneself only – such as storable votes or a modified form of quadratic voting. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions. |
| JEL: | D6 D7 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27743&r=all |
| By: | Ganesh Karapakula; James J. Heckman |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a simple decision-theoretic economic approach for analyzing social experiments with compromised random assignment protocols that are only partially documented. We model administratively constrained experimenters who satisfice in seeking covariate balance. We develop design-based small-sample hypothesis tests that use worst-case (least favorable) randomization null distributions. Our approach accommodates a variety of compromised experiments, including imperfectly documented re-randomization designs. To make our analysis concrete, we focus much of our discussion on the influential Perry Preschool Project. We reexamine previous estimates of program effectiveness using our methods. The choice of how to model reassignment vitally affects inference. |
| JEL: | C01 C4 I21 |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27738&r=all |
| By: | Stijn Baert; Matteo Picchio (-) |
| Abstract: | This article contributes to the nascent literature on the effect of grade retention in school on later labour market success. A field experiment is conducted to rule out the endogeneity of both outcomes. More concretely, various treatments of grade retention are randomly assigned to fictitious résumés sent in application to real vacancies. Overall, grade retention does not significantly affect positive call-back by employers. However, when narrowing in on vacancies for occupations where on-the-job training is important, job candidates with a record of grade retention are 16% less likely to receive a positive reaction. This finding is consistent with Queuing theory. |
| Keywords: | grade retention, hiring youth, training, signalling, queuing |
| JEL: | I21 J23 J70 C93 |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:20/999&r=all |
| By: | Andrej Gill; Matthias Heinz; Heiner Schumacher; Matthias Sutter |
| Abstract: | The financial industry has been struggling with widespread misconduct and public mistrust. Here we argue that the lack of trust into the financial industry may stem from the selection of subjects with little, if any, trustworthiness into the financial industry. We identify the social preferences of business and economics students, and follow up on their first job placements. We find that during college, students who want to start their career in the financial industry are substantially less trustworthy. Most importantly, actual job placements several years later confirm this association. The job market in the financial industry does not screen out less trustworthy subjects. If anything the opposite seems to be the case: Even among students who are highly motivated to work in finance after graduation, those who actually start their career in finance are significantly less trustworthy than those who work elsewhere. |
| Keywords: | trustworthiness, financial industry, selection, social preferences, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 G20 M51 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8501&r=all |
| By: | Shukla, Pallavi; Pullabhotla, Hemant K.; Baylis, Kathy |
| Keywords: | Research Methods/Statistical Methods, International Development, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304451&r=all |
| By: | Schippers, M.C. |
| Abstract: | The effectiveness of decision-making teams depends largely on their ability to integrate and make sense of information. Consequently, teams which more often use majority decision making may make better quality decisions, but particularly so when they also have task representations which emphasize the elaboration of information relevant to the decision, in the absence of clear leadership. In the present study I propose that (a) majority decision making will be more effective when task representations are shared, and that (b) this positive effect will be more pronounced when leadership ambiguity (i.e. team members’ perceptions of the absence of a clear leader) is high. These hypotheses were put to the test using a sample comprising 81 teams competing in a complex business simulation for seven weeks. As predicted, majority decision making was more effective when task representations were shared, and this positive effect was more pronounced when there was leadership ambiguity. The findings extend and nuance earlier research on decision rules, the role of shared task representations, and leadership clarity. |
| Keywords: | group decision making, decision rules, shared task representations, leadership ambiguity, team performance |
| Date: | 2020–09–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ems:eureri:130071&r=all |
| By: | Yan Wang; Xuelei Sherry Ni |
| Abstract: | In the peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market, lenders lend the money to the borrowers through a virtual platform and earn the possible profit generated by the interest rate. From the perspective of lenders, they want to maximize the profit while minimizing the risk. Therefore, many studies have used machine learning algorithms to help the lenders identify the "best" loans for making investments. The studies have mainly focused on two categories to guide the lenders' investments: one aims at minimizing the risk of investment (i.e., the credit scoring perspective) while the other aims at maximizing the profit (i.e., the profit scoring perspective). However, they have all focused on one category only and there is seldom research trying to integrate the two categories together. Motivated by this, we propose a two-stage framework that incorporates the credit information into a profit scoring modeling. We conducted the empirical experiment on a real-world P2P lending data from the US P2P market and used the Light Gradient Boosting Machine (lightGBM) algorithm in the two-stage framework. Results show that the proposed two-stage method could identify more profitable loans and thereby provide better investment guidance to the investors compared to the existing one-stage profit scoring alone approach. Therefore, the proposed framework serves as an innovative perspective for making investment decisions in P2P lending. |
| Date: | 2020–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2009.04536&r=all |
| By: | Regassa, Mekdim D.; Abate, Gashaw T.; Kubik, Zaneta |
| Keywords: | Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession, Labor and Human Capital, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
| Date: | 2020–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea20:304498&r=all |