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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2019‒05‒13
29 papers chosen by |
| By: | Arnaud Tognetti (Karolinska Institutet [Stockholm], Institute for Advanced Study Toulouse); David Doat (ANTHROPO-LAB - Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Expérimentale - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille); Dimitri Dubois (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier); Rustam Romaniuc (ANTHROPO-LAB - Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Expérimentale - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, LEM - Lille économie management - LEM - UMR 9221 - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | The empathy-altruism hypothesis postulates that the awareness of others' need, pain, or distress increases empathetic feelings, which in turn triggers cooperative behaviour. Although some evidence supports this hypothesis, previous studies were prone to the ‘experimenter demand effects' raising concerns about the interpretation of the results. To avoid this issue, we designed a laboratory experiment where we examined whether the presence of individuals with a genuine physical disability would increase group cooperation in a public goods game. By manipulating the group composition during a social dilemma, we created a more ecologically valid environment closer to real-life interactions. Our results showed that the presence of physically disabled individuals did not affect group cooperation. Specifically, their presence did not affect the contributions of their physically abled partners. The lack of a surge in cooperative behaviour questions the interpretation of previous studies and suggests that they may be explained by an experimenter demand effect. Alternatively, our results may also suggest that in the context of a social dilemma with real stakes, people with physical disabilities are not perceived as being in need or do not induce enough empathy to overweight the cost of cooperation and trigger cooperative behaviours. |
| Keywords: | cooperation,empathy-altruism hypothesis,public goods game,physically disabled individuals |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02103832&r=all |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Stephane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales); Julie Rosaz (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UM3 - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - INRA Montpellier - Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier); Jason Shogren (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - UW - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Oath-taking for senior executives has been promoted as a mean to enhance honesty within and towards organizations. Herein we explore whether people who voluntarily sign a solemn truth-telling oath are more committed to sincere behavior when offered the chance to lie. We design an experiment to test how the oath affects truth-telling in two contexts: a neutral context replicating the typical experiment in the literature, and a "loaded" context in which we remind subjects that "a lie is a lie." We consider four payoff configurations, with differential monetary incentives to lie, implemented as within-subjects treatment variables. The results are reinforced by robustness investigations in which each subject made only one lying decision. Our results show that the oath reduces lying, especially in the loaded environment-falsehoods are reduced by fifty percent. The oath, however, have a weaker effect on lying in the neutral environment. The oath did affect decision times in all instances: the average person takes significantly more time deciding whether to lie under oath. |
| Keywords: | Lies,Truth-telling oath,Deception,Laboratory Experiment |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02018089&r=all |
| By: | Alexander Coutts |
| Abstract: | The use of lab in the field experiments has increased dramatically, given benefits of studying relevant populations. Conducted in environments where researchers must relinquish the control a standard laboratory o ers, they raise the specter of communication from past to future participants, posing problems for inference. While researchers may take steps to avoid spillovers, little is known about the mechanics of such spillovers in lab in the field settings, nor to what extent they may bias inference. In rural villages participating in public goods games in Rwanda, I recover estimates of these spillovers by matching villages on all available pre-study observables, comparing those with and without communication opportunities. I find communication led to substantial unanticipated increases in cooperation, driven by conditional cooperators. I conclude with advice to manage potential bias from spillovers. |
| Keywords: | Lab Experiments, Public Goods Games, Field Experiments, Development, Rwanda, East Africa, Spillovers, Information Transmission, Social Learning |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:novafr:wp1903&r=all |
| By: | Albert, Philipp; Kübler, Dorothea; Silva-Goncalves, Juliana |
| Abstract: | Ambition as the desire for personal achievement is an important driver of behavior. Using laboratory experiments, we study the role of social influence on ambition in two distinct domains of achievement, namely performance goals and task complexity. In the first case, participants set themselves a performance goal for a task they have to work on. The goal is associated with a proportional bonus that is added to a piece rate if the goal is reached. In the second case, they choose the complexity of the task, which is positively associated with the piece rate compensation and effort. In both cases we test whether observing peer choices influences own choices. We find strong evidence of peer effects on performance goals. In contrast, we find no support for peer effects on the choice of task complexity. |
| Keywords: | peer effects,ambition,goal setting,task difficulty,laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D83 D91 I24 M5 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2019202&r=all |
| By: | Danne, Michael; Buchholz, Matthias; Musshoff, Oliver |
| Abstract: | Farmland is a principal production factor in agricultural production. Farmers have the opportunity to buy or to rent farmland. In this paper, we apply a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to analyze farmers’ individual buying and rental decisions for farmland. The net present value (NPV) is used as normative benchmark to evaluate farmers’ decisions in the experiment. Sociodemographic and business variables as well as farmers expectations about developments of farmland prices are used as covariates in the econometric analysis. Our results reveal that farmers have a higher willingness to buy than to rent farmland. Covariates as the farm size and the farmers risk attitude influence the farmers’ decisions in the DCE while no effect was observable for the individual expected purchase price change. Finally, we find that farmers act only in nearly the half of all decision in accordance with the NPV. |
| Keywords: | Land Economics/Use |
| Date: | 2019–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaa165:288295&r=all |
| By: | Alice Solda (Queensland University of Technology; University of Lyon); Changxia Ke (Queensland University of Technology); Lionel Page (Queensland University of Technology; University of Technology Sydney); William von Hippel (University of Queensland) |
| Abstract: | We aim to test the hypothesis that overconfidence arises as a strategy to influence others in social interactions. We design an experiment in which participants are incentivised either to form accurate beliefs about their performance at a test, or to convince a group of other participants that they performed well. We also vary participants’ ability to gather information about their performance. Our results provide, the different empirical links of von Hippel and Trivers’ (2011) theory of strategic overconfidence. |
| Keywords: | Overconfidence; motivated cognition; self-deception; persuasion; information sampling; experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uts:ecowps:2019/05&r=all |
| By: | Uzma Afzal; Giovanna D'Adda; Marcel Fafchamps; Simon R. Quinn; Farah Said |
| Abstract: | We conduct a field experiment to test the demand for flexibility and for soft and hard commitment among clients of a microfinance institution. We offer a commitment contract inspired by the rotating structure of a ROSCA. Additional treatments test ex ante demand for soft commitment (in the form of reminders), hard commitment (in the form of a penalty for missing an installment), and flexibility (an option to postpone an installment). Our design is unique in the literature for allowing us to test — using the same respondent population — how demand for explicit commitment features differs between loan and savings contracts. We find substantial demand for both credit and savings contracts but no demand for additional commitment features — either in isolation or in combination — in spite of their effectiveness in improving repayment. In particular, demand for savings is insensitive to explicit commitment features. Individuals offered loans actively dislike commitment and flexibility, unless the latter is combined with reminders. These findings complement a literature showing that commitment devices induce financial discipline. They show that demand for commitment depends on whether commitment features are implicit or explicit. |
| JEL: | G02 O16 |
| Date: | 2019–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25802&r=all |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Stéphane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales, AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jason Shogren (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - UW - University of Wyoming); Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased. |
| Keywords: | Oath,Cheap talk communication,Coordination game |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01480525&r=all |
| By: | Ambroise Descamps (School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology; Oxera Consulting LLP); Sebastien Massoni (School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology); Lionel Page (University of Technology Sydney) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how people make choices when they are unsure about the value of the options they face and have to decide whether to choose now or wait and acquire more information first. We design a laboratory experiment to study whether human behaviour is able to approximate the optimal solution to this problem. We find that participants deviate from it in a systematic manner: they acquire too much information (when costly) or not enough (when cheap). These deviations costs participants between 10% and 25% of their potential payoffs. With time, participants tend to learn to approximate the optimal strategy. |
| Keywords: | search; decision under uncertainty; information; optimal stopping; real option |
| JEL: | C91 D81 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uts:ecowps:2019/04&r=all |
| By: | Breitmoser, Yves; Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian |
| Abstract: | Li (2017) supports his theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy with experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending clock than the static second-price auction (private values). We replicate his experimental study and add three intermediate auction formats to decompose this behavioral improvement into cumulative effects of (1) seeing an ascending-price clock (after bid submission), (2) bidding dynamically on the clock and (3) getting drop-out information. Li's theory predicts dominance to become obvious through (2) dynamic bidding. We find no significant behavioral effect of (2). However, both (1) and (3) are highly significant. |
| Keywords: | strategy proofness,experiments,private value auction |
| JEL: | C91 D44 D82 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2019203&r=all |
| By: | Sascha Becker; Ana Fernandes; Doris Weichselbaumer |
| Abstract: | Due to conventional gender norms, women are more likely to be in charge of childcare than men. From an employer’s perspective, in their fertile age they are also at “risk” of pregnancy. Both factors potentially affect hiring practices of firms. We conduct a largescale correspondence test in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, sending out approx. 9,000 job applications, varying job candidate’s personal characteristics such as marital status and age of children. We find evidence that, for part-time jobs, married women with older kids, who likely finished their childbearing cycle and have more projectable childcare chores than women with very young kids, are at a significant advantage vis-à-vis other groups of women. At the same time, married, but childless applicants, who have a higher likelihood to become pregnant, are at a disadvantage compared to single, but childless applicants to part-time jobs. Such effects are not present for full-time jobs, presumably, because by applying to these in contrast to part-time jobs, women signal that they have arranged for external childcare. |
| Keywords: | fertility, discrimination experimental economics |
| JEL: | C93 J16 J71 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7624&r=all |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Stephane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales); Antoine Malézieux (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, University of Exeter Business School - University of Exeter Business School); Jason Shogren (Departement Economy and Finance, University of Wyoming - UW - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Why do people pay taxes? Rational choice theory has fallen short in answering this question. Another explanation, called "tax morale", has been promoted. Tax morale captures the behavioral idea that non-monetary preferences (like norm-submission, moral emotions and moral judgments) might be better determinants of tax compliance than monetary trade-offs. Herein we report on two lab experiments designed to assess whether norm-submission, moral emotions (e.g., affective empathy, cognitive empathy, propensity to feel guilt and shame) or moral judgments (e.g., ethics principles, integrity, and moralization of everyday life) can help explain compliance behavior. Although we find statistically significant correlations of tax compliance behavior with empathy and shame, the economic significance of these correlations are low more than 80% of the variability in compliance remains unexplained. These results suggest that tax authorities should focus on the institutional context, rather than individual preference characteristics, to handle tax evasion. |
| Keywords: | tax evasion,tax morale,morality,personality traits,psychometrics |
| Date: | 2019–02–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02008071&r=all |
| By: | Aaron Chalfin; Benjamin Hansen; Jason Lerner; Lucie Parker |
| Abstract: | This paper offers experimental evidence that crime can be successfully reduced by changing the situational environment that potential victims and offenders face. We focus on a ubiquitous but surprisingly understudied feature of the urban landscape – street lighting – and report the first experimental evidence on the effect of street lighting on crime. Through a unique public partnership in New York City, temporary streetlights were randomly allocated to public housing developments from March through August 2016. We find evidence that communities that were assigned more lighting experienced sizable reductions in crime. After accounting for potential spatial spillovers, we find that the provision of street lights led, at a minimum, to a 36 percent reduction in nighttime outdoor index crimes. |
| JEL: | H40 H7 I1 K42 |
| Date: | 2019–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25798&r=all |
| By: | Francis Bloch (Department of Economics, Ashoka University); Bhaskar Dutta (Department of Economics, Ashoka University); Stéphane Robin (Department of Economics, Ashoka University); Min Zhu (Department of Economics, Ashoka University) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports on laboratory experiments on the formation of partnerships in social networks. Agents randomly request favors and turn to their neighbors to form a partnership where they commit to provide the favor when requested. The formation of a partnership is modeled as a sequential game, which admits a unique subgame perfect equilibrium resulting in the formation of the maximum number of partnerships. Experimental results show that a large fraction of the subjects (75%) play according to their subgame perfect equilibrium strategy and reveals that the efficient maximum matching is formed over 78% of the times. When subjects deviate from their best responses, they accept to form partnerships too early. The incentive to accept when it is optimal to reject is positively correlated with subjects' risk aversion, and players employ simple heuristics-like the presence of a captive partner-to decide whether they should accept or reject the formation of a partnership. |
| Keywords: | social networks, partnerships, matchings in networks, non-stationary networks, laboratory experiments |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ash:wpaper:1009&r=all |
| By: | M. Martin Boyer; Philippe d’Astous; Pierre-Carl Michaud |
| Abstract: | We conduct a stated-choice experiment to analyze the decision to contribute to front- or back-loaded tax-sheltered savings accounts. Our experimental design includes a randomized financial education treatment that provides information on the two types of accounts. We assess whether respondents learn about the tax implications of these accounts, and whether they make better contribution choices when exposed to the financial education intervention. We find that, relative to a control group, our intervention improves both the understanding of the tax implications of the savings accounts (an increase of 6 to 15 points on a score of 100) and the quality of contribution decisions, improving the well-being of respondents by about 140$ in each scenario presented to them. |
| Keywords: | Tax sheltered saving, retirement saving, financial education. |
| JEL: | G11 H31 D14 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:criacr:1902&r=all |
| By: | M. Martin Boyer; Philippe d'Astous; Pierre-Carl Michaud |
| Abstract: | We conduct a stated-choice experiment to analyze the decision to contribute to front or back-loaded tax-sheltered savings accounts. Our experimental design includes a randomized financial education treatment that provides information on the two types of accounts. We assess whether respondents learn about the tax implications of these accounts, and whether they make better contribution choices when exposed to the financial education intervention. We find that, relative to a control group, our intervention improves both the understanding of the tax implications of the savings accounts (an increase of 6 to 15 points on a score of 100) and the quality of contribution decisions, improving the well-being of respondents by about 140$ in each scenario presented to them. |
| Keywords: | Tax sheltered saving,retirement saving,financial education, |
| JEL: | G11 H31 D14 |
| Date: | 2019–05–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2019s-10&r=all |
| By: | Liu, Manwei (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); van der Heijden, Eline (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Collective-choice rules aggregate individual choices into a group choice. This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situation in which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutions to achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoice rules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identify a direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules may affect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are: (1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium" (i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democratic rule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2) In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictator are more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groups with a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs. |
| Keywords: | collective decision-making; social dilemma; institutions; majority rule; dictatorship; cooperation |
| JEL: | C92 D02 D71 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:78b5d351-486e-425d-a070-2492b5a8f196&r=all |
| By: | Newman Carol; Tarp Finn; Narciso Gaia |
| Abstract: | How can development programmes reach out to remote communities? This paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of a role models intervention that aims to inspire ethnic minority households to start businesses and diversify income sources.The experiment took place in three provinces of the Northern highlands of Viet Nam. The research design enables us to disentangle the extent to which role models shift behaviour by providing information or inspiration.We find that despite successful implementation of the intervention, which was powered to detect reasonably small effects, and a high level of compliance, the role model intervention did not impact on income, livelihoods, or other welfare outcomes. This points to the difficulties involved in using role models to induce behavioural change in contexts where populations are severely marginalized and face a variety of binding constraints. |
| Keywords: | Role models,Rural areas,ethnic minorities,Entrepreneurship |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2018-185&r=all |
| By: | Schmidt, Robert J. |
| Abstract: | We propose a method to identify the ranking of focal points (Schelling, 1960) on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, where subjects bet on only one alternative, subjects coordinate by the distribution of points. This allows them to invest in multiple alternatives and to weigh their choices. As a result, subjects not only reveal which alternative appears most focal to them, but the ranking of the available alternatives with regard to the degree of focality. In an experiment on the elicitation of social norms (Krupka and Weber, 2013), we compare the proposed mechanism with conventional coordination. The data confirms the theoretical predictions regarding coordination behavior and demonstrates that the proposed technique is suited to identify the heterogeneity of focal points on the individual level. Moreover, using Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the proposed mechanism identifies focal points on the group level significantly more efficiently than ordinary coordination. Finally, we point to the possibility to use the mechanism as a simple and direct tool to measure the degree of strategic uncertainty on the individual level. |
| Keywords: | coordination; focal points; game theory; methodology; social norms |
| Date: | 2019–03–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:660&r=all |
| By: | Usmani Faraz; Jeuland Marc; Pattanayak Subhrendu |
| Abstract: | Interventions in remote, rural settings face high transaction costs. We develop a model of household decision-making to evaluate how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) address these implementation-related challenges and influence intervention effectiveness. To test our model’s predictions, we create a sample of observationally similar Indian villages that differ in their prior engagement with a local development NGO. In partnership with this NGO, we then stratify a randomized technology promotion intervention on this institutional variable.We uncover a large, positive, and statistically significant ‘NGO effect’: prior engagement with the NGO increases the effectiveness of our intervention by at least 30 per cent. Our results have implications for the generalizability of experimental research conducted jointly with NGOs. In particular, attempts to scale-up findings from such work may prove less successful than anticipated if the role of NGOs is insufficiently understood. Alternatively, policy makers looking to scale-up could achieve greater success by enlisting trusted local partners. |
| Keywords: | external validity,NGOs,Field experiments |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2018-59&r=all |
| By: | Claude Meidinger (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Whether there is a pre-existing common "language" that ties down the literal meanings of cheap talk messages or not is a distinction plainly important in practice. But it is assumed irrelevant in traditional game theory because it affects neither the payoff structure nor the theoretical possibilities for signaling. And when in experiments the "common-language" assumption is simplicitly implemented, such situations ignore the meta-coordination problem created by communication. Players must coordinate their beliefs on what various messages mean before they can use messages to coordinate on what to do. Using simulations with populations of artificial agents, the paper investigates the way according to which a common meaning can be constituted through a collective process of learning and compares the results thus obtained with those available in some experiments. |
| Abstract: | Le fait de savoir s'il existe ou non un « langage » commun préexistant qui détermine les significations littérales des messages cheap talk est manifestement important en pratique. Cependant ce fait est considéré comme non pertinent dans la théorie traditionnelle des jeux car il n'affecte ni la structure des gains ni les possibilités théoriques de signaler. Et quand dans les expériences l'hypothèse d'un « langage commun » est implicitement implémentée, de telles situations ignorent le problème de méta-coordination créé par la communication. Les joueurs doivent coordonner leurs croyances sur ce que signifient les différents messages avant d'utiliser les messages pour coordonner leurs actions. A l'aide de simulations au sein de populations d'agents artificiels, ce papier étudie la manière selon laquelle une signification commune de messages peut se constituer dans le cadre d'un processus collectif de learning et compare les résultats obtenus avec ceux résultant d'expériences. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics,Computational Economics,Signaling games,Economie expérimentale,Economie computationnelle,Jeux avec communication |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01960762&r=all |
| By: | Alec Brandon; John List; Robert Metcalfe; Michael Price; Florian Rundhammer |
| Abstract: | This study considers the response of household electricity consumption to social nudges during peak load events. Our investigation considers two social nudges. The first targets conservation during peak load events, while the second promotes aggregate conservation. Using data from a natural field experiment with 42,100 households, we find that both social nudges reduce peak load electricity consumption by 2 to 4% when implemented in isolation and by nearly 7% when implemented in combination. These findings suggest an important role for social nudges in the regulation of electricity markets and a limited role for crowd out effects. |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00669&r=all |
| By: | Elias Bouacida (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | I introduce a general method for identifying choice correspondences experimentally, i.e., the sets of best alternatives of decision makers in each choice sets. Most of the revealed preference literature assumes that decision makers can choose sets. In contrast, most experiments force the choice of a single alternative in each choice set. In this paper, I allow decision makers to choose several alternatives, provide a small incentive for each alternative chosen, and then randomly select one for payment. I derive the conditions under which the method at least partially identifies the choice correspondence, by obtaining supersets and subsets for each choice set. I illustrate the method with an experiment, in which subjects chose between four paid tasks. I can retrieve the full choice correspondence for 26% of subjects and bind it for another 46%. Subjects chose sets of size 2 or larger 60% of the time, whereas only 3% of them always chose singletons. I then show that 46% of all observed choices can be rationalized by complete, reflexive and transitive preferences in my experiment, i.e., satisfy the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences – WARP hereafter. Weakening the classical model, incomplete preferences or just-noticeable difference preferences do not rationalize more choice correspondences. Going beyond WARP, however, I show that complete, reflexive and transitive preferences with menu-dependent choices rationalize 93% of observed choices. Having elicited choice correspondences allows me to conclude that indifference is widespread in the experiment. These results pave the way for exploring various behavioral models with a unified method. |
| Keywords: | aggregation of preferences,just noticeable preferences,choice correspondences,revealed preferences,welfare,indifference,WARP |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01998001&r=all |
| By: | Armah, Ralph; Schwab, Ben |
| Keywords: | Risk and Uncertainty |
| Date: | 2019–04–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:scc019:288086&r=all |
| By: | Thomas Demuynck; Christian Seel; Giang Tran |
| Abstract: | We develop an index of competitiveness and cooperativeness which is based on the primitives of a normal-form game, i.e. players, strategies and payoffs. The index relies on a unique decomposition of a given game into a zero-sum game and a common-interest game. The index decreases in the distance to its zero-sum part and it increases in the distance to its common-interest part. Alternatively, the index increases if the share of variation in payoffs captured by the zero-sum part increases We compute our index for well-known classes of games such as Prisoner's Dilemma,games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes, All-pay auctions, Tullock contests, and Public Goods games. The comparative statics of our index coincide with economic intuition. The index does well in explaining experimental |
| Keywords: | Competitiveness, cooperativeness, index |
| Date: | 2019–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/286825&r=all |
| By: | Timmons, Shane; Barjaková, Martina; McElvaney, Terry; Lunn, Pete |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp612&r=all |
| By: | McGowan, Féidhlim; Lunn, Pete; Robertson, Deirdre |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp611&r=all |
| By: | McGowan, Féidhlim; Lunn, Pete; Robertson, Deirdre |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp604&r=all |
| By: | Abhinash Borah (Department of Economics, Ashoka University); Christopher Kops (Department of Economics, Ashoka University) |
| Abstract: | We introduce a theory of socially influenced individual choices. The source of social influence on an individual are his reference groups in society, formed of societal members he psychologically or contextually relates to. Choices made within an individual's reference groups have an influence on the choices he makes. Specifically, we propose a choice procedure under which, in any choice problem, he considers only those alternatives that he can identify with at least one of his reference groups. From this "consideration set," he chooses the best alternative according to his preferences. The procedure is an interactive one and captures the steady state of a process of mutual social influence. We behaviorally characterize this choice procedure. We also highlight the empirical content of the procedure by relating it to both experimental evidence and real world applications. |
| Keywords: | Individual choice, social influence, reference groups, consideration sets, interactive behavioral choices |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ash:wpaper:1010&r=all |