|
on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Kopanyi-Peuker, Anita; Weber, Matthias |
| Abstract: | We study the role of experience in the formation of asset price bubbles. Therefore, we conduct two related experiments. One is a call market experiment in which participants trade assets with each other. The other is a learning-to-forecast experiment in which participants only forecast future prices, while the trade, which is based on these forecasts, is computerized. Each experiment comprises three treatments that vary the amount of information about the fundamental value that participants receive. Each market is repeated three times. In both experiments and in all treatments, we observe sizable bubbles. These bubbles do not disappear with experience. Our findings in the call market experiment stand in contrast to the literature. Our findings in the learning- to-forecast experiment are novel. Interestingly, the shape of the bubbles is different between the two experiments. We observe flat bubbles in the call market experiment and boom-and-bust cycles in the learning-to-forecast experiment. |
| Date: | 2018–12–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:ecj7q&r=all |
| By: | Kate Ambler (International Food Policy Research Institute); Susan Godlonton (Williams College); María P. Recalde (The University of Melbourne) |
| Abstract: | We conduct an artefactual field experiment with farmers in endogenously formed groups in rural Malawi to investigate social influence in risk taking. Our experiment minimizes influence through social learning and social image channels. Treatments vary whether individuals observe the behavior of a formally elected leader, an external leader, or a random peer. Results show that peers are most influential, followed by formal leaders, and then external leaders. Exploratory analysis suggests that farmers follow peers because they extract information from their choices and share risks with them; while other forms of social utility are gained from following the example of leaders. |
| Keywords: | peer effects, risk taking, lab-in-the-field, agriculture, Malawi |
| JEL: | C9 D8 O13 Q12 |
| Date: | 2019–11–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2019-24&r=all |
| By: | Kirk, H. |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relative role of religion in trust networks and proposes a model of the interaction between material payoffs and norm-dependent utility, permitting cooperative equilibria. Four influences on decision-making - believing in religion, stereotyping, belonging to a group, and priming - are tested in the laboratory, using an adapted trust game. The experimental design builds on a classic trust game but reveals characteristics of Responders and Proposers in multiple rounds, better aligning with societal interactions where both parties condition actions and reactions on available information. Religious individuals are both more trusting and trusted; stereotyped trust is a rational strategy. A Cambridge University sample provides unique collegiate affiliation confirming that dense secular networks equally but less intensely promote trust. |
| Keywords: | Decision-Making, Trust, Reciprocity, Religiosity, Design of Experiments, Group Affiliation |
| JEL: | C9 D03 D91 Z12 Z13 |
| Date: | 2019–11–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1995&r=all |
| By: | Elvis Cheng Xu (Nottingham University Business School China) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a field trust game under a natural experiment context to test the impacts of urbanisation on trust. We conjecture that urbanisation, defined in this context as the process of state-led rural-urban migration, contributes to a transformation of trust levels among co-villagers and towards outsiders. We test this conjecture in an experimental approach and more generally, examine whether the urbanisation will produce significant impacts on in-group trust and out-group trust. The research finds that urbanisation does not decrease significantly the trust towards co-villagers, meaning the in-group trust did not change statistically significantly. However, the trust towards outsiders does increase as a result of the state-led urbanisation. We also run a regression on the trust exhibited towards participants in the experiment and found the partial effect of whether they are co-villagers or outsiders weakens as a result of the urbanisation, and therefore conclude urbanisation decreases out-group discrimination in trust. |
| Keywords: | Urbanisation, Trust, Field Experiment |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2019-10&r=all |
| By: | Pietro Battiston; Sharon G. Harrison |
| Abstract: | Models with sunspot equilibria have long been a topic of interest among economists. It then becomes an interesting question to ask whether there is empirical support for their existence. One approach to answer this question is through lab experiments. Such equilibria have been successfully reproduced in the lab, but little is known about their determinants and, most importantly, about their convergence dynamics: when, and how, do individuals assign a coordination role to signals which are publicly known to have no fundamental value? In order to answer this question, we run a laboratory experiment in which individuals are connected through a network, and each of them directly observes the actions of her neighbors as well as aggregated information. By manipulating both the type of information available and the structure of the network, we study the extent to which players are able to converge, and how convergence happens over time. We show that general information about other players' behavior hinders coordination, while information specifically related to the sunspot enhances it. |
| Keywords: | sunspot equilibrium, laboratory experiment, coordination, social networks, communication. |
| JEL: | C92 D81 D85 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:422&r=all |
| By: | Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Adrian Calmettes (SSSUP - Scuola Universitaria Superiore Sant'Anna - Istituto di Tecnologie della Comunicazione, dell'Informazione e della Percezione (Istituto TeCIP)) |
| Abstract: | Quantum-like decision theory is by now a theoretically well-developed field (see e.g., Danilov et al. 2018A). We here test the predictions of an application of this approach to persuasion. One remarkable result entails that in contrast to Bayesian persuasion, distraction rather than relevant information has a powerful potential to influence decision-making. We first provide a quantum decision model for a choice between two uncertain alternatives. We derive the impact of persuasion by means of distractive questions and contrast them with the predictions of the Bayesian model. Next, we conduct an experiment where respondents choose between supporting either one of two projects to save endangered species. We test the impact of persuasion in the form of questions related to different aspects of the uncertain value of the two projects. The experiment involves 900 respondents divided into three groups: a control group, a first treatment group and the distraction treatment group. Our main result is that, in accordance with the predictions of quantum persuasion but in violation with the Bayesian model, distraction significantly affects decision-making. Population variables play no role. Some significant variations between subgroups are exhibited and discussed. The results of the experiment provide support for the hypothesis that the manipulability of people's decision-making can be explained by the quantum indeterminacy of their subjective representations of reality. |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02146862&r=all |
| By: | Priebe, Jan; Rink, Ute; Stemmler, Henry |
| Abstract: | This paper looks at individual risk behavior and disability in Vietnam, where many households live with a disabled family member. Due to the Vietnam war, disability is a common phenomenon and shapes individuals’ daily life and decision making. Using longitudinal data of 2200 households in Vietnam and an instrumental variable strategy, we show that individuals who live with a disabled family member are more risk averse than others. In addition we employ field experiments and psychological primes to elicit risk and loss behavior of individuals living in the Vietnam province Ha-Thinh. The experimental results, underpin our panel results. We show in addition that a negative recollection of health issues, leads to a lower risk attitude of individuals who do not live with a disabled family member and that individuals who live with a disabled family member are less loss averse. Our findings are causal and contribute to existing studies showing that households who are characterized by higher backward risks are more risk averse than others. |
| Keywords: | Risk, Disability, Vietnam |
| JEL: | D1 I14 Z1 |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tvs:wpaper:wp-015&r=all |
| By: | Maria Montero (University of Nottingham, School of Economics); Jesal Sheth (University of Nottingham, School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The unravelling prediction of disclosure theory relies on the idea that strategic forces lead firms (information senders) to voluntarily disclose information about the quality of their products provided the information disclosed is verifiable and the costs of disclosure are negligible. This theoretical prediction requires that consumers (information receivers) hold correct beliefs about non-disclosed information and, in equilibrium, treat all non-disclosed information with extreme scepticism. Previous research finds that receivers are insufficiently sceptical, or in other words are naive, about non-disclosed information, which leads to the failure of unravelling. This paper examines the extent to which naivety responds systematically to features of the decision environment, namely the availability of opportunities to communicate with others (Consultation treatment) and the context of the experimental setting (Context treatment, based on hygiene ratings). We find that complete unravelling fails to occur in all our treatments. Receiver’s beliefs and guesses about non-disclosed information are similar across the Consultation and Context treatments relative to the Baseline implying that naivety about hidden information is a robust phenomenon. We also find that senders are partly to blame for the lack of unravelling, as intermediate types would gain from disclosing more often given the observed receiver behaviour. |
| Keywords: | Consultation, Context, Laboratory Experiment, Verifiable Information Disclosure |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2019-11&r=all |
| By: | Amalia R. Miller (University of Virginia, IZA and NBER); Ragan Petrie (Texas A&M University, Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne); Carmit Segal (University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a novel field experiment to test the implicit prediction of tournament theory that competition increases work time and can therefore contribute to the long work hours required in elite occupations. A majority of workers in the treatment without explicit financial incentives worked past the minimum time, but awarding a tournament prize increased work time and effort by over 80% and lowered costs of effort or output by over a third. Effort was similar with alternative (piece rate, low-prize tournament) bonuses. Men worked longer than women in the high-prize tournament, but for the same duration in other treatments. |
| Keywords: | tournaments, performance pay, long work hours, elite occupations, gender |
| JEL: | M52 M55 J16 J22 J33 J44 D91 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2019n14&r=all |
| By: | Avery, Mallory (University of Pittsburgh); Giuntella, Osea (University of Pittsburgh); Jiao, Peiran (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | Sleep deprivation is a risky behavior prevalent in modern societies, leading to negative health and economic consequences. However, we know little about why people decide to sleep less than the recommended number of hours. This study investigates the mechanisms affecting sleep choice and explores whether commitment devices and monetary incentives can be used to promote healthier sleep habits. Toward this end, we conducted a field experiment with college students, providing them incentives to sleep, and collected data from wearable activity trackers, surveys, and time-use diaries. Our results are consistent with sophisticated time-inconsistent preferences and overconfidence. The subjects in the treatment group responded to the monetary incentives by significantly increasing the likelihood of sleeping between 7 and 9 hours (+19%). We uncover evidence of demand for commitment. Overall, 63% of our subjects were sophisticated enough to take up commitment, and commitment improved sleep for the less overconfident among them. Using time-use diaries, we show that during the intervention, there was a reduction in screen time near bedtime (-48%). Subjects in the treatment group were less likely to report insufficient sleep than at baseline even after removal of the incentive (-16%), which is consistent with habit formation. Finally, our treatment also had positive (albeit small) effects on health and academic outcomes. |
| Keywords: | sleep, health behaviors, sophistication, present bias, habit formation, incentives |
| JEL: | B49 C93 I1 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12772&r=all |
| By: | Aurélien Nioche (School of Electrical Engineering [Aalto] - Aalto University); Basile Garcia (IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod - Département de Philosophie - ENS Paris - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - DEC - Département d'Etudes Cognitives - ENS Paris - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris); Germain Lefebvre (Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives Computationnelles - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale); Thomas Boraud (IMN - Institut des Maladies Neurodégénératives [Bordeaux] - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nicolas Rougier (Mnemosyne - Mnemonic Synergy - LaBRI - Laboratoire Bordelais de Recherche en Informatique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - École Nationale Supérieure d'Électronique, Informatique et Radiocommunications de Bordeaux (ENSEIRB) - Université Sciences et Technologies - Bordeaux 1 - Université Bordeaux Segalen - Bordeaux 2 - Inria Bordeaux - Sud-Ouest - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IMN - Institut des Maladies Neurodégénératives [Bordeaux] - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde (IJN - Institut Jean-Nicod - Département de Philosophie - ENS Paris - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - DEC - Département d'Etudes Cognitives - ENS Paris - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris) |
| Abstract: | Several micro-founded macroeconomic models with rational expectations address the issue of money emergence, by characterizing it as a coordination game. ese models have in common the use of agents who dispose of perfect or near-perfect information on the global state of the economy and who display full-edged computational abilities. Several experimental studies have shown that a simple trial-and-error learning process could constitute an explanation for how agents coordinate on a single mean of exchange (Brown, 1996; Du y, 2001; Kindler et al., 2017; Lefebvre et al., 2018). However, these studies provide subjects with full information regarding the state of the economy while restricting the number of goods in circulation to three. In this study, by the mean of multi-agent simulations and human experiments, we test the hypothesis according to which coordination over a unique medium of exchange is possible in the context of information scarcity. In our experimental design, subjects and arti cial agents are only aware of the outcome of their own decisions. We provide results for economies with 3 and 4 goods to evaluate to which extent it is possible to generalize results obtained with 3 goods to n goods. Our ndings show that in an economyà la Iwai (1996), commodity money can emerge under drastic information restrictions with 3 goods in circulation, but generalization to 4 or more goods is not guaranteed. |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02356248&r=all |
| By: | Tremblay, Ethan; Hupper, Afton; Waring, Timothy |
| Abstract: | Cooperatives as can be presumed to rely on the economic cooperation of their members. However, game-theoretic and institutional models suggest that cooperatives may be inherently fragile due to the individual costs of cooperation. Because of this it is widely believed that organizations which rely less on cooperation may be more stable, while organizations that require cooperation may be at higher risk of folding. Therefore, if cooperatively owned or managed businesses do in fact require higher levels of prosocial and cooperative behavior than hierarchically managed firms, they must attract and maintain cooperation among participants in order to function. We hypothesized that successful consumer food cooperatives will exhibit greater generalized cooperation than conventional grocery stores. We employed an experimental dictator game to measure altruistic cooperation among consumers at a food cooperative and a comparable conventional grocery. Cooperative customers exhibit a higher base rate of cooperation than similar conventional food shoppers, and this relationship holds even when taking demographic factors such as income, education, and age into account. We conclude that, when successful, consumer food cooperatives exhibit greater levels of cooperation than comparable traditional businesses. |
| Date: | 2019–01–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:6x9p3&r=all |
| By: | Farjam, Mike; Nikolaychuk, Olexandr; Bravo, Giangiacomo |
| Abstract: | So far, there has been mixed evidence in the literature regarding the relation between environmental attitudes and actual ``green'' actions, something known as attitude-behavior gap. This raises the question of when attitudes can actually work as a lever to promote environmental objectives, such as climate change mitigation, and, conversely, when other factors would be more effective. We tested the effect of environmental attitudes on behavior in an online experiment with real money at stake and real-world consequences. We found that environmental attitudes affected behavior in low-cost situations while increasing contribution costs generally reduced their effect. This finding is consistent with the low-cost hypothesis of environmental behavior and has important consequences for the design of more effective climate policies in a democratic context. |
| Date: | 2019–03–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:5wxrs&r=all |
| By: | Roberto Galbiati (OSC - Observatoire sociologique du changement - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Emeric Henry (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | How does the exposure to past institutions affect current cooperation? While a growing literature focuses on behavioral channels, we show how cooperation-enforcing institutions affect rational learning about the group's value. Strong institutions, by inducing members to cooperate , may hinder learning about intrinsic values in the group. We show, using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, that participants behave in accordance with a learning model, and in particular react differently to actions of past partners whether they were played in an environment with coercive enforcement or not. |
| Keywords: | Enforcement,social values,cooperation,learning,spillovers,persistence of insti- tutions,repeated games,experiments |
| Date: | 2019–06–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02145486&r=all |
| By: | Marco Angrisani (USC - University of Southern California); Antonio Guarino (UCL - University College of London [London]); Philippe Jehiel (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics, UCL - University College of London [London]); Toru Kitagawa (UCL - University College of London [London]) |
| Abstract: | We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium prediction and the predictions of bounded rationality models of decision making: the redundancy of information neglect model and the overconfidence model. The results of our experiment are in line with the predictions of the overconfidence model and at odds with the others'. |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02183322&r=all |
| By: | Matthias Weber; John Duffy; Arthur Schram |
| Abstract: | Credit default swaps (CDS) played an important role in the financial crisis of 2008. While CDS can be used to hedge risks, they can also be used for speculative purposes (as occured during the financial crisis) and regulations have been proposed to limit such speculative use. Here, we provide the first controlled experiment analyzing the pricing of credit default swaps in a bond market subject to default risk. We further use the laboratory as a testbed to analyze CDS regulation. Our results show that the regulation achieves the goal of increasing the use of CDS for hedging purposes while reducing the use of CDS for speculation. This success does not come at the expense of lower bond IPO revenues and does not negatively affect CDS prices or bond prices in the secondary market. |
| Keywords: | Experimental finance, asset market experiment, CDS, financial regulation, behavioral finance |
| JEL: | C92 D53 |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:sfwpfi:2019:05&r=all |
| By: | Zamora, Paula; Mantilla, Cesar; Blanco, Mariana |
| Abstract: | We conducted an audit experiment to examine whether street vendors in Bogotá (Colombia) exert price discrimination based on buyers' attributes, such as gender and nationality; and based on product characteristics, such as the increasing marginal valuation of items needed to complete a collection. We exploited the seasonal demand for album stickers related to the FIFA World Cup Russia 2018. In our within-subjects design, experimenters carried out in-person audits and quoted a pre-determined list of missing stickers. They interacted with 59 sticker vendors located in five geographic clusters. We find that prices quoted to foreign buyers are higher than prices quoted to Colombian buyers. By contrast, we do not find evidence supporting direct gender-based discrimination, neither that vendors charge a higher price per sticker when the list of missing stickers is shorter. We complement the study with a qualitative analysis based on interviews that reveal vendors' pricing strategies, their awareness of price discrimination, and the trade of counterfeits. |
| Date: | 2019–07–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:6r5hf&r=all |
| By: | Blattman, Chris; Franklin, Simon; Dercon, Stefan |
| Abstract: | We study two interventions for underemployed youth across five Ethiopian sites: a $300 grant to spur self-employment, and a job offer to an industrial firm. Despite significant impacts on occupational choice, income, and health in the first year, after five years we see nearly complete convergence across all groups and outcomes. Short run increases in productivity and earnings from the grant dissipate as recipients exit their micro-enterprises. Adverse effects of factory work on health found after one year also appear to be temporary. These results suggest that one-time and one-dimensional interventions may struggle to overcome barriers to wage- or self-employment. |
| Date: | 2019–04–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:zrqe4&r=all |
| By: | Anders Poulsen (University of East Anglia); Graciela Zevallos-Porles (University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of endogenous ex-post information acquisition on lying behavior and beliefs in a Sender-Receiver game. After choosing an action, the Receiver can decide to find out if the Sender lied or not. We observe that a significant proportion of Receivers decide to become informed, even when this information is costly. There is, however, no impact of the option of information acquisition on Sender behavior, and no evidence of Senders being shame averse. |
| Keywords: | Sender-Receiver Games; Endogenous Ex-Post Information Acquisition; Shame Aversion. |
| JEL: | C91 D63 D82 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:19-04&r=all |
| By: | Hanna Fromell (University of Groningen); Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham, School of Economics & Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER)); Trudy Owens (University of Nottingham, School of Economics); Fabio Tufano (University of Nottingham, School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We measure the social norms of sharing income with kin and neighbors in villages in Kenya. We find a plurality of norms: from a strict norm prohibiting wealth accumulation to a norm facilitating saving. Several individual and social network characteristics predict the norms upheld; the pro-saving norm becomes majoritarian when an individual can conceal their income from kin and neighbors. Whether income secrecy facilitates savings depends on the type of norm individuals uphold: stricter norm supporters are helped by secrecy, pro-saving norm supporters are harmed. This highlights the importance of measuring social norms when devising pro-saving policy interventions. |
| Keywords: | Sharing norms; forced solidarity; social pressure; savings; social norms; KrupkaWeber method; lab-in-the-field experiment |
| Date: | 2019–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2019-12&r=all |
| By: | Marco Cipriani; Ana Fostel; Daniel Houser |
| Abstract: | We study default and endogenous leverage in the laboratory. To this purpose, we develop a general equilibrium model of collateralized borrowing amenable to laboratory implementation and gather experimental data. In the model, leverage is endogenous: agents choose how much to borrow using a risky asset as collateral, and there are no ad-hoc collateral constraints. When the risky asset is financial, namely, its payoff does not depend on ownership (such as a bonds), collateral requirements are high and there is no default. In contrast, when the risky asset is non-financial, namely, its payoff depends on ownership (such as a firm), collateral requirements are lower and default occurs. The experimental outcomes are in line with the theory's main predictions. The type of collateral, whether financial or not, matters. Default rates and loss from default are higher when the risky asset is non-financial, stemming from laxer collateral requirements. Default rates and collateral requirements are closer to the theoretical predictions as the experiment progresses. |
| JEL: | A10 C90 D52 D53 G10 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26469&r=all |
| By: | Neyt, Brecht (Ghent University); Baert, Stijn (Ghent University); Vynckier, Jana (Ghent University) |
| Abstract: | Research exploiting data on classic (offline) couple formation has confirmed predictions from evolutionary psychology in a sense that males attach more value to attractiveness and women attach more value to earnings potential. We examine whether these human partner preferences survive in a context of fewer search and social frictions. We do this by means of a field experiment on the mobile dating app Tinder, which takes a central place in contemporary couple formation. Thirty-two fictitious Tinder profiles that randomly differ in job status and job prestige are evaluated by 4,800 other, real users. We find that both males and females do not use job status or job prestige as a determinant of whom to show initial interest in on Tinder. However, we do see evidence that, after this initial phase, males less frequently begin a conversation with females when those females are unemployed but also then do not care about the particular job prestige of employed females. |
| Keywords: | job prestige, partner preferences, dating apps, online dating, Tinder |
| JEL: | J12 J16 J13 C93 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12746&r=all |
| By: | Antoine Billot (LEMMA - Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas - Sorbonne Universités); Jean-Marc Tallon (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Sujoy Mukerji (QMUL - Queen Mary University of London) |
| Abstract: | We review some of the (theoretical) economic implications of David Schmeidler's models of decision under uncertainty (Choquet expected utility and maxmin expected utility) in competitive market settings. We start with the portfolio inertia result of Dow and Werlang (1992), show how it does or does not generalize in an equilibrium setting. We further explore the equilibrium implications (indeterminacies, non revelation of information) of these decision models. A section is then devoted to the studies of Pareto optimal arrangements under these models. We conclude with a discussion of experimental evidence for these models that relate, in particular, to the implications for market behaviour discussed in the preceding sections. |
| Keywords: | Choquet Expected Utility,Maxmin Expected Utility,No-trade,Risk Sharing,Indeterminacy,Experimental evidence |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02173491&r=all |
| By: | Antoine Billot (Lemma, Université Panthéon-Assas); Sujoy Mukerji (Queen Mary University of London); Jean-Marc Tallon (Paris School of Economics, CNRS) |
| Abstract: | We review some of the (theoretical) economic implications of David Schmeidler's models of decision under uncertainty (Choquet expected utility and maxmin expected utility) in competitive market settings. We start with the portfolio inertia result of Dow and Werlang (1992), show how it does or does not generalize in an equilibrium setting. We further explore the equilibrium implications (indeterminacies, non revelation of information) of these decision models. A section is then devoted to the studies of Pareto optimal arrangements under these models. We conclude with a discussion of experimental evidence for these models that relate, in particular, to the implications for market behaviour discussed in the preceding sections. |
| Keywords: | Choquet Expected Utility; Maxmin Expected Utility; No-trade; Risk Sharing; Indeterminacy; Experimental evidence |
| JEL: | D81 |
| Date: | 2019–10–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:897&r=all |
| By: | Blattman, Chris; Fiala, Nathan; Martinez, Sebastian |
| Abstract: | There is growing enthusiasm for cash grants as a tool to tackle poverty globally, but we have little sense whether the promising short-run impacts persist in the long term. In 2008, Uganda gave $400/person to thousands of young people, to help them start skilled trades. Four years on, an experimental evaluation found grants raised earnings by 38% (Blattman, Fiala, Martinez 2014). We return after 9 years to find these start-up grants raised earnings and consumption temporarily only. Grantees’ investment leveled off; controls eventually increased their incomes through business and casual labor; and so both groups converged in employment, earnings, and consumption. Grants had lasting impacts on assets, skilled work, and possibly child health, but had little effect on mortality, fertility, health or education. |
| Date: | 2019–04–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:vctuh&r=all |
| By: | Hirschauer, Norbert; Gruener, Sven; Mußhoff, Oliver; Becker, Claudia |
| Abstract: | Replication crisis and debates about p-values have raised doubts about what we can statistically infer from research findings, both in experimental and observational studies. The goal of this paper is to provide an adequate differentiation of experimental studies that enables researchers to better understand which inferences can and – perhaps more important – cannot be made from particular designs. |
| Date: | 2019–01–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:67mws&r=all |
| By: | Ngo-Hoang, Dai-Long |
| Abstract: | ‘Ethics’ is a branch of philosophy which examines the concepts of right and wrong. A journal will likely refuse to publish research, or writing, which they feel are not to an acceptable ethical standard. Ethics in science publishing refers to both the experiment and the written account. In terms of the experiment, publishers want to know that the researcher did not mistreat animals or human beings during the course of the study. Further to this, the writing is expected to be a truthful and honest account of the experiment. Finally, authors are expected to uphold a high standard of ethics by abstaining from any form of plagiarism. Interestingly, the United States National Academies begins their third edition of On Being a Scientist: A Guide to Responsible Conduct in Research with the statement, “The scientific enterprise is built on a foundation of trust” (2009). Not factual information, but trust that the information is indeed factual. |
| Date: | 2019–04–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:agrixi:qmd3y&r=all |
| By: | Mauersberger, Felix; Nagel, Rosemarie; Bühren, Christoph |
| Abstract: | The goal of this paper is to show how adding behavioral components to micro-foundated models of macroeconomics may contribute to a better understanding of real world phenomena. The authors introduce the reader to variations of the Keynesian Beauty Contest (Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, 1936), theoretically and experimentally with a descriptive model of behavior. They bridge the discrepancies of (benchmark) solution concepts and bounded rationality through step-level reasoning, the so-called level-k or cognitive hierarchy models. These models have been recently used as building blocks for new behavioral macro theories to understand puzzles like the lacking rise of inflation after the financial crisis, the effectiveness of quantitative easing, the forward guidance puzzle and the effectiveness of temporary fiscal expansion. |
| Keywords: | beauty contest game,expectation formation,equilibration,level-k reasoning,macroeconomics,game theory,experimental economics |
| JEL: | E12 E13 D80 D9 C91 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201953&r=all |
| By: | Hager, Anselm (University of Konstanz); Hensel, Lukas (University of Oxford); Hermle, Johannes (University of California, Berkeley); Roth, Christopher (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | How does a citizen's decision to participate in political activism depend on the participation of others? We examine this core question of collective action in a nation-wide natural field experiment in collaboration with a major European party during a recent national election. In a seemingly unrelated party survey, we randomly assign canvassers to true information about the canvassing intentions of their peers. Using survey evidence and behavioral data from the party's smartphone canvassing application, we find that treated canvassers significantly reduce both their canvassing intentions and behavior when learning that their peers participate more in canvassing than previously believed. These treatment effects are particularly large for supporters who have weaker social ties to the party, and for supporters with higher career concerns within the party. The evidence implies that effort choices of political activists are, on average, strategic substitutes. However, social ties to other activists can act as a force for strategic complementarity. |
| Keywords: | political activism, natural field experiment, strategic behavior, beliefs |
| JEL: | D8 P16 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12759&r=all |
| By: | Philippe Jehiel (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics, UCL - University College of London [London]); Juni Singh (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Keywords: | Ambiguity,Bounded Rationality,Experiment,Learning,Coarse feedback,Valuation equilibrium |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02183444&r=all |
| By: | James J. Heckman; Tomáš Jagelka; Timothy D. Kautz |
| Abstract: | This paper synthesizes recent research in economics and psychology on the measurement and empirical importance of personality skills and preferences. They predict and cause important life outcomes such as wages, health, and longevity. Skills develop over the life cycle and can be enhanced by education, parenting, and environmental influences to different degrees at different ages. Economic analysis clarifies psychological studies by establishing that personality is measured by performance on tasks which depends on incentives and multiple skills. Identification of any single skill therefore requires isolation of confounding factors, accounting for measurement error using rich data and application of appropriate statistical techniques. Skills can be inferred not only by questionnaires and experiments but also from observed behavior. Economists advance the analysis of human differences by providing anchored measures of economic preferences and studying their links to personality and cognitive skills. Connecting the research from the two disciplines promotes understanding of the number and nature of skills and preferences required to characterize essential differences. |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D12 D9 D91 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26459&r=all |