nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2019‒01‒14
23 papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Dynamic Efficiency in Experimental Emissions Trading Markets with Investment Uncertainty By Timothy N. Cason; Frans P. de Vries
  2. Envy and the Islamic Revival: Experimental Evidence from Tunisia By Maleke Fourati
  3. Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments By Clark, Damon; Gill, David; Prowse, Victoria; Rush, Mark
  4. Active Learning Improves Financial Education: By Kaiser, Tim; Menkhoff, Lukas
  5. The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games By Nobuyuki Hanaki; Yukio Koriyama; Angela Sutan; Marc Willinger
  6. Dishonesty, Social Information, and Sorting By AKIN, ZAFER
  7. Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving By Thomas Garcia; Sébastien Massoni; Marie Villeval
  8. Do Workers Value Flexible Jobs? A Field Experiment on Compensating Differentials By Haoran He; David Neumark; Qian Weng
  9. Subject Pools and Deception in Agricultural and Resource Economic Experiments By Timothy N. Cason; Steven Y. Wu
  10. Giving Once, Giving Twice: A Two-Period Field Experiment On Intertemporal Crowding in Charitable Giving By Adena, Maja; Huck, Steffen
  11. Discrimination at the Intersection of Age, Race, and Gender: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-field Experiment By Joanna N. Lahey; Douglas R. Oxley
  12. Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games By Claude Meidinger
  13. More competition in delegated portfolio management: A win-win situation? An experimental analysis. By Tatiana Balmus; Juergen Huber; Matteo Ploner
  14. Do State Laws Protecting Older Workers from Discrimination Reduce Age Discrimination in Hiring? Evidence from a Field Experiment By David Neumark; Ian Burn; Patrick Button; Nanneh Chehras
  15. Reservation Wages and Labor Supply By Kesternich, Iris; Schumacher, H.; Siflinger, Bettina; Valder, Franziska
  16. Macroprudential policy in the lab By Gortner, Paul; Massenot, Baptiste
  17. Mean-Field Leader-Follower Games with Terminal State Constraint By Fu, Guanxing; Horst, Ulrich
  18. Interacting collective action problems in the commons By Nicolas Querou
  19. Testing for Overconfidence Statistically: A Moment Inequality Approach By Yanchun Jin; Ryo Okui
  20. Information provision and willingness to pay irrigation water in Tunisian local associations for agricultural development: an experimental economics study By Stefano Farolfi; Dimitri Dubois; Sylvie Morardet; Imen Nouichi; Serge Marlet
  21. Tax or green nudge? An experimental analysis of pesticide policies in Germany By Buchholz, Matthias; Peth, Denise; Mußhoff, Oliver
  22. The Impact of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Households' Well-Being By Daniela Del Boca; Chiara Pronzato; Giuseppe Sorrenti
  23. Competition and Fatigue At Work By Angelova, Vera; Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta

  1. By: Timothy N. Cason; Frans P. de Vries
    Abstract: This study employs a laboratory experiment to assess the performance of tradable permit markets on dynamic efficiency arising from cost-reducing investment. The permit allocation rule is the main treatment variable, with permits being fully auctioned or grandfathered. The experimental results show significant investment under both allocation rules in the presence of ex ante uncertainty over the actual investment outcome. However, auctioning permits generally provides stronger incentives to invest in R&D, leading to greater dynamic efficiency compared to grandfathering.
    Keywords: Pollution permits; Allowance auction; Grandfathering; Investment incentives; Stochastic R&D; Laboratory experiments
    JEL: C91 D80 O31 Q55 Q58
    Date: 2018–12
  2. By: Maleke Fourati (UNSW Business School)
    Abstract: The Islamic revival defined as the call for a resurgence of Islamic culture by opposition to Western culture and an increase in participation in political Islam, has become a widespread phenomenon in the Muslim world since the 1970s. It is often discussed in the literature as being motivated by psychological factors but with little empirical evidence. In this paper, I test whether envy, defined as a feeling of grievance caused by someone else’s possessions and/or qualities, is causing the Islamic revival. While testing the effect of envy on the Islamic revival is particularly challenging as envy is endogenous to a person’s social state, personal characteristics, and preferences, I exogenously trigger the feeling of envy by a 2 by 2 design experiment conducted in Tunisia. I ran a dictator game with 600 nationally representative Tunisians to test whether participants exposed to envy, which I capture by the interaction between a priming video triggering envy and a low stake, increases participants donation share to a religious charity affiliated with the Tunisian Islamic party, Ennahdha, which represents the Islamic revival. The effect is particularly strong among participants who declare themselves as highly religious. I also test for the external validity of my experimental results and find consistent patterns.
    Date: 2018–10–10
  3. By: Clark, Damon (Department of Economics, UC Irvine and NBER); Gill, David (Department of Economics, Purdue University); Prowse, Victoria (Department of Economics, Purdue University); Rush, Mark (Department of Economics, University of Florida)
    Abstract: Will college students who set goals for themselves work harder and achieve better outcomes? In theory, setting goals can help present-biased students to mitigate their self-control problem. In practice, there is little credible evidence on the causal effects of goal setting for college students. We report the results of two field experiments that involved almost four thousand college students in total. One experiment asked treated students to set goals for performance in the course; the other asked treated students to set goals for a particular task (completing online practice exams). Task-based goals had robust positive effects on the level of task completion, and task-based goals also increased course performance. We also find that performance-based goals had positive but small effects on course performance. We use a theoretical framework that builds on present bias and loss aversion to interpret our results. Since task-based goal setting is low-cost, scalable and logistically simple, we conclude that our findings have important implications for educational practice and future research.
    Keywords: Goal; Goal setting; Higher education; Field experiment; Self-control; Present bias; Time inconsistency; Commitment device; Loss aversion; Reference point; Task-based goal; Performance-based goal; Self-set goal; Performance uncertainty; Overconfidence; Student effort; Student performance; Educational attainment. JEL Classification: I23, C93
    Date: 2018
  4. By: Kaiser, Tim (University of Koblenz-Landau and DIW Berlin); Menkhoff, Lukas (DIW Berlin)
    Abstract: We conduct a randomized field experiment to study the effects of two financial education interventions offered to small-scale retailers in Uganda. The treatments contrast \"active learning\" with \"traditional lecturing\" within standardized lesson-plans. We find that active learning has a positive and economically meaningful impact on savings and investment outcomes, in contrast to insignificant impacts of lecturing. These results are not conditional on prior education or financial literacy. Tentative evidence suggests that only active learning stimulates several cognitive and non-cognitive mechanisms; moreover, a social mechanism may be at play as treated individuals join social groups discussing financial matters.
    Keywords: financial behavior; financial literacy; active learning; lecturing; training method; field experiment;
    JEL: I21 A20 D14 O16
    Date: 2018–12–20
  5. By: Nobuyuki Hanaki (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG (France)); Yukio Koriyama (X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique); Angela Sutan (BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)); Marc Willinger (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)
    Abstract: Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate significantly more from the Nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than when they are strategic substitutes. This "strategic environment effect" offers promising insights into the aggregate consequences of interactions among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroeconomic implications have been questioned because the underlying experiments involve a small number of agents. We studied beauty contest games with a unique interior Nash equilibrium to determine the critical group size for triggering the strategic environment effect, and we use both theory and experiments to shed light on its effectiveness. Based on cognitive hierarchy and level-K models, we show theoretically that the effect is operative for interactions among three or more agents. Our experimental results show a statistically significant strategic environment effect for groups of five or more agents, establishing its robustness against the increase in the population size.
    Keywords: beauty contest games,iterative reasoning,strategic substitutability,strategic complementarity
    Date: 2018–11
  6. By: AKIN, ZAFER
    Abstract: The dishonesty literature investigates how people behave when they are provided certain types of information. However, this approach predominantly ignores the fact that people -to some extent- can choose which information they want to be exposed to. By conducting a laboratory experiment, we study individuals’ decisions to choose which social information they would like to observe and the effect of this sorting on their engagement in unethical conduct. We find evidence that sorting exacerbates the prevalence of dishonesty, which is mainly driven by the ones who chose maximum information. Our results demonstrate that sorting is an important factor determining dishonest behavior and that previously observed levels of prevalence of dishonesty in the literature can be an underestimate of actual level of dishonest behavior in real-world situations.
    Keywords: Dishonesty; social norms; selection; laboratory experiments
    JEL: C91 D03
    Date: 2018–08–01
  7. By: Thomas Garcia (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Sébastien Massoni (QuBE - School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology); Marie Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. In a laboratory experiment, we show that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to behave less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation-rather than its benefits-are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.
    Keywords: Ambiguity,excuse-driven behavior,charitable giving,social preferences
    Date: 2018
  8. By: Haoran He; David Neumark; Qian Weng
    Abstract: We explore compensating differentials for job flexibility, using a field experiment conducted on a Chinese job board. Our job ads differ randomly regarding when one works (time flexibility) and where one works (place flexibility). We find strong evidence that workers value job flexibility – especially regarding place of work. Application rates are higher to flexible jobs, conditional on the salary offered. Additional survey evidence indicates that workers are willing to take lower pay for more flexible jobs. Non-experimental job board data do not indicate that workers value job flexibility, reinforcing the difficulty of estimating compensating differentials from observational data.
    JEL: J01
    Date: 2019–01
  9. By: Timothy N. Cason; Steven Y. Wu
    Abstract: The use of student subjects and deception in experiments are two controversial issues that often raise concerns among editors and reviewers, which might prevent quality research from being published in agricultural and resource economics (ARE) journals. We provide a self-contained methodological discussion of these issues. We argue that field professionals are the most appropriate subjects for questions related to policy or measurement, and students are the most appropriate subjects for scientific research questions closely tied to economic theory. Active deception, where subjects are provided with explicitly misleading information, has been avoided in the mainstream economics discipline because it can lead to a loss of experimental control, lead to subject selection bias, and impose negative externalities on other researchers. Disciplinary ARE journals may want to abide by these norms against deception to maintain credibility. Interdisciplinary ARE journals may have more flexibility, although it is important to provide guidelines to avoid too much reviewer-specific variation in standards. For ARE researchers, we suggest employing a deception-free experimental design whenever possible because we know of no field in which deception is encouraged.
    JEL: C9 Q10 Q30 Q50
    Date: 2018–12
  10. By: Adena, Maja (WZB Berlin); Huck, Steffen (WZB Berlin and University College London)
    Abstract: We study intertemporal crowding between two fundraising campaigns for the same charitable organization by manipulating donors\' beliefs about the likelihood of future campaigns in two subsequent field experiments. The data shows that initial giving is decreasing in the likelihood of a future campaign while subsequent giving increases in initial giving. While this refutes the predictions of a simple expected utility model, the pattern is in line with a model that allows for (anticipated or unanticipated) habit formation provided that donations in the two periods are substitutes.
    Keywords: charitable giving; field experiments; intertemporal crowding;
    JEL: C93 D64 D12
    Date: 2018–12–20
  11. By: Joanna N. Lahey; Douglas R. Oxley
    Abstract: We use a laboratory experiment with randomized resumes and eyetracking to explore the effects of race on employment discrimination over the lifecycle. We show race discrimination against prime-age black job applicants that diminishes into middle age before re-emerging for older applicants. Screeners mechanically process black and white resumes similarly, but spend less time on younger black resumes, suggesting they use negative heuristics or taste-based discrimination. Screeners demonstrate levels-based statistical discrimination, believing that younger black applicants have worse computer skills and more gaps in their job histories. We find no evidence that screeners believe black applicants have worse previous experience. Screeners demonstrate variance-based statistical discrimination against black applicants of all ages, suggesting that screeners perceive the stronger history signals for white applicants, with this type of discrimination disproportionately affecting older applicants. We find suggestive evidence that the signal sent by high school attended is weaker for younger black applicants compared to younger white applicants, and we find no evidence that the signal strength of the applicant’s address varies by race. Evidence from the CPS and an additional study supports the external validity of our experiment, particularly for female job applicants. Results are robust to different controls and specification choices.
    JEL: J14 J15 J23 J7 J70 J71
    Date: 2018–12
  12. By: Claude Meidinger (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
    Abstract: Whether there is a pre-existing common “language” that ties down the literal meanings of cheap talk messages or not is a distinction plainly important in practice. But it is assumed irrelevant in traditional game theory because it affects neither the payoff structure nor the theoretical possibilities for signaling. And when in experiments the “common-language” assumption is simplicitly implemented, such situations ignore the meta-coordination problem created by communication. Players must coordinate their beliefs on what various messages mean before they can use messages to coordinate on what to do. Using simulations with populations of artificial agents, the paper investigates the way according to which a common meaning can be constituted through a collective process of learning and compares the results thus obtained with those available in some experiments
    Keywords: Experimental Economics; Computational Economics; Signaling games
    JEL: C73 C91 D03
    Date: 2018–12
  13. By: Tatiana Balmus; Juergen Huber; Matteo Ploner
    Abstract: With a novel design, we investigate how competition between fund managers and disclosure of other managers' fees and performance influence fees, risk taken, earnings and investor concentration in a fund management experiment. We find that more competition and disclosure leads to a significant reduction of fees – the relative decrease being larger for Management Fees than for Performance Fees. While the decrease in fees does not affect manager's investment strategies, it significantly increases investors' readiness to entrust their funds to a manager. This leads to higher overall earnings, with the benefits going to investors and those fund managers who are able to attract investors. While there is an extensive literature arguing that a competitive environment may lead to unwanted outcomes, our results suggest that more competition is mostly beneficial to investors and those fund managers that succeed in attracting investors.
    Keywords: behavioral finance, Performance Fee, Management Fee, competition, disclosure
    JEL: D14 D18 G11
    Date: 2019
  14. By: David Neumark; Ian Burn; Patrick Button; Nanneh Chehras
    Abstract: We provide evidence from a field experiment in all 50 states on age discrimination in hiring for retail sales jobs. We relate measured age discrimination – the difference in callback rates between old and young applicants – to state variation in anti-discrimination laws protecting older workers. Anti-discrimination laws could boost hiring, although they could have the unintended consequence of deterring hiring if their main effect is to increase termination costs. We find some evidence that there is less discrimination against older men and women in states where age discrimination law allows larger damages, and some evidence that there is lower discrimination against older women in states where disability discrimination law allows larger damages. But this evidence is not robust to all of the estimations we consider. However, we reach a robust conclusion that stronger or broader laws protecting older workers from discrimination do not have the unintended consequence of deterring their hiring.
    JEL: J23 J26 J7 J78 K31
    Date: 2018–12
  15. By: Kesternich, Iris; Schumacher, H.; Siflinger, Bettina (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Valder, Franziska
    Abstract: We test what survey measures of the reservation wage reveal about individual labor supply, i.e., an individual’s willingness to substitute leisure by consumption. To this end, we combine the reservation wage measure from a large labor market survey with the reservation wage for a one-hour job that we elicit in an online experiment. We find that these two measures are highly correlated. On average, the experimental reservation wage increases by 50 Cents for every Euro increase in the survey measure.
    Keywords: reservation wages; labor supply; search; validation of survey measures
    JEL: C83 C91 J22
    Date: 2018
  16. By: Gortner, Paul; Massenot, Baptiste
    Abstract: Higher capital ratios are believed to improve system-wide financial stability through three main channels: (i) higher loss-absorption capacity, (ii) lower moral hazard, (iii) stabilization of the financial cycle if capital ratios are increased during good times. We examine these mechanisms in a laboratory asset market experiment with indebted participants. We find support for the loss-absorption channel: higher capital ratios reduce the bankruptcy rate. However, we do not find support for the moral hazard channel. Higher capital ratios (insignificantly) increase asset price bubbles, an aggregate measure of excessive risk-taking. Additional evidence suggests that bankruptcy aversion explains this surprising result. Finally, the evidence supports the idea that higher capital ratios in good times stabilize the financial cycle.
    JEL: G28 E58
    Date: 2018
  17. By: Fu, Guanxing (HU Berlin); Horst, Ulrich (HU Berlin)
    Abstract: We analyze linear McKean-Vlasov forward-backward SDEs arising in leader-follower games with mean-field type control and terminal state constraints on the state process. We establish an existence and uniqueness of solutions result for such systems in time-weighted spaces as well as a convergence result of the solutions with respect to certain perturbations of the drivers of both the forward and the backward component. The general results are used to solve a novel single-player model of portfolio liquidation under market impact with expectations feedback as well as a novel Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation with asymmetrically informed players.
    Keywords: mean-field control; stackelberg game; mean-field game with a major player; portfolio liquidation;
    Date: 2018–12–20
  18. By: Nicolas Querou (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)
    Abstract: We consider a setting where agents are subject to two types of collective action problems, any group user's individual extraction inducing an externality on others in the same group (intra-group problem), while aggregate extraction in one group induces an externality on each agent in other groups (intergroup problem). One illustrative example of such a setting corresponds to a case where a common-pool resource is jointly extracted in local areas, which are managed by separate groups of individuals extracting the resource in their respective location. The interplay between both types of externality is shown to affect the results obtained in classical models of common-pool resources. We show how the fundamentals affect the individual strategies and welfare compared to the benchmark commons problems. Finally, different initiatives (local cooperation, inter-area agreements) are analyzed to assess whether they may alleviate the problems, and to understand the conditions under which they do so.
    Keywords: externalities,common-pool resource,collective action
    Date: 2018
  19. By: Yanchun Jin (Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University); Ryo Okui (NYU Shanghai)
    Abstract: We propose an econometric procedure to test for the presence of overconfidence using data collected by "ranking experiments." Our approach applies the techniques from the moment inequality literature. Although a ranking experiment is a typical way to collect data for analyzing overconfidence, Benoit and Dubra (2011) show that a ranking experiment may generate data that indicate overconfidence even if participants are purely rational Bayesian updaters. Instead, they provide a set of inequalities that are consistent with purely rational Bayesian updaters. We propose to apply the tests of moment inequalities developed by Romano et al. (2014) to test such a set of inequalities. Then, we examine the data from Svenson (1981) on driving safety. Our results indicate the presence of overconfidence on safety among the US subjects tested by Svenson. However, the other cases tested do not show evidence of overconfidence.
    Keywords: overconfidence; ranking experiments; moment inequality; driving safety
    JEL: C12 D03 D81 R41
    Date: 2018–01
  20. By: Stefano Farolfi (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - ENGREF - Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - CEMAGREF - IRD [France-Sud] - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - CIHEAM-IAMM - Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier); Dimitri Dubois (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UM3 - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - INRA Montpellier - Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier); Sylvie Morardet (Unité de recherche Irrigation - CEMAGREF); Imen Nouichi (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - AgroParisTech - IRSTEA - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture - CIHEAM - Centre International des Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier); Serge Marlet (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - ENGREF - Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural, des Eaux et des Forêts - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - CEMAGREF - IRD [France-Sud] - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - CIHEAM-IAMM - Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier)
    Abstract: Irrigation water is a crucial resource for economic and social development in Tunisia. In a context of decentralization and State devolution, the local associations for agricultural development or 'Groupements de Développement Agricole (GDA)' manage today a large share of irrigation water in the country. However, these institutions are experiencing a lack of acknowledgment by water users, resulting in a low willingness to pay (WTP) for water. In this article we study to what extent information provided to users on the functioning of the system (« institutional » information) and/or on the decisions taken by other users (« social » information) can affect their WTP. Our analysis is twofold. A field survey first revealed the farmers' demand for better information provision. A laboratory experiment allowed then to isolate the impact of the two types of information on subjects' decisions through a game with similar properties to those observed in the field. Data collected in the lab confirm the existence of a causality relation between information provided to users and their WTP for a common resource such as irrigation water.
    Abstract: L'eau d'irrigation est une ressource cruciale pour le développement économique et social en Tunisie. Dans un contexte de décentralisation et de dévolution du rôle de l'Etat, une part importante de la gestion de cette eau d'irrigation a été confiée aux Groupements de Développement Agricole (GDA). Ces groupements souffrent cependant d'un manque de reconnaissance de la part des usagers, qui se manifeste essentiellement par un faible consentement de leur part à payer les redevances. Dans cet article nous nous demandons dans quelle mesure l'information fournie aux usagers sur le fonctionnement du système (information « institutionnelle ») et/ou sur les décisions prises par les autres usagers (information « sociale ») peut impacter leur consentement à payer. Notre analyse s'est faite en deux temps. Nous avons commencé par une enquête sur le terrain, laquelle révèle effectivement une demande des irrigants en matière de diffusion d'informations. Nous avons ensuite élaboré une expérience permettant d'isoler l'impact de différents types d'information sur les décisions prises par les individus dans le cadre d'un jeu qui a des propriétés proches de la situation de terrain. Les données collectées en laboratoire confirment l'existence d'une relation de causalité entre l'information fournie aux usagers et leur consentement à payer pour une ressource commune comme l'eau d'irrigation.
    Keywords: information,irrigation,Tunisie,économie expérimentale,eau
    Date: 2018
  21. By: Buchholz, Matthias; Peth, Denise; Mußhoff, Oliver
    Abstract: Pesticides are one of the most important inputs in modern agriculture. However, intensive use of pesticides is also related to adverse effects on the environment and human health. While implementation of pesticide taxes with the intent to reduce pesticide applications has been widely discussed, green nudges are considered as innovative policy tools to foster environmental friendly behaviour. To date, little is known about the effects of these policy tools at the farm level. With this in mind, we use a business management game to investigate how a pesticide tax and a green nudge affect crop, tillage and pesticide decisions for a "virtual" farm. Results from a sample of German agricultural students reveal that both policies are able to reduce the amount of pesticides applied. However, implementation of the pesticide tax also involves a substantial profit loss. Unlike in the green nudge treatment, participants under pesticide tax adjust their cropping and tillage strategies which could involve unintended ecological effects.
    Keywords: pesticide policies,pesticide tax,green nudge,policy impact analysis,business management game
    Date: 2018
  22. By: Daniela Del Boca (University of Turin and Collegio Carlo Alberto); Chiara Pronzato (University of Turin, CHILD and Collegio Carlo Alberto); Giuseppe Sorrenti (University of Zurich)
    Abstract: We evaluate the impact of a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program that we designed on family well-being among low-income families with young children. Although most CCTs have been implemented in low-income countries, our research is in the context of a high-income country, Italy, where the recent economic crises have worsened the conditions of families with children, especially among immigrants. Our objective is to evaluate the introduction of conditionality (attendance of courses) into a pre-existing unconditional cash transfer program. Using a randomized controlled trial, we find that CCT families search more actively for work, and they work more hours and more regularity than the cash transfer and control groups. CCT families also are able to save more money and eat healthier foods. The CCT intervention appears to be more effective than cash transfer alone in changing households' behavior in several dimensions of well-being. Our findings add to the accumulating evidence on the impact of conditional cash transfers versus unconditional ones and to the literature concerning multidimensional incentive programs.
    Keywords: conditional cash transfers, poverty, use of money, Labor Supply, parenting
    JEL: I10 I20 J24 I31
    Date: 2018–12
  23. By: Angelova, Vera (TU Berlin); Giebe, Thomas (Linnaeus University); Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta (TU Berlin)
    Abstract: We study theoretically and experimentally the role of fatigue and recovery within a competitive work environment. At work, agents usually make their effort choice in response to competition and monetary incentives. At the same time, they have to take into account fatigue, which accumulates over time if there is insufficient recovery. We model a sequence of work periods as tournaments that are linked through fatigue spillovers, inducing a non-time-separable decision problem. We also allow for variations in incentives in one work period, in order to analyze spillover effects to the work periods \"before\" and \"after\". Making recovery harder should, generally, reduce effort. This theoretical prediction is supported by the experimental data. A short-term increase in incentives in one period should lead to higher effort in that period, and, due to fatigue, to strategic resting before and after. Our experimental results confirm the former, whereas we do not find sufficient evidence for the latter. Even in the presence of fatigue, total effort should positively respond to higher-powered incentives. This is not supported by our data. Removing fatigue, we find the expected increase in total effort. For work environments, this may imply that the link between monetary incentives and effort provision becomes weaker in the presence of fatigue or insufficient recovery between work periods.
    Keywords: fatigue; recovery; incentives; experiment; tournament;
    JEL: C72 C91 J22 J33 M52
    Date: 2018–12–20

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