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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Pietro Battiston; Simona Gamba; Matteo Rizzolli; Valentina Rotondi |
| Abstract: | Are public good games really capturing individuals' willingness to contribute to real-life public goods? To answer this question, we conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment with communities who own collective goods. In our experiment, subjects voluntarily contribute to a common pool, which can either be subdivided in individual vouchers, as in standard public good games, or used to acquire collective goods, as it happens for real-life public goods. We show that participants' contributions are larger when the voucher is paid individually, suggesting that individuals' willingness to contribute to public goods may be overestimated when based on results from laboratory experiments. |
| Keywords: | ublic goods, lab-in-the-field experiment, cooperation, group behavior, community, indivisibility |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:don:donwpa:125&r=exp |
| By: | Åshild A. Johnsen; Ola Kvaløy |
| Abstract: | We study to what extent collusive behavior is affected by the awareness of negative externalities. Theories of outcome-based social preferences suggest that negative externalities make collusion harder to sustain than predicted by standard economic theory, while sociological theories of social ties and intergroup comparisons suggest that bilateral cooperation can be strengthened if there exist outsiders that gain from cooperative break down. We investigate this in a laboratory experiment. Subjects play the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma with and without a negative externality. The externality is implemented by letting subjects make a positive contribution to a public good if they choose to defect from cooperation, i.e. cooperation is collusive since the gains are at the expense of the public. We find that this negative externality increases collusive behavior. Subjects cooperate more if it hurts a third party. |
| Keywords: | infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, negative externality, cooperation, collusion, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7308&r=exp |
| By: | Billur Aksoy (Texas A&M University, Department of Economics); Marco A. Palma (Texas A&M University, Department of Agricultural Economics) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of scarcity on cheating and in-group favoritism using a two-stage lab-in-the-field experiment with low-income coffee farmers in a small, isolated village in Guatemala. During the coffee harvesting months, farmers in this village experience a significant income boost from selling their coffee beans. However, during the non-harvesting months, they experience a substantial decline in income, inducing a pronounced state of scarcity, while other factors remain similar. Using this distinctive variance in income, we first conducted our experiment before the coffee harvest (Scarcity period). We then repeated the experiment-with the same group of subjects-during the harvest season (Abundance period). First, using the Fischbacher and Follmi-Heusi (2013) die-roll paradigm, we find that subjects cheat at high levels in both periods when they are the beneficiaries of the cheating. Scarcity does not impact this cheating behavior. Secondly, using subjects' natural village identity, we find significant in-group favoritism for cheating in the Abundance period, which disappears during the Scarcity period. Finally, using a dictator game, we show that this finding holds when the cost of favoring an in-group member is monetary rather than moral. |
| Keywords: | dishonesty, lab-in-the-field experiment, pro-social cheating, scarcity, social identity. |
| JEL: | C93 D63 D64 |
| Date: | 2018–11–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:txm:wpaper:20181111-001&r=exp |
| By: | Florian Hett (Johannes Gutenberg-University); Felix Schmidt (Johannes Gutenberg-University) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies heterogeneity in the reaction to rank feedback. In a laboratory experiment, individuals take part in a series of dynamic real-e ort contests with intermediate feedback. To solve the identification problem in estimating the causal e ect of rank feedback on subsequent e ort provision we implement a random multiplier in the first round of each contest. The realization of this multiplier then serves as a valid instrument for rank feedback. While rank feedback has a robust e ect on subsequent e ort provision on average, an explicit analysis of between-subject heterogeneity reveals that a substantial fraction of participants in fact react entirely opposite than the aggregated results indicate. We further show that this heterogeneity has consequences for overall outcomes, thereby arguing that heterogeneous sensitivities to rank feedback could have implications for the design of various policies in education and organizations. |
| Keywords: | direct deliveries, branch-cut-and-price, weighted customer waiting times, just-in-time logistics |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2018–03–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jgu:wpaper:1806&r=exp |
| By: | Juan F. Castro (Universidad del Pacífico); Gustavo Yamada (Universidad del Pacífico); Hans Contreras (Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos); Freddy Linares (Neurometrics); Herwig Watson (Neurometrics) |
| Abstract: | The relation between monetary incentives, cognitive effort and task performance has been extensively studied. There is, however, scant experimental evidence about the concurrent effect of incentives on cognitive effort and emotions, and its implications for task performance. It is well documented that high-stakes tests correlate with students’ anxiety and performance, but the available evidence is not causal. In this paper we estimate the effect of providing a monetary prize on the cognitive effort, emotions and efficacy exhibited by a group of university students when solving a set of four mathematics and logical reasoning questions. The prize was conditional on answering all questions correctly and was randomly assigned within a group of 126 participants. We find that the incentive produced more cognitive effort but this did not translate into increased test-solving efficacy. We provide evidence suggesting that the absence of increased efficacy despite the greater input of cognitive effort can be linked to the participants’ emotional response to the prize. |
| Keywords: | Cognitive effort, emotions, monetary incentives, eye-tracking, facial expressions |
| JEL: | D91 C91 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apc:wpaper:131&r=exp |
| By: | Isabelle Lebon (CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), University of Caen Normandie, 14 000 Caen, France, and Condorcet Center); Antoinette Baujard (GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne (UMR CNRS 5824), University Jean Monnet and University of Lyon, 42 023 Saint-Etienne, France); Frédéric Gavrel (CREM (UMR CNRS 6211), University of Caen Normandie, 14 000 Caen, France, and Condorcet Center); Herrade Igersheim (CNRS and Beta (UMR CNRS 7522), University of Strasbourg, 67 085 Strasbourg, France); Jean-François Laslier (CNRS and PJSE (UMR CNRS 8545), 75014 Paris, France) |
| Abstract: | In two laboratory surveys run in France during the 2014 European Elections, we asked the participants to provide their personal evaluations of the parties in terms of ideological proximity, and asked how they would vote under three proportional, closed-list voting rules : the (official) single-vote rule, a split-my-vote rule, and a list-approval rule. The paper analyzes the relation between opinions and vote, under the three systems. Compared to multi-vote rules, the single-vote system leads to voters’ decisions that are more often strategic but also more often sincere. Sincere voting and strategic voting therefore appear to be more consistent than contradictory. Multi-vote rules allow the voter to express complex behavior, and the concepts of “sincere” and “strategic” voting are not always sufficient to render this complexity. |
| Keywords: | Approval voting, Cumulative voting, Proportional systems, Contextualized experiment, Laboratory experiment, Strategic voting |
| JEL: | D72 C93 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1833&r=exp |
| By: | Daniel Jones; Mirco Tonin; Michael Vlassopoulos |
| Abstract: | How does pay-for-performance (P4P) impact productivity, multitasking, and the composition of workers in mission-oriented jobs? These are central issues in sectors like education or healthcare. We conduct a laboratory experiment, manipulating compensation and mission, to answer these questions. We find that P4P has positive effects on productivity on the incentivized dimension of effort and negative effects on the non-incentivized dimension for workers in non-mission-oriented treatments. In mission-oriented treatments, P4P generates minimal change on either dimension. Participants in the non-mission sector – but not in the mission-oriented treatments – sort on ability, with lower ability workers opting out of the P4P scheme. |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:don:donwpa:123&r=exp |
| By: | Simone D'Alessandro; Caterina Giannetti; Pietro Guarnieri |
| Abstract: | Relying on a threshold public good game, we experimentally investigate the effect of two types of incentives on prosocial behaviours. On the one hand, a private type of incentive targets individuals by reducing their cost of contribution. On the other hand, a public type of incentive targets groups by providing an investment that directly support the achievement of the collective objective (i.e. the threshold in the public good game). Thus, we study how expectations on others determine the impact of incentives on prosocial behaviours and how incentives themselves affect these expectations in turn. We interpret this mutual relation as reflecting an endogenous relation between incentive provision and social trust. |
| Keywords: | Motivation crowding, Social Norms, Incentives |
| JEL: | C92 D04 |
| Date: | 2018–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pie:dsedps:2018/240&r=exp |
| By: | Isabelle Lebon (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Antoinette Baujard (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Frédéric Gavrel (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Herrade Igersheim (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jean-François Laslier (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In two laboratory surveys run in France during the 2014 European Elections, we asked the participants to provide their personal evaluations of the parties in terms of ideological proximity, and asked how they would vote under three proportional, closed-list voting rules : the (official) single-vote rule, a split-my-vote rule, and a list-approval rule. The paper analyzes the relation between opinions and vote, under the three systems. Compared to multi-vote rules, the single-vote system leads to voters' decisions that are more often strategic but also more often sincere. Sincere voting and strategic voting therefore appear to be more consistent than contradictory. Multi-vote rules allow the voter to express complex behavior, and the concepts of "sincere" and "strategic" voting are not always sufficient to render this complexity. |
| Keywords: | Approval voting,Cumulative voting,Proportional systems,Contextualized experiment,Laboratory experiment,Strategic voting |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01943903&r=exp |
| By: | Natalia Jimenez (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide & Middlesex University); Elena Molis-Bañales (Departamento de Teoria e Historia Economica, University of Granada & Globe); Angel Solano-Garcia (Departamento de Teoria e Historia Economica, University of Granada & Globe) |
| Abstract: | According to Alesina and Angeletos (2005), societies are less redistributive but more efficient when the median voter believes that effort and talent are much more important than luck to determine income. We test these results through a lab experiment in which participants vote over the tax rate and their pre-tax income is determined according to their performance in a real effort task with leisure time. Subjects receive either a high or a low wage and this condition is either obtained through their talent in a tournament or randomly assigned. We compare subjects' decisions in these two different scenarios considering different levels of wage inequality. In our framework, this initial income inequality turns out to be crucial to support the theoretical hypothesis of Alesina and Angeletos (2005). Overall, we find that, only if the wage inequality is high, subjects choose a lower level of income redistribution and they provide a higher effort level in the scenario in which high-wage subjects are selected based on their talent through a tournament (than when it is randomly). Thus, we confirm almost all theoretical results in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) when the wage inequality is high enough. The big exception is for efficiency (measured as the sum of total payoffs), since theoretical results only hold for the scenario in which wage inequality is low. |
| Keywords: | income redistribution, voting, taxation, real-effort task, leisure. |
| JEL: | C92 D72 H30 J41 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:18.13&r=exp |
| By: | Patrick Asuming; Hyuncheol Bryant Kim; Armand Sim |
| Abstract: | We study long-run selection and treatment effects of a health insurance subsidy in Ghana, where mandates are not enforceable. We randomly provide different levels of subsidy (1/3, 2/3, and full), with follow-up surveys seven months and three years after the initial intervention. We find that a one-time subsidy promotes and sustains insurance enrollment for all treatment groups, but long-run health care service utilization increases only for the partial subsidy (1/3 and 2/3) groups. We find evidence that selection explains this pattern: those who were enrolled due to the subsidy, especially the partial subsidy, are more ill and have greater health care utilization. |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1811.09004&r=exp |
| By: | David Gill; Eduardo Fe |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate how observable cognitive skills influence the development of strategic sophistication. To answer this question, we study experimentally how psychometric measures of theory-of-mind and cognitive ability (or‘fluid intelligence')work together with age to determine the strategic ability and level-k behavior of children in a variety of incentivized strategic interactions. We find that better theory-of-mind and cognitive ability predict strategic sophistication in competitive games. Furthermore, age and cognitive ability act in tandem as complements, while age and theory-of-mind operate independently. Older children respond to information about the cognitive ability of their opponent, which provides support for the emergence of a sophisticated strategic theory-of-mind. Finally, theory-of-mind and age strongly predict whether children respond to intentions in a gift-exchange game, while cognitive ability has no influence, suggesting that different psychometric measures of cognitive skill correspond to different cognitive processes in strategic situations that involve the understanding of intentions. |
| Keywords: | Cognitive skills; theory-of-mind; cognitive ability; fluid intelligence; strategic sophistication; age; children; experiment; level-k; bounded rationality; non-equilibrium thinking; intentions; gift-exchange game; competitive game; strategic game; strategic interaction. |
| JEL: | C91 D91 J24 |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pur:prukra:1310&r=exp |
| By: | Arno Apffelstaedt; Jana Freundt (Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania); ; |
| Abstract: | We study experimentally how people’s willingness to comply with elected rules is affected by voter manipulation and disenfranchisement. Groups of 100 subjects vote on a “code of conduct” regarding behavior in a dictator game. Introducing a voting fee, offering subjects money to change their votes, or excluding the votes of low-income subjects leads to a strong decline in voluntary compliance with elected rules that ask subjects to give. Rules that ask subjects to not give see no decline. Heterogeneity in behavioral reactions suggests that treatment effects are driven by preferences for democratic participation and by preferences for unbiased election procedures. |
| JEL: | D02 D72 D91 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0018&r=exp |
| By: | Björn Bartling; Ernst Fehr; David B. Huffman; Nick Netzer |
| Abstract: | Trust affects almost all human relationships – in families, organizations, markets and politics. However, identifying the conditions under which trust, defined as people’s beliefs in the trustworthiness of others, has a causal effect on the efficiency of human interactions has proven to be difficult. We show experimentally and theoretically that trust indeed has a causal effect. The duration of the effect depends, however, on whether initial trust variations are supported by multiple equilibria. We study a repeated principal-agent game with multiple equilibria and document empirically that an efficient equilibrium is selected if principals believe that agents are trustworthy, while players coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium if principals believe that agents are untrustworthy. Yet, if we change the institutional environment such that there is a unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in the latter environment, exogenous variations in trust do not even have a short-run effect. The institutional environment thus appears to be key for whether trust has causal effects and whether the effects are transient or persistent. |
| Keywords: | trust, causality, equilibrium selection, belief distortions, incomplete contracts, screening, institutions |
| JEL: | C91 D02 D91 E02 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7324&r=exp |
| By: | Simon Dato; Petra Nieken |
| Abstract: | We study gender differences in relation to performance and sabotage in competitions. While we find no systematic gender differences in performance in the real effort task, we observe a strong gender gap in sabotage choices in our experiment. This gap is rooted in the uncertainty about the opponent's sabotage: in the absence of information about the opponent's sabotage choice, males expect to suffer from sabotage to a higher degree than females and choose higher sabotage levels themselves. If beliefs are exogenously aligned by implementing sabotage via strategy method, the gender gap in sabotage choices disappears. Moreover, providing a noisy signal about the sabotage level from which subjects might suffer leads to an endogenous alignment of beliefs and eliminates the gender gap in sabotage. |
| Keywords: | gender, sabotage, tournament, belief formation |
| JEL: | J16 M12 C91 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7315&r=exp |
| By: | James C. Cox; Daniel Kreisman; Susan Dynarski |
| Abstract: | We ask why so few student loan borrowers enroll in Income Driven Repayment when the majority would benefit from doing so. To do so we run an incentivized laboratory experiment using a facsimile of the government’s Student Loan Exit Counseling website. We test the role information complexity, uncertainty about earnings, and the default option play. We show that despite an ex ante optimal choice, the majority choose, or are defaulted into, a plan that offers no protection against default. We find the default option is a driver of this phenomenon, suggesting the government has an easy policy lever to lower default rates – change the default plan. |
| JEL: | I2 I20 I21 I22 I23 I28 J01 |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25258&r=exp |
| By: | Charles Bellemare; Alexander Sebald |
| Abstract: | Subjective performance evaluations are commonly used to provide feedback and incentives to workers. However, such evaluations can generate significant disagreements and conflicts, the severity of which may be driven by many factors. In this paper we show that a workers’ level of self-confidence plays a central role in shaping reactions to subjective evaluations - overconfident agents engage in costly punishment when they receive evaluations below their own, but provide limited rewards to principals when evaluations exceed their own. In contrast, underconfident agents do not significantly react to evaluations below their own, but reward significantly evaluations exceeding their own. Our analysis exploits data from a principal-agent experiment run with a large sample of the Danish working age population, varying the financial consequences associated with the evaluations workers receive. In contrast to existing economic models of reciprocal behavior, reactions to evaluations are weakly related to the financial consequences of the evaluations. These results point towards a behavioral model of reciprocity that intertwines the desire to protect self-perceptions with over-/underconfidence. |
| Keywords: | subjective performance evaluations, self-confidence, reciprocity |
| JEL: | D01 D02 D82 D86 J41 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7325&r=exp |
| By: | Gary Bolton; Eugen Dimant (Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania); Ulrich Schmidt; |
| Abstract: | Both theory and recent empirical evidence on nudging suggests that observability of behavior acts as an instrument for promoting (discouraging) pro-social (anti-social) behavior. Our study questions the universality of these claims. We employ a novel four-party setup to disentangle the roles three observational mechanisms play in mediating behavior. We systematically vary the observability of one’s actions by others as well as the (non-)monetary relationship between observer and observee. Observability involving economic incentives crowds-out anti-social behavior in favor of more pro-social behavior. Surprisingly, social observation without economic incentives fails to achieve any aggregate pro-social effect, and if anything it backfires. Additional experiments confirm that observability without additional monetary incentives can indeed backfire. However, they also show that the effect of observability on pro-social behavior is increased when social norms are made salient. |
| Keywords: | Anti-Social Behavior, Experiment, Nudge, Pro-Social Behavior, Reputation |
| JEL: | C91 D64 D9 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0017&r=exp |
| By: | James Andreoni; Deniz Aydin; Blake Barton; B. Douglas Bernheim; Jeffrey Naecker |
| Abstract: | In settings with uncertainty, tension exists between ex ante and ex post notions of fairness (e.g., equal opportunity versus equal outcomes). In a laboratory experiment, the most common behavioral pattern is for subjects to select the ex ante fair alternative ex ante, and switch to the ex post fair alternative ex post. One potential explanation embraces consequentialism and construes the reversals as manifestations of time inconsistency. Another abandons consequentialism, thereby avoiding the implication that revisions imply inconsistency. We test between these explanations by examining the demand for commitment, and contingent planning. The hypothesis of time-consistent non-consequentialism receives strong support. |
| JEL: | D03 D63 |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25257&r=exp |
| By: | Cerroni, S.; Watson, V.; Macdiarmid, J. |
| Abstract: | This paper tests if Second Price Vickrey Auction (SPVA) and Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) are isomorphic and whether lack of isomorphism is due to value-elicitation, value-formation or both. We conduct an artefactual field experiment that combines induced-value (IV) and home-grown (HG) procedures using SPVA and DCE. IV preferences are elicited for tokens and HG preferences for multi-attribute lasagnes. Attributes are healthiness and environmental sustainability. Our results suggest that HG preferences differ across elicitation methods. This discrepancy is due to value-elicitation and value-formation. DCE is the most demand-revealing approach and provides the highest premiums for healthy and environmentally sustainable lasagnes. Acknowledgement : |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics and Policy |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277155&r=exp |
| By: | Jessica Goldberg; Mario Macis; Pradeep Chintagunta |
| Abstract: | Peer referrals are a common strategy for addressing asymmetric information in contexts such as the labor market. They could be especially valuable for increasing testing and treatment of infectious diseases, where peers may have advantages over health workers in both identifying new patients and providing them credible information, but they are rare in that context. In an experiment with 3,182 patients at 128 tuberculosis (TB) treatment centers in India, we find peers are indeed more effective than health workers in bringing in new suspects for testing, and low-cost incentives of about $US 3 per referral considerably increase the probability that current patients make referrals that result in the testing of new symptomatics and the identification of new TB cases. Peer outreach identifies new TB cases at 25%-35% of the cost of outreach by health workers and can be a valuable tool in combating infectious disease. |
| JEL: | I1 O1 |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25279&r=exp |
| By: | Deepak Gupta (University School of Management Studies, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University) |
| Abstract: | People, everday are inumdated with making decisions whether they are big or small. Cognitive psychology plays a major role in how people make their choices. Cognitive bias is known to have an effect on decision making. These biases are based on memory which create a systematic deviation in thinking and processing information. This paper aims to identify the effect of select cognitive biases i.e., Overconfidence bias, Endowment bias, Ambiguity Aversion bias and Recency bias on General Decision Making of a person as well as Financial Decision Making. The study also explores the differences and similarities in cognitive biases working during general decision making and financial decision making. For this, a self-administered questionnaire was used to collect data from 416 people and analysis and conclusions were drawn based on it. |
| Keywords: | Over confidence bias, Endowment bias, Ambiguity Aversion bias, Recency bias, Decision making, Financial Decision Making |
| JEL: | M00 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:7010051&r=exp |
| By: | Mathieu Bunel; Samuel Gorohouna; Yannick L’Horty; Pascale Petit; Catherine Ris |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tep:teppwp:wp18-06&r=exp |
| By: | Andersson, Lina (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player, who transitions between different states of mind as a response to observed actions taken by the other player, can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind. The state of mind determines the player's psychological payoff that together with a material payoff constitutes his utility. In the friendly (hostile) state of mind the player has a positive (negative) concern for the other player's material payoffs. Emotions can both facilitate and obstruct cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma game. If finitely repeated, then a traditional player (who cares only for own material payoffs) can have an incentive to manipulate an emotional player into a friendly state of mind for future gains. If infinitely repeated, then two emotional players may require less patience to sustain cooperation. However, emotions can also obstruct cooperation if the players are either unwilling to punisheach other, or become revengeful when punished. |
| Keywords: | Emotions; cooperation; repeated prisoners dilemma; stochastic games |
| JEL: | C73 D01 D91 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0747&r=exp |
| By: | Okonogi, S.; Takeshi, S. |
| Abstract: | In recent years, sales of commercial nutritionally enhanced complementary food are very common land scape in developing countries. However, whether this phenomenon can improve child nutrition or not is ambiguous. This study explore the impact of appearance of new commercial supplementary food product on child nutrition by means of randomized sales experiment. We use definitely new product for impact evaluation of market based approach. Therefore we can evaluate the impact of appearance and prevalence of the commercial product. The results shows there are heterogeneous impact of the product. The consumption of the product has statistically significant and positive impacts on child weight only for initially less-weighted children, but not for initially well-weighted children. Our results show the market based approach is effective way for improvement of child nutrition in Ghana. Acknowledgement : |
| Keywords: | Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277368&r=exp |