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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi (Université Côte d'Azur; CNRS, GREDEG, France); Samuele Centorrino (Stony Brook University); Elena Manzoni (University of Verona) |
| Abstract: | We study two well-known electronic markets: an over-the-counter (OTC) market, in which each agent looks for the best counterpart through bilateral negotiations, and a double auction (DA) market, in which traders post their quotes publicly. We focus on the DA-OTC efficiency gap and show how it varies with different market sizes (10, 20, 40, and 80 traders). We compare experimental results from a sample of 6,400 undergraduate students in Economics with zero-intelligent (ZI) agent-based simulations. Simulations with ZI traders show that the traded quantity (with respect to the efficient one) increases with market size under both DA and OTC. Experimental results with human traders confirm the same tendency under DA, while the share of periods in which the traded quantity is higher (lower) than the efficient one decreases (increases) with market size under OTC, ultimately leading to a DA-OTC efficiency gap increasing with market size. We rationalize these results by putting forward a novel game-theoretical model of OTC market as a repeated bargaining procedure under incomplete information on buyers' valuations and sellers' costs, showing how efficiency decreases slightly with size due to two counteracting effects: acceptance rates in earlier periods decrease with size, and earlier offers increase, but not always enough to compensate the decrease in acceptance rates. |
| Keywords: | Market Design, Classroom Experiment, Agent-based Modelling, Game-theoretic Modelling |
| JEL: | C70 C91 C92 D41 D47 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2020-10&r=all |
| By: | Zhang, Quing ⓡ; Greiner, Ben |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study the relationship between time inconsistency, sophistication about time inconsistency, and self-commitment. Previous research has interpreted demand for commitment devices as evidence for the sophistication of a time-inconsistent decision-maker. In our laboratory experiment, we attempt to measure sophistication directly by way of a cognitive test. We then test the hypothesis that people who are both time-inconsistent and show high cognitive capacity take up commitment devices when offered in the strategic game between their current and their future self. For experimental laboratory commitment choices, we cannot detect a moderating effect of cognition on commitment demand of time-inconsistent subjects. However, we find that the existence of time-inconsistent preferences and sophistication (proxied by cognitive performance) can predict the demand for savings commitment in our hypothetical survey vignette question. |
| Keywords: | time-inconsistency, sophistication, present bias, future bias |
| Date: | 2020–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wus055:7530&r=all |
| By: | M. Dinkova; S.K. Elling; A.S. Kalwij; L.R. Lentz |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses whether offering tailored pension information based on age and gender is a way to get people interested in pension information. We conducted a randomised field experiment in which we sent email invitations to all employees of an insurance company to use an online tool, referred to as “the Pensioncheck†, in order to learn more about their personal pension situation. This experimental set-up enabled us to answer the following research question: Does tailoring induce participants to perform the Pensioncheck? We found evidence that tailoring in the trigger phase can work in two opposite directions. |
| Keywords: | pension communication, pension information, tailoring, field experiment, financial decision making |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:1913&r=all |
| By: | Zhengyang Bao; Andreas Leibbrandt |
| Abstract: | Workplace tournaments are one likely contributor to gender differences in labor market outcomes. Relative to men, women are often less eager to compete and thrive less under competitive pressure. We investigate a competitive workplace environment that may produce more gender-neutral outcomes: tournaments with safeguards. In our experiments, participants take part in a tournament with a real effort task and choose whether they want to have a complimentary safeguard that guarantees higher wages for the low-ranked. As expected, we find that women are more likely than men to obtain such a safeguard. However, obtaining a safeguard comes at a cost. On average, the safeguard causes lower performance, creates a gender wage gap, and over-proportionally disadvantages women. Thus, we provide novel evidence that easing women into tournaments can backfire. |
| Keywords: | workplace tournaments, gender differences, safeguard, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 J16 M52 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8147&r=all |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Kene Boun My (BETA, Université de Strasbourg); Andrea Guido (Institute for Futures Studies; Laboratory for Agent-Based Social Simulations (LABSS)); Mathieu Lefebvre (BETA, Université de Strasbourg) |
| Abstract: | There is robust evidence in the experimental economics literature showing that monopoly power is affected by trading institutions. In this paper we study whether trading institutions themselves can shape agents' market behaviour through the formation of anchors and reference points. We recreate experimentally five different double-auction market structures (perfect competition, perfect competition with quotas, cartel on price, cartel on price with quotas, and monopoly) in a within-subject design, varying the order of markets implementation. We investigate whether monopoly power endures the formation of reference prices emerged in previously implemented market structures. Results from our classroom experiments suggest that double-auction trading institutions succeed in preventing monopolists to exploit their market power. Furthermore, the formation of reference points in previously implemented markets negatively impacts on monopolists' power in later market structures. |
| Keywords: | Double Auctions, Perfect Competition, Monopoly, Market Imperfection, Spillovers, Classroom Experiments |
| JEL: | C90 D41 D42 D43 D44 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2020-06&r=all |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Roberta Dessi (Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)); Frédéric Moisan (University of Cambridge); Donald Robertson (University of Cambridge) |
| Abstract: | Individuals' decisions to behave prosocially (or the contrary) can often be observed by other individuals, with no direct connection to them, but who may nevertheless be influenced by them (e.g. through social media). Does knowing that they may be viewed as role models by other, notably younger, people a ect the way individuals behave? Does it make them more likely to behave prosocially? We study how participants' behavior in an experimental public good game is affected when they know that information about their choices and outcomes, together with different sets of information about their identity, will be transmitted the following year to a set of new, unknown, younger participants - with no payoff linkages between the two sets of players. When subjects know their photo, choices and outcomes will be transmitted, they contribute significantly less. We consider different possible explanations, and argue that the most convincing is based on image concerns, but in a surprising way: subjects in the photo treatment care about not being perceived as "suckers" by future players. |
| Keywords: | Role models, image concerns, identity, audience, public goods |
| JEL: | C91 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2020-05&r=all |
| By: | Karthik Muralidharan; Mauricio Romero; Kaspar Wüthrich |
| Abstract: | Factorial designs are widely used for studying multiple treatments in one experiment. While “long” model t-tests provide valid inferences, “short” model t-tests (ignoring interactions) yield higher power if interactions are zero, but incorrect inferences otherwise. Of 27 factorial experiments published in top-5 journals (2007–2017), 19 use the short model. After including all interactions, over half their results lose significance. Modest local power improvements over the long model are possible, but with lower power for most values of the interaction. If interactions are not of interest, leaving the interaction cells empty yields valid inferences and global power improvements. |
| Keywords: | randomized controlled trial, factorial designs, cross-cut designs, field experiments |
| JEL: | C12 C18 C90 C93 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8137&r=all |
| By: | Andrej Angelovski; Jordi Brandts; Carles Solà |
| Abstract: | We study the performance effects of two profit sharing schemes in a simplified representation of an organization with high task interdependence. The production process involves three stages such that output of earlier stages is the necessary input for subsequent stages. Work at earlier stages is easier than at later stages and the product is only final if it goes successfully through the highest stage. We compare the effects on the performance of the organization of a payment scheme in which profits are equally shared by all those involved in the production process with one where the participation in profits is strongly increasing in the production stage. The comparison is made for two ways of assigning individuals to the production stage: randomly or by merit. We also study the distinction between sharing schemes that are exogenously imposed and those that are chosen by the person at the top of the hierarchy. We find that overall the type of payment scheme has no effect on profits. We also find that profits increase over time and more so with the equal than with the unequal sharing scheme. The high interdependence in production that we study makes steep incentives ineffective and even counter-productive. These changes in profits over time can be explained by changes in production performance over time. We also find that merit-based assignment to positions in the hierarchy leads to significantly higher profits than random assignment. |
| Keywords: | profit sharing, experiments, Organizations |
| JEL: | C92 D23 D90 |
| Date: | 2020–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1169&r=all |
| By: | Bu, Di; Hanspal, Tobin; Liao, Yin; Liu, Yong |
| Abstract: | We report the results of a longitudinal intervention with students across five universities in China designed to reduce online consumer debt. Our research design allocates individuals to either a financial literacy treatment, a self-control training program, or a zero-touch control group. Financial education interventions improve test scores on general financial literacy but only marginally affect future online borrowing. Our self-control treatment features detailed tracking of spending and borrowing activity with a third-party app and introspection about individuals' consumption with a counselor. These sessions reduce future online borrowing, delinquency charges, and borrowing for entertainment reasons - and are driven by the male subjects in the sample. Our results suggest that self-regulation can affect financial behavior in e-commerce platforms. |
| Keywords: | Financial literacy,online borrowing,Consumer credit,Self-control,FinTech,China |
| JEL: | D14 D18 G23 G21 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:273&r=all |
| By: | Brice Corgnet (emlyon business school, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Mark Desantis (Chapman University); David Porter (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | The growing prevalence of stock market chat rooms and social media suggests communication between traders may affect market outcomes. Using data from a series of laboratory experiments, we study the causal effect of trader communication on the price efficiency of markets. We show that communication allows markets to convey private information more effectively. This effect is most pronounced when the communication platform publicizes a reputation score that might identify a person as not being truthful. This illustrates the need for market designers to consider social interactions when designing market institutions to leverage the social motives that foster information aggregation. Abstract The growing prevalence of stock market chat rooms and social media suggests communication |
| Keywords: | Information aggregation,market efficiency,communication,experimental asset markets,social market design |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02509127&r=all |
| By: | Quentin Cavalan (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Université Paris 1 panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics; https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr); Vincent De Gardelle (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - CNRS, Paris School of Economics; https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr); Jean-Christophe Vergnaud (CNRS - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne; https://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr) |
| Abstract: | Although conflicts in bargaining have attracted a lot of attention in the literature, situations in which bargainers have to share the product of their performance have been rarely investigated theoretically and empirically. Here, by decomposing the well-known overplacement effect, we show that two types of biases can lead to conflict in these situations: players might be overconfident in their own production (overconfidence bias) and/or underestimate the production of others (other-underestimation bias). To quantify these biases, we develop a novel experimental setting using a psychophysically controlled production task within a bargaining game. In comparison to Bayesian agents, participants tend to disagree too often, partly because they exhibit both cognitive biases. We test interventions to mitigate these biases, and are able to increase settlements mainly by reducing the other-underestimation bias. Our approach illustrates how combining psychophysical methods and economic analyses could prove helpful to identify the impact of cognitive biases on individuals' behavior |
| Keywords: | overconfidence; bargaining; joint production; belief updating |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D74 D81 |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:20003&r=all |
| By: | Davide Viviano |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses the problem of the design of experiments under network interference. We allow for a possibly fully connected network and a general class of estimands, which encompasses average treatment and average spillover effects, as well as estimands obtained from interactions of the two. We discuss a near-optimal design mechanism, where the experimenter optimizes over participants and treatment assignments to minimize the variance of the estimators of interest, using a first-wave experiment for estimation of the variance. We guarantee valid asymptotic inference on causal effects using either parametric or non-parametric estimators under the proposed experimental design, allowing for local dependence of potential outcomes, arbitrary dependence of the treatment assignment indicators, and spillovers across units. We showcase asymptotic optimality and finite-sample upper bounds on the regret of the proposed design mechanism. Simulations illustrate the advantage of the method over state-of-art methodologies. |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2003.08421&r=all |
| By: | Adena, Maja; Hager, Anselm |
| Abstract: | Does online fundraising increase charitable giving? We implemented a natural field experiment across Germany, randomly assigning all of the country's 8,000 zip codes to Save the Children Facebook fundraising videos or a pure control and studied changes in the volume of donations to this and other similar charities by zip code. Our design circumvents many shortcomings inherent in studies based on click-through data, especially substitution and measurement issues. We found that (i) the video fundraising increased donation frequency and value to Save the Children during the campaign and in the subsequent five weeks; (ii) the campaign was profitable for the fundraiser; and (iii) the effects were similar independent of the video content and impression assignment strategy. However, we also found that the overall volume of donations does not increase, due to a massive crowding out of donations to other similar charities. Finally, we demonstrate that click data are an inappropriate proxy for donations. |
| Keywords: | Charitable giving,field experiments,fundraising,social media,competition |
| JEL: | C93 D64 D12 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2020302&r=all |
| By: | Richard Carson; Joshua S. Graff Zivin; Jordan Louviere; Sally Sadoff; Jeffrey G. Shrader Jr |
| Abstract: | Innovation is important for firm performance and broader economic growth. But breakthrough innovations necessarily require greater risk-taking than more incremental approaches. To understand how managers respond to uncertainty when making research and development decisions, we conducted three experiments with master’s degree students in a program focused on the intersection of business and technology. Study participants were asked to choose whether to fund hypothetical research projects using a process that mirrors real-world research and development funding decisions. The experiments provided financial rewards that disproportionately encouraged the choice of higher-risk projects. Despite these incentives, most participants chose lower-risk projects at the expense of projects more likely to generate a large payoff. We also elicited participants’ personal risk preferences and found that decision-makers who are more tolerant of risk were more likely to fund breakthrough projects. The results suggest that the risk preferences of managers in charge of research investments may have an oversized effect on the rate of breakthrough innovation and the profitability of firms. |
| JEL: | D8 G11 O3 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26847&r=all |
| By: | Tarozzi,Alessandro; Maertens,Ricardo; Ahmed,Kazi Matin Uddin; van Geen,Alexander |
| Abstract: | Millions of villagers in Bangladesh are exposed to arsenic by drinking contaminated water from private wells. Testing for arsenic can encourage switching from unsafe wells to safer sources. This study describes results from a cluster randomized controlled trial conducted in 112 villages in Bangladesh to evaluate the effectiveness of different test selling schemes at inducing switching from unsafe wells. At a price of about USD0.60, only one in four households purchased a test. Sales were not increased by informal inter-household agreements to share water from wells found to be safe, or by visual reminders of well status in the form of metal placards mounted on the well pump. However, switching away from unsafe wells almost doubled in response to agreements or placards relative to the one in three proportion of households who switched away from an unsafe well with simple individual sales. |
| Date: | 2020–03–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9194&r=all |
| By: | Peter John Robinson; W.J.W. Botzen; F. Zhou |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the problem of “charity hazard†, which is the crowding out of private insurance demand by government compensation. In the context of flood insurance and disaster financing, charity hazard is particularly worrisome given current trends of increasing flood risks as a result of climate change and more people choosing to locate in high-risk areas. We conduct an experimental analysis of the influence on flood insurance demand of risk and ambiguity preferences and the availability of different forms of government compensation for disaster damage. Certain and risky government compensation crowd out demand, confirming charity hazard, but this is not observed for ambiguous compensation. Ambiguity averse subjects have higher insurance demand when government compensation is ambiguous relative to risky. Policy recommendations are discussed to overcome charity hazard |
| Keywords: | Ambiguity preferences, charity hazard;, economic experiment;, flood insurance demand, risk preferences |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:1919&r=all |
| By: | Alfarano, Simone; Banal-Estanol, Albert; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Iori, Giulia; Kapar, Burcu |
| Abstract: | This paper compares the performance of centralized and decentralized markets experimentally. We constrain trading exchanges to happen on an exogenously predetermined network, representing the trading relationships in markets with differing levels of connectivity. Our experimental results show that, despite having lower trading volumes, decentralized markets are not necessarily less efficient. Although information can propagate quicker through highly connected markets, we show that higher connectivity also induces informed traders to trade faster and exploit further their information advantages before the information becomes fully incorporated into prices. This not only reduces market efficiency, but it also increases wealth inequality. We show that, in more connected markets, informed traders trade not only relatively quicker, but also more, in the right direction, despite not doing it at better prices. |
| Keywords: | Experiments, financial markets, diffusion of information, decentralized trading. |
| JEL: | C92 D82 G14 |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:99129&r=all |
| By: | Patrick M. Kline; Christopher R. Walters |
| Abstract: | This paper develops methods for detecting discrimination by individual employers using correspondence experiments that send fictitious resumes to real job openings. We establish identification of higher moments of the distribution of job-level callback rates as a function of the number of resumes sent to each job and propose shape-constrained estimators of these moments. Applying our methods to three experimental datasets, we find striking job-level heterogeneity in the extent to which callback probabilities differ by race or sex. Estimates of higher moments reveal that while most jobs barely discriminate, a few discriminate heavily. These moment estimates are then used to bound the share of jobs that discriminate and the posterior probability that each individual job is engaged in discrimination. In a recent experiment manipulating racially distinctive names, we find that at least 85% of jobs that contact both of two white applications and neither of two black applications are engaged in discrimination. To assess the potential value of our methods for regulators, we consider the accuracy of decision rules for investigating suspicious callback behavior in various experimental designs under a simple two-type model that rationalizes the experimental data. Though we estimate that only 17% of employers discriminate on the basis of race, we find that an experiment sending 10 applications to each job would enable detection of 7-10% of discriminatory jobs while yielding Type I error rates below 0.2%. A minimax decision rule acknowledging partial identification of the distribution of callback rates yields only slightly fewer investigations than a Bayes decision rule based on the two-type model. These findings suggest illegal labor market discrimination can be reliably monitored with relatively small modifications to existing correspondence designs. |
| JEL: | C14 C44 C9 J7 J71 K31 K42 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26861&r=all |
| By: | Schutte, Sebastian; Ruhe, Constantin; Linke, Andrew |
| Abstract: | Armed conflicts frequently fuel tensions between groups. The underlying mechanisms remain understudied. The “cognitive perspective” of group identification offers a possible explanation, but is tacit on exact causal pathways. We predict that indiscriminate violence by armed actors induces fear of future attacks which in turn leads to prejudice, enhanced in-group cohesion, and calls for segregation. Selective violence that yields a lower probability of affecting bystanders does not contribute to fear and thereby does not foster prejudice, segregation, and cohesion. To test our predictions, we rely on large-scale, reimbursed, electronic panel surveys conducted in Nairobi and Mombasa during the violent Kenyan elections in the Summer of 2017. Relying on the same 2,109 respondents, we conducted interviews before, during, and after violence erupted. We find evidence for the predicted effects among Christians while accounting for individual and survey wave fixed effects and in an additional endorsement experiment. |
| Date: | 2020–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:kngq2&r=all |
| By: | Fortuna Casoria; Arno Riedl; Peter Werner |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews experimental studies that investigate the effects of communication on be-havior in organizational settings. Two main classes of studies are identified: (a) studies on coordination and competition, which include experimental research that tests whether com-munication can help to overcome coordination failure within organizations, and (b) studies that analyze the role of communication in alleviating problems arising from information asym-metries at the workplace. The evidence from these studies indicates that communication is suited to improve efficient coordination within firms and to mitigate information problems in employer-employee relationships. In addition, studies are presented that focus on the interac- tion between communication and monetary incentive schemes in companies. |
| Keywords: | communication, organization, experiment, behavior |
| JEL: | C90 D82 D83 J53 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8140&r=all |
| By: | Ashraf, Nava; Bandiera, Oriana; Lee, Scott |
| Abstract: | We embed a field experiment in a nationwide recruitment drive for a new healthcare position in Zambia to test whether career benefits attract talent at the expense of prosocial motivation. In line with common wisdom, offering career opportunities attracts less prosocial applicants. However, the trade-off only exists at low levels of talent; the marginal applicants in treatment are more talented and equally prosocial. These are hired, and perform better at every step of the causal chain: they provide more inputs, increase facility utilization, and improve health outcomes including a 25% decrease in child malnutrition. |
| JEL: | J24 O15 M54 D82 |
| Date: | 2019–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:101422&r=all |
| By: | Diogo Geraldes; Franziska Heinicke; Duk Gyoo Kim |
| Abstract: | Abstract |
| Keywords: | laboratory experiment, lying |
| JEL: | C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8142&r=all |
| By: | Marta Angelici; Paola Profeta |
| Abstract: | Does removing the constraints of time and place of work increase the utility of workers and firms? We design a randomized experiment on a sample of workers in a large Italian company: workers are randomly divided into a treated group that engages in flexible space and time job (which we call “smart-working”) one day per week for 9 months and a control group that continues to work traditionally. By comparing the treated and control workers, we find causal evidence that the flexibility of smart-working increases the productivity of workers and improves their well-being and work-life balance. We also observe that the effects are stronger for women and that there are no significant spillover effects within workers of a team. |
| Keywords: | randomized control trial, productivity, work-life balance, well-being |
| JEL: | J16 J22 J24 L20 M54 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8165&r=all |
| By: | Luigi Butera (CBS - Copenhagen Business School [Copenhagen]); Philip Grossman (Monash University [Melbourne]); Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University - George Mason University [Fairfax]); John List (University of Chicago); Marie Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social s ciences, arguing that a component of Fischer (1935)'s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. The importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, but researchers' incentives are not sufficient to encourage replications. We analyze a novel mechanism promoting replications through beneficial gains between scholars and editors. We highlight the tradeoffs involved in seeking independent replications before submission to journals, and demonstrate the operation of this method via an investigation of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on cooperation in public goods games, a pervasive but largely unexplored feature in the literature. |
| Keywords: | Replication,science,public goods,uncertainty,experiment |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02512932&r=all |
| By: | Antoine Billot (LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas); Sujoy Mukerji (QMUL - Queen Mary University of London); Jean-Marc Tallon (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | We review some of the (theoretical) economic implications of David Schmeidler's models of decision under uncertainty (Choquet expected utility and maxmin expected utility) in competitive market settings. We start with the portfolio inertia result of Dow and Werlang (1992), show how it does or does not generalize in an equilibrium setting. We further explore the equilibrium implications (indeterminacies, non revelation of information) of these decision models. A section is then devoted to the studies of Pareto optimal arrangements under these models. We conclude with a discussion of experimental evidence for these models that relate, in particular, to the implications for market behaviour discussed in the preceding sections. |
| Abstract: | Nous passons en revue les implications en termes d'allocation du risque des modèles de décision développés par David Schmeidler. Nous revenons sur le résultat d'inertie des portfeuilles de Dow et Werlang (1992) et discutons de l'extension du résultat dans un cadre d'équilibre. Nous procédons ensuite à une revue des propriétés d'équilibre (indétermination, non révélation d'information) liées à ces modèles. Nous exposons ensuite les propriétés d'optimalité et concluons avec une discussion de la littérature expérimentale sur le sujet.. |
| Keywords: | Maxmin Expected Utility,No-trade,Risk Sharing,Indeterminacy,Experimental evidence,Choquet Expected Utility,Espérance d'utilité à la Choquet,Minimum d'espérances d'utilité,absence d'échanges,partage du risque,indétermination,expériences |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02495663&r=all |
| By: | Ana Fernandes; Martin Huber; Giannina Vaccaro |
| Abstract: | Using a survey on wage expectations among students at two Swiss institutions of higher education, we examine the wage expectations of our respondents along two main lines. First, we investigate the rationality of wage expectations by comparing average expected wages from our sample with those of similar graduates; we further examine how our respondents revise their expectations when provided information about actual wages. Second, using causal mediation analysis, we test whether the consideration of a rich set of personal and professional controls, namely concerning family formation and children in addition to professional preferences, accounts for the difference in wage expectations across genders. We find that males and females overestimate their wages compared to actual ones, and that males respond in an overconfident manner to information about outside wages. Despite the attenuation of the gender difference in wage expectations brought about by the comprehensive set of controls, gender generally retains a significant direct, unexplained effect on wage expectations. |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2003.11496&r=all |
| By: | Iossa, Elisabetta; Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie; Rey, Patrick |
| Abstract: | Collusive schemes by suppliers often take the form of allocating customers or markets among cartel members. We analyze incentives for suppliers to initiate and sustain such a collusive schemes in a repeated procurement setting. We show that, contrary to some prevailing beliefs, staggered (versus synchronized) purchasing does not make collusion more difficult to sustain or initiate. Buyer defensive measures include synchronized rather than staggered purchasing, first-price rather than second-price auctions, more aggressive or secrete reserve prices, longer contract lengths, withholding information, and avoiding observable registration procedures. Inefficiency induced by defensive measures is an often unrecognized social cost of collusive conduct. |
| Keywords: | synchronized vs staggered purchasing; sustainability and initiation of collusion; coordinated effects |
| JEL: | D44 D82 L41 |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:124177&r=all |
| By: | Steven Glazerman; Ira Nichols-Barrer; Jon Valant; Jesse Chandler; Alyson Burnett |
| Abstract: | The authors conducted a randomized factorial experiment to determine how displaying school information to parents in different ways affects what schools they choose for their children in a hypothetical school district. |
| Keywords: | School choice, choice architecture, nudge, Bayesian hierarchical model, information experiment, factorial experiment |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:873f5fc0c2514949be63e5126c4b9f3f&r=all |
| By: | Cascino, Stefano |
| Abstract: | Barthelme et al. (2018) examine the real effects of pension accounting regulation and provide evidence consistent with the claim that recent changes in financial reporting rules affect pension asset allocation decisions. Their study offers an interesting opportunity to highlight the importance of evidence-based policymaking in the field of financial reporting. I discuss some empirical challenges that the authors face to causally identify the effects they examine to show how a closer cooperation between academia and regulators can enable researchers to overcome identification challenges and help produce even more policy-relevant research. |
| Keywords: | regulation; evidence-based policymaking; accounting standards; pension asset allocation; IAS 19R; real effects |
| JEL: | A11 G18 G30 G32 G38 K22 L51 M41 |
| Date: | 2018–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:90194&r=all |
| By: | Fischer, Sabine; Grosch, Kerstin |
| Abstract: | Contract compliance is key for economic growth. However, determinants affecting contract breach are not yet well understood. In this paper, we focus on contract situations with a potential hold-up problem, such as contract farming agreements which are prevalent in many developing countries. We examine if agents' payoff expectations serve as a reference point affecting (non-)compliant behavior by inducing a subjective loss when the agent compares the realized payoff and the expected payoff from the contract. Results from our lab experiment in Ghana indicate that overconfident agents, i.e., agents with relatively high payoff expectations, breach more often than underconfident agents, i.e., agents with relatively low payoff expectations. Moreover, more pronounced individual loss aversion amplies the effect of subjective losses on contract breach. In a treatment, we manipulate agent's overestimation exogenously and use it as an instrument to demonstrate that the reported effectects are causal. |
| Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
| Date: | 2020–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:gagfdp:302641&r=all |
| By: | Cerulli, Giovanni |
| Abstract: | We present a Super-Learning Machine (SLM) to predict economic outcomes which improves prediction (i) by cross-validated optimal tuning, (ii) by comparing/combining results from different learners. Our application to a labor economics dataset shows that different learners may behave differently. However, combining learners into one singleton super-learner proves to preserve good predictive accuracy lowering the variance more than stand-alone approaches. |
| Keywords: | Machine learning; Ensemble methods; Optimal prediction |
| JEL: | C53 C61 C63 |
| Date: | 2020–03–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:99111&r=all |
| By: | Einhorn, Laura |
| Abstract: | Studies from various disciplines show that including more meat-free dishes in our diets benefits our environment and our health while also promoting animal welfare. However, little is known about what encourages the adoption of more meat-free meal choices into our everyday diets. This paper focuses on the role of normative social influence on food choice as a potential answer to this question. In a real-world setting and based on the combination of a field and a survey experiment in seven German university dining halls, I analyze the impact of social norms on meat consumption in a single meal choice situation. I distinguish between descriptive and injunctive norms as well as between remote and direct norms. In a first step, descriptive and injunctive remote norm message interventions promoting a vegetarian diet were implemented. In a second step, the influence of direct social norms, i.e., the influence of vegetarian peers on non-vegetarians' meal choice, was assessed. I find that neither type of remote eating norm influences food choice, while direct normative influence leads to convergence towards vegetarian meal choices in a university setting. I summarize the implications of these findings, discuss their limitations, and point to directions for future research. |
| Keywords: | descriptive norms,field experiment,food choice,injunctive norms,meat consumption,social influence,vegetarianism,deskriptive Normen,Ernährung,Feldexperiment,Fleischkonsum,präskriptive Normen,soziale Normen,Vegetarismus |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:201&r=all |
| By: | Rohit Ticku (Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics and Society, Chapman University); Raghul S. Venkatesh (University of Aix-Marseille) |
| Abstract: | We study how identity politics determines clientelism and provision of public goods in representative democracies. Parties cultivate vote banks—a group of voters who vote along identity lines — in exchange for clientelistic transfers, and provide public goods to nonpartisan voters. There is ex-post identity formation among non-partisans that depends on the party in power. This generates an asymmetry in ex-post conflict payoff for the majority identity. The main theoretical result proposes a new mechanism for clientelism and rent seeking that is driven by identity politics. We further show that asymmetry in identity payoffs i) increases investment in conflict when the party with the support of minorities wins; and ii) increases public goods provision by both parties when income of minorities is below a threshold. We provide empirical evidence from state level elections in India for the period from 1983 till 2000. Results show that identity conflict is more intense when the party with minority identity vote bank is in power. This effect is magnified by the income of minorities. Further, provision of public goods under the party with minority vote bank increases with asymmetry in identity payoffs. |
| Keywords: | Identity Politics; Clientalism; Inter-group Conflict; Public Goods |
| JEL: | D0 H0 H4 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:201-3&r=all |