|
on Experimental Economics |
|
Issue of 2019‒10‒21
thirty-two papers chosen by |
| By: | Bharat Chandar; Ali Hortacsu; John List; Ian Muir; Jeffrey Wooldridge |
| Abstract: | Field experiments conducted with the village, city, state, region, or even country as the unit of randomization are becoming commonplace in the social sciences. While convenient, subsequent data analysis may be complicated by the constraint on the number of clusters in treatment and control. Through a battery of Monte Carlo simulations, we examine best practices for estimating unit-level treatment effects in cluster-randomized field experiments, particularly in settings that generate short panel data. In most settings we consider, unit-level estimation with unit fixed effects and cluster-level estimation weighted by the number of units per cluster tend to be robust to potentially problematic features in the data while giving greater statistical power. Using insights from our analysis, we evaluate the effect of a unique field experiment: a nationwide tipping field experiment across markets on the Uber app. Beyond the import of showing how tipping affects aggregate outcomes, we provide several insights on aspects of generating and analyzing cluster-randomized experimental data when there are constraints on the number of experimental units in treatment and control. |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00681&r=all |
| By: | Takanori IDA; Ryo OKUI |
| Abstract: | In this study, we examine how information provision a ects the degree of overcon dence using an online experiment. The 4,210 experimental participants engaged in stock market prediction exercises in 2014 were asked to evaluate their absolute and relative performance. We conducted a randomized controlled trial such that randomly selected participants obtained information about their own performance and/or the distribution of others' performances before evaluating their performances. We nd that while participants exhibit overcon dence bias, this can be alleviated by information provision and that the e ect of the elimination of overcon dence is stronger when only partial information, rather than complete information, is provided. Further, we show that the mere provision of information, even if it is consistent with prior beliefs, decreases the degree of overcon dence. |
| Keywords: | Overcon dence, information provision, randomized controlled trial, online experiment, stock market prediction. |
| JEL: | C91 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kue:epaper:e-19-005&r=all |
| By: | Pierrot, Thibaud |
| Abstract: | An individual is affected by the curse of knowledge when he fails to appreciate the viewpoint of a lesser-informed agent. In contrast to a rational person, the cursed individual behaves as if part of his private information were common knowledge. This systematic cognitive bias alters many predictions derived from game theory which involve an asymmetry of information between the players. We investigate in this article how the curse of knowledge modifies individual behaviours in negotiation situations. We report the results of a laboratory experiment that was designed to isolate the effect of the curse of knowledge by varying the information available to the players ceteris paribus. Our analysis of the expectations and choices of subjects playing the ultimatum game in different information settings indicates that the curse of knowledge can lead to an increase of impasses in the negotiation and partially explains empirically observed phenomenons such as abnormally high rates of bargaining failures. Unlike previous behavioural research, that is mostly based on motivated beliefs and actions, this work provides a purely nonstrategic explanation for negotiation impasses observed in many real life situations. |
| Keywords: | curse of knowledge,hindsight bias,negotiation,experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D80 D82 D83 D84 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2019211&r=all |
| By: | Butschek, Sebastian (University of Cologne); González Amor, Roberto (Zalon by Zalando); Kampkötter, Patrick (University of Tübingen); Sliwka, Dirk (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We study the performance effects of payment schemes for freelancers offering services on an online platform in an RCT. Under the initial scheme, the firm pays workers a pure sales commission. The intervention reduces the commission rate and adds a fixed payment per processed order to insure workers against earnings risk. Our experiment tests predictions from a formal model on labor supply and performance for individuals with different degrees of risk aversion and intrinsic motivation for the task. The treatment did not affect labor supply and even though the commission rate was reduced by 50% we find no sizeable loss in sales per order. However, there is strong evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects. The treatment reduced performance for less intrinsically motivated workers. For more intrinsically motivated workers, however, we observe the opposite pattern as performance increased even though commission rates were reduced. |
| Keywords: | incentives, risk aversion, intrinsic motivation, sales compensation, multitasking, field experiment, gig economy, on demand economy, platform economy |
| JEL: | D23 J33 M52 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12667&r=all |
| By: | Luciano Andreozzi (Department of Economics, University of Trento); Matteo Ploner (Department of Economics, University of Trento); Ali Seyhun Saral (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | An often-replicated result in the experimental literature on social dilemmas is that a large share of subjects reveal conditionally cooperative preferences. Cooperation generated by this type of preferences is notoriously unstable, as individuals reduce their contributions to the public good in reaction to other subjects free-riding. This has led to the widely-shared conclusion that cooperation observed in experiments (and its collapse) is mostly driven by imperfect reciprocity. In this study, we explore the possibility that reciprocally cooperative preferences may themselves be unstable. We do so by observing the evolution of subjects’ preferences in an anonymously repeated social dilemma. Our results show that a significant fraction of reciprocally cooperative subjects become selfish in the course of the experiment, while the reverse is rarely observed. We are thus driven to the conclusion that egoism is more resistant to exposure to social dilemmas than reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | reciprocity, conditional cooperation, strategy method |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2019_12&r=all |
| By: | Paolo Crosetto (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes, INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique); Antonio Filippin (University of Milan); Katuščák Peter (RWTH Aachen University); John Smith (Rutgers University [Camden] - Rutgers - Rutgers University System) |
| Abstract: | We conduct an experiment in which subjects participate in a first-price auction against an automaton that bids randomly in a given range. The subjects first place a bid in the auction. They are then given an incentivized elicitation of their beliefs of the opponent's bid. Despite having been told that the bid of the opponent was drawn from a uniform distribution, we find that most of the subjects report beliefs that have a peak in the interior of the range. The result is robust across seven different experimental treatments. While not expected at the outset, these single-peaked beliefs have precedence in the experimental psychology judgments literature. Our results suggest that an elicitation of probability beliefs can result in responses that are more concentrated than the objectively known or induced truth. We provide indicative evidence that such individual belief reports can be rationalized by well-defined subjective beliefs that differ from the objective truth. Our findings offer an explanation for the conservatism and overprecision biases in Bayesian updating. Finally, our findings suggest that probabilistic forecasts of uncertain events might have less variance than the actual events. |
| Keywords: | conservatism,overprecision,belief elicitation,quadratic scoring rule |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02308641&r=all |
| By: | Adena, Maja; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Huck, Steffen |
| Abstract: | Previous studies of charitable giving have focused on middle or higher income earners in Western countries, neglecting the poor. Despite this focus, the lowest income groups are often shown to contribute substantial shares of their income to charitable causes. In a large-scale natural field experiment with over 180,000 cli-ents of a micro-lending company in Kyrgyzstan, we study charitable giving by a population that is much poorer relative to the typical donors that have been stud-ied so far. In a 2x2 design, we explore two main hypotheses about giving by the poor: (i) that they are more price sensitive and (ii) that they care about their prox-imity to the charitable project. We find evidence in favor of the former hypothesis but not of the latter. |
| Keywords: | Charitable giving,field experiments,matching donations |
| JEL: | C93 D64 D12 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2019305&r=all |
| By: | Crosetto, P.; Filippin, A.; Katuscak, P.; Smith, J. |
| Abstract: | We conduct an experiment in which subjects participate in a first-price auction against an automaton that bids randomly in a given range. The subjects first place a bid in the auction. They are then given an incentivized elicitation of their beliefs of the opponent’s bid. Despite having been told that the bid of the opponent was drawn from a uniform distribution, we find that most of the subjects report beliefs that have a peak in the interior of the range. The result is robust across seven different experimental treatments. While not expected at the outset, these single-peaked beliefs have precedence in the experimental psychology judgments literature. Our results suggest that an elicitation of probability beliefs can result in responses that are more concentrated than the objectively known or induced truth. We provide indicative evidence that such individual belief reports can be rationalized by well-defined subjective beliefs that differ from the objective truth. Our findings offer an explanation for the conservatism and overprecision biases in Bayesian updating. Finally, our findings suggest that probabilistic forecasts of uncertain events might have less variance than the actual events. |
| Keywords: | BELIEF ELICITATION;QUADRATIC SCORING RULE;OVERPRECISION;CONSERVATISM |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2019-04&r=all |
| By: | Aristotelis Boukouras; Will Jennings; Lunzheng Li; Zacharias Maniadis |
| Abstract: | Biased exposure of voters to the outcome of polls constitutes a risk to the principle of balanced and impartial elections. We first show empirically how modern communication (through social media) may naturally result in such biased exposure. Then, in a series of experiments with a total of 375 participants, we investigate the impact of such biased exposure on election outcomes in an environment where only a strict subset of voters has information on the quality of the two candidates. Thus, polls serve to communicate information to uninformed voters. In our treatment conditions, participants have access to a biased sample of polls’ results, favouring systematically one candidate. Participants in the biased treatment conditions consistently elect the candidate favoured by polls more often than in the unbiased control conditions. Remarkably, this holds even when voters are a priori informed about the bias. Accordingly, our results indicate that – in an experimental setting at least – biased polls distort election results via two channels: (i) by distorting the information set of voters, and (ii) by providing an anchor for subjects’ expectations regarding the election outcome. Overall, biased exposure distorts elections in a very robust manner. |
| JEL: | D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:19/06&r=all |
| By: | Adena, Maja; Huck, Steffen |
| Abstract: | Some companies engage in mass fundraising - where thousands of recipients are asked to make small donations - in addition to their core business. Via a corpo-rate social responsibility (CSR) channel this may increase sales. However, recent research uncovered significant "ask avoidance" which, if present, could imply that fundraising activities may harm a company's core business. Here we examine how asking for donations affects ticket sales of a publically owned leading opera company. In two large-scale randomized controlled trials with a total of over 50,000 opera visitors, who are asked to donate for a social youth project, we find that donations can crowd out ticket expenditure during a campaign. But for the longer run we observe a precisely estimated null effect. |
| Keywords: | Charitable giving,field experiments,ask avoidance,corporate social responsibility |
| JEL: | C93 D64 D12 L21 M14 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2019304&r=all |
| By: | Belot, Michèle (European University Institute); James, Jonathan (University of Bath); Spiteri, Jonathan (University of Malta) |
| Abstract: | This paper tests an intervention aimed at facilitating (cognitively) the adoption of healthy dietary habits. We provide easy-to-understand information about the risks of developing diabetes or heart diseases and give easy-to-follow dietary recommendations to minimize these risks. We implement two variations, one consisting of generic information, the other consisting of information tailored to the individual, the latter resembling newly developed on-line health assessment tools. On top of the information treatment, we implement a second experimental variation nudging people into spending more time thinking about their dietary choices. We find evidence that the information intervention leads to healthier choices in the short run, but mostly in the generic treatment. Surprisingly, we find that people are on average pessimistic about their health, and therefore receive good news on average when the information is tailored to them. We find no evidence that increasing the time available to make choices leads to healthier choices, and find no evidence of long-term changes in habits. These results do not support a bounded rationality explanation for poor dietary choices. |
| Keywords: | health risks, dietary habits, bounded rationality, heuristics, information, time availability, laboratory experiments |
| JEL: | I12 I18 H51 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12675&r=all |
| By: | Oechssler, Joerg; Reischmann, Andreas; Sofianos, Andis |
| Abstract: | We present a new and simple mechanism for repeated public good environments. In the Conditional Contribution Mechanism (CCM), agents send two message of the form, "I am willing to contribute x units to the public good if in total y units are contributed." This mechanism offers agents risk-free strategies, which we call unexploitable. We prove that if agents choose unexploitable messages in a Better Response Dynamics model, all stable outcomes of the CCM are Pareto efficient. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether observed behavior is consistent with this prediction. In the complete information case we find that indeed almost 80% of outcomes are Pareto optimal. Furthermore, comparison treatments with the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism show that the CCM leads to significantly higher contribution rates. Even under incomplete information, contributions are fairly high and do not deteriorate over time. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics,Public Goods,Mechanism Design,Better Response Dynamics |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D82 H41 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2019209&r=all |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Roberta Dessi (Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)); Frédéric Moisan (University of Cambridge); Donald Robertson (University of Cambridge) |
| Abstract: | Individuals' decisions to behave prosocially (or the contrary) can often be observed by other individuals, with no direct connection to them, but who may nevertheless be influenced by them (e.g. through social media). Does knowing that they may be viewed as role models by other, notably younger, people a ect the way individuals behave? Does it make them more likely to behave prosocially? We study how participants' behavior in an experimental public good game is affected when they know that information about their choices and outcomes, together with different sets of information about their identity, will be transmitted the following year to a set of new, unknown, younger participants - with no payoff linkages between the two sets of players. When subjects know their photo, choices and outcomes will be transmitted, they contribute significantly less. We consider different possible explanations, and argue that the most convincing is based on image concerns, but in a surprising way: subjects in the photo treatment care about not being perceived as "suckers" by future players. |
| Keywords: | Role models, image concerns, identity, audience, public goods |
| JEL: | C91 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2019-27&r=all |
| By: | Tim Lohse; Sven A. Simon |
| Abstract: | In today's business environment, team work is omnipresent. But might teams be more prone toward non-compliance with laws and regulations than single individuals despite imminent negative consequences of uncovering misconduct? The recent prevalence of corporate delinquencies gives rise to this concern. In our laboratory experiment, we investigate the determinants of teams' compliance behavior. In particular, we disentangle the e¤ect of deciding jointly as a team of two from sharing the economic consequences among both team members. Our findings provide evidence that teams are substantially less compliant than individuals are. This drop in compliance is driven by the joint, rather than the individual, liability of team members. In contrast, whether subjects make their decisions alone or together does not influence the overall compliance rate. When coordinating their compliance decision teams predominately discuss the risk of getting caught in an audit, and team decision-making is characterized by behavioral spillovers between team members. Holding each team member fully liable is a promising means to deter them from going astray. |
| Keywords: | Compliance, lying, team decision, shared liability, audit, communication, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D91 K42 |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2018-03_4&r=all |
| By: | Eerola, Essi; Kosonen, Tuomas; Kotakorpi, Kaisa; Lyytikäinen, Teemu; Tuimala, Jarno |
| Abstract: | We study rental income tax compliance using a large-scale randomized fild experiment and register data with third-party information on the ownership of apartments. We analyze the responses of potential landlords to treatment letters notifying them of stricter tax enforcement, or providing simplifying information on filing practices for the rental income tax. We find that both types of letters caused an increase in the propensity to report rental income, with letters notifying landlords of the use of third-party information in tax enforcement having the strongest effect. Our research design also allows us to analyze different types of spillover effects in tax enforcement. We find an indication of positive reporting spillovers within the household, but do not find clear evidence of spillovers between landlords in local rental markets. |
| Keywords: | tax compliance, field experiment, rental market, Social security, taxation and inequality, H26, H31, |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fer:wpaper:122&r=all |
| By: | Bharat Chandar; Uri Gneezy; John List; Ian Muir |
| Abstract: | Even though social preferences affect nearly every facet of life, there exist many open questions on the economics of social preferences in markets. We leverage a unique opportunity to generate a large data set to inform the who's, what's, where's, and when's of social preferences through the lens of a nationwide tipping field experiment on the Uber platform. Our field experiment generates data from more than 40 million trips, allowing an exploration of social preferences in the ride sharing market using bid data. Combining experimental and natural variation in the data, we are able to establish tipping facts as well as provide insights into the underlying motives for tipping. Interestingly, even though tips are made privately, and without external social benefits or pressure, more than 15% of trips are tipped. Yet, nearly 60% of people never tip, and only 1% of people always tip. Overall, the demand-side explains much more of the observed tipping variation than the supply-side. |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00680&r=all |
| By: | Serhiy Kandul; Bruno Lanz; Ghislaine Lang |
| Abstract: | This field experiment quantifies the impact of social norm information on the demand for indoor temperature. Based on high-frequency data from indoor temperature monitors, we provide participating households with a comparison of average temperature in their apartments relative to that measured in a control group. For more than 90 percent of participants, financial benefits of energy savings are only indirect, as building-level heating costs are shared across apartments in proportion to their volume. Despite the associated collective action problem, we estimate that the intervention induces a -0.28 °C reduction in average indoor temperature. This suggests that direct monetary incentives is not a pre-requisite for social comparison feedback to induce energy savings. |
| Keywords: | Informational intervention; Monetary incentives; Energy savings; Social comparison feedback; Social norms. |
| JEL: | C91 D12 D62 D91 H41 Q41 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irn:wpaper:19-06&r=all |
| By: | Nikoloz Kudashvili; Philipp Lergetporer |
| Abstract: | Discrimination against minorities is pervasive in many societies, but little is known about minorities’ strategies to avoid being discriminated against. In our trust game among 758 high-school students in the country of Georgia, ethnic Georgian trustors discriminate against the ethnic Armenian minority group. We introduce an initial signaling stage to investigate Armenians’ willingness to hide their ethnicity to avoid expected discrimination. 43 percent of Armenian trustees untruthfully signal to have a Georgian name. Signaling behavior is driven by expected transfers and non-pecuniary motives. This strategic misrepresentation of ethnicity increases Georgian trustors’ expected back transfers and eliminates their discriminatory behavior. |
| Keywords: | discrimination, trust game, experiment, signaling, adolescents |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D83 J15 J16 D90 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7861&r=all |
| By: | Belot, Michèle (European University Institute); James, Jonathan (University of Bath); Vecchi, Martina (University of Bath); Vitt, Nicolai (Pennsylvania State University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether short-term everyday stressors leads to unhealthier dietary choices among low socioeconomic status mothers. We propose a novel stress protocol that aims to mimic everyday stressors experienced by this population, involving time and financial pressure. We evaluate the impact of stress on immediate and planned food choices, comparing a group exposed to our stress protocol relative to a control group. Immediate consumption is measured with in-laboratory consumption of low calorie and high calorie snacks; planned consumption is measured with an incentivized food shopping task. The stressfulness of the stress protocol is evaluated using subjective assessments, as well as physiological measurements (heart rate and salivary cortisol levels). We find no evidence of an effect of stress on the nutritional content of immediate or planned food consumption, thus no support for the hypothesis that everyday stressors are a likely explanation for unhealthy food choices. |
| Keywords: | diet, acute stress, everyday stressors, lab experiment |
| JEL: | I12 D91 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12674&r=all |
| By: | Adriana Weisleder; Carolyn Brockmeyer Cates; Jessica F. Harding; Samantha B. Johnson; Caitlin F. Canfield; Anne M. Seery; Caroline D. Raak; Angelica Alonso; Benard P. Dreyer; Alan L. Mendelsohn |
| Abstract: | Using an experimental design, this study identifies pathways by which parent-child interactions in shared reading and play can improve child behavioral outcomes. |
| Keywords: | preventive intervention, parenting, behavior problems, early childhood, poverty |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:a63c8a814a1c4a27af545f65995e66f2&r=all |
| By: | Robert S. Gibbons; Manuel Grieder; Holger Herz; Christian Zehnder |
| Abstract: | Effective organizations are able not only to coordinate their members on efficient strategies but also to adapt members’ strategies to unforeseen change in an efficient manner. We explore whether part of organizational culture - namely, relational contracts that facilitate both coordi-nation and adaptation - enable organizations to achieve these ends. In a novel experiment, we explore how parties establish such relational contracts, whether they achieve efficient coopera-tion, and how they adapt to exogenous shocks. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that basing a relational contract on general principles rather than specific rules is more successful in achieving efficient adaptation. In our Baseline condition, we observe that pairs who articulate general principles achieve significantly higher performance than those who rely on specific rules. The mechanism underlying this correlation is that pairs with principle-based agreements are more likely to expect their pair to take actions that are consistent with what their relational contract prescribes. To investigate whether there is a causal link between principle-based agreements and performance, we implement a “Nudge” intervention to foster principle-based relational con-tracts. The Nudge succeeds in motivating more pairs to formulate principles and in making pairs significantly more likely to select efficient initial choices. However, the intervention fails to increase performance in the long run. Our results suggest that principle-based relational con-tracts may improve organizational performance, but our results also illustrate the difficulty of building such an organizational culture, which is consistent with the idea that high-performing relational contracts constitute a competitive advantage only if they are difficult to imitate. |
| Keywords: | organization economics, adaptation, relational contracts |
| JEL: | D02 D23 L14 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7871&r=all |
| By: | Sofia Monteiro; Justine Burns; Patrizio Piraino |
| Abstract: | There is limited theory and empirical evidence about the effects of inherited wealth and social comparison on individual labor-market behavior. Investigating the impact of inherited-wealth status – an accident of birth rather than an outcome of competition – contributes to the understanding of the mechanisms underlying intergenerational inequality. This lab experiment analyses whether framed inherited endowments influence real-effort task performance. In particular, the analysis concerns the interaction between a framed inherited status in the lab and participants’ real intergenerational wealth status outside the lab. The results indicate that inheritance-framed endowments trigger a race gap (in favor of non-black participants) but identity-neutral lottery-framed endowments do not. Inheritance framing in the lab appears to trigger significant changes in behavior for Princes (participants that expect to inherit wealth from their parents) while opposite but non-significant effects are found for Paupers (who do not expect to inherit wealth from their parents). |
| Keywords: | experiment, slider task, inheritance, status, framing |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rza:wpaper:748&r=all |
| By: | Akiko Watanabe (Aoyama Gakuin University); Yosuke Kurihara (Aoyama Gakuin University); Satoshi Kumagai (Aoyama Gakuin University); Toshiyuki Matsumoto (Aoyama Gakuin University); Takuya Hida (Aoyama Gakuin University) |
| Abstract: | Most traffic accidents in Japan are caused by a lack of attention by drivers. One of the main factors contributing to this is ?driving fatigue?. Previous research based on electromyographic evaluations has indicated that the optimal driving methods for reducing the upper limb load on drivers are an ?underside? grip position and the ?push?pull? steering operation technique. This previous research developed the systems that estimate the upper limb load during car driving. However, the systems developed only estimate the upper limb load based on a driving route assumed before driving a car: the problem being that actual driving operation is not considered. Therefore, we previously proposed a method for discriminating the grip position when steering on a straight road to estimate the upper limb load based on steering wheel operation during actual driving. This study now proposes a method for discriminating the modes of steering operation during turns to the right and left. First, we conduct an experiment with a motion sensor and a simple driving simulator to detect the two modes of steering-wheel operation (hand-over-hand steering and push?pull steering) on turning a corner. The 10 subjects (5 males and 5 females) perform the steering operation for each mode according to driving videos. It is found that the modes of steering operation can be discriminated because there are differences in the measurement results of the motion sensor for the two modes Second, using the experimental results, the method of steering operation is discriminated through machine learning with a support vector machine (SVM), supplying the SVM with the average value, standard deviation, maximum value, and minimum value of the measurements taken during steering operation. The discrimination accuracy rate of the test data is found by 5-fold cross-validation to be 97.5%. |
| Keywords: | steering operation, upper limb load, support vector machine |
| JEL: | I19 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:9811648&r=all |
| By: | Omar Al-Ubaydli; John List; Claire Mackevicius; Min Sok Lee; Dana Suskind |
| Abstract: | Policymakers are increasingly turning to insights gained from the experimental method as a means to inform large scale public policies. Critics view this increased usage as premature, pointing to the fact that many experimentally-tested programs fail to deliver their promise at scale. Under this view, the experimental approach drives too much public policy. Yet, if policymakers could be more confident that the original research findings would be delivered at scale, even the staunchest critics would carve out a larger role for experiments to inform policy. Leveraging the economic framework of Al-Ubaydli et al. (2019), we put forward 12 simple proposals, spanning researchers, policymakers, funders, and stakeholders, which together tackle the most vexing scalability threats. The framework highlights that only after we deepen our understanding of the scale up problem will we be on solid ground to argue that scientific experiments should hold a more prominent place in the policymaker's quiver. |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00679&r=all |
| By: | Rajesh Rathod |
| Abstract: | "In the present study Researcher tried to Study the effectiveness of Constructivist approach in Mathematics. Random sampling technique was used for selecting the school and the total sample compressed 89 students in which 51 students in Experimental group and 38 students in control group were selected with the use of cluster sampling technique. Researcher develop various activities for experiment like as Envelop Techniques, Model of the square and square root and Model of the circle. Researcher collect the data with the use of Achievement test and Questionnaire for data analysis. Researcher was used Randomized pre-test post-test equivalent group design as experimental design. Researcher used t-test for comparison and calculate the percentage for analysis of questionnaire related to the constructivist approach. Experimental group and Control group were equal at the stage of experiment start. Constructivist approach and Conventional teaching method were equally effective in mathematics. Most of the students are interested in all the constructivist activity. Student taught in constructivist learning environment have significantly enhanced their understanding and application abilities as compared to other abilities like knowledge and skill." Key Words: Constructivist approach, effectiveness, conventional teaching method. Policy |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vor:issues:2019-31-03&r=all |
| By: | Bruenner, Tobias; Friebel, Guido; Holden, Richard; Prasad, Suraj |
| Abstract: | We study an agent's incentives to discover where her talents lie before putting them to productive use. In our setting, an agent can specialize and learn about the same type of talent repeatedly, or experiment and learn about different types of talent. When talents are normally and symmetrically distributed we find that experimentation is efficient, regardless of one's initial draw of talent. Competitive labor markets encourage experimentation whereas monopsonistic labor markets induce specialization. Relaxing our assumptions of normality and symmetry in the distribution of talents, and allowing for human capital acquisition, provides a role for specialization in discovering talents. |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13979&r=all |
| By: | Renaud Foucart; Jana Friedrichsen |
| Abstract: | We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market consisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest below a certain quality threshold, they only compete for those consumers already aware of their existence. Above this threshold, a firm is visible to all and the highest quality attracts all consumers. In equilibrium, firms do not choose their investment deterministically but randomize over two disconnected intervals. On the one hand, the existence of initially captive consumers introduces an anti-competitive element: holding fixed the behavior of the rival firm, a firm with a larger captive segment enjoys a higher payoff from not investing at all. On the other hand, the fact that a firm’s initially captive consumers can still be attracted by very high quality introduces a pro-competitive element: high quality investments becomes more profitable for the underdog when the captive segment of the dominant firm increases. The share of initially captive consumers therefore has a non-monotonic effect on the investment levels of both firms. |
| Keywords: | quality competition, all-pay auction, endogenous prize, consideration sets |
| JEL: | D21 D44 M13 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:277451127&r=all |
| By: | Stark, Oded (University of Bonn); Budzinski, Wiktor (University of Warsaw); Jakubek, Marcin (Institute of Economics, Polish Academy of Sciences) |
| Abstract: | Assuming that an individual's rank in the wealth distribution is the only factor determining the individual's wellbeing, we analyze the individual's risk preferences in relation to gaining or losing rank, rather than the individual’s risk preferences towards gaining or losing absolute wealth. We show that in this characterization of preferences, a high-ranked individual is more willing than a low-ranked individual to take risks that can provide him with a rise in rank: relative risk aversion with respect to rank in the wealth distribution is a decreasing function of rank. This result is robust to incorporating (the level of) absolute wealth in the individual's utility function. |
| Keywords: | rank in the wealth distribution, rank-based utility, variation in risk-taking behavior, relative risk aversion |
| JEL: | D01 D31 D81 G32 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12637&r=all |
| By: | Andersson, Jonas (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics); Jörnsten, Kurt (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics); Lillestøl, Jostein (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics); Ubøe, Jan (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we use probabilistic methods to analyze learning effects in a behavioral experiment on the newsvendor model. We argue why we should believe that suggested orders follow a multinomial logit distribution, and use the single parameter in that model to extract information on learning effects. We revisit the data, analyzed previously by Bolton et al. (2012), and show that our model predicts the pull-to-center effect in these experimental data very well. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral OR; experimental economics; bounded rationality; probabilistic methods; pull-to-center effect |
| JEL: | C00 C70 |
| Date: | 2019–10–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2019_013&r=all |
| By: | Stark, Oded; Budzinski, Wiktor; Jakubek, Marcin |
| Abstract: | Assuming that an individual's rank in the wealth distribution is the only factor determining the individual's wellbeing, we analyze the individual's risk preferences in relation to gaining or losing rank, rather than the individual's risk preferences towards gaining or losing absolute wealth. We show that in this characterization of preferences, a high-ranked individual is more willing than a low-ranked individual to take risks that can provide him with a rise in rank: relative risk aversion with respect to rank in the wealth distribution is a decreasing function of rank. This result is robust to incorporating (the level of) absolute wealth in the individual's utility function. |
| Keywords: | Rank in the wealth distribution,Rank-based utility,Variation in risk-takingbehavior,Relative risk aversion |
| JEL: | D01 D31 D81 G32 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuewef:123&r=all |
| By: | Christine L. Exley; Judd B. Kessler |
| Abstract: | In job applications, job interviews, performance reviews, and a wide range of other environ-ments, individuals are explicitly asked or implicitly invited to assess their own performance. In a series of experiments, we ?nd that women rate their performance less favorably than equally performing men. This gender gap in self-promotion is notably persistent. It stays just as strong when we eliminate gender di?erences in con?dence about performance and when we eliminate strategic incentives to engage in self-promotion. Because of the prevalence of self-promotion opportunities, this self-promotion gap may contribute to the persistent gender gap in education and labor market outcomes. |
| Keywords: | promotion, gender gap, performance incentives |
| JEL: | J16 J60 C92 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2019-058&r=all |
| By: | Islam, Asadul (Monash University); Ushchev, Philip (HSE); Zenou, Yves (Monash University); Zhang, Xin (Beijing Normal University) |
| Abstract: | We develop a theoretical model in which technology adoption decisions are based on the information received from others about the quality of a new technology and on their risk attitudes. We test the predictions of this model using a randomized field experiment in Bangladesh. We show that the share of treated farmers who receive better training in System of Rice Intensification (SRI) technology have a high positive impact on the adoption rate of untreated farmers. We also find that untreated farmers who are more risk-averse tend to adopt the technology less and are less influenced by their treated peers. Finally, a trained farmer's impact on his untrained peers increases if he himself adopts SRI technology. Our results indicate that the crucial determinants of technology adoption for untreated farmers are the accuracy and reliability of information transmission about the quality of the technology circulated among farmers as well as their degree of risk aversion. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian model, technology adoption, peers, risk attitude, RCT, Bangladesh |
| JEL: | O13 Z13 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12672&r=all |