|
on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Hu Sun (University of Michigan); Yun Wang (Xiamen University) |
| Abstract: | Competing in the labor market requires job-seekers to evaluate the competitiveness of themselves and of others. Will their evaluations of others be more objective and their evaluations of themselves be more biased? Will successful and unsuccessful job-seekers in the same labor market engage in different patterns while making their evaluations? We design a laboratory experiment to study the dynamics of job-seeking strategies and individuals' belief updating in a labor market. Our experimental treatments feature the decision-making and the evaluation of competitiveness of oneself versus of others. The probability of being accepted for a job depends on external shocks as well as the individuals' ability ranking. We find that subjects are less likely to evaluate others' competitiveness as high as their own in the same situation. Subjects are more inclined to attribute failure to external shocks and attribute success to their own competitiveness. Estimation results from a reinforcement learning model show that, compared to decision-making for others, subjects have a higher tolerance for failure and remain in applying for unsuitable jobs for longer periods when seeking jobs for themselves. Our findings provide evidence for the presence of self-serving attributional bias when individuals' self-image affects their economic decisions. |
| Keywords: | Decision-making for others; Labor market experiment; Belief updating; Belief elicitation; Reinforcement learning; Self-serving attribution bias |
| JEL: | C91 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2019–07–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wyi:wpaper:002515&r=all |
| By: | Barron, Kai |
| Abstract: | Bayes' statistical rule remains the status quo for modeling belief updating in both normative and descriptive models of behavior under uncertainty. Some recent research has questioned the use of Bayes' rule in descriptive models of behavior, presenting evidence that people overweight 'good news' relative to 'bad news' when updating ego-relevant beliefs. In this paper, we present experimental evidence testing whether this 'good-news, bad-news' effect is present in a financial decision making context (i.e. a domain that is important for understanding much economic decision making). We find no evidence of asymmetric updating in this domain. In contrast, in our experiment, belief updating is close to the Bayesian benchmark on average. However, we show that this average behavior masks substantial heterogeneity in individual updating behavior. We find no evidence in support of a sizeable subgroup of asymmetric updators. |
| Keywords: | economic experiments,Bayes' rule,belief updating,belief measurement,proper scoring rules,motivated beliefs |
| JEL: | C11 C91 D83 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2016309r&r=all |
| By: | John Duffy (University of California, Irvine); Janet Hua Jiang (Bank of Canada); Huan Xie (Concordia University) |
| Abstract: | We study the trade of indefinitely-lived assets in experimental markets. The traded prices of these assets are on average more than 40% below the risk-neutral fundamental value under the expected utility assumption. We examine the effects of three interrelated factors for the traded price, payoff uncertainty about the asset’s dividend payments, horizon uncertainty about the duration of trade, and the expected utility assumption. Our results suggest that horizon uncertainty does not significantly affect the traded price. Incorporating risk aversion into non-expected utility models with recursive preferences and probability weighting can rationalize the low prices observed in our indefinite-horizon asset markets. |
| Keywords: | asset pricing, behavioral finance, experiments, indefinite horizon, random termination, risk and uncertainty, expected utility, Epstein-Zin recursive preferences, probability weighting |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D81 G12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crd:wpaper:19005&r=all |
| By: | Amador, Luis; Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Espín, Antonio M.; Garcia, Teresa; Hernández, Ana |
| Abstract: | There is an intense debate whether decision making under uncertainty is partially driven by cognitive abilities. The critical issue is whether choices arising from subjects with lower cognitive abilities are more likely driven by errors or lack of understanding than pure preferences for risk. The latter implies that the often argued link between risk preferences and cognitive abilities might be a spurious correlation. This experiment reports evidence from a sample of 556 participants who made choices in risk-related tasks about winning and losing money and completed three cognitive tasks, all with real monetary incentives: number-additions under time pressure (including incentive-compatible expected number of correct additions), the Cognitive Refection Test (to measure analytical/reflective thinking) and the Remote Associates Test (for convergent thinking). Results are unambiguous: none of our cognition measures plays any systematic role on risky decision making. Our data indeed suggest that cognitive abilities are negatively associated with noisy, inconsistent choices, which might have led to spurious correlations with risk preferences in previous studies. |
| Keywords: | decision making under uncertainty, cognitive abilities, online experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D81 |
| Date: | 2019–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:95178&r=all |
| By: | Leusch, Yannik M.; Loschelder, David D.; Basso, Frédéric |
| Abstract: | The present study aims for a better understanding of how individuals’ behavior in monetary price negotiations differs from their behavior in bartering situations. Two contrasting hypotheses were derived from endowment theory and current negotiation research to examine whether negotiators are more susceptible to anchoring in price negotiations versus in bartering transactions. In addition, past research found that cues of coldness enhance cognitive control and reduce anchoring effects. We attempted to replicate these coldness findings for price anchors in a distributive negotiations scenario and to illuminate the potential interplay of coldness priming with a price versus bartering manipulation. Participants (N=219) were recruited for a 2 × 2 between-subjects negotiation experiment manipulating (1) monetary focus and (2) temperature priming. Our data show a higher anchoring susceptibility in price negotiations than in bartering transactions. Despite a successful priming manipulation check, coldness priming did not enhance cognitive control (nor interact with the price/bartering manipulation). Our findings improve our theoretical understanding of how the focus on negotiation resources frames economic transactions as either unidirectional or bidirectional, and how this focus shapes parties’ susceptibility for the anchoring bias and negotiation behavior. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. |
| Keywords: | anchoring; loss aversion; resource framing; money; embodiment; temperature priming; Bartering |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2018–07–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:88288&r=all |
| By: | Pogorelskiy, Kirill (University of Warwick); Shum, Matthew (Caltech) |
| Abstract: | More voters than ever get political news from their friends on social media platforms. Is this bad for democracy? Using context-neutral laboratory experiments, we find that biased (mis)information shared on social networks affects the quality of collective decisions relatively more than does segregation by political preferences on social media. Two features of subject behavior underlie this finding: 1) they share news signals selectively, revealing signals favorable to their candidates more often than unfavorable signals; 2) they na¨ively take signals at face value and account for neither the selection in the selection in the shared signals nor the differential informativeness of news signals across different sources. |
| Keywords: | news sharing, social networks, voting, media bias, fake news, polarization, filter bubble, lab experiments JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92, D72, D83, D85 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:427&r=all |
| By: | Damien Besancenot (LIRAES - EA 4470 - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5, UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5); Radu Vranceanu (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ESSEC Business School - Essec Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results from a two-person "pledge and give" experiment. Each person's endowment is private information available only to him. In the first stage, each agent informs the other about the amount he intends to give, or makes a pledge. In the second stage, each agent makes a contribution to the joint donation. A simple theoretical model shows that in this game the equilibrium pledge function is linear in the endowment of each agent. Furthermore, if agents have a strong taste for conformity, the optimal gift is positively related to one's own endowment and to the pledge of his partner. Data from the lab experiment show that, indeed, subjects pledge approximately 60% of their endowment. Also, pledges have an important social influence role: an agent will increase his donation by 20 cents on average if his partner pledges one more euro. |
| Keywords: | charity giving,conformity,strategic pledges,social influence |
| Date: | 2019–06–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02176269&r=all |
| By: | Becker, Sascha O. (university of warwick; warwick); Fernandes, Ana (bern university); Weichselbaumer, Doris (university of linz) |
| Abstract: | Due to conventional gender norms, women are more likely to be in charge of childcare than men. From an employer’s perspective, in their fertile age they are also at “risk” of pregnancy. Both factors potentially affect hiring practices of firms. We conduct a large-scale correspondence test in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, sending out approx. 9,000 job applications, varying job candidate’s personal characteristics such as marital status and age of children. We find evidence that, for part-time jobs, married women with older kids, who likely finished their childbearing cycle and have more projectable childcare chores than women with very young kids, are at a significant advantage vis-à-vis other groups of women. At the same time, married, but childless applicants, who have a higher likelihood to become pregnant, are at a disadvantage compared to single, but childless applicants to part-time jobs. Such effects are not present for full-time jobs, presumably, because by applying to these in contrast to part-time jobs, women signal that they have arranged for external childcare. |
| Keywords: | fertility, discrimination, experimental economics |
| JEL: | C93 J16 J71 |
| Date: | 2019–05–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2019015&r=all |
| By: | Becker, Sascha O. (university of warwick; warwick); Fernandes, Ana (bern university); Weichselbaumer, Doris (university of linz) |
| Abstract: | Due to conventional gender norms, women are more likely to be in charge of childcare than men. From an employer’s perspective, in their fertile age they are also at “risk” of pregnancy. Both factors potentially affect hiring practices of firms. We conduct a largescale correspondence test in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, sending out approx. 9,000 job applications, varying job candidate’s personal characteristics such as marital status and age of children. We find evidence that, for part-time jobs, married women with older kids, who likely finished their childbearing cycle and have more projectable childcare chores than women with very young kids, are at a significant advantage vis-à-vis other groups of women. At the same time, married, but childless applicants, who have a higher likelihood to become pregnant, are at a disadvantage compared to single, but childless applicants to part-time jobs. Such effects are not present for full-time jobs, presumably, because by applying to these in contrast to part-time jobs, women signal that they have arranged for external childcare. |
| Keywords: | fertility, discrimination, experimental economics |
| JEL: | C93 J16 J71 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umaror:2019002&r=all |
| By: | Kevin J. Boudreau; Matt Marx |
| Abstract: | Young workers typically enter the professional labor market only after completing higher education. We investigate how earlier professional work experience affects skilled worker development. In a field experiment, 1,787 Engineering majors were randomly assigned to 6-month work terms to begin either in the second or third year of studies. Early exposure caused systematic differences in inclination to take Engineering elective courses, choice of major, and the probability of persisting in Engineering years later—consistent with engagement, retention, and sorting effects. Early exposure notably increased academic and professional outcomes of lower-income students. |
| JEL: | I21 J2 O3 |
| Date: | 2019–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26013&r=all |
| By: | Patrick Kline; Christopher Walters |
| Abstract: | We develop tools for utilizing correspondence experiments to detect illegal discrimination by individual employers. Employers violate US employment law if their propensity to contact applicants depends on protected characteristics such as race or sex. We establish identification of higher moments of the causal effects of protected characteristics on callback rates as a function of the number of fictitious applications sent to each job ad. These moments are used to bound the fraction of jobs that illegally discriminate. Applying our results to three experimental datasets, we find evidence of significant employer heterogeneity in discriminatory behavior, with the standard deviation of gaps in job-specific callback probabilities across protected groups averaging roughly twice the mean gap. In a recent experiment manipulating racially distinctive names, we estimate that at least 85% of jobs that contact both of two white applications and neither of two black applications are engaged in illegal discrimination. To assess the tradeoff between type I and II errors presented by these patterns, we consider the performance of a series of decision rules for investigating suspicious callback behavior under a simple two-type model that rationalizes the experimental data. Though, in our preferred specification, only 17% of employers are estimated to discriminate on the basis of race, we find that an experiment sending 10 applications to each job would enable accurate detection of 7-10% of discriminators while falsely accusing fewer than 0.2% of non-discriminators. A minimax decision rule acknowledging partial identification of the joint distribution of callback rates yields higher error rates but more investigations than our baseline two-type model. Our results suggest illegal labor market discrimination can be reliably monitored with relatively small modifications to existing audit designs. |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1907.06622&r=all |
| By: | Tatiana Homonoff; Rourke O'Brien; Abigail B. Sussman |
| Abstract: | One in five consumer credit accounts incur late fees each quarter. Evidence on the efficacy of regulations to improve behavior through enhanced disclosure of financial product attributes is mixed. We test a novel form of disclosure that provides borrowers with a personalized measure of their creditworthiness. In a field experiment with over 400,000 student loan borrowers, treatment group members received communications about the availability of their FICO Score. The intervention significantly reduced late payments and increased borrowers’ FICO Scores. Survey data show treatment group members were less likely to overestimate their FICO Scores, suggesting the intervention may correct for overoptimism. |
| JEL: | D14 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26048&r=all |
| By: | Adam Farago; Martin Holmén; Felix Holzmeister; Michael Kirchler; Michael Razen |
| Abstract: | By running a battery of incentivized and non-incentivized experiments with fund managers from four countries in the European Union, we investigate the impact of fund managers' cognitive skills and economic preferences on the dynamics of the mutual funds they manage. First, we find that fund managers' risk tolerance positively correlates with fund risk when accounting for fund benchmark, fund category, and other controls. Second, we show that fund managers' ambiguity tolerance positively correlates with the funds' tracking error from the benchmark. Finally, we report that cognitive skills do not explain fund performance in terms of excess returns. However, we do find that fund managers with high cognitive reflection abilities generate these returns at lower risk. |
| Keywords: | cognitive skills, economic preferences, fund managers, fund performance, experimental finance |
| JEL: | C91 D91 G11 J24 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2019-16&r=all |
| By: | Gill, David (Purdue University); Prowse, Victoria (Purdue University) |
| Abstract: | Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games. In this paper, we leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on average whenthey face that situation (where we categorize situations according to the characteristics of play in the previous round). We find that strategic complexity varies significantly across situations, and we find considerable heterogeneity in how responsive subjects’ thinking times are to complexity. We also study how variation in response times at the individual level across rounds affects strategic behavior and success. We find that ‘overthinking’ is detrimental to performance: when a subject thinks for longer than she would normally do in a particular situation, she wins less frequently and earns less. The behavioral mechanism that drives the reduction in performance is a tendency to move away from Nash equilibrium behavior. Overthinking is detrimental even though subjects who think for longer on average tend to be more successful. Finally, cognitive ability and personality have no effect on average response times. |
| Keywords: | Response time; decision time; thinking time; strategic complexity; game theory; strategic games; repeated games; beauty contest; cognitive ability; personality. JEL Classification: C72; C91. |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:431&r=all |
| By: | Nikolai Bazenkov (Institute of Control Sciences RAS, Moscow, Russia); Elena Glamozdina (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Maria Kuznetsova (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Marina Sandomirskaia (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper considers three hypotheses about the strategic origin of price dispersion in homogeneous product online sales. The rst two are the E-equilibrium and the quantal-response equilibrium (QRE) in a pure Bertrand setting involving the boundedly rational behavior of sellers. The third introduces the share of loyal consumers into the model of competition. These hypotheses were supported by estimations on experimental lab data. We test the hypotheses on a set of real prices for 30 models of household appliances collected from the largest Russian online marketplace Market.Yandex.ru. In contrast to the previously reported experimental data, we found very limited support for any of these explanations. QRE showed the best performance on the data. For most of the products it accurately predicts central tendency, i.e. the mean and the median. However, the shape of the observed price distributions is not explained well by any of the models. These results pose new challenges for theoretical explanations of observed Internet prices. |
| Keywords: | price dispersion, Internet markets, household appliances, E-equilibrium, quantal-response equilibrium, loyal consumers, e-commerce |
| JEL: | C52 C72 D22 D43 L81 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:219/ec/2019&r=all |
| By: | Giulio Cinquanta (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we develop an experimental questionnaire to analyse people’s social concern for different mobility dimensions. We consider two mobility scenarios: the wealth evolution among generations and periods. Moreover, we test whether people’s social preferences change conditional to different sources of wealth inequality among generations (periods). We find that equality of opportunity in the mobility process has high social value in both mobility scenarios. However, people are not willing to tolerate high wealth inequality and fluctuation among generations (periods) in order to achieve equality of opportunity. Finally, the source of wealth inequality seems to affect differently people preferences for mobility in the two mobility scenarios |
| Keywords: | Intergenerational Mobility, Intragenerational Mobility, Welfare Evaluation, Experimental Questionnaire |
| JEL: | D63 J62 C91 I30 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2019:23&r=all |
| By: | Fochmann, Martin; Hechtner, Frank; Kirchler, Erich; Mohr, Peter |
| Abstract: | Emotions have a strong impact on our everyday life, including our mental health, sleep pattern, overall well-being, and judgment and decision making. Our paper is the first study to show that incidental emotions, i.e., emotions not related to the actual choice problem, influence the compliance behavior of individuals. In particular, we provide evidence that individuals have a lower willingness to comply with social norms after being primed with positive incidental emotions compared with aversive emotions. This result is replicated in a second study. As an extension to our first study, we add a neutral condition as a control. Willingness to comply in this condition ranges between the other two conditions. Importantly, this finding indicates that the valence of an emotion but not its arousal drives the influence on compliance behavior. Furthermore, we show that priming with incidental emotions is only effective if individuals are - at least to some extent - emotionally sensitive. |
| Keywords: | compliance behavior,emotions,cheating,tax evasion,norms,experimental economics |
| JEL: | C91 D91 H26 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:arqudp:237&r=all |
| By: | Fochmann, Martin; Sachs, Florian; Weimann, Joachim |
| Abstract: | Services are often provided by groups. The question of remuneration arises both at the group level and for each individual group member. We examine the question of how relative pay should be designed within the group if all group members are to regard the payment scheme as fair. We use a three-step laboratory experiment to compare which fairness norms are chosen by high-performing and low-performing group members. It turns out that both types of group members prefer the performance pay principle. Support for equal pay is negligible. However, the low performers use their bargaining power to improve their position, but without deviating from the performance principle substantially. A random influence on the performance of the players does not change the results. |
| Keywords: | performance principle,fairness norms,relative remuneration |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D31 D90 J31 M52 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:arqudp:238&r=all |
| By: | Christopher Kah; Daniel Neururer |
| Abstract: | In Österreich wird die Buchpreisbindung durch ein Bundesgesetz aus dem Jahr 2000 geregelt. Die gesetzlichen Regelungen zur Buchpreisbindung polarisieren sehr stark und diese Polarisierung wird dadurch verstärkt, dass sich die Argumente der Befürworter und Gegner meist sehr schwer mit validen Daten belegen lassen. Die Idee dieser Studie ist, dass wir mit Hilfe eines natürlichen Experiments empirisch untersuchen, inwieweit der stationäre Buchhandel positive Nachfrageeffekte generiert und dadurch dem Kulturgut Buch zu einer weiteren Verbreitung verhilft. Unsere Resultate zeigen, dass der stationäre Buchhandel vor allem bei der Personengruppe der Nicht-Pendler positive Nachfrageeffekte generiert und sich der Großteil dieses positiven Nachfrageeffektes wiederum im Buchhandel vor Ort niederschlägt. Aufgrund der klar abgegrenzten Forschungsfrage und dem methodologischen Zugang stellt diese Studie ein Komplement zu klassischen juristischen bzw. ökonomischen Studien über die Buchpreisbindung dar. |
| Keywords: | Buchpreisbindung, Markteingriffe, Preisregulierung |
| JEL: | C93 L42 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2019-15&r=all |
| By: | Molin, Francois (TIER TA); Cabus, Sofie (ku leuven); Haelermans, Carla (General Economics 2 (Macro)); Groot, Wim (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance) |
| Abstract: | This study evaluates the effectiveness of an intervention of formative assessments with a clicker-based technology on anxiety and academic performance. We use a randomized experiment in physics education in one school in Dutch secondary education. For treated students the formative assessments are operationalized through quizzing at the end of each physics class, where clickers enable students to respond to questions. Control students do not receive these assessments and do not use clickers, but apart from that the classes they attend are similar. Findings from multilevel regressions indicate that the formative assessments significantly reduce anxiety in physics, and improve academic performance in physics in comparison with a traditional teaching. Furthermore, a mediation effect of anxiety in physics on academic performance is observed. In sum, this implies that an easily to implement technique of formative assessments can make students feel more at ease, which contributes to better educational performance. |
| Keywords: | formative assessment, physics, Clicker Devices, Secondary education, anxiety, academic performance |
| JEL: | I20 I21 |
| Date: | 2019–05–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2019014&r=all |
| By: | Molin, Francois (TIER TA); Cabus, Sofie; Haelermans, Carla (General Economics 2 (Macro)); Groot, Wim (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance) |
| Abstract: | This study evaluates the effectiveness of an intervention of formative assessments with a clicker-based technology on anxiety and academic performance. We use a randomized experiment in physics education in one school in Dutch secondary education. For treated students the formative assessments are operationalized through quizzing at the end of each physics class, where clickers enable students to respond to questions. Control students do not receive these assessments and do not use clickers, but apart from that the classes they attend are similar. Findings from multilevel regressions indicate that the formative assessments significantly reduce anxiety in physics, and improve academic performance in physics in comparison with a traditional teaching. Furthermore, a mediation effect of anxiety in physics on academic performance is observed. In sum, this implies that an easily to implement technique of formative assessments can make students feel more at ease, which contributes to better educational performance. |
| Keywords: | formative assessment, physics, clicker devices, secondary education, anxiety, academic performance |
| JEL: | I20 I21 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umaror:2019003&r=all |
| By: | Wilhelms, Steven; Coatney, Kalyn T.; Yun, Seong Do; Chaudhry, Anita M.; Barnes, James N. |
| Keywords: | Resource /Energy Economics and Policy |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:291106&r=all |
| By: | Colin Castillo, Sergio; Martinez-Cruz, Adan L.; Manríquez García, Naim; Vázquez-Pérez, Joel T. |
| Keywords: | Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:290765&r=all |
| By: | Dosis, Anastasios (ESSEC Business School and THEMA); Muthoo, Abhinay (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We study a two-stage, winner-takes-all, R&D race, in which, at the outset, firms are uncertain regarding the viability of the project. Learning through experimentation introduces a bilateral (dynamic) feedback mechanism. For relatively low-value products,the equilibrium stopping time coincides with the socially efficient stopping time although firms might experiment excessively inequilibrium; forrelatively high-value products, firms might reduce experimentation and stop rather prematurely due to the fundamental free-riding effect. Perhaps surprisingly, a decrease in the value of the product can spur experimentation. |
| Keywords: | Experimentation ; learning ; dynamic R&D competition ; inefficiency |
| JEL: | C73 D83 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1214&r=all |
| By: | Wang, Holly; Yang, Jing; Zheng, Qiujie; Jiang, Yu |
| Keywords: | Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:290935&r=all |
| By: | Hörner, Denise; Bouguen, Adrien; Frölich, Markus; Wollni, Meike |
| Keywords: | Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:291314&r=all |
| By: | Non, Arjan (General Economics 2 (Macro)); Rohde, Ingrid (iza university of bonn); de Grip, Andries (Research Centre for Educ and Labour Mark); Dohmen, Thomas (General Economics 2 (Macro)) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a discrete choice experiment to investigate how the mission of high-tech companies affects job attractiveness and induces self-selection of science and engineering graduates with respect to their prosocial attitudes. We characterize mission by whether or not the company combines its profit motive with a mission on innovation or corporate social responsibility (CSR). Furthermore, we vary job design (e.g. autonomy) and contractible job attributes (e.g. job security). We find that companies with a mission on innovation or CSR are considered more attractive. Women and individuals who are more altruistic and less competitive feel particularly attracted to such companies. |
| Keywords: | mission of the company, sorting, discrete choice experiment, job characteristics, social preferences |
| JEL: | J81 J82 M52 |
| Date: | 2019–07–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2019020&r=all |
| By: | Non, Arjan (General Economics 2 (Macro)); Rohde, Ingrid (iza university of bonn); de Grip, Andries (Research Centre for Educ and Labour Mark); Dohmen, Thomas (General Economics 2 (Macro)) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a discrete choice experiment to investigate how the mission of high-tech companies affects job attractiveness and induces self-selection of science and engineering graduates with respect to their prosocial attitudes. We characterize mission by whether or not the company combines its profit motive with a mission on innovation or corporate social responsibility (CSR). Furthermore, we vary job design (e.g. autonomy) and contractible job attributes (e.g. job security). We find that companies with a mission on innovation or CSR are considered more attractive. Women and individuals who are more altruistic and less competitive feel particularly attracted to such companies. |
| Keywords: | mission of the company, sorting, discrete choice experiment, job characteristics, social preferences |
| JEL: | J81 J82 M52 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umaror:2019006&r=all |
| By: | Calil, Yuri Clements Daglia; Ribera, Luis A.; Anderson, David P.; Koury Filho, William |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:290684&r=all |
| By: | Holowach, Monique C.; Parkins, John; Anders, Sven M.; Meyerhoff, Juergen |
| Keywords: | Resource /Energy Economics and Policy |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:291103&r=all |