nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2019‒09‒30
twenty-one papers chosen by

  1. The Giver as a General in Her Fortunes. Experimental Evidence on Trust, Inequality and Growth (or Decline) By Marcello D'Amato; Niall O’Higgins; Marco Stimolo
  2. "Trust, Beliefs and Cooperation: Excavating a Foundation of Strong Economics By Jeongbin Kim; Louis Putterman; Xinyi Zhang
  3. Time Delay and Investment Decisions: Evidence from an Experiment in Tanzania By Nikolov, Plamen
  4. A radius of trust? Contrasting insights from experiments and survey data By Parlasca, Martin C.; Hermann, Daniel; Mußhoff, Oliver
  5. Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Motivators on Creative Collaboration: The Effect of Sharing Rewards By Giuseppe Attanasi; Ylenia Curci; Patrick Llerena; Giulia Urso
  6. Effect of Inquiry and Problem Based Pedagogy on Learning: Evidence from 10 Field Experiments in Four Countries By Rosangela Bando; Emma Näslund-Hadley; Paul Gertler
  7. Cognitive Ability and Observed Behavior in Laboratory Experiments: Implications for Macroeconomic Theory By Nobuyuki Hanaki
  8. Looking at Creativity from East to West: Risk Taking and Intrinsic Motivation in Socially and Culturally Diverse Countries By Giuseppe Attanasi; Ylenia Curci; Patrick Llerena; Adriana Carolina Pinate; Maria del Pino Ramos-Sosa; Giulia Urso
  9. E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs : Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India By Banerjee, Abhijit; Duflo, Esther; Imbert, Clement; Mathew, Santhosh; Pande, Rohini
  10. Redistribution of Individual Pension Wealth to Survivor Pensions: Evidence from a Stated Preferences Analysis By de Grip, Andries; Fouarge, Didier; Montizaan, Raymond
  11. Decomposing Present Value Effects on Defaults: Evidence from a large-scale restructuring experiment By Deniz Aydin
  12. Self-Employment and Migration By Giambra, Samuele; McKenzie, David
  13. Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments (Revised version of CARF-F-433) By Yutaka Kayaba; Hitoshi Matsushima; Tomohisa Toyama
  14. Deciding to Delegate: On Distributional Consequences of Endogenous Delegation By Lara Ezquerra; Praveen Kujal
  15. Why Do We Procrastinate? Present Bias and Optimism By Zachary Breig; Matthew Gibson; Jeffrey Shrader
  16. Managerial Behavior in the Lab: Information Disclosure, Decision Process and Leadership Style By Angela Sutan; Radu Vranceanu
  17. Reusing Natural Experiments By Heath, Davidson; Ringgenberg, Matthew C.; Samadi, Mehrdad; Werner, Ingrid M.
  18. Conflicting Identities: Cosmopolitan or Anxious? Appreciating Concerns of Host Country Population Improves Attitudes Towards Immigrants By Stöhr, Tobias; Wichardt, Philipp
  19. Unbiased IV in Stata By Austin Nichols
  20. The Way People Lie in Markets By Chloe Tergiman; Marie Claire Villeval
  21. The role of overconfidence in overweighting private information: Does gender matter? By Cao, Qian; Li, Jianbiao; Niu, Xiaofei

  1. By: Marcello D'Amato (Università di Salerno, CELPE and CSEF); Niall O’Higgins (Università di Salerno and International Labour Organization (ILO)); Marco Stimolo (Università della Campania Luigi Vanvitelli)
    Abstract: We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on the trust game and designed to assess the impact of economic growth and inequality on trust in a unified framework. Compared to a control with no inequality, we implement three treatments with exogenously induced inequality in environments characterized by growing, stable or falling initial average endowments. We find that trust and trustworthiness both decrease with inequality, and trust (but not trustworthiness) increases with an increase in the average endowment level. Hence, the negative impact of inequality on trust results to be stronger in the environment with falling average endowment, whereas no effect is recorded in the environment with growing average endowment. These aggregate effects are driven by the significant negative reactions to inequality by those who, due to treatment, end up at the bottom of the endowment distribution. Classification-C91, D31, D90
    Keywords: Trust Game, Inequality, Growth, Decline
    Date: 2019–09–19
  2. By: Jeongbin Kim; Louis Putterman; Xinyi Zhang
    Abstract: We use a two-phase experimental design to study how systematically manipulated beliefs about trust and trustworthiness can promote or deter cooperation. We use decisions in an initially played trust game to create five environments that differ in the information subjects have about the relative trust/trustworthiness of fellow group members when they make a voluntary contribution decision in our experiment’s second phase. We find that perceived high trusting environments are treated equivalently to ones of perceived high trustworthiness, with both positively affecting subjects’ first-order beliefs about the cooperativeness of group-mates, and in consequence, leading to higher contributions. Our results indicate that people cooperate more and hence produce more together in an environment of high trust/trustworthiness, indicating one channel through which trust helps to grow the economic pie.
    Date: 2019
  3. By: Nikolov, Plamen (State University of New York)
    Abstract: Attitudes toward risk underlie virtually every important economic decision an individual makes. In this experimental study, I examine how introducing a time delay into the execution of an investment plan influences individuals' risk preferences. The field experiment proceeded in three stages: a decision stage, an execution stage and a payout stage. At the outset, in the Decision Stage (Stage 1), each subject was asked to make an investment plan by splitting a monetary investment amount between a risky asset and a safe asset. Subjects were informed that the investment plans they made in the Decision Stage are binding and will be executed during the Execution Stage (Stage 2). The Payout Stage (Stage 3) was the payout date. The timing of the Decision Stage and Payout Stage was the same for each subject, but the timing of the Execution Stage varied experimentally. I find that individuals who were assigned to execute their investment plans later (i.e., for whom there was a greater delay prior to the Execution Stage) invested a greater amount in the risky asset during the Decision Stage.
    Keywords: risk and time, risk preferences, reference-dependent utility preferences, temporal construal, time inconsistency, endowment effect, field experiment
    JEL: D03 D81 D91 O12 O16
    Date: 2019–09
  4. By: Parlasca, Martin C.; Hermann, Daniel; Mußhoff, Oliver
    Abstract: A person's reach of efficient economic activities is strongly influenced by the extent to which she grants trust towards other people. The radius of trust has recently gained interest as a concept to elucidate the underlying principles of how far a person extends her trust. However, empirical research on the radius of trust has up to now only been grounded in survey data. In this paper we use an incentivized experiment, namely the trust game, and two sets of survey questions to i) identify and localize the radius of trust and ii) contrast experimental and survey results regarding the radius of trust. To do so, we measure trust layers of 394 semi-nomadic pastoralists in rural Kenya conditional on three levels of social distance: trust towards people from one's own village, trust towards people from a neighboring village, and trust towards city dwellers from the county capital. Experimental data suggest that city dwellers are excluded from the radius of trust and face particularly low trust levels, while people from one's own village and from neighboring villages are inside the radius of trust. Survey data do not suggest any clear-cut radius of trust. Implications for development practitioners and further research on the radius of trust are discussed.
    Keywords: radius of trust,social distance,trust,field experiment,pastoralism,Kenya
    JEL: C93 D01 O12
    Date: 2019
  5. By: Giuseppe Attanasi (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Ylenia Curci (RECITS - FEMTO, UTBM, Belfort, France); Patrick Llerena (BETA, University of Strasbourg, France); Giulia Urso (Social Sciences, Gran Sasso Science Institute, L'Aquila, Italy)
    Abstract: Charness and Grieco (2019) have experimentally shown that financial incentives have a positive impact on individual creativity, but only in the case of “close” creativity, i.e., when there are constraints to the creative task that a subject has to accomplish. In this paper, we build on the same “close” creativity assignments of Charness and Grieco (2019) and analyze with undergraduate students and with experts in creativity the interplay between monetary incentives and group cooperation in creative assignments. We introduce a novel model of intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation to group collaboration in creativity and run a theorydriven experiment to test our experimental hypotheses on the crowding out of intrinsic motivation due to extrinsic motivation to group creativity. We find more creativity in the group than in the individual treatment, apart when there are explicit monetary incentives to co-working (sharing ideas) in the creative assignment. Therefore, while Charness and Grieco (2019) show a positive interplay between monetary incentives (extrinsic individual motivation) and “close” creativity at the individual level, we provide evidence of a negative interplay between monetary incentives and “close” creativity at the group level (crowding out of intrinsic group motivation). Furthermore, and again in line with our model predictions, the latter effect is found more in the experimental sessions with experts in creativity than in those with undergraduate students.
    Keywords: Creativity, Group cooperation, Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Motivation, Crowding out, Experiment
    JEL: I23 O31 O32
    Date: 2019–09
  6. By: Rosangela Bando; Emma Näslund-Hadley; Paul Gertler
    Abstract: This paper uses data from 10 at-scale field experiments in four countries to estimate the effect of inquiry- and problem-based pedagogy (IPP) on students’ mathematics and science test scores. IPP creates active problem-solving opportunities in settings that provide meaning to the child. Students learn by collaboratively solving real-life problems, developing explanations, and communicating ideas. Using individual-level data on 17,006 students, the analysis finds that after seven months IPP increased mathematics and science scores by 0.18 and 0.14 standard deviations, respectively, and by 0.39 and 0.23 standard deviations, respectively, after four years. We also identify important gender learning gaps with boys benefiting substantially more than girls. Our approach not only provides strong causal evidence, but also high external validity. These 10 experiments in four countries allow us to examine the effects of IPP across a wide set of geographic, socioeconomic, teacher background, and age/grade contexts (i.e., preschool and third and fourth grades). The results prove to be robust across these different contexts. The 10 RCTs were registered in the American Economic Association Registry for randomized control trials. See the supplementary materials for trial numbers.
    JEL: I21 I24 I25
    Date: 2019–09
  7. By: Nobuyuki Hanaki (Université Côte d'Azur; CNRS, GREDEG; IUF)
    Abstract: This paper discusses the relationships between the \measured" cognitive ability of participants and their behavior as observed during laboratory experiments. Based on such relationships, macroeconomic implications of micro-level "boundedly rational" individual behavior will be discussed. The paper also addresses potential problems that arise when insucient attention is paid to large di erences in the measured cognitive ability of participants across several experimental laboratories, in uencing the replicability of existing experimental results but also the interpretation of results from cross-country experimental analyses, and proposes to complement participants' database with individual characteristics.
    Keywords: Cognitive Ability, Laboratory Experiments, Strategic Environment Effect
    JEL: C90 D84
    Date: 2019–09
  8. By: Giuseppe Attanasi (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Ylenia Curci (RECITS - FEMTO, UTBM, Belfort, France); Patrick Llerena (BETA, University of Strasbourg, France); Adriana Carolina Pinate (Department of Neuroscience Imaging, CeSI-MeT, University of G. d'Annunzio, Chieti-Pescara, Italy); Maria del Pino Ramos-Sosa (Departamento de Economía, Universidad Loyola Andalucía, Campus Palmas Altas, Seville, Spain); Giulia Urso (Social Sciences, Gran Sasso Science Institute, L'Aquila, Italy)
    Abstract: This article presents a mixed-methods research in the eld of creativity. By making use of experiments and a questionnaire, it analyses how creativity is aected by three factors: i) motivation, ii) individuals' attitudes towards risk and ambiguity and iii) social context. Each one of these factors has been extensively investigated in the theoretical and empirical literature getting to results still open to discussion. In particular, this research focuses on two aspects. First, we try to shed some light on the controversial ndings linking risk taking and creativity that exist in the economic and psychology literature. To do so, we test the hypotheses that self perception of creative abilities may play a role in establishing a riskcreativity positive correlation. Second, being the three factors strongly inuenced by culture, the study investigates whether the impacts on creativity may dier in diverse geographical locations. Following Attanasi et al. (2019), we exploit data from experiments performed in main cities of one eastern and one western country: Ho Chi Minh city (Vietnam) and Strasbourg (France). The information to build the risk and ambiguity factor derive from risk and ambiguity elicitation via lotteries. To account for motivation, dierent organizational scenarios are set in experimental treatments (nancial incentives vs non nancial incentives to collaborate). Finally, information on social context and self perception of creative abilities are collected through a self administrated questionnaire. In our analysis, we nd that risk aversion, social habits and leisure activities have a positive eect on the creative performance of the French participants, while for Vietnamese the intrinsic motivation and the perception of their own creative capacities are positive correlated with creative scores. Our results suggest that in a country like France, social context has a strong inuence on individual creativity, while for Vietnam individual features play a role in creativity, suggesting that the socio-cultural context has dierent impacts on creativity.
    Keywords: experiments, risk, ambiguity, self-perceived creativity, motivation, geographical location, social context
    JEL: I23 O31 O32
    Date: 2019–08
  9. By: Banerjee, Abhijit (MIT); Duflo, Esther (MIT); Imbert, Clement (University of Warwick); Mathew, Santhosh (Bill and Melida Gates Foundation); Pande, Rohini (Harvard University)
    Abstract: Can e-governance reforms improve government policy? By making information available on a realtime basis, information technologies may reduce the theft of public funds. We analyze a large eld experiment and the nationwide scale-up of a reform to India's workfare program. Advance payments were replaced by "just-in-time" payments, triggered by e-invoicing, making it easier to detect misreporting. Leakages went down: program expenditures dropped by 24%, while employment slightly increased; there were fewer fake households in the ocial database; program ocials' personal wealth fell by 10%. However, payment delays increased. The nationwide scale-up resulted in a persistent 19% reduction in program expenditure.
    Date: 2019
  10. By: de Grip, Andries (ROA, Maastricht University); Fouarge, Didier (ROA, Maastricht University); Montizaan, Raymond (ROA, Maastricht University)
    Abstract: Pension schemes in the Netherlands allow workers to redistribute their own pension wealth to increase the survivor pension of their partner. However, due to lacking communication and knowledge of survivor pensions among workers, and also due to the lack of transparent products and choice architecture, redistribution remains limited. This paper uses a stated preferences experiment that is explicitly designed for workers with a partner in the age group of 55 to 65 years to elicit their pension redistribution preferences. We find that, on average, the preferred pension wealth redistribution amounts to 50%. 35% of all individuals have such a preference. 33% of all individuals would prefer less redistribution, and 32% percent prefers to redistribute more pension income to the partner upon one's death. We further show that total family income during working life does not affect the redistribution to survivor pensions. However, the distribution of the contribution to total family income before retirement across partners, as well as the survival likelihood of the partner and the number of years the partner is expected to survive, have a significant causal impact on the preferred pension redistribution decision. The preference for redistribution to survivor pensions also depends significantly on personal characteristics, preferences and social attitude. Males have a significantly stronger preference for redistribution compared to females. Moreover, forward-looking, more risk averse and more altruistic individuals have a stronger preference to redistribute part of their pension wealth to a survivor pension. Finally, in particular when employees have the perception that their partner is more forward looking, they are willing to invest more in a survivor pension.
    Keywords: stated preferences experiment, redistribution of pension wealth, survivors pension, economic preferences
    JEL: J14 J26 D31
    Date: 2019–09
  11. By: Deniz Aydin (Washington University in St. Louis)
    Abstract: This study quantitatively assesses the importance of balance sheet present-value effects in the con- text of consumer debt restructuring. We design and implement a large scale randomized trial where we offer various type of debt relief to delinquent borrowers. Our design deliberately varies the inter- est rate and temporary payment reductions, as well as the maturity of the restructured loans, all while holding consumers’ outstanding debt balance constant. We find that interest rate reductions lead to a persistent decrease in delinquency rates, in contrast, the effect of short-term forbearance on delinquen- cies disappears in the long-run. Decomposing the effects of periodic payments and the present-value of the stream of future obligations, we reject models where balance sheet effects are absent and de- faults are driven purely by payment difficulties, or models where a dollar of cash flow change has the same effect as a dollar change in present-value. From the lender’s perspective, offering neither short-term forbearance nor rate reductions is profitable for the typical participant, however balance sheet effects are sufficiently strong to make it the most efficient way to incentive intermediaries.
    Date: 2019
  12. By: Giambra, Samuele (Brown University); McKenzie, David (World Bank)
    Abstract: There is a widespread policy view that a lack of job opportunities at home is a key reason for migration, accompanied by suggestions of the need to spend more on creating these opportunities so as to reduce migration. Self-employment is widespread in poor countries, and faced with a lack of existing jobs, providing more opportunities for people to start businesses is a key policy option. But empirical evidence to support this idea is slight, and economic theory offers several reasons why the self-employed may in fact be more likely to migrate. We put together panel surveys from eight countries to descriptively examine the relationship between migration and self-employment, finding that the self-employed are indeed less likely to migrate than either wage workers or the unemployed. We then analyze seven randomized experiments that increased self-employment, and find their causal impacts on migration are negative on average, but often small in magnitude.
    Keywords: internal migration, international migration, self-employment, migrant selection, randomized experiment
    JEL: F22 J61 O15
    Date: 2019–09
  13. By: Yutaka Kayaba (University of Tokyo); Hitoshi Matsushima (University of Tokyo); Tomohisa Toyama (International Christian University)
    Abstract: We experimentally examine repeated prisoner’s dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of the subjects follow generous tit-for-tat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of tit-for-tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous tit-for-tat equilibrium behavior. Showing inconsistent behavior, subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those with high accuracy. Furthermore, subjects with low accuracy tend to retaliate considerably with lesser strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, while subjects with high accuracy tend to retaliate with more strength than that predicted by the equilibrium theory, or with strength almost equivalent to it.
    Date: 2019–09
  14. By: Lara Ezquerra (Universitat de les Illes Balears); Praveen Kujal (Middlesex University London and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)
    Abstract: We allow for principals to self-select into delegating (or not) the allocation decision to an agent in a modified dictator game. The standard dictator game is obtained when they choose not to delegate. Nearly half the subjects choose to be a dictator and make the allocation themselves. Dictators thus obtained transfer lower amounts to receivers, relative to when the decision making is passed to an agent (or the standard dictator game). Subjects self-selecting into the role of a dictator give less relative to those that pass the allocation decision to an agent. Finally, the distributional consequences of delegating, or not, vary with less inequality obtained when the delegation decision is delegated.
    Date: 2019
  15. By: Zachary Breig (School of Economics, The University of Queensland); Matthew Gibson (Williams College); Jeffrey Shrader (School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University)
    Abstract: A large body of research has shown that procrastination can have significant adverse effects on individuals, including lower savings and poorer health. Such procrastination is typically modeled as the result of present bias. In this paper we study an alternative: excessively optimistic beliefs about future demands on an individual’s time. Our experimental results refute the hypothesis that present bias is the sole source of dynamic inconsistency, but they are consistent with optimism. These findings offer an explanation for low takeup of commitment and suggest that personalized information on past choices can mitigate procrastination.
    JEL: D90 D84 J22
    Date: 2019–02
  16. By: Angela Sutan (BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)); Radu Vranceanu (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: This paper reports the results from a lab experiment in which subjects playing the manager role can implement either an efficient / inegalitarian allocation or an inefficient / egalitarian allocation of payoffs. The experiment simulates a stylized managerial context by allowing the manager to manipulate information and select the decision process and by allowing the stakeholders to retaliate against the manager given different choices in the decision process. We found that the inefficient allocation is often selected and that this choice depends on whether the employees can retaliate against the manager and on whether the manager can hide information about the payoffs. The social preferences of the manager also explain the choice of the option. However, the decision process and the managerial style based on self-reported attitudes have little influence on the choice of allocation. This is consistent with employee satisfaction essentially depending on the payoff and not being sensible to the process.
    Keywords: Management style.,Managerial decision,Decision process,Asymmetric information,Communication strategy
    Date: 2019–09–17
  17. By: Heath, Davidson (University of Utah David Eccles School of Business); Ringgenberg, Matthew C. (University of Utah - Department of Finance); Samadi, Mehrdad (Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Finance Department); Werner, Ingrid M. (The Ohio State University - Fisher College of Business)
    Abstract: Natural experiments are used in empirical research to make causal inferences. After a natural experiment is first used, other researchers often reuse the setting, examining different outcomes based on causal chain arguments. Using simulation evidence combined with two extensively studied natural experiments, business combination laws and the Regulation SHO pilot, we show that the repeated use of a natural experiment significantly increases the likelihood of false discoveries. To correct this, we propose multiple testing methods which account for dependence across tests and we show evidence of their efficacy.
    JEL: G1 G10
    Date: 2019–09
  18. By: Stöhr, Tobias (Kiel Institute for the World Economy); Wichardt, Philipp (University of Rostock)
    Abstract: This paper connects insights from the literature on cosmopolitan values in political science, anxiety in social psychology, and identity economics in a vignette-style experiment. We asked German respondents about their attitudes towards a Syrian refugee, randomizing components of his description (N=662). The main treatment describes the refugee as being aware of and empathetic towards potential Germans' worries about cultural change, costs and violence associated with refugee inflows. This increases reported levels of sympathy and trust substantially, especially for risk averse people. We argue that acknowledging concerns of the host population relieves the tension between an anxious and a cosmopolitan part of peoples' identities. When one aspect of identity is already acknowledged (expressing anxieties) it has less influence on actual behavior (expressing sympathy). In addition, we find that previous contact with foreigners and a higher willingness to take risks are important factors to determine an individual's willingness to interact with refugees.
    Keywords: identity, integration, attitudes, immigration, refugees
    JEL: F22 Z10 Z12
    Date: 2019–09
  19. By: Austin Nichols (Abt Associates)
    Abstract: A well-known result is that exactly identified IV has no moments, including in the ideal case of an experimental design (that is, a randomized control trial with imperfect compliance). However, this result no longer holds when the sign of the first stage is known. I describe a Stata implementation of an unbiased estimator for instrumental-variable models with a single endogenous regressor where the sign of one or more first-stage coefficients is known (Andrews and Armstrong 2017) and its finite sample properties under alternative error structures.
    Date: 2019–09–15
  20. By: Chloe Tergiman (Penn State - Pennsylvania State University - Penn State System); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: In a finitely repeated game with asymmetric information, we experimentally study how reputation and standard market mechanisms change the nature of fraudulent announcements by experts. While some lies can be detected ex post by investors, other lies remain deniable. Lying behavior suggests that individuals care more about the consequences of being caught, rather than the act of lying per se. Allowing for reputation reduces the frequency of lies that can be detected but has no impact on deniable lies: individuals simply hide their lies better and fraud persists. Competition without reputation increases risky lies and never protects investment.
    Keywords: Dishonesty,Reputation,Competition,Financial Markets
    Date: 2019
  21. By: Cao, Qian; Li, Jianbiao; Niu, Xiaofei
    Abstract: This paper analyzes gender differences of overweighting private information in a social learning game. The results show that male participants’ fraction of choosing in line with private signal is significantly higher than female, i.e. men are more likely to follow their own private information than women. This gender effect is primarily salient in the incongruent rounds where a participant receives a private signal that is against with majority of the public information. However, no significant gender differences of overweighting private information are found in the congruent rounds where a participant receives a private signal that matches with majority of public information. In addition, we find that overweighting private information is positively correlated with overconfidence; men are more overconfident than women; a mediation analysis reveals that overconfidence explains the gender differences of overweighting private information.
    Keywords: overweighting private information,gender,overconfidence
    JEL: C91 D81
    Date: 2019

General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.