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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2020‒07‒20
thirty papers chosen by |
| By: | Deversi, Marvin (University of Munich (LMU)); Kocher, Martin G. (Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, University of Vienna, and University of Gothenburg); Schwieren, Christiane (University of Heidelberg) |
| Abstract: | We analyze cooperation within a company setting in order to study the relationshipbetween cooperative attitudes and financial as well as non-financial rewards. In to-tal, 910 employees of a large software company participate in an incentivized onlineexperiment. We observe high levels of cooperation and the typical conditional con-tribution patterns in a modified public goods game. When linking experiment andcompany record data, we observe that cooperative attitudes of employees do not payoff in terms of financial rewards within the company. Rather, cooperative employeesreceive non-financial benefits such as recognition or friendship as the main rewardmedium. In contrast to most studies in the experimental laboratory, sustained levelsof cooperation in our company setting relate to non-financial values of cooperationrather than solely to financial incentives. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, social dilemma, field experiment, company |
| JEL: | C93 D23 H41 J31 J32 M52 |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ihs:ihswps:15&r=all |
| By: | Andrew Choi; Syngjoo Choi; Yves Gueron; Eungik Lee |
| Abstract: | This paper provides experimental evidence on the impacts of irreversibility and imperfect monitoring on the efficiency and the equity of repeated public goods game. We find that irreversibility and imperfect monitoring both lead to inefficient and unequal outcomes through different channels. Irreversibility lowers public goods contribution in earlier periods and makes the initial-period contribution gap between two players long-lasting. Imperfect monitoring hampers conditional cooperation and reduces group contribution persistently. A finite mixture estimation with conditional cooperator provides a coherent account of the treatment effects. |
| Keywords: | repeated games; dynamic games; imperfect monitoring; irreversibility; cooperation; |
| JEL: | C73 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no133&r=all |
| By: | Nicolas L. Bottan; Ricardo Perez-Truglia |
| Abstract: | Home price expectations play a central role in macroeconomics and finance. However, there is little direct evidence on how these expectations affect market choices. We provide the first experimental evidence based on a large-scale, high-stakes field experiment in the United States. We provided information by mail to 57,910 homeowners who recently listed their homes on the market. Collectively, these homes were worth $34 billion dollars. We randomized the information contained in the mailing to create non-deceptive, exogenous variation in the subjects’ home price expectations. We then used rich administrative data to measure the effects of these information shocks on the subject’s market choices. We find that, consistent with economic theory, higher home price expectations caused the subjects to delay selling their homes. These effects are statistically highly significant, economically large in magnitude, and robust to a number of sharp checks. Our results indicate that market choices are highly elastic to expectations: a 1 percentage point increase in home price expectations reduced the probability of selling within six months by 2.45 percentage points. Moreover, we provide evidence that this behavioral elasticity would be even higher if it were not for the presence of optimization frictions. |
| JEL: | C81 C93 D83 D84 R31 |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27412&r=all |
| By: | Syngjoo Choi; Byung-Yeon Kim; Jungmin Lee; Sokbae Lee |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether growing up in a socialist country affects the development of competitiveness by comparing three Korean groups in South Korea, born and raised in three countries with distinct institutional environments: South Korea, North Korea, and China. We examine the effect of home country experiences on competitiveness using laboratory experiments. Results show that North Korean refugees are significantly less competitive than South Koreans or Korean-Chinese immigrants. Ultimately, we find that the lower cognitive ability of North Koreans is a crucial determinant for the deficiency of competitiveness, while we fail to find evidence for direct effects of socialist institutions. Analysis through the lens of a choice model with probability weighting uncovers the effects of cognitive ability not only on expected performance but also on subject belief about winning and aversion for competition. |
| Keywords: | Piece Rate; Tournament; North Korea; Institution; Laboratory Experiment; |
| JEL: | C92 P20 |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no134&r=all |
| By: | Raghunathan, Kalyani; Kumar, Neha; Gupta, Shivani; Chauhan, Tarana; Kathuria, Ashi Kohli; Menon, Purnima |
| Abstract: | Despite improvements over the last decade or more, India still accounts for a large proportion of the global prevalence of maternal and child undernutrition. We use a cluster-randomized controlled design and two waves of panel data on more than 2000 households from Bihar to analyse the impact on diet quality and anthropometry of a health and nutrition intervention delivered through an at-scale women’s self-help group (SHGs) platform. We find that the intervention had small but significant impacts on women and children’s dietary diversity, with the main impacts coming from an increase in the consumption of fruits and vegetables and dairy, however, it had no impact on women’s body mass index. We identify several potential pathways to impact. To the extent that SHGs can effect broad-based social change, their current reach to millions of women makes them a powerful platform for accelerating improvements in maternal and child health and nutrition outcomes. |
| Keywords: | INDIA; SOUTH ASIA; ASIA; nutrition; maternal nutrition; self-help groups; randomized controlled trials; anthropometry; maternal and child health; health; diet; body mass index; women; children; empowerment; gender; women's empowerment; rural areas; behavior change communication |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1936&r=all |
| By: | Galasso, Vincenzo; Nannicini, Tommaso; Nunnari, Salvatore |
| Abstract: | Negative advertising is frequent in electoral campaigns, despite its ambiguous effectiveness: negativity may reduce voters' evaluation of the targeted politician but have a backlash effect for the attacker. We study the effect of negative advertising in electoral races with more than two candidates with a large scale field experiment during an electoral campaign for mayor in Italy and a survey experiment in a fictitious mayoral campaign. In our field experiment, we find a strong, positive spillover effect on the third main candidate (neither the target nor the attacker). This effect is confirmed in our survey experiment, which creates a controlled environment with no ideological components nor strategic voting. The negative ad has no impact on the targeted incumbent, has a sizable backlash effect on the attacker, and largely benefits the idle candidate. The attacker is perceived as less cooperative, less likely to lead a successful government, and more ideologically extreme. |
| Keywords: | Electoral Campaign; field experiment; Political Advertisement; randomized controlled trial; Survey Experiment |
| JEL: | C90 D72 M37 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14312&r=all |
| By: | Asim,Salman; Riaz,Amina |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the results of a field experiment in rural Sindh, Pakistan, where half of the school-age children (ages 6-10 years) are out of school. The study tests simple and low-intensity approaches to strengthen engagement of communities with schools: face-to-face dialogue at externally facilitated community meetings, and ongoing, anonymous dialogue via text messages. The interventions increased communities'interest in education as measured through an improvement in the number of functioning schools and, in the case of the text message treatment, substantial gains in retention of students in grades 2, 3, and 4. On the supply side, the schools significantly increased staffing and the share of one-teacher schools was reduced; however, teacher absenteeism increased, and there was no substantial impact on basic school infrastructure. Elections and capacity building for school committees were implemented in a cross-over experimental design. The intervention undermined the participation of communities in meetings and reduced impacts on all indicators except new admissions and availability of toilets in schools. No evidence is found of impact on measured test scores for any intervention. |
| Date: | 2020–06–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9280&r=all |
| By: | Andrew Ellis; David J Freeman |
| Abstract: | In a decision problem comprised of multiple intermediate choices, subjects may fail to take into account the interdependencies between their choices. We design and deploy a novel experiment to understand how people make decisions in such problems. We provide revealed preference tests of three models of choice bracketing: broad, narrow, and partial-narrow. We apply these tests in three experiments to determine how subjects bracket in portfolio allocation under risk, social allocation, and induced-utility shopping experiments. 40-44\% of our subjects are consistent with narrow bracketing, while only 0-15\% are consistent with broad bracketing. Classifying subjects while adjusting for models' predictive precision, 75\% of subjects are best described by narrow bracketing, 14\% by broad bracketing, and 3\% by intermediate cases. |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2006.14869&r=all |
| By: | Melis Kartal (Vienna University of Economics and Business); Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We study extensions that allow for partisan biases, targeted misinformation intended to move public opinion in a specific direction, and correlated news signals (due to for example media ownership concentration). In our experiment, voters are exposed to correct news or misinformation. The extent to which a subject is likely to observe correct news depends on their cognitive ability. Absent overconfidence, more cognitively able subjects are predicted to vote while less able subjects are predicted to abstain, and information is predicted to aggregate well. We provide evidence that overconfidence induces misinformed subjects to vote excessively, thereby severly undermining information aggregation. |
| Keywords: | behavioral political economy, voting, misinformation, Dunning-Kruger effect |
| JEL: | D72 D83 D91 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:2003&r=all |
| By: | Engelmann, Dirk; Grüner, Hans Peter; Hoffmann, Timo; Possajennikov, Alex |
| Abstract: | Under simple majority voting an absolute majority of voters may choose policies that are harmful to minorities. It is the purpose of sub- and super-majority rules to protect legitimate minority interests. We study how voting rules are chosen under the veil of ignorance. In our experiment, individuals choose voting rules for given distributions of gains and losses that can arise from a policy, but before learning their own valuation of the policy. We find that subjects on average adjust the voting rule in line with the skewness of the distribution. As a result, a higher share of the achievable surplus can be extracted with the suggested rules than with exogenously given simple majority voting. The rule choices, however, imperfectly reflect the distributions of benefits and costs, in expectation leading to only 63% of the surplus being extracted. Both under-protection and over-protection of minorities contribute to the loss. Voting insincerely leads to a further surplus loss of 5-15%. We classify subjects according to their rule choices and show that most subjects' rule choices follow the incentives embedded in the distributions. For a few participants, however, this is not the case, which leads to a large part of the surplus loss. |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14393&r=all |
| By: | Susan Athey; Raj Chetty; Guido Imbens |
| Abstract: | There has been an increase in interest in experimental evaluations to estimate causal effects, partly because their internal validity tends to be high. At the same time, as part of the big data revolution, large, detailed, and representative, administrative data sets have become more widely available. However, the credibility of estimates of causal effects based on such data sets alone can be low. In this paper, we develop statistical methods for systematically combining experimental and observational data to obtain credible estimates of the causal effect of a binary treatment on a primary outcome that we only observe in the observational sample. Both the observational and experimental samples contain data about a treatment, observable individual characteristics, and a secondary (often short term) outcome. To estimate the effect of a treatment on the primary outcome while addressing the potential confounding in the observational sample, we propose a method that makes use of estimates of the relationship between the treatment and the secondary outcome from the experimental sample. If assignment to the treatment in the observational sample were unconfounded, we would expect the treatment effects on the secondary outcome in the two samples to be similar. We interpret differences in the estimated causal effects on the secondary outcome between the two samples as evidence of unobserved confounders in the observational sample, and develop control function methods for using those differences to adjust the estimates of the treatment effects on the primary outcome. We illustrate these ideas by combining data on class size and third grade test scores from the Project STAR experiment with observational data on class size and both third and eighth grade test scores from the New York school system. |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2006.09676&r=all |
| By: | Bejarano, Hernan; Gillet, Joris; Lara, Ismael Rodríguez |
| Abstract: | We investigate experimentally the effect of a negative endowment shock in a trust game to assess whether different causes of inequality have different effects on trust and trustworthiness. In our trust game there may be inequality in favor of the second mover and this may (or may not) be the result of a negative random shock (i.e., the outcome of a die roll) that decreases the endowment of the first-mover. Our findings suggest that inequality leads to differences in behavior. First-movers send more of their endowment and second-movers return more when there is inequality. However, we do not find support for the hypothesis that the cause of the inequality matters. Behavior after the occurrence of a random shock is not significantly different from the behavior when the inequality exists from the outset. Our results highlight that we have to be cautious when interpreting the effects on trust and trustworthiness of negative random shocks that occur in the field (e.g., natural disasters). Our results suggest that these effects are largely driven by the inequality caused by the shock and not by any of the additional characteristics of the shock like saliency or uncertainty. |
| Date: | 2020–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:p4tw2&r=all |
| By: | Díaz Serrano, Lluís; Flamand, Sabine |
| Abstract: | Single parenthood is on the rise everywhere in the world. Previous studies show that acceptance of single parent headed households is increasing, although some authors point out that single-parent families are often considered as a reality rather than as an ideal. This circumstance may cause negative attitudes against single parents, who are among the most vulnerable groups of society. Motivated by these findings, in this study, we examine for the first time whether schools are more reluctant to give feedback to single parents than to heterosexual couples during children's pre-registration period in Catalonia (Spain). To do so, we design a correspondence experiment to be conducted in schools. We create three types of fictitious families (heterosexual couple, single mother and single father) and send e-mails to schools in which the family structure is explicit. Our results indicate that single parents benefit from positive discrimination. Schools are more prone to interact with single parents than with heterosexual couples. Further, single mothers receive more answers than single fathers. Keywords: Single parents, heterosexual couples, schools, discrimination, field experiment |
| Keywords: | Família monoparental, Discriminació, Escola, 316 - Sociologia. Comunicació, |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/376036&r=all |
| By: | Bandiera, Oriana; Best, Michael; Khan, Adnan; Prat, Andrea |
| Abstract: | We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce financial incentives to a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face a monitor who does not delay approvals. The results illustrate that organizational design and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy. |
| JEL: | D23 H11 H57 O17 O23 |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14381&r=all |
| By: | Ismaël Benslimane (IPhiG - Institut de Philosophie de Grenoble - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes); Paolo Crosetto (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Raul Magni-Berton (IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble); Simon Varaine (PACTE - Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - UJF - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2) |
| Abstract: | This study attempts to experimentally capture the effects of democratic reform of intellectual property (IP) and measure how a vote "against IP" can disappoint the most talented innovators and reduce their creativity. Contrary to expectations, the results show that such a vote increases overall creativity. Actually, the most talented innovators do not vote in favor of IP. Rather, those who vote in favor of IP are those who benefit relatively more from royalties. Surprisingly, no correlation is found between these two populations: the IP in our experiment seems not to reward the best players, but the players choosing an 'autarkic' strategy of relying on their own creationsand forego cross-fertilization with other players. These are not particularly brilliant players thatopt for a rent-seeking strategy that maximises gainsfromthe IP systemitself. There are plausible arguments to argue that this result is at least partly valid in the real world, especially for complexand highly sequential innovations where it has been proven that patent trolls and anti-competitivestrategies are important. These findings lead us not to recommend IP constitutional protections,because there are no major "tyranny from the majority" concerns. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual Property,Patents,Institutional Reform,Innovation policy,Creativity,Real effort task,Vote,Laboratory experiment |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02794343&r=all |
| By: | Afridi, Farzana; Dhillon, Amrita; Li, Sherry Xin; Sharma, Swati |
| Abstract: | Production processes are often organized in teams, yet there is limited evidence on whether and how social connections and financial incentives affect productivity in tasks that require coordination among workers. We simulate assembly line production in a lab-in-the-field experiment in which workers exert real effort in a minimum-effort game in teams whose members are either socially connected or unconnected and are paid according to the group output. We find that group output increases by 18%, and coordination improves by 30-39% when workers are socially connected with their co-workers. These findings can plausibly be explained by the higher levels of pro-social motivation between co-workers in socially connected teams. |
| Keywords: | caste-based networks; coordination; Financial incentives; minimum effort game; output; social incentives |
| JEL: | C93 D20 D22 D24 J33 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14356&r=all |
| By: | Hager, Anselm (University of Oxford); Hensel, Lukas (University of California, Berkeley and IZA); Hermle, Johannes (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin); Roth, Christopher (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Does party competition affect political activism? This paper studies the decision of party supporters to join political campaigns. We present a framework that incorporates supporters’ instrumental and expressive motives and illustrates that party competition can either increase or decrease party activism. To distinguish between these competing predictions, we implemented a field experiment with a European party during a national election. In a seemingly unrelated party survey, we randomly assigned 1,417 party supporters to true information that the canvassing activity of the main competitor party was exceptionally high. Using unobtrusive, real-time data on party supporters’ canvassing behavior, we find that treated respondents are 30 percent less likely to go canvassing. To investigate the causal mechanism, we leverage additional survey evidence collected two months after the campaign. Consistent with affective accounts of political activism, we show that increased competition lowered party supporters’ political self-efficacy, which plausibly led them to remain inactive. |
| Keywords: | Party Activism ; Electoral Competition ; Field Experiment ; Campaigns |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1278&r=all |
| By: | Castillo, Marco (Texas A&M University) |
| Abstract: | Using a longitudinal study of 1,900 Peruvian children, I show that children who grow up in a household where mothers report experiencing domestic violence are more risk averse and have lower cognitive development. Risk attitudes are measured with an incentivized experiment. The effect of domestic violence on risk attitudes is not mediated by cognitive development and suggests that early negative experiences in life can directly influence the risk attitudes of children. This experience is associated with other behavioral changes as well, including lower physical activity and higher BMI. |
| Keywords: | domestic violence, cognitive development, risk preferences, children |
| JEL: | C93 J13 |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp13320&r=all |
| By: | Pierpaolo Battigalli; Martin Dufwenberg |
| Abstract: | The mathematical framework of psychological game theory is useful for describing many forms of motivation where preferences depend directly on own or others’ beliefs. It allows for incorporating, e.g., emotions, reciprocity, image concerns, and self-esteem in economic analysis. We explain how and why, discussing basic theory, experiments, applied work, and methodology. |
| Keywords: | psychological game theory, belief-dependent motivation, reciprocity, emotions, image concerns, self-esteem |
| JEL: | C72 D91 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8285&r=all |
| By: | Davies, Elwyn; Fafchamps, Marcel |
| Abstract: | We conduct in the an interactive online experiment framed as an employment contract between employer and worker. Subjects from the US and India are matched in pairs within and across countries. Employers make a one-period offer to a worker who can either decline or choose a high or low effort. The offer is made from within a restricted and variable set of possible contracts: high and low fixed wage; bonus and malus contracts; and bonus and malus with reneging. High effort is always efficient. Self-interest predicts a fraction of observed choices, but many choices indicate conditional or unconditional cooperation instead. Indian subjects are more likely to play unconditional cooperation and provide high effort more often. US subjects are more likely to follow self-interest. Indian subjects reach a more efficient outcome than US subjects in 5 of the 6 treatments. Survey data on demographics and attitudes to incentives is unable to predict behavioral differences between the two countries, suggesting the possible existence of cultural differences in the response to labor incentives. |
| Keywords: | conditional cooperation; Cross-country comparisons; intrinsic motivation; Labor contracts; work incentives |
| JEL: | D9 J31 O12 O57 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14283&r=all |
| By: | Christian Belzil; Arnaud Maurel; Modibo Sidibé |
| Abstract: | Using data from a Canadian field experiment on the financial barriers to higher education, we estimate the distribution of the value of financial aid for prospective students. We find that a considerable share of prospective students perceive significant credit constraints. Most of the individuals are willing to pay a sizable interest premium above the prevailing market rate for the option to take up a loan, with a median interest rate wedge equal to 6.8 percentage points for a $1,000 loan. The willingness-to-pay for financial aid is highly heterogeneous across students, with preferences and in particular discount factors playing a key role in accounting for the variation. |
| Keywords: | Higher Education, Financing, Time and Risk Preferences, Field Experiment, |
| JEL: | J22 J23 J24 |
| Date: | 2020–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2020s-38&r=all |
| By: | Sophie Clot (UOR - University of Reading); Gilles Grolleau (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)); Lisette Ibanez (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | The projection bias corresponds to the human tendency to project current preferences into the future as if present tastes remained unchanged. We apply the projection bias to the environmental domain and design a survey experiment to investigate its relevance on two environmentally friendly initiatives, namely solar panels and eco-friendly transport. We found that some attitudes and behavioral intentions are subject to positive change when individuals are solicited a day when the weather is congruent with the proposed changes. We draw several policy and managerial implications for ecological issues. |
| Keywords: | environment,experimental survey,projection bias,solar panels,transport. |
| Date: | 2020–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02874044&r=all |
| By: | Battaglini, Marco; Morton, Rebecca; Patacchini, Eleonora |
| Abstract: | We present an informational theory of public protests, according to which public protests allow citizens to aggregate privately dispersed information and signal it to the policy maker. The model predicts that information sharing of signals within social groups can facilitate information aggregation when the social groups are sufficiently large even when it is not predicted with individual signals. We use experiments in the laboratory and on Amazon Mechanical Turk to test these predictions. We find that information sharing in social groups significantly affects citizens' protest decisions and as a consequence mitigates the effects of high conflict, leading to greater efficiency in policy makers' choices. Our experiments highlight that social media can play an important role in protests beyond simply a way in which citizens can coordinate their actions; and indeed that the information aggregation and the coordination motives behind public protests are intimately connected and cannot be conceptually separated. |
| Keywords: | Petitions; Public Protests; Social groups |
| JEL: | D72 D78 |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14385&r=all |
| By: | Aminaka, Hirokazu; Yoshioka-Kobayashi, Tohru |
| Abstract: | This study addresses the potential of crowdfunding of scientific research as a complementary source of funding to competitive government-funded research grants. Although a growing number of academic researchers expect scientific crowdfunding to support academic research that is not funded through traditional grants, few studies have investigated the motives of crowdfunding contributors. This study develops hypotheses regarding the relationship between crowdfunding and its returns or emotional motivations. The hypotheses are tested using an internet survey of 3,443 Japanese citizens regarding their willingness to contribute to academic research. We controlled two biases, disinterest and acquiescence, in the responses by applying a randomized experiment method. Our results identify two influential determinants of both an interest in donating and the willingness to contribute, namely, research that increases empathy and research that contributes to global knowledge. We also find that returns from crowdfunding, such as increasing national scientific competitiveness, do not always drive donation behavior. The results confirm the usefulness of crowdfunding in supporting various types of academic research. |
| Date: | 2020–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:iirwps:20-09&r=all |
| By: | Miguel Costa-Gomes; Georgios Gerasimou |
| Abstract: | Inertia and context-dependent choice effects are well-studied classes of behavioural phenomena. While much is known about these effects individually, little is known about whether one of them "dominates" another. Knowledge of any such dominance is important for effective choice architecture and for accurate descriptive modelling. We initiate this empirical investigation with a lab experiment on choice under risk that was designed to test for dominance between *status quo bias* and the *decoy effect*. We find that the former unambiguously prevails over the latter and is powerful enough to make the average subject switch from being risk averse to being risk-seeking. The observed reversal in risk attitudes is explainable by a large class of Kozsegi-Rabin (2006) reference-dependent preferences. |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2006.14868&r=all |
| By: | Barankay, Iwan; Chadha, Sakshum; Jones, Lauren S.; Olthoff, Kim; Reese, Peter; Serper, Marina; Shults, Justine |
| Abstract: | Kidney transplant recipients (KTRs) and liver transplant recipients (LTRs) have significant post-transplant weight gain and low physical activity. We conducted a home-based, remotely-monitored intervention using wearable accelerometer devices to promote post-transplant physical activity. We randomized 61 KTRs and 66 LTRs within 24 months of transplant to: 1) control, 2) accelerometer, or 3) intervention: accelerometer paired with financial incentives and health engagement questions to increase steps by 15% from baseline every 2 weeks. The primary outcome was weight change. A co-primary outcome for the two accelerometer arms was steps. Participants were recruited at a median of 9.5 [3-17] months post-transplant. At 3 months, there were no significant differences in weight change across the 3 arms. The intervention arm was more likely to achieve â?¥7000 steps compared to control with device (OR 1.99, 95% CI:1.03-3.87); effect remained significant after adjusting for demographics, allograft, time from transplant, and baseline weight. Adherence to target step goals was 74% in the intervention arm, 84% of health engagement questions were answered correctly. A pilot study with financial incentives and health engagement questions was feasible and led KTRs and LTRs to walk more, but did not affect weight. A definitive trial is warranted. (ClinicalTrials.gov number: NCT03221465). |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14420&r=all |
| By: | Daniel Cardona (Universitat de les Illes Balears); Jenny De Freitas (Universitat de les Illes Balears); Antoni Rubí-Barceló (Universitat de les Illes Balears) |
| Abstract: | Lottery and share contests are equivalent for risk neutral contestants. We compare these two contests designs to show that this equivalence does no longer hold for risk averse contestants, in a policy contest setting. As expected, they prefer the share contest as it eliminates the uncertainty of the lottery. Under institutional settings in which contestants can pre-commit to policies different from their ideal one, the previous result is switched: Risk-averse contestants prefer lottery contests because, only under this design, they strategically moderate their claims, calming down the conflict and reducing the uncertainty of the lottery. Moreover, we show that contestants exert more effort in share contests. These results provide arguments justifying each of these two types of contests depending on the institutional framework and the comparative criteria. |
| Keywords: | lobbying; lottery contest; share contest; risk aversion; commitment; strategic restraint. |
| JEL: | C72 D72 D81 H40 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubi:deawps:93&r=all |
| By: | Emeric Henry (Département d'économie); Sergei Guriev (Département d'économie); Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Using an online randomized experiment in the context of the 2019 European elections campaign in France, we study how fact-checking affects sharing of false news on social media. We exposed over 4200 voting-age French to statements on the role of the EU made by the extreme right populist party Rassemblement National. A randomly selected subgroup of experiment participants was also presented with fact-checking of these statements; another subgroup was offered a choice whether to view the fact-checking or not. Then, all participants could choose whether to share the false statements on their Facebook pages. We show that: (i) both imposed and voluntary fact-checking reduced sharing of false statements by more than 25%; (ii) the size of the effect was similar between imposed and voluntary fact-checking; and (iii) each additional click required to share false statements reduced sharing by 75%. |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/27dls12b6d8aor7i6sipg9ie3g&r=all |
| By: | Emeric Henry (Département d'économie); Sergei Guriev (Département d'économie); Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Using an online randomized experiment in the context of the 2019 European elections campaign in France, we study how fact-checking affects sharing of false news on social media. We exposed over 4200 voting-age French to statements on the role of the EU made by the extreme right populist party Rassemblement National. A randomly selected subgroup of experiment participants was also presented with fact-checking of these statements; another subgroup was offered a choice whether to view the fact-checking or not. Then, all participants could choose whether to share the false statements on their Facebook pages. We show that: (i) both imposed and voluntary fact-checking reduced sharing of false statements by more than 25%; (ii) the size of the effect was similar between imposed and voluntary fact-checking; and (iii) each additional click required to share false statements reduced sharing by 75%. |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/27dls12b6d8aor7i6sipg9ie3g&r=all |
| By: | David Tannenbaum; Alain Cohn; Christian Lukas Zünd; Michel André Maréchal |
| Abstract: | We validate survey measures of social capital with a new data set that examines whether citizens report a lost wallet to its owner. Using data from more than 17,000 lost wallets across 40 countries, we find that survey measures of social capital - especially questions concerning generalized trust or generalized morality - are strongly and significantly correlated with country-level differences in wallet reporting rates. A second finding is that lost wallet reporting rates predict unique variation in economic development and government effectiveness not captured by existing measures, suggesting this data set also holds promise as a useful indicator of social capital. |
| Keywords: | Social capital, trust, honesty, field experiment, surveys |
| JEL: | C93 C83 Z10 O10 |
| Date: | 2020–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:352&r=all |