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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2020‒05‒25
24 papers chosen by |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Stephane Luchini (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Julie Rosaz (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier); Jason Shogren (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - UW - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Oath-taking for senior executives has been promoted as a mean to enhance honesty within and towards organizations. Herein we explore whether people who voluntarily sign a solemn truth-telling oath are more committed to sincere behavior when offered the chance to lie. We design an experiment to test how the oath affects truth-telling in two contexts: a neutral context replicating the typical experiment in the literature, and a "loaded" context in which we remind subjects that "a lie is a lie." We consider four payoff configurations, with differential monetary incentives to lie, implemented as within-subjects treatment variables. The results are reinforced by robustness investigations in which each subject made only one lying decision. Our results show that the oath reduces lying, especially in the loaded environment-falsehoods are reduced by fifty percent. The oath, however, have a weaker effect on lying in the neutral environment. The oath did affect decision times in all instances: the average person takes significantly more time deciding whether to lie under oath. |
| Keywords: | Laboratory Experiment,Deception,Truth-telling oath,Lies |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02018089&r=all |
| By: | Adena, Maja; Huck, Steffen |
| Abstract: | In an artefactual field experiment we implement a crowdfunding campaign for a club good-an institute's summer party with free food, drinks, and music-and compare "donation" and "contribution" framings. We find that the "donation" frame generates higher income than the "contribution" frame. While individuals in the "donation" frame give substantially larger amounts, the individuals in the "contribution" frame respond more strongly to reward thresholds and suggestions. An additional survey experiment on M-Turk indicates that the term "donation" triggers more positive emotional responses, and that emotions are highly correlated with giving. It appears that making a "donation" is perceived as a more voluntary act and is, thus, more successful at generating warm glow than making a "contribution". We conjecture that this extends to other funding mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | crowdfunding,field experiment,framing,suggestions |
| JEL: | C93 D64 D12 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2016308r&r=all |
| By: | Adena, Maja; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Huck, Steffen |
| Abstract: | Previous studies of charitable giving have focused on middle- or high-income earners in Western countries, neglecting the poor, although the lowest income groups are often shown to contribute substantial shares of their income to charitable causes. In a large-scale natural field experiment with over 180,000 clients of a micro-lending company in Kyrgyzstan, we study charitable giving by a population that is much poorer than the typical donors studied so far. In a 2x2 design, we explore two main (pre-registered) hypotheses about giving by the poor: (i) that they are more price sensitive than the rich such that, in contrast to previous studies, matching incentives induce crowding in of out-of-pocket donations; (ii) that they care about their proximity to the charitable project. We find evidence in favor of the former but not the latter. |
| Keywords: | Charitable giving,field experiments,matching donations |
| JEL: | C93 D64 D12 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2019305r&r=all |
| By: | Eugenio Proto; Aldo Rustichini; Andis Sofianos |
| Abstract: | A large literature in behavioral economics has emphasized in the last decades the role of individual differences in social preferences (such as trust and altruism) in influencing behavior in strategic environments. Here we emphasize the role of attention and working memory, and show that social interactions among heterogeneous groups are mediated by differences in cognitive skills. Our design uses a repeated prisoner’s dilemma; we compare rates of cooperation in groups of subjects separated according to their IQ, with those in integrated groups, where subjects of different IQ are pooled together. In integrated groups we observe higher aggregated cooperation rates and profits than in separated groups. There are gains in earnings among lower IQ subjects who learn how to cooperate faster than when they play separately, and smaller losses for higher IQ subjects. We also see that higher IQ subjects become less lenient when they are matched with lower IQ subjects than when they play separately. This pattern is an instance of a general phenomenon, which we demonstrate in an evolutionary game theory model, in which higher IQ among subjects induces –possibly thanks to better working memory– a lower frequency of errors in strategy implementation. We show that players indeed choose less-lenient strategies in environments in which subjects have higher error rates. Estimations of errors and strategies from the experimental data are consistent with the hypothesis and model’s predictions. |
| Keywords: | Repeated Prisoners Dilemma, Cooperation, Intelligence, IQ, Strategy, Error in Transition |
| JEL: | C73 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gla:glaewp:2020_07&r=all |
| By: | Pelligra, Vittorio; Reggiani, Tommaso (Cardiff Business School); Zizzo, Daniel John (University of Queensland) |
| Abstract: | We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests by an authority in a trust game experiment. The authority, modelled as the experimenter, systematically varies the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of the level of each request and in terms of the sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less, but high requests tend to be ignored. Dynamic reasonableness also matters, in the sense that, if requests keep increasing, trustees return less compared to the same requests presented in random or decreasing order. Requests never systematically increase trustworthiness but may decrease it. |
| Keywords: | trust; trustworthiness; authority; reasonableness; moral wiggle room; moral licensing |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D03 D63 |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2020/7&r=all |
| By: | Diemo Urbig (Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal); Werner Boente (Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal); Vivien D. Procher (Grenoble Ecole de Management, Univ Grenoble Alpes ComUE and RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung); Sandro Lombardo (Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, University of Wuppertal) |
| Abstract: | Referring to Isreal M. Kirzner (1973) and Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934), who emphasized the competitive nature of entrepreneurship, this study investigates whether potential and revealed entrepreneurs are more likely to seek competition than non-entrepreneurs. We provide a conceptual framework that links entrepreneurship to three facets of individual competitiveness drawn from economic, entrepreneurship, and psychological research: a desire to win, striving for personal development, and an enjoyment of competition. Following economic research linking competitive behavior in experiments to career choices, we conduct a lab-in-the-field study and demonstrate that entrepreneurs are more likely to enter competitions than non-entrepreneurs. Accounting for individual desires to win and mastery-related achievement motivations, our results indicate that entrepreneurs tend to enter competition for the sake of competition itself rather than for the prospect of winning it or personal development. Our results suggest that enjoyment of competition might be an additional factor driving entrepreneurs’ market entry decisions beyond well-known factors like overconfidence and risk taking. |
| Keywords: | Enjoyment of competition; Individual competitiveness; Entrepreneurship; Behavioral Economics; Lab-in-the-field experiment |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwu:schdps:sdp20001&r=all |
| By: | Konstantin Buechel; Martina Jakob; Daniel Steffen; Christoph Kuehnhanss; Aymo Brunetti |
| Abstract: | This study provides novel evidence on the relative effectiveness of computer-assisted learning (CAL) software and traditional teaching. Based on a randomized controlled trial in Salvadoran primary schools, we evaluate three interventions that aim to improve learning outcomes in mathematics: (i) teacher-led classes, (ii) CAL classes monitored by a technical supervisor, and (iii) CAL classes instructed by a teacher. As all three interventions involve the same amount of additional mathematics lessons, we can directly compare the productivity of the three teaching methods. CAL lessons lead to larger improvements in students' mathematics skills than traditional teacher-centered classes. In addition, teachers add little to the e ectiveness of learning software. Overall, our results highlight the value of CAL approaches in an environment with poorly quali ed teachers. |
| Keywords: | computer-assisted learning, productivity in education, primary education, teacher content knowledge |
| JEL: | C93 I21 J24 O15 |
| Date: | 2020–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2006&r=all |
| By: | Alzua Soyolmaa Batbekh,Maria Laura; Batchuluun,Altantsetseg; Dalkhjav,Bayarmaa; Galdo,Jose |
| Abstract: | The effectiveness of a demand-driven vocational-training program for disadvantaged youth in Ulaanbaatar, the capital city of Mongolia is assessed through a randomized controlled trial. Mongolia, a transitional country whose economic structure shifted from a Communist, centrally planned economy to a free-market economy over a relatively short period, offers a new setting in which to test the effectiveness of market-based active-labor-market policies. Results show short-term positive impacts on self-employment and skills match, while positive but uncertain effects emerge for employment and earnings. Substantial heterogeneity emerges as relatively older, richer, and better-educated individuals drive these positive effects. A second intervention, in which participants were randomly assigned to receive newsletters with information on market returns to vocational training, shows statistically meaningful effects on the length of exposure to the program (i.e., number of training days attended). These positive impacts, however, do not lead to higher employment or greater earnings. |
| Date: | 2020–04–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9226&r=all |
| By: | Diekert, Florian; Eymess, Tillmann; Luomba, Joseph; Waichman, Israel |
| Abstract: | Preventing overfishing at Lake Victoria is a typical situation where policies have to rely on norm-based interventions to improve outcomes. Our lab-in-the-field experiment studies how information about high or low levels of previous cooperation affects the creation of social norms in a three-player prisoner’s dilemma game with/without a feedback mechanism. The provision of social information succeeds in creating norms of cooperation only if a feedback mechanism is available. Without feedback, social information cannot prevent the decline of cooperation rates. Exploring the role of the reference network, we find that the effect increases with social proximity among participants. |
| Keywords: | common pool resource; collective action; social norms; lab-in-the-field experiment |
| Date: | 2020–05–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0684&r=all |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Stéphane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales, AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jason Shogren (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - UW - University of Wyoming); Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased. |
| Keywords: | Oath,Cheap talk communication,Coordination game |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01480525&r=all |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics); Stéphane Luchini (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Antoine Malezieux; Jason Shogren (UW - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Why do people pay taxes? Rational choice theory has fallen short in answering this question. Another explanation, called "tax morale", has been promoted. Tax morale captures the behavioral idea that non-monetary preferences (like norm-submission, moral emotions and moral judgments) might be better determinants of tax compliance than monetary trade-offs. Herein we report on two lab experiments designed to assess whether norm-submission, moral emotions (e.g. affective empathy, cognitive empathy, propensity to feel guilt and shame) or moral judgments (e.g. ethics principles, integrity, and moralization of everyday life) can help explain compliance behavior. Although we find statistically significant correlations of tax compliance behavior with empathy and shame, the economic significance of these correlations are low–—more than 80% of the variability in compliance remains unexplained. These results suggest that tax authorities should focus on the institutional context, rather than individual preference characteristics, to handle tax evasion. |
| Keywords: | tax evasion,tax morale,morality,personality traits,psychometrics |
| Date: | 2019–06–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-02290402&r=all |
| By: | Roberto Galbiati (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Emeric Henry (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | In situations where social payoffs are not aligned with private incentives, enforcement with fines can be a way to sustain cooperation. In this paper we show, by the means of a lab experiment , that past fines can have an effect on current behavior even when no longer in force. We document two mechanisms: a) past fines affect directly individuals' future propensity to cooperate; b) when fines for non cooperation are in place in the past, individuals experience higher levels of cooperation from partners and, consistent with indirect reciprocity motives, are in turn nicer towards others once these fines have been removed. This second mechanism is empirically prevalent and, in contrast with the first, induces a snowball effect of past enforcement. Our results can inform the design of costly enforcement policies. |
| Keywords: | experiments,Laws,social values,cooperation,learning,spillovers,persistence of institutions,repeated games |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01971468&r=all |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi; Michela Chessa; Sara Gil Gallen; Patrick Llerena |
| Abstract: | The interplay between individual creative ability and the way to enhance it – through monetary and nonmonetary incentives – is an issue with tremendous potential for economic analysis. In this survey, we dwell into the issue by focusing on the methodological advantages of economic experiments. We provide a review of the literature in experimental economics on creativity, identifying six main directions of analysis. Namely, the impact on creativity of: (1) low vs high monetary incentives, (2) the interplay of monetary incentives and tasks, (3) within-group competition, (4) within-group cooperation, (5) cultural factors, and (6) non-monetary social incentives. In the spirit of a “meta-study,” we classify the works in our review not only according to the aforementioned research questions, but also disentangling by the type of creative task that the experimental subjects face, the way in which creativity is assessed, and other key features of standard experimental procedures in economics. This multidimensional comparison allows us to conclude that the current lack of robust findings on the determinants of creativity in economics might be due to the absence of comparable experimental studies under the same experimental conditions. We conduct our analysis without neglecting the psychological roots of creativity research and their way through management, underlying how both disciplines have heavily outlined the work of experimental economists in the topic of creativity. |
| Keywords: | Creativity, Experimental Economics, Social Psychology, Incentives, Intrinsic Motivation. |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D91 O31 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2020-23&r=all |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Michela Chessa (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Sara Gil Gallen (Università degli studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy); Patrick Llerena (University of Strasbourg, France; BETA CNRS) |
| Abstract: | The interplay between individual creative ability and the way to enhance it – through monetary and nonmonetary incentives – is an issue with tremendous potential for economic analysis. In this survey, we dwell into the issue by focusing on the methodological advantages of economic experiments. We provide a review of the literature in experimental economics on creativity, identifying six main directions of analysis. Namely, the impact on creativity of: (1) low vs high monetary incentives, (2) the interplay of monetary incentives and tasks, (3) within-group competition, (4) within-group cooperation, (5) cultural factors, and (6) non-monetary social incentives. In the spirit of a “meta-study,” we classify the works in our review not only according to the aforementioned research questions, but also disentangling by the type of creative task that the experimental subjects face, the way in which creativity is assessed, and other key features of standard experimental procedures in economics. This multidimensional comparison allows us to conclude that the current lack of robust findings on the determinants of creativity in economics might be due to the absence of comparable experimental studies under the same experimental conditions. We conduct our analysis without neglecting the psychological roots of creativity research and their way through management, underlying how both disciplines have heavily outlined the work of experimental economists in the topic of creativity. |
| Keywords: | Creativity, Experimental Economics, Social Psychology, Incentives, Intrinsic Motivation |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D91 O31 |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2020-20&r=all |
| By: | Eugen Dimant |
| Abstract: | This paper uses a novel experimental design to study the contagion of pro- and anti-social behavior and the role of social proximity among peers. Across systematic variations thereof, we find that anti-social behavior is generally more contagious than pro-social behavior. Surprisingly, we also find that social proximity amplifies the contagion of anti-social behavior more strongly than the contagion of pro-social behavior. Anti-social individuals are also most susceptible to the behavioral contagion of other anti-social peers. These findings paired with the methodological contribution inform the design of effective norm-based policy interventions directed at facilitating pro-social behavior and reducing anti-social behavior in social and economic environments. |
| Keywords: | behavioral contagion, peer effects, anti-social & pro-social behavior |
| JEL: | C91 D64 D90 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8263&r=all |
| By: | Marine Hainguerlot (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne); Jean-Christophe Vergnaud (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne); Vincent de Gardelle (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Learning how certain cues in our environment predict specific states of nature is an essential ability for survival. However learning typically requires external feedback, which is not always available in everyday life. One potential substitute for external feedback could be to use the confidence we have in our decisions. Under this hypothesis, if no external feedback is available, then the agents' ability to learn about predictive cues should increase with the quality of their confidence judgments (i.e. metacognitive efficiency). We tested and confirmed this novel prediction in an experimental study using a perceptual decision task. We evaluated in separate sessions the metacognitive abilities of participants (N = 65) and their abilities to learn about predictive cues. As predicted, participants with greater metacognitive abilities learned more about the cues. Knowledge of the cues improved accuracy in the perceptual task. Our results provide strong evidence that confidence plays an active role in improving learning and performance. |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01761531&r=all |
| By: | Matthias Rodemeier; Andreas Löschel |
| Abstract: | How much information should governments reveal to consumers if consumption choices have uninternalized consequences to society? How does an alternative tax policy compare to information disclosure? We develop a price theoretic model of information design that allows empiricists to identify the welfare effects of any arbitrary information policy. Based on this model, we run a natural field experiment in cooperation with a large European appliance retailer and randomize information regarding the financial benefits of energy-efficient household lighting among more than 640,000 subjects. We find that full information disclosure strongly decreases demand for energy efficiency, while partial information disclosure increases demand. More information reduces social welfare because the increase in consumer surplus is outweighed by the rise in environmental externalities. By randomizing product prices, we identify the optimal tax vector as an alternative policy and show that sizable taxes on energy-inefficient products yield larger welfare gains than any information policy. We also document an important policy interaction: information provision dramatically reduces attention to pecuniary incentives and thereby limits the effectiveness of taxes. |
| Keywords: | persuasion, optimal taxation, internality, taxes, field experiments, energy efficiency, behavioral public economics |
| JEL: | D61 D83 H21 Q41 Q48 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8259&r=all |
| By: | Falco, Paolo; Zaccagni, Sarah |
| Abstract: | Reminders to promote social distancing have been ubiquitous throughout the COVID-19 crisis, but little is known about their effectiveness. Existing studies find positive impacts on intentions to comply, but no evidence exists of actual behavioural change. We conduct a randomised controlled trial with a large representative sample of Danish residents, who receive different versions of a reminder to stay home as much as possible at the height of the crisis. We are the first to measure impacts on both intentions to comply and on realised actions in the following days (i.e., whether the person does stay home). We find that the reminder significantly increases people’s intentions to stay home when it emphasises the consequences of non-compliance for the respondent or his/her family, while it has not impact when the emphasis is on other people or the country as a whole. Changes in intentions, however, translate into weaker changes in actions that are not statistically significant. This is consistent with the existence of important intention-to-action gaps. Only people who are in relatively poor health are significantly more likely to stay home after receiving the reminder with an emphasis on personal and family risks. This shows that while reminders may be useful to protect groups at risk by increasing their own compliance with social distancing, such a tool is unable to change the behaviour of those who face limited personal risks but could spread the disease. |
| Date: | 2020–05–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:a2nys&r=all |
| By: | Hambulo Ngoma; Amare Teklay Hailu; Stephen Kabwe; Arild Angelson |
| Abstract: | Key Findings -167,000 – 300,000 hectares of forest are lost every year in Zambia, and different polices are in place or have been proposed to contain forest loss. But, there is limited evidence on the effectiveness of these policies. -We conducted framed field experiments with actual forest users to test ex-ante the impacts of community forest management, command and control, and payments for environmental services on forest conservation in Zambia. -Relative to open access, community forest management and payments for environmental services to individuals led to more forest conservation, implying that both monetary and non-monetary motives matter for forest conservation. -Forest reliance, measured by whether the participants sold any forest product in the month preceding the survey, significantly increased harvest in the experiment. -Female participants had significantly higher harvest rates than males. This result runs counter to assertions suggesting that females are more pro-conservation. -These results imply that better conservation outcomes might be achieved by some combinations of community forest management and individual payments for environmental services, provided the transaction costs can be kept at acceptable levels. -Thus, Zambia’s community forestry management will need to provide individual households with clear material benefits in order to compensate for the loss from reduced forest use. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics and Policy, Food Security and Poverty, International Development |
| Date: | 2019–05–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:miffpb:303610&r=all |
| By: | Daniela Del Boca; Chiara Pronzato; Giuseppe Sorrenti |
| Abstract: | Employment contributes to reduce the risk of poverty. Through a randomized controlled trial, we evaluate the impact of a conditional cash transfer program (CCT) to low-income families with dependent children on household members’ labor supply. The attendance of labor-market-oriented mentoring courses constitutes the condition to obtain the transfer. One year after admission to the program, fathers assigned to the CCT program are more likely to work (+14 percent) than fathers assigned to an unconditional cash transfer program or to a pure control group. No effect arises for mothers. Increased paternal investments in activities enhancing labor market opportunities and improved family networks seem to explain the results. |
| Keywords: | conditional cash transfers, poverty, household labor supply, mentoring courses |
| JEL: | I10 I20 J24 I31 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8247&r=all |
| By: | Fernandes, Ana (University of Applied Sciences); Huber, Martin; Vaccaro, Giannina |
| Abstract: | Using a survey on wage expectations among students at two Swiss institutions of higher education, we examine the wage expectations of our respondents along two main lines. First, we investigate the rationality of wage expectations by comparing average expected wages from our sample with those of similar graduates; we further examine how our respondents revise their expectations when provided information about actual wages. Second, using causal mediation analysis, we test whether the consideration of a rich set of personal and professional controls, namely concerning family formation and children in addition to professional preferences, accounts for the difference in wage expectations across genders. We find that males and females overestimate their wages compared to actual ones, and that males respond in an overconfident manner to information about outside wages. Despite the attenuation of the gender difference in wage expectations brought about by the comprehensive set of controls, gender generally retains a significant direct, unexplained effect on wage expectations. |
| Keywords: | Wage expectations; gender wage differences; mediation; direct effect; indirect effect; experiment |
| JEL: | C21 J16 J31 |
| Date: | 2020–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fri:fribow:fribow00516&r=all |
| By: | Timothée Demont (Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, EHESS, Centrale Marseille, IRD, AMSE) |
| Abstract: | This paper asks whether local savings and credit associations help poor rural households hit by climatic shocks. Combining data from an original field experiment with meteorological data, I investigate how Self-Help Groups (SHGs) allow households to cope with rainfall shocks in villages of East India over a sevenyear period. I show that SHGs withstand large rainfall shocks remarkably, and that credit flows are very stable in treated villages. As a result, treated households experience a higher food security during the lean season following a drought and increase seasonal migration to mitigate future income shocks. These results imply that small-scale financial institutions like SHGs help to finance temporary risk management strategies and to cope with important covariate income shocks such as droughts. |
| Keywords: | microfinance, weather shocks, risk management, seasonal migration, food security |
| JEL: | O13 O15 G21 Q54 |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2016&r=all |
| By: | Shilpa Aggarwal; Rebecca Dizon-Ross; Ariel D. Zucker |
| Abstract: | How should the design of incentives vary with agent time preferences? We develop two predictions. First, “bundling” the payment function over time – specifically by making the payment for future effort increase in current effort – is more effective if individuals are impatient over effort. Second, increasing the frequency of payment is more effective if individuals are impatient over payment. We test the efficacy of time-bundling and payment frequency, and their interactions with impatience, using a randomized evaluation of an incentive program for exercise among diabetics in India. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, bundling payments over time meaningfully increases effort among the impatient relative to the patient. In contrast, increasing payment frequency has limited efficacy, suggesting limited impatience over payments. On average, incentives increase daily steps by 1,266 (13 minutes of brisk walking) and improve health. |
| JEL: | D9 I12 I15 |
| Date: | 2020–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27079&r=all |
| By: | Falk, Armin; Kosse, Fabian; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Zimmermann, Florian |
| Abstract: | This study presents descriptive and causal evidence on the role of the social environment in shaping the accuracy of self-assessment. We introduce a novel incentivized measurement tool to measure the accuracy of self-assessment among children and use this tool to show that children from high socioeconomic status (SES) families are more accurate in their self-assessment, compared to children from low SES families. To move beyond correlational evidence, we then exploit the exogenous variation of participation in a mentoring program designed to enrich the social environment of children. We document that the mentoring program has a causal positive effect on the accuracy of children's self-assessment. Finally, we show that the mentoring program is most effective for children whose parents provide few social and interactive activities for their children. |
| Keywords: | Self-Assessment,Beliefs,Experiments,Randomized Intervention,Children |
| JEL: | D03 C21 C91 I24 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:339&r=all |