nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2019‒07‒22
twenty-one papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Using Survey Questions to Measure Preferences: Lessons from an Experimental Validation in Kenya By Bauer, Michal; Chytilová, Julie; Miguel, Edward
  2. Rank Incentives and Social Learning: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial By Dobrescu, Isabella; Faravelli, Marco; Megalokonomou, Rigissa; Motta, Alberto
  3. Learning Management Through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design By Girum Abebe; Marcel Fafchamps; Michael Koelle; Simon Quinn
  4. Cheap Talk and Coordination in the Lab and in the Field: Collective Commercialization in Senegal By Fo Kodjo Dzinyefa Aflagah; Tanguy Bernard; Angelino Viceisza
  5. Veto Power in Standing Committees: An Experimental Study By Salvatore Nunnari
  6. An experiment on coordination in a modified stag hunt game By Pietro Guarnieri; Tommaso Luzzati; Stefano Marchetti
  7. "I" on You: Identity in the Dictator Game By Anita Kopányi-Peuker; Jin Di Zheng
  8. Talking about Performance or Paying for it? Evidence from a Field Experiment By Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo
  9. Training, Soft Skills and Productivity: Evidence from a Field Experiment By Prada, Maria; Rucci, Graciana; Urzua, Sergio
  10. Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games By Gilles, Grandjean; Mathieu, Lefebvre; Marco, Mantovani
  11. Audi Alteram Partem: An Experiment on Selective Exposure to Information By Salvatore Nunnari; Giovanni Montari
  12. Intégrer la responsabilité sociétale dans les enseignements de spécialité des masters de Finance : la nécessité d'un équilibre By Marco Heimann; Katia Lobre-Lebraty
  14. Who are the Loss-Averse Farmers? Experimental Evidence from Structurally Estimated Risk Preferences By Bonjean, Isabelle
  15. The Effects of Decentralized and Video-based Extension on the Adoption of Integrated Soil Fertility Management – Experimental Evidence from Ethiopia By Denise Hörner; Adrien Bouguen; Markus Frölich; Meike Wollni
  16. Can Smallholder Extension Transform African Agriculture? By Joshua W. Deutschmann; Maya Duru; Kim Siegal; Emilia Tjernström
  17. Ordinal Imitative Dynamics By George Loginov
  18. What Do Student Jobs on Graduate CVs Signal to Employers? By Van Belle, Eva; Caers, Ralf; Cuypers, Laure; De Couck, Marijke; Neyt, Brecht; Van Borm, Hannah; Baert, Stijn
  19. A Class of Solvable Multidimensional Stopping Problems in the Presence of Knightian Uncertainty By Luis H. R. Alvarez E.; S\"oren Christensen
  20. Ergodicity-breaking reveals time optimal economic behavior in humans By David Meder; Finn Rabe; Tobias Morville; Kristoffer H. Madsen; Magnus T. Koudahl; Ray J. Dolan; Hartwig R. Siebner; Oliver J. Hulme
  21. Choice Architecture for Healthier Insurance Choices: Ordering and Partitioning Can Improve Decisions By Dellaert, B.G.C.; Johnson, E.J.; Baker, T.

  1. By: Bauer, Michal (Charles University, Prague); Chytilová, Julie (Charles University, Prague); Miguel, Edward (University of California, Berkeley)
    Abstract: Can a short survey instrument reliably measure a range of fundamental economic preferences across diverse settings? We focus on survey questions that systematically predict behavior in incentivized experimental tasks among German university students (Becker et al. 2016) and were implemented among representative samples across the globe (Falk et al. 2018). This paper presents results of an experimental validation conducted among low-income individuals in Nairobi, Kenya. We find that quantitative survey measures - hypothetical versions of experimental tasks - of time preference, attitude to risk and altruism are good predictors of choices in incentivized experiments, suggesting these measures are broadly experimentally valid. At the same time, we find that qualitative questions - self-assessments - do not correlate with the experimental measures of preferences in the Kenyan sample. Thus, caution is needed before treating self-assessments as proxies of preferences in new contexts.
    Keywords: preference measurement, experiment, survey, validation
    JEL: C83 D90
    Date: 2019–06
  2. By: Dobrescu, Isabella (University of New South Wales); Faravelli, Marco (University of Queensland); Megalokonomou, Rigissa (University of Queensland); Motta, Alberto (University of New South Wales)
    Abstract: In a 1-year randomized controlled trial involving thousands of university students, we provide real-time private feedback on relative performance in a semester-long online assignment. Within this setup, our experimental design cleanly identifies the behavioral response to rank incentives (i.e., the incentives stemming from an inherent preference for high rank). We find that rank incentives not only boost performance in the related assignment, but also increase the average grade across all course exams taken over the semester by 0.21 standard deviations. These beneficial effects remain sizeable across all quantiles and extend beyond the time of the intervention. The mechanism behind these findings involves social learning: rank incentives make students engage more in peer interactions, which lead them to perform significantly better across the board. Finally, we explore the virtues of real-time feedback by analyzing a number of alternative variations in the way it is provided.
    Keywords: relative performance feedback, rank incentives, social learning, academic performance, randomized controlled trial
    JEL: J24 J18
    Date: 2019–06
  3. By: Girum Abebe; Marcel Fafchamps; Michael Koelle; Simon Quinn
    Abstract: What is the effect of exposing motivated youth to firm management in practice? To answer this question, we place young professionals for one month in established firms to shadow middle managers. Using random assignment into program participation, we find positive average effects on wage employment, but no average effect on the likelihood of self-employment. Within the treatment group, we match individuals and firms in batches using a deferred-acceptance algorithm. We show how this allows us to identify heterogeneous treatment effects by firm and intern. We find striking heterogeneity in self-employment effects, but almost no heterogeneity in wage employment. Estimates of marginal treatment effects (MTE) are then used to simulate counterfactual mechanism design. We find that some assignment mechanisms substantially outperform random matching in generating employment and income effects. These results demonstrate the importance of treatment heterogeneity for the design of field experiments and the role of matching algorithms in intervention design.
    JEL: J24 O1 O15
    Date: 2019–07
  4. By: Fo Kodjo Dzinyefa Aflagah; Tanguy Bernard; Angelino Viceisza
    Abstract: Coordination is central to social interactions. Theory and conventional lab experiments suggest that cheap talk/communication can enhance coordination under certain conditions. Two aspects that remain underexplored are (1) the interaction between the number of players (group size) and communication and (2) how existing findings might play out in the field. We address both of these by studying a typical naturally-occurring setting that requires coordination; that is, one where members of agricultural cooperatives seek to jointly sell their output. Combining artefactual/lab-in-the-field experiments (LFEs), natural field experiments (RCTs), surveys, and cooperative records, we find that (1) revealing farmers' intended sales (i.e., cheap talk/communication) yields enhanced collective commercialization (i.e., coordination), particularly in larger groups; (2) such cheap talk may lead to higher incomes for small-scale farmers; (3) participants transfer learning from the LFEs thus affecting subsequent behavior in the RCTs (i.e., the day-to-day environment). Our results contribute to existing literature by highlighting the potential for cheap-talk institutions to (1) boost coordination, particularly in settings with greater strategic uncertainty (e.g., larger farmer cooperatives), and (2) promote collective entrepreneurship and development.
    JEL: C92 C93 D7 L26 O12 P32 Q13
    Date: 2019–07
  5. By: Salvatore Nunnari
    Abstract: Many voting bodies grant one or several of their members a veto right, that is, the right to block decisions even when a proposal has secured the necessary majority. The existence of veto power raises two concerns: first, it increases the possibility of status quo inertia; second, although it only grants the power to block decisions, it could allow veto members to impose their ideal decision on the rest of the committee. While these concerns have been investigated from the perspective of ad hoc committees, which bargain on a single policy, most committees are standing and bargain over a sequence of policies while an endogenous status quo is in place. In this paper, I present the results of a laboratory experiment designed to study the consequences of veto power in these committees. I show that (i) non-veto players are substantially less willing to support the expropriation of other non-veto players when dynamic incentives are strong and (ii) veto power substantially reduces proposal power; nonetheless, (iii) the allocation to the veto player displays a ratchet effect, and (iv) committees with a veto player have more status quo inertia and inequality of outcomes than committees without a veto player. I relate these results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power in standing committees. JEL Classiffications: C72, C73, C78, C92, D71, D72, D78 Keywords: Legislative Bargaining; Endogenous Status Quo; Veto Power; Laboratory Experiments; Status Quo Inertia; Policy Capture; Redistribution; Inequality
    Date: 2019
  6. By: Pietro Guarnieri; Tommaso Luzzati; Stefano Marchetti
    Abstract: The paper experimentally investigates whether adding a dominated strategy changes subjects’ decisions in a stag hunt decision context. Specifically, we run two two-periods treatments where respectively 1) the decision makers firstly face the standard stag-hunt matrix and then the modified three-options matrix and 2) the decision makers firstly face the modified three-options matrix and then the standard two-options stag-hunt matrix. Given the circumstance that the added strategy is dominated, standard rationality assumption would predict no changes in participants decisions across periods and treatments. On the contrary, our results show that the exposure to one or the other treatment frames the decision-situation in a different way. Decision makers become less propense to take the risk of “hunting stags” in the modified three-options matrix, after they are firstly exposed to the two-options standard stag-hunt matrix. Vice versa, they appear more propense to change their decision towards the payoff dominant quilibrium, when they are firstly exposed to the modified three-options matrix and then to the two-options standard stag-hunt matrix.
    Keywords: stag hunt, coordination, risk-dominance, risk framing
    JEL: C91 C72 D8
    Date: 2019–07–01
  7. By: Anita Kopányi-Peuker (University of Amsterdam); Jin Di Zheng (Nanjing Audit University)
    Abstract: We study a giver’s generosity depending on her relationship with the recipient and the observer. We assign different group identities to the players using a variation of the minimumgroup paradigm, and test the effect of group memberships on altruistic giving in the dictator game with a passive observer. The results show that the dictator gives the least when she is from a different group than the other two. We further show that dictators give more when there is no observer. This is driven by male subjects who react more to the presence of the observer.
    Keywords: dictator game, observer, group identity, laboratory experiment
    JEL: D91 C72 C92
    Date: 2019–07–16
  8. By: Manthei, Kathrin (RFH Koeln); Sliwka, Dirk (University of Cologne); Vogelsang, Timo (University of Cologne)
    Abstract: We investigate the causal effect of conversations about performance and performance pay implementing a 2x2 field experiment in a retail chain. In the performance pay treatments, managers receive a bonus for profit increases. In the performance review treatments, managers have regular meetings with their supervisors discussing their activities to increase profits. We find that review conversations raise profits by 7%-8%. However, when additionally receiving performance pay this effect vanishes. Analyzing an extension of Bénabou and Tirole (2006), we rationalize this effect formally and provide empirical evidence that the use of performance pay changes the nature of conversations undermining their value.
    Keywords: performance pay, performance reviews, monitoring, feedback, field experiment, management practices
    JEL: J3 L2 M5 C93
    Date: 2019–06
  9. By: Prada, Maria (University of Maryland); Rucci, Graciana (IADB); Urzua, Sergio (University of Maryland)
    Abstract: This paper examines a training intervention aimed at boosting leadership and communication skills among employees of a large Latin American retailer. The identification exploits an experimental design in the context of a difference-in-difference strategy. Using longitudinal information obtained from the firm and two skills surveys, we document large positive effects of the training on store- and individual- level productivity. The intervention was more effective in boosting leadership than communication skills. Spillovers from trained managers to untrained sales representatives also contribute to the main effects. Our findings confirm the possibility of increasing productivity through training targeting critical soft-skills.
    Keywords: socio-emotional skills, training, productivity, experiments with firms
    JEL: C93 J24 M53 O15
    Date: 2019–06
  10. By: Gilles, Grandjean; Mathieu, Lefebvre; Marco, Mantovani
    Abstract: We analyze experimentally behavior in a finitely repeated public goods game. One of the main results of the literature is that contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two explanations of this pattern have been developed: (i) the population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well; (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper contributes to bridging the gap between these views. We analyze preferences and strategic ability in one design by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both dimensions. Our results highlight the interaction between the two: groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation.
    Keywords: Voluntary contribution, conditional cooperation, free riding, strategic sophistication.
    JEL: H41 C73 C92
    Date: 2018–12–19
  11. By: Salvatore Nunnari; Giovanni Montari
    Abstract: This paper presents a model of selective exposure to information and an experiment to test its predictions. An agent interested in learning about an uncertain state of the world can acquire information from one of two sources which have opposite biases: when informed on the state, they report it truthfully; when uninformed, they report their favorite state. When sources have the same reliability, a Bayesian agent is better off seeking confirmatory information. On the other hand, it is optimal to seek contradictory information if and only if the source biased against the prior is sufficiently more reliable. We test these predictions with an online experiment. When sources are symmetrically reliable, subjects are more likely to seek confirmatory information but they listen to the other side too frequently. When sources are asymmetrically reliable, subjects are more likely to consult the more reliable source even when prior beliefs are strongly unbalanced and listening to the less reliable source is more informative. Moreover, subjects follow contradictory advice sub-optimally; are too trusting of information in line with a source bias; and too skeptic of information misaligned with a source bias. Our experiment suggests that biases in information processing and simple heuristics - e.g., listen to the more reliable source - are important drivers of the endogenous acquisition of information. Keywords: Choice under Uncertainty, Information Acquisition, Bayesian Updating, Selective Exposure, Con rmation Bias, Limited Attention, Online Experiment JEL Codes: C91, D81, D83, D91
    Date: 2019
  12. By: Marco Heimann (Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon, Université de Lyon, UJML3, IAE Lyon, Magellan ou University of Lyon, UJML3, iaelyon School of Management, Magellan, Centre de Recherche Magellan - UJML - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon III - Université de Lyon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon); Katia Lobre-Lebraty (Université de Lyon, UJML3, IAE Lyon, Magellan ou University of Lyon, UJML3, iaelyon School of Management, Magellan, Centre de Recherche Magellan - UJML - Université Jean Moulin - Lyon III - Université de Lyon - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Lyon)
    Abstract: Social responsibility is on the rise in businesses and business schools alike. However, most of management education focuses on general courses of business ethics and specialties like finance are lagging behind in integrating responsible management practices in their curriculum. To experiment with responsible finance education tools we ask whether providing extra-financial information in a stock picking game can be used to lever responsible behavior education? To answer this question 142 graduate students of finance participated in a stock market simulation where they had to manage a virtual portfolio. During four months students were provided with financial, environmental, social and governance information of 600 European companies on a dedicated website. Further, we used an experimental in between subjects two by two design and manipulated reminders of responsibility and reminders of the importance of financial performance within the game. We find that portfolios contain more responsible stocks over time suggesting that habit formation plays a significant role. More interestingly, we show that when students are reminded about the importance of the moral conduct of management without reminding them of the importance of financial performance, the stocks in their portfolios are less responsible. We conclude that finance students can be brought to familiarize and adopt responsible management practices by long term simulations but redoubt moralization of their curriculum. This implies that responsible management educators should not only focus on moral imperatives but also on the importance of a holistic approach to performance. We finally draw links to literature on pro-social behavior and psychological mechanisms that could underlie the investment decisions.
    Abstract: La responsabilité sociale a le vent en poupe, dans les entreprises comme dans les écoles de management. Cependant, la formation à cette responsabilité se réalise le plus souvent par l'ajout de cours généraux, dédiés à la Responsabilité Sociétale des Organisations sous de multiples appellations (développement durable, éthique des affaires…) dans les cursus et les formations. Ainsi, les spécialités très techniques telles que la finance tardent à intégrer les pratiques de gestion responsable dans leurs enseignements. Cette forme d'implémentation, plus conforme au caractère transversal et holiste de la RSO, semble également plus à même de former de futurs managers effectivement responsables. Afin de le vérifier, une expérimentation pédagogique réalisée auprès de 142 étudiants de Master 2 en finance à l'iaelyon, école de management universitaire publique, a été mise en oeuvre. Celle-ci a consisté en un jeu d'investissement responsable qui a permis d'analyser le comportement d'investissement des étudiants, sur une durée de 4 mois. L'utilisation de l'information extra financière par les étudiants a notamment pu être étudiée à travers le niveau de responsabilité de leurs portefeuilles. Une analyse et une discussion approfondie tant des résultats attendus qu'atypiques est alors conduite débouchant à la fois sur des perspectives théoriques mais aussi pratiques en matière de formation à la RSO.
    Keywords: Socially Responsible Investment (SRI),responsible management education,experimenta- tion,responsible behavior,decision psychology,Investissement Socialement Responsable (ISR),éducation à la gestion responsable,expérimentation,comportement responsable,psychologie décisionnelle.
    Date: 2018–12–01
  13. By: Stijn Baert; Brecht Neyt; Thomas Siedler; Ilse Toback; Dieter Verhaest (-)
    Abstract: Internships during tertiary education have become substantially more common over the past decades in many industrialised countries. This study examines the impact of a voluntary intra-curricular internship experience during university studies on the probability of being invited to a job interview. To estimate a causal relationship, we conducted a randomised field experiment in which we sent 1,248 fictitious, but realistic, resumes to real job openings. We find that applicants with internship experience have, on average, a 12.6% higher probability of being invited to a job interview.
    Keywords: Internship, hiring, human capital, signalling, field experiment.
    JEL: C93 I21 J23 J24
    Date: 2019–07
  14. By: Bonjean, Isabelle
    Keywords: Farm Management, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods
    Date: 2019–07–13
  15. By: Denise Hörner; Adrien Bouguen; Markus Frölich; Meike Wollni
    Abstract: The slow adoption of new agricultural technologies is an important factor in explaining persistent productivity deficits among smallholders in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Farmers delay in particular the uptake of technology packages. Since knowledge constraints are an important barrier to adoption, effective extension approaches are key. In recent decades, extension systems in many SSA countries have moved towards decentralized “bottom-up” models involving farmers as active stakeholders. In this study we assess the effects of a decentralized extension program and an additional video intervention on the adoption of integrated soil fertility management (ISFM) among 2,382 farmers in Ethiopia using a randomized controlled trial. ISFM should enhance soil fertility and productivity by combining organic and inorganic soil amendments. We find that both extension-only and extension combined with video increase ISFM adoption and knowledge. We further find evidence for increased adoption of ISFM practices among farmers in treatment communities that do not actively participate in the extension activities. The additional video intervention shows a significant complementary effect for these non-actively involved farmers, in particular regarding the combined use of the practices on the same plot. A causal mediation analysis reveals that increases in knowledge explain part of the treatment effects on adoption.
    JEL: Q01 Q15 Q16
    Date: 2019–07
  16. By: Joshua W. Deutschmann; Maya Duru; Kim Siegal; Emilia Tjernström
    Abstract: Agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lags far behind all other regions of the world. A long list of policy experiments has yielded more evidence on what fails than on what works. We analyze a randomized control trial of a rare scaled-up success story: One Acre Fund’s small farmer program. Much like anti-poverty "graduation" interventions, the program aims to relax multiple constraints to productivity simultaneously. We show that participation causes statistically and economically significant increases in output, yields, and profits. In our preferred specification, maize production increases by 24% and profits by 16%. We find little evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects on yields, but observe some attenuation of impacts on total output and profits at the top end of the distribution.
    JEL: O12 O13 Q12
    Date: 2019–07
  17. By: George Loginov
    Abstract: This paper introduces an evolutionary dynamics based on imitate the better realization (IBR) rule. Under this rule, agents in a population game imitate the strategy of a randomly chosen opponent whenever the opponent`s realized payoff is higher than their own. Such behavior generates an ordinal mean dynamics which is polynomial in strategy utilization frequencies. We demonstrate that while the dynamics does not possess Nash stationarity or payoff monotonicity, under it pure strategies iteratively strictly dominated by pure strategies are eliminated and strict equilibria are locally stable. We investigate the relationship between the dynamics based on the IBR rule and the replicator dynamics. In trivial cases, the two dynamics are topologically equivalent. In Rock-Paper-Scissors games we conjecture that both dynamics exhibit the same types of behavior, but the partitions of the game set do not coincide. In other cases, the IBR dynamics exhibits behaviors that are impossible under the replicator dynamics.
    Date: 2019–07
  18. By: Van Belle, Eva (University of Neuchatel); Caers, Ralf (KU Leuven); Cuypers, Laure (Ghent University); De Couck, Marijke (Free University of Brussels); Neyt, Brecht (Ghent University); Van Borm, Hannah (Ghent University); Baert, Stijn (Ghent University)
    Abstract: Due to the prevalence and important consequences of student work, the topic has seen an increased interest in the literature. However, to date the focus has been solely on measuring the effect of student employment on later labour market outcomes, relying on signalling theory to explain the observed effects. In the current study, we go beyond measuring the effect of student work and we examine for the first time what exactly is being signalled by student employment. We do this by means of a vignette experiment in which we ask 242 human resource professionals to evaluate a set of five fictitious profiles. Whereas all types of student work signal a better work attitude, a larger social network, a greater sense of responsibility, an increased motivation, and more maturity, only student employment in line with a job candidate's field of study is a signal of increased human capital and increased trainability.
    Keywords: student employment, signalling, hiring chances, vignette study
    JEL: C91 I21 J22 J24
    Date: 2019–06
  19. By: Luis H. R. Alvarez E.; S\"oren Christensen
    Abstract: We investigate the impact of Knightian uncertainty on the optimal timing policy of an ambiguity averse decision maker in the case where the underlying factor dynamics follow a multidimensional Brownian motion and the exercise payoff depends on either a linear combination of the factors or the radial part of the driving factor dynamics. We present a general characterization of the value of the optimal timing policy and the worst case measure in terms of a family of an explicitly identified excessive functions generating an appropriate class of supermartingales. In line with previous findings based on linear diffusions, we find that ambiguity accelerates timing in comparison with the unambiguous setting. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that ambiguity may result into stationarity in models which typically do not possess stationary behavior. In this way, our results indicate that ambiguity may act as a stabilizing mechanism.
    Date: 2019–07
  20. By: David Meder; Finn Rabe; Tobias Morville; Kristoffer H. Madsen; Magnus T. Koudahl; Ray J. Dolan; Hartwig R. Siebner; Oliver J. Hulme
    Abstract: Ergodicity describes an equivalence between the expectation value and the time average of observables. Applied to human behaviour, ergodic theory reveals how individuals should tolerate risk in different environments. To optimise wealth over time, agents should adapt their utility function according to the dynamical setting they face. Linear utility is optimal for additive dynamics, whereas logarithmic utility is optimal for multiplicative dynamics. Whether humans approximate time optimal behavior across different dynamics is unknown. Here we compare the effects of additive versus multiplicative gamble dynamics on risky choice. We show that utility functions are modulated by gamble dynamics in ways not explained by prevailing economic theory. Instead, as predicted by time optimality, risk aversion increases under multiplicative dynamics, distributing close to the values that maximise the time average growth of wealth. We suggest that our findings motivate a need for explicitly grounding theories of decision-making on ergodic considerations.
    Date: 2019–06
  21. By: Dellaert, B.G.C.; Johnson, E.J.; Baker, T.
    Abstract: Health insurance decisions are a challenge for many consumers and influence welfare, health outcomes, and longevity. Two choice architecture tools are examined that can improve these decisions: informed ordering of options (from best to worst) and choice set partitioning. It is hypothesized that these tools can improve choices by changing: (1) decision focus: the options in a set on which consumers focus their attention, and (2) decision strategy: how consumers integrate the different attributes that make up the options. The first experiment focuses on the mediating role of the hypothesized decision processes on consumer decision outcomes. The outcome results are validated further in a field study of over 40,000 consumers making actual health insurance choices and in two additional experiments. The results show that informed ordering and partitioning can reduce consumers’ mistakes by hundreds of dollars per year. They suggest that wise choice architecture interventions depend upon two factors: The quality of the user model possessed by the firm to predict consumers’ best choice and possible interactions among the ensemble of choice architecture tools.
    Keywords: choice architecture, decision-making, consumer decision process, health insurance choice, consumer welfare
    Date: 2019–07–01

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