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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Cécile Bazart; Mathieu Lefebvre; Julie Rosaz |
| Abstract: | In a series of experiments, we test the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to, respectively, four manipulation treatments relying on: an information strategy, a low commitment strategy, a high commitment strategy and a promise strategy. We confirm the advantages of psychologically orientated policies as they increase the overall level of contribution and for some, that is commitment and promises, question the decreasing trend traditionally observed in long term contributions to public goods. |
| Keywords: | Experiment, Persuasion, Commitment, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. |
| JEL: | C91 D91 H41 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2019-05&r=all |
| By: | Blimpo, Moussa P. (University of Oklahoma); Carneiro, Pedro (University College London); Jervis, Pamela (Institute for Fiscal Studies, London); Pugatch, Todd (Oregon State University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies two experiments of early childhood development programs in The Gambia: one increasing access to services, and another improving service quality. In the first experiment, new community-based early childhood development (ECD) centers were introduced to randomly chosen villages that had no pre-existing structured ECD services. In the second experiment, a randomly assigned subset of existing ECD centers received intensive provider training. We find no evidence that either intervention improved average levels of child development. Exploratory analysis suggests that, in fact, the first experiment, which increased access to relatively low quality ECD services, led to declines in child development among children from less disadvantaged households. Evidence supports that these households may have been steered away from better quality early childhood settings in their homes. |
| Keywords: | early childhood development, cognitive stimulation, teacher training, The Gambia, randomized control trials, Malawi Developmental Assessment Tool |
| JEL: | I25 I38 O15 O22 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12163&r=all |
| By: | Bauer, Kevin |
| Abstract: | In the current paper, I deploy a novel laboratory experiment to answer the following questions: Does people’s other-regarding behavior change with the number of group memberships they have in common with others? Can uncertainty about others’ group memberships weaken in-group favoritism and lead to more selfish behavior? There are two main findings. First, on average pro-social concerns increase monotonically with the number of joint group affiliations. On the individual level, however, I document a considerable heterogeneity. Second, in situations where participants have only in- complete information on others’ group affiliations, they do not behave more selfishly. It seems as if the awareness of one joint group affiliation in combination with ignorance about the nature of other group memberships is sufficient to elicit maximum other-regarding concerns. My results highlight the importance of carefully navigating workers perceptions on complex and overlapping group affiliations as a task of diversity management within organizations where a high degree of social diversity characterizes the workforce. |
| Keywords: | Social groups, Behavioral Heterogeneity, Moral Wiggle Room |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D03 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–01–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:92374&r=all |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi; Kene Boun My; Andrea Guido; Mathieu Lefevbre |
| Abstract: | There is robust evidence in the experimental economics literature studying decentralized forms to control monopoly power via trading institutions. This strand provides evidence showing that double-auction trading institutions do affect monopoly power. In addition, recent experimental evidence shows that trading institutions themselves can shape agents' market behaviour through the formation of anchors and reference points. We recreate experimentally five different double-auction market structures (perfect competition,perfect competition with quotas, cartel on price, cartel on price with quotas, and monopoly) in a within-subject experimental design, varying the order of markets implementation. We investigate whether monopoly power endures the formation of reference prices emerged in previously implemented market structures. Results from our classroom experiments suggest that i) prevailing prices in the first implemented market work as reference points in subsequent market structures, ii) the formation of reference points negatively impacts on monopolists' power in later market structures.. |
| Keywords: | Classroom Experiment, Monopoly, Perfect Competition, Double-Auction. |
| JEL: | D42 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2019-08&r=all |
| By: | Klaus Abbink (Monash Business School); Lu Dong (Economics Experimental Laboratory, Nanjing Audit University); Lingbo Huang (Economics Experimental Laboratory, Nanjing Audit University) |
| Abstract: | We study escalation and aggression in an experimental first-strike game in which two participants play multiple rounds of a money-earning task. In each round, both players can spend money to accumulate weapons. The player with more weapons can spend money to strike against the other player, which almost totally eliminates the victim’s earnings potential and removes their capacity to strike. Weapons can serve as a means of deterrence. In four treatments, we find that deterrence is strengthened if weapon stocking cannot be observed, that a balance of power is effective in maintaining peace, and that mutually beneficial trade decreases the risk of confrontation, but not necessarily the likelihood of costly arms races. |
| Keywords: | Mutually assured destruction, balance of power, arms races, deterrence, trade, laboratory experiment |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2019-01&r=all |
| By: | Alice Solda; Changxia Ke; Lionel Page; William von Hippel |
| Abstract: | We aim to test the hypothesis that overconfidence arises as a strategy to influence others in social interactions. We design an experiment in which participants are incentivised either to form accurate beliefs about their performance at a test, or to convince a group of other participants that they performed well. We also vary participants’ ability to gather information about their performance. Our results provide, the different empirical links of von Hippel and Trivers’ (2011) theory of strategic overconfidence. First, we find that participants are more likely to overestimate their performance when they anticipate that they will try to persuade others. Second, when offered the possibility to gather information about their performance, they bias their information search in a manner conducive to receiving more positive feedback. Third, the increase in confidence generated by this motivated reasoning has a positive effect on their persuasiveness. |
| Keywords: | Overconfidence, motivated cognition, self-deception, persuasion, information sampling, experiment. |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qut:qubewp:wp057&r=all |
| By: | James Andreoni; Michael A. Kuhn; John A. List; Anya Samek; Kevin Sokal; Charles Sprenger |
| Abstract: | Time preferences have been correlated with a range of life outcomes, yet little is known about their early development. We conduct a field experiment to elicit time preferences of over 1,200 children ages 3-12, who make several intertemporal decisions. To shed light on how such primitives form, we explore various channels that might affect time preferences, from background characteristics to the causal impact of an early schooling program that we developed and operated. Our results suggest that time preferences evolve substantially during this period, with younger children displaying more impatience than older children. We also find a strong association with race: black children, relative to white or Hispanic children, are more impatient. Finally, assignment to different schooling opportunities is not significantly associated with child time preferences. |
| JEL: | C9 C93 D03 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25590&r=all |
| By: | Sonntag, Axel; Poulsen, Anders |
| Abstract: | We experimentally examine the effects of varying time pressure in a coordination game with a label salient focal equilibrium. We consider both a pure coordination game (payoff symmetry) and a battle of the sexes game with conflict of interest (payoff asymmetry). In symmetric games, there are no effects of time pressure, since the label-salient outcome is highly focal regardless of how much time subjects have to decide. In asymmetric games, less time results in greater focality of the the label-salient action, and it becomes significantly more likely that any coordination is on the focal outcome. |
| Keywords: | coordination game; focal point; time pressure; response times; social heuristics hypothesis; experiment |
| JEL: | C70 C72 C92 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:92262&r=all |
| By: | Dhar, Diva; Jain, Tarun; Jayachandran, Seema |
| Abstract: | Societal norms about gender roles contribute to the economic disadvantages facing women in many developing countries. This paper evaluates an intervention aimed at eroding support for restrictive gender norms, specifically a multi-year school-based intervention in Haryana, India, that engaged adolescents in classroom discussions about gender equality. Using a randomized controlled trial, we find that the intervention increased adolescents' support for gender equality by 0.25 standard deviations, a sizable effect compared to other correlates of their gender attitudes such as their parents' views. Program participants also report more gender-equitable behavior; for example, boys report helping out more with household chores. |
| Keywords: | Gender equality; Persuasion; preference formation; Social norms |
| JEL: | J12 J13 J16 O12 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13413&r=all |
| By: | Colasante, Annarita; Alfarano, Simone; Camacho-Cuena, Eva |
| Abstract: | We compare the performance of two learning algorithms in replicating individual short and long-run expectations: the Exploration-Explotation Algorithm (EEA) and the Heuristic Switching Model (HSM). Individual expectations are elicited in a series of Learning-to-Forecast Experiments (LtFEs) with different feedback mechanisms between expectations and market price: positive and negative feedback markets. We implement the EEA proposed by Colasante et al. (2018c). Moreover, we modify the existing version of the HSM in order to incorporate the long-run predictions. Although the two algorithms provide a fairly good description of marker prices in the short-run, the EEA outperforms the HSM in replicating the main characteristics of individual expectation in the long-run, both in terms of coordination of individual expectations and convergence of expectations to the fundamental value. |
| Keywords: | Expectations, Experiment, Evolutionary Learning |
| JEL: | C91 D03 G12 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:92391&r=all |
| By: | Ondřej Krčál (Masaryk University); Rostislav Staněk (Masaryk University); Bára Karlínová (Masaryk University); Stefanie Peer (Vienna University of Economics and Business, Masaryk University) |
| Abstract: | In a controlled lab experiment, we investigate hypothetical biases in the value of time by comparing stated preference (SP) and revealed preference (RP) values attached to unexpected waiting times. The SP and RP choice sets are identical in terms of design with the only difference being that the RP choices have real consequences in terms of unexpected waiting times and monetary incentives. We find a substantial hypothetical bias with the average SP value of time being only 71% of the corresponding RP value. The bias is mainly driven by participants who have scheduling constraints during the time of the unexpected wait. Scheduling constraints are taken into account to a much lesser extent in the SP setting than in the RP setting, presumably because only in the latter, the consequences of ignoring them are costly. We find evidence that this effect is stronger for persons with relatively low cognitive ability. |
| Keywords: | valuation of time, hypothetical bias, stated preference, revealed preference, waiting time |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2019-03&r=all |
| By: | Jesse Burkhardt; Kenneth Gillingham; Praveen K. Kopalle |
| Abstract: | This study examines a field experiment in Texas that includes pricing and informational interventions to encourage energy conservation during summer peak load days when the social cost of generation is the highest. We estimate that our critical peak pricing intervention reduces electricity consumption by 14%. Using unique high frequency appliance-level data, we can attribute 74% of this response to air conditioning. In contrast, we find minimal response to active information provision and conservation appeals. A complementary experimental program also lowers nighttime prices during the off-peak season, providing the first evidence of electric vehicle loadshifting in response to price. |
| JEL: | D83 L94 L98 Q41 Q48 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25576&r=all |
| By: | Le Yaouanq, Yves (LMU Munich); Schwardmann, Peter (LMU Munich) |
| Abstract: | How can naivete about present bias persist despite experience? To answer this question, our experiment investigates participants\' ability to learn from their own behavior. Participants decide how much to work on a real effort task on two predetermined dates. In the week preceding each work date, they state their commitment preferences and predictions of future effort. While we find that participants are present biased and initially naive about their bias, our methodology enables us to establish that they are Bayesian in how they learn from their experience at the first work date. A treatment in which we vary the nature of the task at the second date further shows that learning is unencumbered by a change in environment. Our results suggest that persistent naivete cannot be explained by a fundamental inferential bias. At the same time, we find that participants initially underestimate the information that their experience will provide - a bias that may lead to underinvestment in experimentation and a failure to activate self-regulation mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | naivete; present bias; learning; |
| JEL: | D83 D90 |
| Date: | 2019–02–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:144&r=all |
| By: | van der Klaauw, Bas (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Ziegler, Lennart |
| Abstract: | We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of labor market speeddates where unemployed workers meet temporary employment agencies. Our analysis shows that participation in such events increases immediate job finding by 6-7 percentage points. In the subsequent months, employment effects diminish again, suggesting that vacancies mediated through temporary employment agencies have no long-lasting effect on employment prospects. While the intervention is cost effective for the UI administration, higher labor earnings of treated job seekers do not fully compensate for the decline in benefit payments. Additional survey evidence shows that speeddate participation increases job search motivation and reduces reservation wages. |
| Keywords: | matching events, active labor market policies, randomized experiment, temporary work, job search behavior |
| JEL: | J64 J65 C21 C93 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12140&r=all |
| By: | Iriberri, Nagore; Rey-Biel, Pedro |
| Abstract: | We study gender differences in willingness to guess using approximately 10,000 multiple-choice math tests, where for half of the questions, both wrong answers and omitted questions are scored 0, and for the other half, wrong answers are scored 0 but omitted questions are scored +1. Using a within-participant regression analysis, we find that female participants leave significantly more omitted questions than males when there is a reward for omitted questions. This gender difference, which is stronger among high ability and older participants, hurts female performance as measured by the final score and position in the ranking. In a subsequent survey, female participants showed lower levels of confidence and higher risk aversion, which may explain this differential behavior. When both are considered, risk aversion is the main factor explaining the gender differential in the willingness to guess. A scoring rule that is gender neutral must use non-differential scoring between wrong answers and omitted questions. |
| Keywords: | confidence; gender differences; natural field experiment; perceived ability in math; risk preferences; willingness to guess |
| JEL: | C93 D81 I20 J16 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13541&r=all |
| By: | Islam, Asadul; Ushchev, Philip; Zenou, Yves; Zhang, Xin |
| Abstract: | We develop a theoretical model in which adoption decisions are based on information received from others about the quality of a new technology and on their risk attitude. We test the predictions of this model using a field experiment in Bangladesh. We show that treated farmers who receive better training in System of Rice Intensification (SRI) technology have more accurate information about this technology, and have a higher impact on the adoption rate of untreated farmers. We also find that untreated farmers that are more risk-averse tend to adopt less and are less influenced by their treated peers. Finally, a trained farmers' impact on his untrained peers increases if he himself adopts SRI technology. Our results indicate that the crucial determinant of technology adoption for untreated farmers is their degree of risk aversion and the accuracy and reliability of information transmission about the quality of technology circulated among farmers. |
| Keywords: | randomized controlled trial (RCT); risk attitude; Technology adoption |
| JEL: | O13 Z13 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13419&r=all |
| By: | Button, Patrick (Tulane University); Walker, Brigham (Tulane University) |
| Abstract: | We conducted a resume correspondence experiment to measure discrimination in hiring faced by Indigenous Peoples in the United States (Native Americans, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians). We sent employers realistic resumes for common jobs (retail sales, kitchen staff, server, janitor, and security) in 11 cities and compared interview offer rates. We signaled Indigenous status in one of four different ways. Based on 13,516 applications, we do not find hiring discrimination in any context. These findings hold after numerous robustness checks, although our checks and discussions raise multiple concerns that are relevant to audit studies generally. |
| Keywords: | indigenous peoples, employment discrimination, Native American, Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian, Indian reservations, correspondence experiment, resume study, Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition |
| JEL: | J15 J7 C93 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12131&r=all |
| By: | Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Cabrales, Antonio; Mateu, Guillermo; Sánchez, Angel; Sutan, Angela |
| Abstract: | We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. These interactions are often complex. Thus, we attempt to isolate the impact of several of its more common components: conversations, food, and beverages, which could be alcoholic or nonalcoholic. To do this, our subjects take part in a standardized negotiation (complex and simple) under six conditions: without interaction, interaction only, and interactions with water, wine, water and food and wine and food. We find that none of the treatments improve the outcomes over the treatment without interactions. We also study trust and reciprocity in the same context. For all-male groups, we find the same lack of superiority of interaction treatments over no interaction. For all-female groups, some very simple social interactions have a positive impact on trust. |
| Keywords: | business meals; negotiation; Social interactions; Trust |
| JEL: | C91 I18 M11 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13417&r=all |
| By: | Julio J. Elias; Nicola Lacetera; Mario Macis |
| Abstract: | Legislation and public policies are often the result of competition and compromise between different views and interests. In several cases, strongly held moral beliefs voiced by societal groups lead lawmakers to prohibit certain transactions or to prevent them from occurring through markets. However, there is limited evidence about the specific nature of the general population’s opposition to using prices in such contentious transactions. We conducted a randomized survey with 2,666 American residents to study preferences for legalizing payments to kidney donors. We found strong polarization, with many participants supporting or opposing payments regardless of potential transplant gains. However, about 18 percent of respondents would switch to favoring payments for sufficiently large increases in transplants. Preferences for compensation have strong moral foundations; participants especially reject direct payments by patients, which they find would violate principles of fairness. We corroborate the interpretation of our findings with a choice experiment of a costly decision to donate money to a foundation that supports donor compensation. |
| JEL: | D01 D63 D64 I11 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25581&r=all |
| By: | Calvano, Emilio; Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Pastorello, Sergio |
| Abstract: | Increasingly, pricing algorithms are supplanting human decision making in real marketplaces. To inform the competition policy debate on the possible consequences of this development, we experiment with pricing algorithms powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI) in controlled environments (computer simulations), studying the interaction among a number of Q-learning algorithms in a workhorse oligopoly model of price competition with Logit demand and constant marginal costs. In this setting the algorithms consistently learn to charge supra-competitive prices, without communicating with one another. The high prices are sustained by classical collusive strategies with a finite phase of punishment followed by a gradual return to cooperation. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or demand and to changes in the number of players. |
| Keywords: | artificial intelligence; Collusion; Pricing-Algorithms; Q-Learning; Reinforcement Learning |
| JEL: | D43 D83 L13 L41 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13405&r=all |
| By: | Bellemare, Charles (Université Laval); Sebald, Alexander (University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We derive bounds on the causal effect of belief-dependent preferences (reciprocity and guilt aversion) on choices in sequential two-player games without exploiting information or data on the (higher-order) beliefs of players. We show how informative bounds can be derived by exploiting a specific invariance property common to those preferences. We illustrate our approach by analyzing data from an experiment conducted in Denmark. Our approach produces tight bounds on the causal effect of reciprocity in the games we consider. These bounds suggest there exists significant reciprocity in our population – a result also substantiated by the participants' answers to a post-experimental questionnaire. On the other hand, our approach yields high implausible estimates of guilt aversion. We contrast our estimated bounds with point estimates obtained using data on self-declared higher-order beliefs, keeping all other aspects of the model unchanged. We find that point estimates fall within our estimated bounds suggesting that elicited higher-order belief data in our experiment is weakly (if at all) affected by a potential endogeneity problem due to e.g. false consensus effects. |
| Keywords: | belief-dependent preferences, partial identification |
| JEL: | C93 D63 D84 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12153&r=all |
| By: | Alistair Wilson |
| Abstract: | In dynamic environments where the strategic setting evolves across time the specific rule governing the transitions can substantially alter the incentives that agents face. This is particularly true when history-dependent strategies are used. In a laboratory study we examine whether subjects respond to the transition rule and internalize its effects on continuation values. Our main comparison is between an endogenous transition, where future states directly depend on current choices, and exogenous transitions, where the future environment is random and independent of current choices. Our evidence shows that subjects readily internalize the effect of the dynamic game transition rule on their incentives, in line with theoretical predictions. |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:6533&r=all |
| By: | Keisuke Takahata; Takahiro Hoshino |
| Abstract: | We propose a semiparametric two-stage least square estimator for the heterogeneous treatment effects (HTE). HTE is the solution to certain integral equation which belongs to the class of Fredholm integral equations of the first kind, which is known to be ill-posed problem. Naive semi/nonparametric methods do not provide stable solution to such problems. Then we propose to approximate the function of interest by orthogonal series under the constraint which makes the inverse mapping of integral to be continuous and eliminates the ill-posedness. We illustrate the performance of the proposed estimator through simulation experiments. |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1902.09978&r=all |
| By: | Bougen, Adrien; Huang, Yue; Kremer, Michael; Miguel, Edward |
| Abstract: | We assess evidence from randomized control trials (RCTs) on long-run economic productivity and living standards in poor countries. We first document that several studies estimate large positive long-run impacts, but that relatively few existing RCTs have been evaluated over the long-run. We next present evidence from a systematic survey of existing RCTs, with a focus on cash transfer and child health programs, and show that a meaningful subset can realistically be evaluated for long-run effects. We discuss ways to bridge the gap between the burgeoning number of development RCTs and the limited number that have been followed up to date, including through new panel (longitudinal) data, improved participant tracking methods, alternative research designs, and access to administrative, remote sensing, and cell phone data. We conclude that the rise of development economics RCTs since roughly 2000 provides a novel opportunity to generate high-quality evidence on the long-run drivers of living standards. |
| Keywords: | cash transfers; child health; development economics; long-run impacts; panel (longitudinal) data; randomized controlled trials |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13443&r=all |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Stephane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales); Antoine Malézieux (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jason Shogren (Departement Economy and Finance, University of Wyoming - UW - University of Wyoming) |
| Date: | 2019–02–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02008071&r=all |
| By: | Sepahvand, Mohammad H (Department of Economics); Shahbazian, Roujman (Swedish institute for social research); Bali Swain, Ranjula (Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | A popular uprising in 2014, led to a revolution overthrowing the sitting president of Burkina Faso. We investigate if individuals’ risk attitudes changed due to this revolution. Specifically, we investigate the impact of the revolution on risk attitudes, by gender, age and level of education. The analysis is based on a unique nationally representative panel Household Budget Survey, which allows us to track the changes in the risk attitudes of the same individuals before, during and after the revolution. Our results suggest that the impact of the revolution is short-term. Individuals become risk averse during the revolution but converge back to the pre-revolution risk attitudes, slightly increasing their risk taking, after the revolution is over. Women are more risk taking than the men after the revolution but are more risk averse during the revolution. In general, older individuals tend to have higher risk aversion than the younger individuals. During the revolution, however, the individuals with higher level of education are less willing to take risk. |
| Keywords: | Risk attitudes; exogenous shock; revolution; gender; Burkina Faso |
| JEL: | D12 D74 D81 O12 Z10 |
| Date: | 2018–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2019_002&r=all |
| By: | Johnson, Samuel G. B. |
| Abstract: | Behavioral economics characterizes decision-makers using psychologically-informed models. Cognitive science produces psychologically-informed models. Why don't these disciplines talk more? Here, the author presents several arguments for why cognitive science should inform behavioral economics - it characterizes internal psychological states, builds a richer conception of human nature, pays equal attention to cognition's successes and failures, embraces multidisciplinary insights, and avoids blind spots produced by behavioral economics' intellectual lineage. The author illustrates these principles using the cognitive science of sense-making - how humans understand information - including mental tools such as heuristics, stories, and theories. The science of mind can produce new insights to enrich economics. |
| Keywords: | cognitive science,behavioral economics,experimental economics,behavioral finance,economics methodology,information processing,decision-making under uncertainty |
| JEL: | A12 B4 D01 D11 D7 D8 D9 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201910&r=all |