nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2020‒09‒14
fifty-one papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. When nudges fail to scale: Field experimental evidence from goal setting on mobile phones By Löschel, Andreas; Rodemeier, Matthias; Werthschulte, Madeline
  2. Letting off Steam! Experimental Evidence on Inappropriate Punishment By Elina Khachatryan; Christoph Buehren
  3. Higher Order Risk Preferences: New Experimental Measures, Determinants and Field Behavior By Sebastian O.Schneider; Matthias Sutter
  4. Selection into Leadership and Dishonest Behavior of Leaders: A Gender Experiment By Kerstin Grosch, Kerstin; Müller, Stephan; Rau, Holger A.; Zhurakhovska, Lilia
  5. Does bonus cap curb risk taking? An experimental study of relative performance pay and bonus regulation By Harris, Qun; Tanaka, Misa; Soane, Emma
  6. Secret and publicly observable contribution intentions in a public goods experiment By Werner Gueth; Anastasios Koukoumelis; Maria Vittoria Levati; Vincenzo Prete
  7. Institutions, opportunism and prosocial behavior: Some experimental evidence By Antonio Cabrales; Irma Clots-Figueras; Roberto Hernan Gonzalez; Praveen Kujal
  8. On the (ir)relevance of monetary incentives in risk preference elicitation experiments By Hackethal, Andreas; Kirchler, Michael; Laudenbach, Christine; Razen, Michael; Weber, Annika
  9. Financial Literacy, Risk and Time Preferences: Results from a Randomized Educational Intervention By Sutter, Matthias; Weyland, Michael; Untertrifaller, Anna; Froitzheim, Manuel
  10. Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment By Valeria Burdea; Maria Montero; Martin Sefton
  11. Old habits die hard: The experience of inequality and persistence of low cooperation By Abhijit Ramalingam; Brock V. Stoddard
  12. Conditional punishment: Descriptive social norms drive negative reciprocity By Xueheng Li; Lucas Molleman; Dennie van Dolder
  13. Declining Wages Increase Selfish Redistribution in an Environment with Fixed Income Inequality By Zaunbrecher, Henrik; Gagnon, Nickolas
  14. Him or her? Choosing competition on behalf of someone else By Helena Fornwagner; Monika Pompeo; Nina Serdarevic
  15. Experimental Evidence on Forecaster (anti-) Herding in Sports Markets By Christoph Buehren; Tim Meyer; Christian Pierdzioch
  16. Consumer Inequality Aversion and Risk Preferences in Community Supported Agriculture By Kévin Bernard; Aurélie Bonein; Douadia Bougherara
  17. Designing for empowerment impact in agricultural development projects: Experimental evidence from the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Gender Linkages (ANGeL) project in Bangladesh By Quisumbing, Agnes R.; Ahmed, Akhter; Hoddinott, John F.; Pereira, Audrey; Roy, Shalini
  18. Experimental Effects of an Absent Crowd on Performances and Refereeing Decisions during COVID-19 By Bryson, Alex; Dolton, Peter; Reade, J. James; Schreyer, Dominik; Singleton, Carl
  19. Confirmatory factor analysis comparing incentivized experiments with self-report methods to elicit adolescent smoking and vaping social norms: MECHANISMS study By Jennifer M. Murray; Erik O. Kimbrough; Erin L. Krupka; Abhijit Ramalingam; Rajnish Kumar; Joanna McHugh Power; Sharon Sanchez-Franco; Olga L. Sarmiento; Frank Kee; Ruth F. Hunter
  20. The power of experiments: How big is your n? By Igor Asanov; Christoph Buehren; Panagiota Zacharodimou
  21. Understanding Gambling Behavior and Risk Attitudes Using Cryptocurrency-based Casino Blockchain Data By Jonathan Meng; Feng Fu
  22. Ulysses' Pact or Ulysses' Raft: Using Pre-Analysis Plans in Experimental and Non-Experimental Research By Janzen, Sarah; Michler, Jeffrey D
  23. Mastering the Art of Cookbook Medicine: Machine Learning, Randomized Trials, and Misallocation By Jason Abaluck; Leila Agha; David C. Chan Jr; Daniel Singer; Diana Zhu
  24. Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – Evidence from a natural field experiment By Mark Kassis; Sascha L. Schmidt; Dominik Schreyer; Matthias Sutter
  25. Trust, reciprocity, and social history: New pathways of learning when max U (own reward) fails decisively By Vernon L. Smith
  26. Confidence Snowballing and Relative Performance Feedback By Zahra Murad; Chris Starmer
  27. Socially Optimal Mistakes? Debiasing COVID-19 Mortality Risk Perceptions and Prosocial Behavior By Abel, Martin; Byker, Tanya; Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
  28. The Coordinating Power of Social Norms By Francesco Fallucchi; Daniele Nosenzo
  29. Improving Management through Worker Evaluations: Evidence from Auto Manufacturing By Jing Cai; Shing-Yi Wang
  30. Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia: Preliminary report on the quantitative data generation, analysis and results By Abigail Barr; Marlene Dekker; Floyd Mwansa; Tia Linda Zuze
  31. Promoting Female Interest in Economics: Limits to Nudges By Pugatch, Todd; Schroeder, Elizabeth
  32. Explicit and implicit belief-based gender discrimination: A hiring experiment By Barron, Kai; Ditlmann, Ruth; Gehrig, Stefan; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
  33. Demonstration plots, seed trial packs, bidirectional learning, and modern input sales: Evidence from a field experiment in Tanzania By Biedny, Christina; Mason, Nicole M.; Snapp, Sieglinde S.; Nord, Alison; Rubyogo, Jean-Claude; Lwehabura, Jovin
  34. Mental Health Effects of an Old Age Pension: Experimental Evidence for Ekiti State in Nigeria By Alzua, Maria Laura; Cantet, Maria Natalia; Dammert, Ana; Olajide, Daminola
  35. Property, Redistribution, and the Status Quo By Konstantin Chatziathanasiou; Svenja Hippel; Michael Kurschilgen
  36. Should the Randomistas (Continue to) Rule? By Martin Ravallion
  37. Determinants of individual sustainable investment behavior - A framed field experiment By Gunnar Gutsche; Heike Wetzel; Andreas Ziegler
  38. The Impressive Effects of Tutoring on PreK-12 Learning: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Experimental Evidence By Andre Nickow; Philip Oreopoulos; Vincent Quan
  39. Identifying appropriate incentive mechanisms for smallholder farmers to exploit inter-temporal arbitrage opportunities for grain legumes: Experimental evidence from Malawi By Nindi, Tabitha C.; Ricker-Gilbert, Jacob; Bauchet, Jonathan
  40. The Long-Term Effects of Relaxing Information and Credit Constraints on Adoption, Retention, and Soil Perceptions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Tanzania By Tamim, Abdulrazzak; Harou, Aurelie P.; Magombab, Christopher; Michelson, Hope; Palm, Cheryl
  41. Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare? By Alessandra Casella; Antonin Macé
  42. Reminder Nudge, Attribute Nonattendance, and Willingness to Pay in a Discrete Choice Experiment By Kassie, Girma T.; Zeleke, Fresenbet; Birhanu, Mulugeta Y.; Scarpa, Riccardo
  43. Lottery "strategies": monetizing players' behavioral biases By Raman Kachurka; Michał Wiktor Krawczyk
  44. Law and Norms: Empirical Evidence By LANE Tom; NOSENZO Daniele
  45. Revisiting the Gap Between the Willingness-to-Pay and Willingness-to-Accept for Public Goods By Christian A. Vossler; Stéphane Bergeron; Maurice Doyon; Daniel Rondeau
  46. Sorting and Wage Premiums in Immoral Work By Florian H. Schneider; Fanny Brun; Roberto A. Weber
  47. Optimal Nested Simulation Experiment Design via Likelihood Ratio Method By Mingbin Ben Feng; Eunhye Song
  48. The Differential Impact of Friendship on Cooperative and Competitive Coordination By Gabriele Chierchia; Fabio Tufano; Giorgio Coricelli
  49. A Signal of (Train)Ability? Grade Repetition and Hiring Chances By Baert, Stijn; Picchio, Matteo
  50. Perceived Social Norm and Behavior Quickly Adjusted to Legal Changes During the COVID-19 Pandemic By Fortuna Casoria; Fabio Galeotti; Marie Claire Villeval
  51. IKEA Effect vs. Trophy Effect - An Experimental Comparison By Christoph Buehren; Marco Plessner

  1. By: Löschel, Andreas; Rodemeier, Matthias; Werthschulte, Madeline
    Abstract: Non-pecuniary incentives motivated by insights from psychology ("nudges") have been shown to be effective tools to change behavior in a variety of fields. An often unanswered question relevant for public policy is whether these promising interventions can be scaled up. In cooperation with a large public utility in Germany, we develop an energy savings application for mobile phones that can be used by the majority of the population. The app randomizes a goal-setting nudge prompting users to set themselves energy consumption targets. The roll-out of the app is promoted by a mass-marketing campaign and large financial incentives. Results document low demand for the energy app in the general population and a tightly estimated null effect of the nudge on electricity consumption among app users. A likely mechanism of the null effect is unfavorable self-selection into the app: users are characterized by an already low baseline energy consumption and exhibit none of the behavioral biases that typically explain why goal setting affects behavior. We also find that the nudge significantly decreases the likelihood to use the app over time. Structural estimates imply that the average user is willing to pay 7.41 EUR to avoid the nudge and the intervention would yield substantial welfare losses if implemented nationwide.
    Keywords: nudging,goal setting,scalability,field experiments,energy,behavioral welfare economics,mobile phones
    JEL: C93 D91 Q49
    Date: 2020
  2. By: Elina Khachatryan (University of Kassel); Christoph Buehren (Clausthal University of Technology)
    Abstract: Aggression is displaced when provocations cannot be directly retaliated against and when it is redirected towards a target innocent of any wrongdoing. While this phenomenon is widespread, it has not been widely explored in experimental economics. We fill this gap and find that a sizeable proportion of subjects (37%), when treated unfairly, punish co-players who are not at all responsible for the unfairness. When in a disadvantaged position, inequity-aversion seems to be the driving force of punishment, yet when treated fairly, some subjects (17%) exhibit status-seeking behavior. Moreover, students affiliated with an armed forces university are much more likely than regular students to engage in displaced aggression.
    Keywords: Displaced Aggression; Punishment; Soldiers; Dictator Game, Experiment
    JEL: C91 D03 D63
    Date: 2020
  3. By: Sebastian O.Schneider (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn; University of Cologne, IZA Bonn, CESifo Munich & University of Innsbruck)
    Abstract: We use a novel method to elicit and measure higher order risk preferences (prudence and temperance) in an experiment with 658 adolescents. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that higher order risk preferences - particularly prudence - are strongly related to adolescents' field behavior, including their financial decision making, eco-friendly behavior, and health status, including addictive behavior. Most importantly, we show that dropping prudence and temperance from the analysis of students' field behavior would yield largely misleading conclusions about the relation of risk aversion to these domains of field behavior. Thus our paper puts previous work that ignored higher order risk preferences into an encompassing perspective and clarifies which orders of risk preferences can help understand field behavior of adolescents.
    Keywords: Higher order risk preferences, prudence, temperance, risk aversion, field behavior, adolescents, health, addictive behavior, smartphone addiction, experiment
    JEL: C93 D81 D91 J13
    Date: 2020–08
  4. By: Kerstin Grosch, Kerstin (Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria); Müller, Stephan (University of Goettingen, Germany); Rau, Holger A. (University of Goettingen, Germany); Zhurakhovska, Lilia (University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany)
    Abstract: Leaders often have to weigh ethical against monetary consequences. Such situations may evoke psychological costs from being dishonest and dismissing higher monetary benefits for others. In a within-subjects experiment, we analyze such a dilemma. We first measure individual dishonest behavior when subjects report the outcome of a die roll, which determines their payoffs. Subsequently, they act as leaders and report payoffs for a group including themselves. In our main treatment, subjects can apply for leadership, whereas in the control treatment, we assign leadership randomly. Results reveal that women behave more dishonestly as leaders while men behave similarly in both the individual and the group decision. For female leaders, we find that sorting into leadership is not related to individual honesty preferences. In the control we find that female leaders do not increase dishonesty. A follow-up study reveals that female leaders become more dishonest after assuming leadership, as they align dishonest behavior with their belief on group members’ honesty preferences.
    Keywords: leadership, decision for others, lab experiment, gender differences, dishonesty
    JEL: C91 H26 J16
    Date: 2020–08
  5. By: Harris, Qun (Bank of England); Tanaka, Misa (Bank of England); Soane, Emma (London School of Economics and Political Science)
    Abstract: We conducted a lab experiment with 253 participants to examine how constraints on bonus akin to bonus regulations, such as bonus cap and malus, could affect individuals’ risk-taking in the presence of relative performance pay. Participants took greater risks when bonus was linked to investment performance relative to that of their peers (relative performance pay) than when it depended on their own performance only. In the absence of relative performance pay, bonus cap and malus reduced risk-taking. With relative performance pay, the risk-mitigating effects of bonus cap and malus were significantly weakened; but participants took less risk when bonus was made conditional on their team avoiding a loss.
    Keywords: Bonus cap; malus; bonus regulation; risk choice
    JEL: C91 G28 J31 J33 M52
    Date: 2020–08–14
  6. By: Werner Gueth (Max Planck Institute of Economics); Anastasios Koukoumelis (Department of Economics (University of Verona)); Maria Vittoria Levati (Department of Economics (University of Verona)); Vincenzo Prete (Department of Economics (University of Verona))
    Abstract: In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary, over a period of stochastic length, two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the other subjects (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted to choose as actual contribution either current alternative. Based on the two types of choice data for a partners and a perfect strangers condition, we confirm that final outcomes strongly depend on the matching protocol. As to choice dynamics, we find that they are affected by player types.
    Keywords: Public goods game, Cheap talk communication, Real-time protocol
    JEL: C72 H41 D82 D83
    Date: 2019–06
  7. By: Antonio Cabrales (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Irma Clots-Figueras (University of Kent); Roberto Hernan Gonzalez (Burgundy School of Business); Praveen Kujal (Middlesex University)
    Abstract: Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) choice of institutions. Whether voted or purchased, we find that there is demand for institutions in low trustworthiness groups, while high trustworthiness groups always demand lower levels of institutions. Lower levels of institutions are demanded when those who can benefit from opportunistic behavior, i.e. low trustworthiness individuals, can also vote for them. Importantly, the presence of insurance crowds out civic spirit even when subjects can choose the no insurance option: trustworthiness when formal institutions are available is lower than in their absence.
    Keywords: institutions; trust; trustworthiness; voting; insurance
    Date: 2020–09
  8. By: Hackethal, Andreas; Kirchler, Michael; Laudenbach, Christine; Razen, Michael; Weber, Annika
    Abstract: Incentivized experiments in which individuals receive monetary rewards according to the outcomes of their decisions are regarded as the gold standard for preference elicitation in experimental economics. These task-related real payments are considered necessary to reveal subjects' "true preferences". Using a systematic, large-sample approach with three subject pools of private investors, professional investors, and students, we test the effect of task-related monetary incentives on risk preferences elicited in four standard experimental tasks. We find no systematic differences in behavior between subjects in the incentivized and non-incentivized regimes. We discuss implications for academic research and for applications in the field.
    Keywords: Experimental Economics,Incentives,Risk Aversion,Risk Preferences
    JEL: C91 D01 D81
    Date: 2020
  9. By: Sutter, Matthias (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Weyland, Michael; Untertrifaller, Anna (University of Cologne); Froitzheim, Manuel (University of Siegen)
    Abstract: We present the results of a randomized intervention in schools to study how teaching financial literacy affects risk and time preferences of adolescents. Following more than 600 adolescents, aged 16 years on average, over about half a year, we provide causal evidence that teaching financial literacy has significant short-term and longer-term effects on risk and time preferences. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that teaching financial literacy makes subjects more patient, less present-biased, and slightly more risk-averse. Our finding that the intervention changes economic preferences contributes to a better understanding of why financial literacy has been shown to correlate systematically with financial behavior in previous studies. We argue that the link between financial literacy and field behavior works through economic preferences. In our study, the latter are also related in a meaningful way to students' field behavior.
    Keywords: time preferences, risk preferences, randomized intervention, financial literacy, field experiment
    JEL: C93 D14 I21
    Date: 2020–08
  10. By: Valeria Burdea (University of Pittsburgh); Maria Montero (University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially veriï¬ able information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be veriï¬ ed. We compare a treatment where the receiver chooses which dimension to verify with one where the sender has this veriï¬ cation control. We ï¬ nd signiï¬ cant differences in outcomes across treatments. However, receivers’ payoffs do not differ signiï¬ cantly across treatments, suggesting they are not hurt by delegating veriï¬ cation control. We also show that in both treatments the receiver’s best reply to senders’ observed behavior is close to the optimal commitment strategy identiï¬ ed by Glazer and Rubinstein.
    Keywords: communication, partially verifiable messages, verification control, experiment
    Date: 2020–11
  11. By: Abhijit Ramalingam; Brock V. Stoddard
    Abstract: Inequality reduces the ability of communities to work together. The theory of reciprocity suggests reducing inequality allows groups to increase cooperation. We experimentally test if, after experiencing inequality, unconditional income transfers to the poor increase contributions to public goods. Pure redistribution to eliminate inequality does not raise cooperation in groups that experienced inequality. Even additional resources directed to the poor without reducing resources of the rich fail to raise cooperation beyond levels observed in groups that were always equal. The experience of inequality locks groups in a low-level cooperation trap that they are unable to escape, despite moves towards equality. Key Words: reciprocity; inequality reduction; income transfers; cooperation; public goods; experiment
    JEL: C91 C92 D31 D63 H41
    Date: 2020
  12. By: Xueheng Li (Nanjing Audit University, China); Lucas Molleman (University of Amsterdam); Dennie van Dolder (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
    Abstract: Is punishment of free riders driven by descriptive social norms of cooperation and punishment? We conduct experiments in which participants interact in a one-shot social dilemma with punishment. We study how punishment of free riders is influenced by behavior among members of a payoff-irrelevant reference group. Participants can condition punishment on either the level of cooperation or the level of punishment in the reference group, respectively reflecting descriptive norms of cooperation and punishment. We observe considerable heterogeneity in punishment behavior. Among punishers, the most common strategies are to increase punishment with higher levels of cooperation (‘norm enforcement’), and to increase punishment with higher levels of punishment in the reference group (‘conformist punishment’). By means of a simple dynamic model, we demonstrate that these conditional punishment strategies can substantially promote cooperation: conformist punishment helps cooperation to gain a foothold in a population, and norm enforcement helps to maintain cooperation at high levels. Our study illustrates how punishment is shaped by the social context, and highlights the potential of conditional punishment strategies to promote the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.
    Keywords: Cooperation; peer punishment; decision-making experiment; sanctioning; online experiment; conditional strategies
    Date: 2020–05
  13. By: Zaunbrecher, Henrik (General Economics 0 (Onderwijs), RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research); Gagnon, Nickolas (RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research, Microeconomics & Public Economics)
    Abstract: We use a highly-controlled laboratory experiment to study the causal impact of income decreases on redistribution decisions, in an environment where the income inequality that may be created with wage changes is kept fixed. First, we investigate the role of a decreasing wage compared to one’s past wage (intra-personal decrease). Second, we investigate the role of a wage that decreases relative to the wage of another person (inter-personal decrease). If intra-personal or inter-personal decreases create dissatisfaction for an individual, that person may support redistribution policies that compensate him or her for the situation or rectify it. Overall, we find evidence that individuals indeed behave more selfishly when they experience decreasing wages. While many studies examine the effect of income inequality on redistribution decisions, this is the first to isolate the effect of income changes.
    JEL: C91 D31 D63
    Date: 2020–08–27
  14. By: Helena Fornwagner (University of Innsbruck); Monika Pompeo (University of Nottingham); Nina Serdarevic (University of Bergen)
    Abstract: We extend the literature on competitive behaviour by investigating environments in which the choice to compete is not made by an individual themselves, but by someone else. Choosing on behalf of others is an integral part of life and gender may be an important factor in shaping the perceived suitability of individuals for career promotions in competitive environments. We assign subjects either the role of an agent or a principal in an experiment. Agents perform a real effort task and a randomly assigned principal chooses whether the agent performs under a piece rate or tournament incentive scheme. Before making a decision for the agent, we vary whether the principal is informed about the agent’s gender or not. Regardless of whether gender is revealed, we ï¬ nd no gender gap in competitiveness when principals are choosing for agents. In terms of determinants of the principals’ choices, we observe that expectations about their agent’s performance, as well as the principal’s own preferences for risk and competitiveness matter for the decision to make others compete. In addition, we replicate existing results reporting that women are less willing to enter the tournament than men when choosing themselves. We compare both decision environments and show that efficiency (deï¬ ned as average performance and earnings) does not suffer, whereas the winners’ performance is lower when principals decide for agents. Taken together, our results suggest that allowing others to decide has the potential to increase the representation of women in competitive situations, many of which resemble the labour market.
    Keywords: competitiveness, gender differences, decision-making for others, laboratory experiment
    Date: 2020
  15. By: Christoph Buehren (Clausthal University of Technology); Tim Meyer (Helmut Schmidt University); Christian Pierdzioch (Helmut Schmidt University)
    Abstract: We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in forecasts of the German Bundesliga. Self-reported knowledge and, more surprisingly, winner-takes-all incentives reduced anti-herding. On average, forecasts were less accurate with stronger anti-herding. Winner-takes-all incentives and self-reported knowledge improved forecasts.
    Keywords: (Anti-)Herding, Sports forecasting, Experiment, Survey data
    Date: 2020
  16. By: Kévin Bernard (SMART - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - AGROCAMPUS OUEST - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement); Aurélie Bonein (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Douadia Bougherara (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: In community-supported agriculture (CSA), consumers face a tradeoff between (i.) the desire to support a CSA farmer and obtain environmentally-friendly goods and (ii.) the risk associated with a long-term commitment. We elicit inequality aversion and risk preferences of a sample of 162 French CSA consumers using incen-tivized field experiments. We find that CSA consumers are concerned about payoff inequalities. While we obtain evidence of advantageous inequality aversion toward CSA farmers, we also find disadvantageous inequality seeking. We find that CSA consumers are risk averse and loss averse and distort probabilities. We also observe that inequality and risk preferences in the loss domain might complement each other to strengthen consumers' support for CSA farmers.
    Keywords: Community supported agriculture,Field experiment,Risk aversion,Inequality aversion preferences
    Date: 2020
  17. By: Quisumbing, Agnes R.; Ahmed, Akhter; Hoddinott, John F.; Pereira, Audrey; Roy, Shalini
    Abstract: The importance of women’s roles for nutrition-sensitive agricultural projects is increasingly recognized, yet little is known about whether such projects improve women’s empowerment and gender equality. We study the Agriculture, Nutrition, and Gender Linkages (ANGeL) pilot project, which was implemented as a cluster-randomized controlled trial by the Government of Bangladesh. The project’s treatment arms included agricultural training, nutrition behavior change communication (BCC), and gender sensitization trainings to husbands and wives together – with these components combined additively, such that the impact of gender sensitization could be distinguished from that of agriculture and nutrition trainings. Empowerment was measured using the internationally-validated project-level Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (pro-WEAI), and attitudes regarding gender roles were elicited from both men and women, to explore potentially gender-transformative impacts. Our study finds that ANGeL increased both women’s and men’s empowerment, raised the prevalence of households achieving gender parity, and led to small improvements in the gender attitudes of both women and men. We find significant increases in women’s empowerment scores and empowerment status from all treatment arms but with no significant differences across these. We find no evidence of unintended impacts on workloads and we note inconclusive evidence of possible increases in intimate partner violence (IPV). Our results also suggest some potential benefits of bundling nutrition and gender components with an agricultural development intervention; however, many of these benefits seem to be driven by bundling nutrition with agriculture. While we cannot assess the extent to which including men and women within the same treatment arms contributed to our results, it is plausible that the positive impacts of all treatment arms on women’s empowerment outcomes may have arisen from implementation modalities that provided information to both husbands and wives when they were together. The role of engaging men and women jointly in interventions is a promising area for future research.
    Keywords: BANGLADESH; SOUTH ASIA; ASIA; empowerment; gender; agricultural development; agriculture; nutrition; women; women's empowerment; randomized controlled trials; gender norms; nutrition-sensitive agriculture
    Date: 2020
  18. By: Bryson, Alex (University College London); Dolton, Peter (University of Sussex); Reade, J. James (University of Reading); Schreyer, Dominik (WHU Vallendar); Singleton, Carl (University of Reading)
    Abstract: The Covid-19 pandemic has induced worldwide natural experiments on the effects of crowds. We exploit one of these experiments currently taking place over several countries in almost identical settings: professional football matches played behind closed doors. We find large and statistically significant effects on the number of yellow cards issued by referees. Without a crowd, fewer cards were awarded to the away teams, reducing home advantage. These results have implications for the influence of social pressure and crowds on the neutrality of refereeing decisions.
    Keywords: attendance, Coronavirus, COVID-19, home advantage, natural experiments, referee bias, social pressure
    JEL: C90 D91 L83 Z20
    Date: 2020–08
  19. By: Jennifer M. Murray; Erik O. Kimbrough; Erin L. Krupka; Abhijit Ramalingam; Rajnish Kumar; Joanna McHugh Power; Sharon Sanchez-Franco; Olga L. Sarmiento; Frank Kee; Ruth F. Hunter
    Abstract: Introduction: Many adolescent smoking prevention programmes target social norms, typically evaluated with self-report, susceptible to social desirability bias. An alternative approach with little application in public health are experimental norms elicitation methods. Methods: Using the Mechanisms of Networks and Norms Influence on Smoking in Schools (MECHANISMS) study baseline data, from 12-13 year old school pupils (n=1656) in Northern Ireland and Bogotá (Colombia), we compare two methods of measuring injunctive and descriptive smoking and vaping norms: (1) incentivized experiments, using monetary payments to elicit norms; (2) self-report scales. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) examined whether the methods measured the same construct. Paths from exposures (country, sex, personality) to social norms, and associations of norms with (self-reported and objectively measured) smoking behavior/intentions were inspected in another structural model. Results: Second-order CFA showed that latent variables representing experimental and survey norms measurements were measuring the same underlying construct of anti- smoking/vaping norms (Comparative Fit Index=0.958, Tucker Lewis Index=0.951, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation=0.030, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual=0.034). Adding covariates into a structural model showed significant paths from country to norms (second-order anti-smoking/vaping norms latent variable: standardized factor loading [ß]=0.30, standard error [SE]=0.09, p
    Date: 2020
  20. By: Igor Asanov (University of Kassel); Christoph Buehren (Clausthal University of Technology); Panagiota Zacharodimou (European Parliament)
    Abstract: The replicability and credibility crisis in psychology and economics sparked the debate on underpowered experiments, publication biases, and p-hacking. Analyzing the number of independent observations of experiments published in Experimental Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, and the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, we observe that we did not learn much from this debate. The median experiment in our sample has too few independent observations and, thus, is underpowered. Moreover, we find indications for biases in reporting highly significant results. We investigate for which papers and experiments it is more likely to find reporting biases, and we suggest remedies that could help to overcome the replicability crisis.
    Keywords: Statistical power; statistical significance; meta-study; balanced randomization; caliper test
    JEL: C10 C12 C18
    Date: 2020
  21. By: Jonathan Meng; Feng Fu
    Abstract: The statistical concept of Gambler's Ruin suggests that gambling has a large amount of risk. Nevertheless, gambling at casinos and gambling on the Internet are both hugely popular activities. In recent years, both prospect theory and lab-controlled experiments have been used to improve our understanding of risk attitudes associated with gambling. Despite theoretical progress, collecting real-life gambling data, which is essential to validate predictions and experimental findings, remains a challenge. To address this issue, we collect publicly available betting data from a \emph{DApp} (decentralized application) on the Ethereum Blockchain, which instantly publishes the outcome of every single bet (consisting of each bet's timestamp, wager, probability of winning, userID, and profit). This online casino is a simple dice game that allows gamblers to tune their own winning probabilities. Thus the dataset is well suited for studying gambling strategies and the complex dynamic of risk attitudes involved in betting decisions. We analyze the dataset through the lens of current probability-theoretic models and discover empirical examples of gambling systems. Our results shed light on understanding the role of risk preferences in human financial behavior and decision-makings beyond gambling.
    Date: 2020–08
  22. By: Janzen, Sarah; Michler, Jeffrey D (University of Arizona)
    Abstract: In recent years, pre-analysis plans have been adopted by economists in response to concerns raised about robustness and transparency in social science research. By pre-specifying an analysis plan, researchers bind themselves and thus avoid the temptation to data mine or $p$-hack. The application of pre-analysis plans has been most widely used for randomized evaluations, particularly in the field of development economics. The increased use of pre-analysis plans has raised competing concerns that detailed plans are overly restrictive and limit the type of inspiration that only comes from exploring the data. This paper considers these competing views of pre-analysis plans, examines the extent that pre-analysis plans have been used in research conducted by agricultural economists, and discusses the usefulness of pre-analysis plans for non-experimental economic research.
    Date: 2020–07–29
  23. By: Jason Abaluck; Leila Agha; David C. Chan Jr; Daniel Singer; Diana Zhu
    Abstract: The application of machine learning (ML) to randomized controlled trials (RCTs) can quantify and improve misallocation in healthcare. We study the decision to prescribe anticoagulants for atrial fibrillation patients; anticoagulation reduces stroke risk but increases hemorrhage risk. We combine observational data on treatment choice and guideline use with ML estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects from eight RCTs. When physicians adopt a clinical guideline, treatment decisions shift towards the recommendation but adherence remains far from perfect. Improving guideline adherence would produce larger gains than informing physicians about guidelines. Adherence to an optimal rule would prevent 47% more strokes without increasing hemorrhages.
    JEL: I11 I18 O33
    Date: 2020–07
  24. By: Mark Kassis; Sascha L. Schmidt; Dominik Schreyer; Matthias Sutter
    Abstract: In this paper, we show that the right to determine the sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament improves the chances of winning the contest. Because studying dynamic team tournaments – like R&D races – with interim feedback is difficult with company data, we examine decisions of highly paid professionals in soccer penalty shootouts and show that teams whose captains can decide about the shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout. So, managerial decisions matter for outcomes of dynamic tournaments and we discuss potential reasons for this finding.
    Keywords: Dynamic tournament; sports professionals; psychological pressure; value of decision rights; penalty shoot-outs; behavioral economics
    JEL: C93 D00 D81 D91 Z20
    Date: 2020–08
  25. By: Vernon L. Smith (Chapman University)
    Abstract: This evaluation begins with the BDM protocol—itself a methodological contribution—and the experimental findings. The question of the replicability and robustness of these unexpected results is addressed next in a summary of two subsequent experimental papers. We follow with a discussion of two attempts to explain qua understand the BDM findings; both, however, have methological deficiencies—Reciprocity and Social Preference explanations. Finally, we offer a brief on Adam Smith’s (1759; 1853; hereafter in the text, Sentiments) model of human sociability, based on strictly self-interested actors, that culminates in propositions that (1) account for trust game choices, and (2) predict action in new variations on trust game designs that, in the absence of Adam Smith’s model, would be neither natural or well-motivated.
    Date: 2020
  26. By: Zahra Murad (University of Portsmouth); Chris Starmer (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: We investigate whether relative performance feedback can create biases in confidence leading it to ‘snowball’. We study elicited confidence about own performance, relative to other group members, in three stages. As subjects move across stages, we change group composition so that new groups contain either only top performers or only bottom performers, from the previous stage. Between treatments, we manipulate whether subjects know about their own past relative performance or that of currently matched group members. In the NoFeedback treatment, they know neither of these things and confidence remains calibrated and stable across the stages. In both of the other two treatments, we provide feedback on own performance and, in both of these treatments, confidence snowballs significantly in the direction of the feedback: confidence consistently rises among top performers and falls among bottom performers. In one of these treatments - the OwnFeedback treatment, which we interpret as inducing full reference group neglect – subjects are not told about how their reference group is changing. In the FullFeedback treatment, however, subjects do have a basis for judging that their own performance feedback is essentially uninformative, yet we still find strong evidence that confidence snowballs and only limited evidence that they are weaker than those arising from full reference group neglect. Hence, the results are broadly consistent with the reference group neglect hypothesis. The results suggest the possibility of confidence biases emerging and snowballing in a potentially wide range of field settings.
    Keywords: overconfidence, relative performance feedback, confidence updating
    Date: 2020–08
  27. By: Abel, Martin (Middlebury College); Byker, Tanya (Middlebury College); Carpenter, Jeffrey P. (Middlebury College)
    Abstract: The perception of risk affects how people behave during crises. We conduct a series of experiments to explore how people form COVID-19 mortality risk beliefs and the implications for prosocial behavior. We first document that people overestimate their own risk and that of young people, while underestimating the risk old people face. We show that the availability heuristic contributes to these biased beliefs. Using information about the actual risk to debias people's own risk perception does not affect donations to the Centers for Disease Control but does decrease the amount of time invested in learning how to protect older people. This constitutes a debiasing social dilemma. Additionally providing information on the risk for the elderly, however, counteracts these negative effects. Importantly, debiasing seems to operate through the subjective categorization of and emotional response to new information.
    Keywords: risk perception, prosocial behavior, debiasing, experiment
    JEL: C91 D91 H41
    Date: 2020–07
  28. By: Francesco Fallucchi (Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER)); Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham and Aarhus University)
    Abstract: A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber, 2013). The Krupka-Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alternative focal points to coordinate, in which case the method may deliver distorted measurements of the social norm. We test the vulnerability of the Krupka-Weber method to the presence of alternative salient focal points. We find that the method is robust as long as there are clear normative expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior. In settings where there is a less clear consensus about the social norm, the method is more vulnerable.
    Keywords: Social Norms; Krupka-Weber method; Coordination; Focal Point; Saliency; Dictator Game.
    Date: 2020
  29. By: Jing Cai; Shing-Yi Wang
    Abstract: Using a randomized experiment with an automobile manufacturing firm in China, we measure the effects of letting workers evaluate their managers on worker and firm outcomes. In the treatment teams, workers evaluate their supervisors monthly. We find that providing feedback leads to significant reductions in worker turnover and increases in team-level productivity. In addition, workers report higher levels of happiness and positive mood. The evidence suggests that these results are driven by changes in the behavior of managers and an overall better relationship between managers and workers.
    JEL: D22 O1
    Date: 2020–08
  30. By: Abigail Barr (University of Nottingham); Marlene Dekker (African Studies Center, Leiden University); Floyd Mwansa (Financial Sector Deepening Zambia); Tia Linda Zuze (Financial Sector Deepening Zambia, and Stellenbosch University)
    Abstract: This document presents the preliminary findings from the quantitative data generation and analysis conducted as part of the project “Financial decision-making, gender and social norms in Zambia†. Using a series of specially designed behavioural experiments, we generated an extensive set of insights into the normative environment within which spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, make decisions about individual money holding and saving. Here are some of those insights. Spouses in Eastern Province, Zambia, are willing to compromise household-level earnings in order to maintain individual control over money. Wives, but not husbands, are more likely to compromise household-level earnings in order to maintain individual control over money, when they can keep that money and their actions hidden from their spouses. Individually-held behavioural prescriptions, i.e., the “shoulds†and “oughts†that individuals have in mind and reference as guides for their own behaviour and as benchmarks against which to evaluate others’ behaviour, inform decision-making about maintaining individual control over money at a cost to the household. Further, when individuals know that their spouses will find out about their descisions regarding maintaining individual control over money (or not) at a cost to the household, the individuals take their spouses’ opinions about what they should do into account, i.e., they compromise. There is strong but not unequivocal evidence pointing to the existence of a social norm, i.e., a “should†or “ought†that is collectively held and enforced by members of a community, forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse, with the secrecy not the saving being the problem. Assuming it exists, this social norm forbidding saving in secret from one’s spouse applies to both husbands and wives, and this is acknowledged by both husbands and wives. However, the extent to which violations of this norm are tolerated depends on who is doing the violating and who the evaluating. In patrilineal communities (as compared to matrilineal communities), both husbands and wives are especially intolerant of secret saving by husbands and in both patrilineal and matrilineal communities, wives are less tolerant than husbands of secret saving by husbands and more tolerant than husbands of secret saving by wives. This relative tolerance of secret saving by wives notwithstanding, just under one in three wives and one in six husbands think that a man is justified in beating his wife if he discovers that she is saving in an e-wallet or has joined a savings group without his knowledge and, as grounds for wife beating, saving in secret is on a par with neglecting the children, visiting friends or family in secret and refusing to have sex. For further insights, see the main text of the report.
    Keywords: financial decision-making, Zambia, gender, social norms
    Date: 2020–06
  31. By: Pugatch, Todd (Oregon State University); Schroeder, Elizabeth (Oregon State University)
    Abstract: Why is the proportion of women who study Economics so low? This study assesses whether students respond to messages about majoring in Economics, and whether this response varies by student gender. We conducted an experiment among more than 2,000 students enrolled in Economics Principles courses, with interventions proceeding in two phases. In the first phase, randomly assigned students received a message with basic information about the Economics major, or the basic message combined with an emphasis on the rewarding careers or financial returns associated with the major. A control group received no such messages. In the second phase, all students receiving a grade of B- or better received a message after the course ended encouraging them to major in Economics. For a randomly chosen subset of these students, the message also encouraged them to persist in Economics even if their grade was disappointing. The basic message increased the proportion of male students majoring in Economics by 2 percentage points, equivalent to the control mean. We find no significant effects for female students. Extrapolating to the full sample, the basic message would nearly double the male/female ratio among Economics majors. Our results suggest the limits of light-touch interventions to promote diversity in Economics.
    Keywords: college major choice, gender gap in economics, higher education, nudges, randomized control trial
    JEL: I21 I23
    Date: 2020–07
  32. By: Barron, Kai; Ditlmann, Ruth; Gehrig, Stefan; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
    Abstract: Understanding discrimination is key for designing policy interventions that promote equality in society. Economists have studied the topic intensively, typically taxonomizing discrimination as either taste-based or (accurate) statistical discrimination. To enrich this taxonomy, we design a hiring experiment that rules out both of these sources of discrimination along the gender dimension. Yet, we still detect substantial discrimination against women. We provide evidence of two forms of discrimination, explicit and implicit belief-based discrimination. Both rely on statistically inaccurate beliefs but differ in how clearly they reveal the decision-maker's gender bias. Our analysis highlights the central role played by contextual features of the choice environment in determining whether and how discrimination will manifest. We conclude by discussing how policy makers may design effective regulation to address specific forms of discrimination.
    Keywords: Discrimination,Hiring Decisions,Gender,Beliefs,Experiment
    JEL: D90 J71 D83
    Date: 2020
  33. By: Biedny, Christina; Mason, Nicole M.; Snapp, Sieglinde S.; Nord, Alison; Rubyogo, Jean-Claude; Lwehabura, Jovin
    Keywords: International Development, Agricultural and Food Policy, Marketing
    Date: 2020–07
  34. By: Alzua, Maria Laura; Cantet, Maria Natalia; Dammert, Ana; Olajide, Daminola
    Keywords: Community/Rural/Urban Development, Research Methods/Statistical Methods, Agricultural and Food Policy
    Date: 2020–07
  35. By: Konstantin Chatziathanasiou (University of Münster); Svenja Hippel (Unversity of Würzburg); Michael Kurschilgen (Technical University of Munich and the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)
    Abstract: A large strand of research has documented negative behavioral responses to redistribution, like lower effort and wasteful avoidance activity. We report experimental evidence showing a positive effect of redistribution on economic efficiency via the self-enforcement of property rights, and identify which status groups benefit more and which less. We model an economy in which wealth is produced if players voluntarily comply with the – efficient but inequitable – prevailing social order. We vary exogenously whether redistribution is feasible, and how it is organized. We find that redistribution benefits all status groups as property disputes recede. It is most effective when transfers are not discretionary but instead imposed by some exogenous administration. In the absence of coercive means to enforce property rights, it is the higher status groups, not the lower status groups, who benefit from redistribution being compulsory rather than voluntary.
    Keywords: Redistribution; Property; Status; Correlated Equilibrium; Battle of Sexes; Experiment
    JEL: C72 C92 D74 H23 P48
    Date: 2020–09
  36. By: Martin Ravallion
    Abstract: The rising popularity of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in development applications has come with continuing debates about the merits of this approach. The paper takes stock of the issues. It argues that an unconditional preference for RCTs is questionable on three main counts. First, the case for such a preference is unclear on a priori grounds. For example, with a given budget, even a biased observational study can come closer to the truth than a costly RCT. Second, the ethical objections to RCTs have not been properly addressed by advocates. Third, there is a risk of distorting the evidence-base for informing policymaking, given that an insistence on RCTs generates selection bias in what gets evaluated. Going forward, pressing knowledge gaps should drive the questions asked and how they are answered, not the methodological preferences of some researchers. The gold standard is the best method for the question at hand.
    JEL: B41 C93 O22
    Date: 2020–07
  37. By: Gunnar Gutsche (University of Kassel); Heike Wetzel (University of Kassel); Andreas Ziegler (University of Kassel)
    Abstract: This paper employs a new empirical approach for eliciting preferences for and determinants of sustainable investments at the individual investor level. We examine data from an incentivized framed field experiment that was part of a representative survey among financial decision makers in German households. The analysis reveals strong preferences for sustainable funds. These preferences are especially driven by non-pecuniary factors such as financial literacy, environmental values, and social norms. Interestingly, economic preferences or the Big Five personality traits are only of minor relevance. Our results provide useful implications for the discussion on how to mobilize individual investors for sustainable development.
    Keywords: Sustainable investments; individual investors; determinants; revealed preferences; framed field experiment
    JEL: G11 Q56 G02 A12 A13
    Date: 2020
  38. By: Andre Nickow; Philip Oreopoulos; Vincent Quan
    Abstract: Tutoring—defined here as one-on-one or small-group instructional programming by teachers, paraprofessionals, volunteers, or parents—is one of the most versatile and potentially transformative educational tools in use today. Within the past decade, dozens of preK-12 tutoring experiments have been conducted, varying widely in their approach, context, and cost. Our study represents the first systematic review and meta-analysis of these and earlier studies. We develop a framework for considering different types of programs to not only examine overall effects, but also explore how these effects vary by program characteristics and intervention context. We find that tutoring programs yield consistent and substantial positive impacts on learning outcomes, with an overall pooled effect size estimate of 0.37 SD. Effects are stronger, on average, for teacher and paraprofessional tutoring programs than for nonprofessional and parent tutoring. Effects also tend to be strongest among the earlier grades. While overall effects for reading and math interventions are similar, reading tutoring tends to yield higher effect sizes in earlier grades, while math tutoring tends to yield higher effect sizes in later grades. Tutoring programs conducted during school tend to have larger impacts than those conducted after school.
    JEL: I2 J24
    Date: 2020–07
  39. By: Nindi, Tabitha C.; Ricker-Gilbert, Jacob; Bauchet, Jonathan
    Keywords: International Development, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Productivity Analysis
    Date: 2020–07
  40. By: Tamim, Abdulrazzak; Harou, Aurelie P.; Magombab, Christopher; Michelson, Hope; Palm, Cheryl
    Keywords: International Development, Productivity Analysis, Research Methods/Statistical Methods
    Date: 2020–07
  41. By: Alessandra Casella (Columbia University [New York]); Antonin Macé (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: Voters have strong incentives to increase their inuence by trading votes, a practice indeed believed to be common. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling { the exchange of votes for votes, considering both explicit vote exchanges and implicit vote trades engineered by bundling issues in a single bill. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We cover competitive markets, strategic market games, decentralized bargaining, and more centralized mechanisms, such as quadratic voting, where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions { to trade votes with oneself only { such as storable votes or a modi_ed form of quadratic voting. We _nd that vote trading and vote markets are typically ine_cient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.
    Keywords: logrolling,vote trading,storable votes,quadratic voting,bundling,vote markets
    Date: 2020–08
  42. By: Kassie, Girma T.; Zeleke, Fresenbet; Birhanu, Mulugeta Y.; Scarpa, Riccardo
    Keywords: Marketing, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Research Methods/Statistical Methods
    Date: 2020–07
  43. By: Raman Kachurka (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Michał Wiktor Krawczyk (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw)
    Abstract: The popularity of lotteries around the world is puzzling. In this paper, we study one factor, which might contribute to this phenomenon, namely lottery “strategies” that could allegedly improve players’ odds. In an online survey of lottery players we find that such strategies are popular and their use is related to more frequent lottery play and a number of personality traits and beliefs about gambling. Systematically searching for websites and books, we amass the largest dataset of lottery strategies in existence. We subsequently analyze their descriptions, categorize them, and investigate how they exploit their target audience’s behavioral biases, including the illusion of control, authority bias, magical thinking, the illusion of correlation, gambler’s fallacy, hot hand fallacy, representativeness heuristic, availability heuristic, and regret aversion. We find that the strategies maintain gamblers’ (false) beliefs about the possibility of controlling lottery results. This exploratory work contributes to a deeper understanding of (problem) gambling and lays the foundation for the design of experiments testing how the specific features of different strategies may interact with beliefs and trigger (excessive) lottery play.
    Keywords: decision making under risk, lottery strategy, illusion of control
    JEL: C91 D01 D81 D83 D91
    Date: 2020
  44. By: LANE Tom; NOSENZO Daniele
    Abstract: A large theoretical literature argues laws exert a causal effect on norms. This paper is the first to provide a clean empirical test of the proposition. Using an incentivized vignette experiment, we directly measure social normsrelating to actions subject to legal thresholds. Results from three samples with around 800 subjects drawn from universities in the UK and China, and the UK general population, show laws often, but not always, influence norms. The strength of the effect varies across different scenarios, with some evidence that it is more powerful when lawbreaking is more likely to be intentional and accurately measurable.
    Keywords: social Norms; Law; Expressive Function of Law
    JEL: C91 C92 K00 K42
    Date: 2020–04
  45. By: Christian A. Vossler; Stéphane Bergeron; Maurice Doyon; Daniel Rondeau
    Abstract: Comparisons of willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA) compensation measures have raised concerns over the validity of stated preference methods, and have motivated researchers to predominantly elicit WTP measures even when existing property rights or entitlements would make WTA measures more appropriate. Extending the insight of Plott and Zeiler (2005) to the case of public goods, we argue that past results may in part be driven by experimental design choices, including the use of non-incentive compatible elicitation methods. Using the conservation of wetlands in northern Quebec (Canada) as a case study, we find that WTA/WTP ratios are poorly identified unless estimation procedures control for the beliefs of respondents regarding the consequentiality of their responses. Beliefs over consequentiality are directly tied to sufficiency conditions for the incentive compatibility of stated preference surveys. We find that when respondents express at least “moderate” beliefs over the consequentiality of the survey, resulting WTA/WTP ratios are close to unity.
    Keywords: Stated Preferences,Incentive Compatibility,Willingness-to-Pay,Willingness-to-Accept,Consequentiality,
    JEL: C93 D6 Q51
    Date: 2020–09–08
  46. By: Florian H. Schneider; Fanny Brun; Roberto A. Weber
    Abstract: We use surveys, laboratory experiments and administrative labor-market data to study how heterogeneity in the perceived immorality of work and in workers’ aversion to acting immorally interact to impact labor market outcomes. Specifically, we investigate whether those individuals least concerned with acting morally select into jobs generally perceived as immoral and whether the aversion among many individuals to performing such acts contributes to immorality wage premiums, a form of compensating differential. We show that immoral work is associated with higher wages, both using correlational evidence from administrative labor-market data and causal evidence from a laboratory experiment. We also measure individuals’ aversion to performing immoral acts and show that those who find immoral behavior least aversive are more likely to be employed in immoral work in the lab and have a relative preference for work perceived as immoral outside the laboratory. We note that sorting by “immoral” types into jobs that can cause harm may be detrimental for society. Our study highlights the value of employing complementary research methods.
    Keywords: wage premium, immoral behaviour, sorting, experiments
    JEL: C92 J31 D03
    Date: 2020
  47. By: Mingbin Ben Feng; Eunhye Song
    Abstract: Nested simulation arises frequently in financial or input uncertainty quantification problems, where the performance measure is defined as a function of the simulation output mean conditional on the outer scenario. The standard nested simulation samples $M$ outer scenarios and runs $N$ inner replications at each. We propose a new experiment design framework for a problem whose inner replication's inputs are generated from probability distribution functions parameterized by the outer scenario. This structure lets us pool replications from an outer scenario to estimate another scenario's conditional mean via the likelihood ratio method. We formulate a bi-level optimization problem to decide not only which of $M$ outer scenarios to simulate and how many times to replicate at each, but also how to pool these replications such that the total simulation effort is minimized while achieving the same estimation error as the standard nested simulation. The resulting optimal design requires far less simulation effort than $MN$. We provide asymptotic analyses on the convergence rates of the performance measure estimators computed from the experiment design. Empirical results show that our experiment design significantly reduces the simulation cost compared to the standard nested simulation as well as a state-of-the-art design that pools replications via regressions.
    Date: 2020–08
  48. By: Gabriele Chierchia (University of Trento, and University College London); Fabio Tufano (University of Nottingham); Giorgio Coricelli (University of Trento, Italy, and University of Southern California)
    Abstract: Friendship is commonly assumed to reduce strategic uncertainty and enhance tacit coordination. However, this assumption has never been tested across two opposite poles of coordination involving either strategic complementarity or substitutability. We had participants interact with friends or strangers in two classic coordination games: the stag hunt game, which exhibits strategic complementarity and may foster “cooperation†, and the entry game, which exhibits strategic substitutability and may foster “competition†. Both games capture a frequent trade-off between a potentially high paying but uncertain option and a low paying but safe alternative. We find that, relative to strangers, friends are more likely to choose options involving uncertainty in stag hunt games but the opposite is true in entry games. Furthermore, in stag hunt games, friends “tremble†less between options, coordinate better and earn more, but these advantages are largely decreased or lost in entry games. We further investigate how these effects are modulated by risk attitudes, friendship qualities and interpersonal similarities.
    Keywords: coordination; entry game; friendship; strategic complementarity; strategic substitutability; stag hunt game; strategic uncertainty
    Date: 2020–07
  49. By: Baert, Stijn (Ghent University); Picchio, Matteo (Università Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona)
    Abstract: This article contributes to the nascent literature on the effect of grade retention in school on later labour market success. A field experiment is conducted to rule out the endogeneity of both outcomes. More concretely, various treatments of grade retention are randomly assigned to fictitious résumés sent in application to real vacancies. Overall, grade retention does not significantly affect positive call-back by employers. However, when narrowing in on vacancies for occupations where on-the-job training is important, job candidates with a record of grade retention are 16% less likely to receive a positive reaction. This finding is consistent with Queuing theory.
    Keywords: grade retention, hiring youth, training, signalling, queuing
    JEL: I21 J23 J70 C93
    Date: 2020–07
  50. By: Fortuna Casoria (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR 5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France); Fabio Galeotti (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR 5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR 5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany)
    Abstract: In response to the pandemic of COVID-19 and in lack of pharmaceutical solutions, many countries have introduced social and physical distancing regulations to contain the transmission of the virus. These measures are effective insofar as they are able to quickly change people’s habits. This is achieved by changing the monetary incentives of rule violators but also by shifting people’s perception regarding the appropriateness of socialization. We studied the effect of introducing, and then lifting, distancing regulations on the perceived norm regarding social encounters. We conducted an online incentivized experiment in France where we elicited the same participants’ perceived norm and social distancing behavior every week for three months. We found that people shifted behavior and norm perception as soon as the government introduced or removed distancing measures. This effect was fast acting and long lasting. This is informative for future interventions, especially in light of a possible COVID-19 recurrence.
    Keywords: COVID-19, Social Distancing, Social Norms, Laws
    JEL: C9 D02 D91 H12 I12 I18
    Date: 2020
  51. By: Christoph Buehren (Clausthal University of Technology); Marco Plessner (Hamm-Lippstadt University of Applied Sciences)
    Abstract: Successful work – either invested to create or to obtain a product – increases the customer’s valuation of the product. These phenomena are called the IKEA and the trophy effect. We test both of them separately as well as combined and find that the trophy winner effect looms larger than the IKEA effect for inexpensive items, in our case paper planes. For more expensive products, in our case 3-D-puzzles, we find a trophy loser effect. Positive emotions of trophy winners drive our result for inexpensive products, whereas negative emotions of trophy losers drive our result for more expensive products. We discuss the implications of our findings.
    Keywords: effort; labor; competition; achievement; failure; valuation
    Date: 2020

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