nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2018‒12‒03
29 papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Experience Does not Eliminate Bubbles: Experimental Evidence By Anita (A.G.) Kopanyi-Peuker; Matthias Weber
  2. Can Facebook Ads and Email Messages Increase Fiscal Capacity? Experimental Evidence from Venezuela By Gallego, J.A.; Federico Ortega
  3. Physicians’ Incentives to Adopt Personalized Medicine: Experimental Evidence By David Bardey; Samuel Kembou Nzale; Bruno Ventelou
  4. Comparing compliance behaviour of students and farmers: Implications for agricultural policy impact analysis By Peth, Denise; Mußhoff, Oliver
  5. Rationally Inattentive Consumer: An Experiment By Civelli, Andrea; Deck, Cary; LeBlanc, Justin D.; Tutino, Antonella
  6. What Drives Conditional Cooperation in Public Goods Games? By Peter Katuscak; Tomas Miklanek
  7. Can Stated Measures of Willingness-to-Accept be Valid? Evidence from Laboratory Experiments By Lloyd-Smith, P.; Adamowicz, V.
  8. Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect By Justin Dijk; Erik Ansink
  9. Physicians' Incentives to Adopt Personalized Medicine: Experimental Evidence By David Bardey; Samuel Kembou Nzalé; Bruno Ventelou
  10. Anti-social Behavior in Groups By Michal Bauer; Jana Cahlikova; Dagmara Celik Katreniak; Julie Chytilova; Lubomir Cingl; Tomas Zelinsky
  11. Cortisol meets GARP : The Effect of Stress on Economic Rationality By Cettolin, Elena; Dalton, Patricio; Kop, Willem; Zhang, Wanqing
  12. Ambiguity and excuse-driven behavior in charitable giving By Thomas Garcia; Sébastien Massoni; Marie Claire Villeval
  13. Is Social Responsibility a Normal Good? By Björn Bartling; Vanessa Valero; Roberto A. Weber
  14. Willingness to Pay for a new farm technology given Risk Preferences. Evidence from an experimental auction in Kenya. By Channa, H.; Ricker-Gilbert, J.; De Groote, H.; Marenya, P.; Bauchet, J.
  15. Experimental Evidence of Risk Attitude of Farmers from Risk-Preference Elicitation in India By Patil, V.; Veettil, P.C.
  16. Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions By Fabian Dvorak; Sebastian Fehrler
  17. Technical and economic evaluation of the deficit irrigation on yield of cotton By Zounemat-Kermani, M.; Asadi, R.
  18. The Role of Strategic Uncertainty in Area-wide Pest Management Decisions of Florida Citrus Growers By Singerman, A.; Useche, P.
  19. Preferences and strategic behavior in public goods games By Gilles Grandjean; Mathieu Lefebvre; Marco Mantovani
  20. Metacognitive ability predicts learning cue-stimulus associations in the absence of external feedback By Marine Hainguerlot; Jean-Christophe Vergnaud; Vincent De Gardelle
  21. War and Social Attitudes By Child, Travers Barclay; Nikolova, Elena
  22. If I Don’t Trust Your Preferences, I Won’t Follow Mine: Preference Stability, Beliefs, and Strategic Choice By Irenaeus Wolff
  23. Assessing household preferences for wastewater fed fish: Lessons from a field experiment in Peru By Danso, G.; Boaitey, A.; Otoo, M.
  24. Entrainment of Voluntary Movement to Undetected Auditory Regularities By Aaron Schurger; Nathan Faivre; Leila Cammoun; Bianca Trovó; Olaf Blanke
  25. Assessing consumer and producer preferences for animal welfare using a common elicitation format. By Schreiner, J.A.
  26. The stabilizing role of forward guidance: A macro experiment By Ahrens, Steffen; Lustenhouwer, Joep; Tettamanzi, Michele
  27. How Wage Announcements Affect Job Search - A Field Experiment By Michèle Belot; Philipp Kircher; Paul Muller
  28. Can Job Search Assistance Improve the Labour Market Integration for Refugees? Evidence from a Field Experiment By Michele Battisti; Yvonne Giesing; Nadzeya Laurentsyeva
  29. Going with your Gut: The (In)accuracy of Forecast Revisions in a Football Score Prediction Game By Carl Singleton; J. James Reade; Alsdair Brown

  1. By: Anita (A.G.) Kopanyi-Peuker (University of Amsterdam); Matthias Weber (University of St. Gallen, Vilnius University)
    Abstract: We study the role of experience in the formation of asset price bubbles. Therefore, we conduct two related experiments. One is a call market experiment in which participants trade assets with each other. The other is a learning-to-forecast experiment in which participants only forecast future prices, while the trade, which is based on these forecasts, is computerized. Each experiment comprises three treatments that vary the amount of information about the fundamental value that participants receive. Each market is repeated three times. In both experiments and in all treatments, we observe sizable bubbles. These bubbles do not disappear with experience. Our findings in the call market experiment stand in contrast to the literature. Our findings in the learning-to-forecast experiment are novel. Interestingly, the shape of the bubbles is different between the two experiments. We observe flat bubbles in the call market experiment and boom-and-bust cycles in the learning-to-forecast experiment.
    Keywords: Experimental finance; asset market experiment; asset pricing; behavioral finance; bubbles; experience.
    JEL: C92 D53 D90
    Date: 2018–11–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20180092&r=exp
  2. By: Gallego, J.A.; Federico Ortega
    Abstract: Tax compliance is an important challenge in weakly institutionalized countries, in which citizens do not trust the State and prefer to evade taxation. However, e-government strategies may improve fiscal capacity, as the transaction costs of compliance are reduced and more information from taxpayers is gathered and exploited. Can compliance be increased, and hence fiscal capacity strengthened, using online communication strategies that exploit these tools and sources of information? We perform a randomized field experiment in the capital of Venezuela, Caracas, to determine if online strategies, namely email reminders and targeted Facebook advertisements, can increase tax compliance. We vary the mechanism used to approach taxpayers to test if more direct and personalized methods, such as email messages, are more effective than general advertisement tools, such as Facebook ads. Moreover, our design allows us to test potential complementarities between these strategies thus boosting the capacity of the local government to increase compliance. We find that these strategies are cost-effective methods for increasing tax revenues, but that the effects vary across different types of taxpayers.
    Keywords: Tax compliance, Randomized controlled trial, Fiscal capacity, Online strategies
    JEL: C93 H26 H71 O12
    Date: 2018–11–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000092:016968&r=exp
  3. By: David Bardey (CEDE - Los Andes University and Toulouse School of Economics); Samuel Kembou Nzale (Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, EHESS, Centrale Marseille, AMSE); Bruno Ventelou (Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, EHESS, Centrale Marseille, AMSE)
    Abstract: We study physicians’ incentives to use personalized medicine techniques, replicating the physician’s trade-offs under the option of personalized medicine information. In a laboratory experiment where prospective physicians play a dual-agent real-effort game, we vary both the information structure (free access versus paid access to personalized medicine information) and the payment scheme (pay-for-performance (P4P), capitation (CAP) and fee-for-service (FFS)) by applying a within-subject design. Our results are threefold. i) Compared to FFS and CAP, the P4P payment scheme strongly impacts the decision to adopt personalized medicine. ii) Although expected to dominate the other schemes, P4P is not always efficient in transforming free access to personalized medicine into higher quality patient care. iii) When it has to be paid for, personalized medicine is positively associated with quality, suggesting that subjects tend to make better use of information that comes at a cost. We conclude that this last result can be considered a “commitment device†. However, quantification of our results suggests that the positive impact of the commitment device observed is not strong enough to justify generalizing paid access to personalized medicine.
    Keywords: personalized medicine, fee-for-service, capitation, pay-for-performance, physician altruism, laboratory experiment
    JEL: C91 I11
    Date: 2018–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1823&r=exp
  4. By: Peth, Denise; Mußhoff, Oliver
    Abstract: Increasing popularity of economic experiments for policy impact analysis has led to an ongoing debate about the suitability of students to substitute professionals as experimental subjects. To date, subject pool effects in agricultural and resource economics experiments have not been sufficiently studied. In order to identify differences and similarities between students and non-students, we carry out an experiment in the form of a multi-period business management game that is adapted to an agri-environmental context. We compare the compliance behaviour of German agricultural students and German farmers with regard to water protection rules and analyse their responses to two different green nudge interventions. The experimental results reveal that the direction of the response to the policy treatments is similar. Even unexpected behaviour could be reproduced by the student sample. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the treatment effects differed between the two samples. This implies that experimenters in the field of agricultural and resource economics could use the subject pool of students to analyse the direction of nudge policies. If predictions should be made about the magnitude effects, we suggest using a professional subject pool.
    Keywords: subject pool effect,green nudges,policy impact analysis,compliance behaviour
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:daredp:1809&r=exp
  5. By: Civelli, Andrea (University of Arkansas); Deck, Cary (University of Alabama and Chapman University); LeBlanc, Justin D. (University of Arkansas); Tutino, Antonella (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas)
    Abstract: This paper presents a laboratory experiment that directly tests the theoretical predictions of consumption choices under rational inattention. Subjects are asked to select consumption when income is random. They can optimally decide to reduce uncertainty about income by acquiring signals about it. The informativeness of the signals directly relates to the cognitive effort required to process the information. We find that subjects’ behavior is largely in line with the predictions of the theory: 1) Subjects optimally make stochastic consumption choices; 2) They respond to incentives and changes in the economic environment by varying their attention and consumption; 3) They respond asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks to income, with negative shocks triggering stronger and faster reactions than positive shocks.
    Keywords: Rational Inattention; Experimental Evidence; Information Processing Capacity; Consumption
    JEL: C91 D11 D8 E20
    Date: 2018–11–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:feddwp:1813&r=exp
  6. By: Peter Katuscak; Tomas Miklanek
    Abstract: Extensive experimental research on public goods games documents that many subjects are “conditional cooperators” in that they positively correlate their contributions with (their belief about) contributions of other subjects in their group. The goal of our study is to shed light on what preference and decision-making patterns drive this observed regularity. We consider four potential explanations, including reciprocity, conformity, inequality aversion, and residual factors such as confusing and anchoring, and aim to disentangle their effects. We find that, of the average conditionally cooperative behavior in the sample, about two thirds is accounted for by residual factors, a quarter by inequality aversion and a tenth by conformity, while reciprocity plays virtually no role. These findings carry important messages about how to interpret conditional cooperation as observed in the lab and ways it can be exploited for fundraising purposes.
    Keywords: : conditional cooperation; public goods game; reciprocity; conformity; inequality aversion; anchoring; fundraising;
    JEL: H41 C91 D64
    Date: 2018–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp631&r=exp
  7. By: Lloyd-Smith, P.; Adamowicz, V.
    Abstract: Willingness-to-accept (WTA) questions have been largely abandoned in stated preference empirical work in favor of eliciting willingness-to-pay (WTP) responses, mainly due to perceived unreliability of questions that ask respondents for compensation amounts. This paper reassesses whether stated WTA welfare measures can be valid in public and private good contexts. We conduct two sets of laboratory experiments to analyze whether elicitation format, survey design and framing, and follow-up questions can generate truthful responses. For public goods, we adapt the existing WTP incentive compatibility theoretical framework to the WTA context and test the theory using an experiment involving voting. Results are consistent with the WTP literature and suggest that WTA values can be valid as long as responses have consequences for respondents. For the private good experiment, we focus on whether respondents are motivated to affect the price or the provision of the good. We find that strategic behavior is present and in the direction expected by theory. Survey framing and the use of follow-up questions can provide bounds on the value estimates. These findings raise potential concerns with the use of non-incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms in WTA contexts. Acknowledgement :
    Keywords: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277241&r=exp
  8. By: Justin Dijk (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, PBL); Erik Ansink (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
    Abstract: We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while behavioral economics suggests that repetition may increase market efficiency because it attenuates the endowment effect - the phenomenon that ownership of a good tends to increase one's valuation of the good. We find that of these two countervailing effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition increases market efficiency, conservation contracts can be of shorter duration and procured at a higher frequency than has been suggested before.
    Keywords: Auctions; procurement; endowment effect; collusion; nature conservation
    JEL: C91 D44 H57 Q57
    Date: 2018–11–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20180093&r=exp
  9. By: David Bardey (CEDE - Los Andes University, TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics); Samuel Kembou Nzalé (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Bruno Ventelou (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We study physicians' incentives to use personalized medicine techniques, replicating the physician's trade-offs under the option of personalized medicine information. In a laboratory experiment where prospective physicians play a dual-agent real-effort game, we vary both the information structure (free access versus paid access to personalized medicine information) and the payment scheme (pay-for-performance (P4P), capitation (CAP) and fee-for-service (FFS)) by applying a within-subject design. Our results are threefold. i) Compared to FFS and CAP, the P4P payment scheme strongly impacts the decision to adopt personalized medicine. ii) Although expected to dominate the other schemes, P4P is not always efficient in transforming free access to personalized medicine into higher quality patient care. iii) When it has to be paid for, personalized medicine is positively associated with quality, suggesting that subjects tend to make better use of information that comes at a cost. We conclude that this last result can be considered a "commitment device". However, quantification of our results suggests that the positive impact of the commitment device observed is not strong enough to justify generalizing paid access to personalized medicine.
    Keywords: personalized medicine,fee-for-service,capitation,pay-for-performance,physician altruism,laboratory experiment
    Date: 2018–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01928128&r=exp
  10. By: Michal Bauer; Jana Cahlikova; Dagmara Celik Katreniak; Julie Chytilova; Lubomir Cingl; Tomas Zelinsky
    Abstract: This paper provides strong evidence supporting the long-standing speculation that decisionmaking in groups has a dark side, by magnifying the prevalence of anti-social behavior towards outsiders. A large-scale experiment implemented in Slovakia and Uganda (N=2,309) reveals that deciding in a group with randomly assigned peers increases the prevalence of anti-social behavior that reduces everyone’s payoff but which improves the relative position of own group. The effects are driven by the influence of a group context on individual behavior, rather than by group deliberation. The observed patterns are strikingly similar on both continents.
    Keywords: antisocial behavior; aggressive competitiveness; group membership; group decision-making; group conflict;
    JEL: C92 C93 D01 D64 D74 D91
    Date: 2018–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp632&r=exp
  11. By: Cettolin, Elena (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Dalton, Patricio (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Kop, Willem (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Zhang, Wanqing (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)
    Abstract: Rationality is a fundamental pillar of Economics. It is however unclear if this assumption holds when decisions are made under stress. To answer this question, we design a laboratory experiment where we exogenously induce physiological stress in participants and test the consistency of their choices with economic rationality. We induce stress with the Cold Pressor test and measure it by assessing individuals’ cortisol levels in saliva. Economic rationality is measured by the consistency of participants’ choices with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). We find that participants exposed to the stress manipulation experience a significant increase in cortisol levels compared to those in the placebo group. However, differences in cortisol levels do not affect the consistency of choices with GARP. Our findings provide strong empirical support for the robustness of the economic rationality assumption.
    Keywords: economic rationality; GARP; Physiological Stress; Cortisol
    JEL: C90 C91 D01 D91
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:53ddb666-a610-4835-b6ba-6985b5fd2761&r=exp
  12. By: Thomas Garcia (Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France; QuBE - School of Economics and Finance, QUT, Brisbane, Australia); Sébastien Massoni (QuBE - School of Economics, Finance and Australian Centre for Entrepreneurship Research, QUT, Brisbane, Australia); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69131 Ecully, France ; IZA, Bonn, Germany)
    Abstract: A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. In a laboratory experiment, we show that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to behave less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation -rather than its benefits- are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.
    Keywords: Ambiguity, excuse-driven behavior, charitable giving, social preferences, experiment
    JEL: C91 D64 D81
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1826&r=exp
  13. By: Björn Bartling; Vanessa Valero; Roberto A. Weber
    Abstract: We investigate whether growth in consumer income causes an increased willingness to pay to mitigate negative externalities from consumption. Correlational field evidence suggests a positive relationship between income and social responsibility. To investigate a causal link, we conduct a laboratory market experiment in which firms and consumers can exchange products that differ in the degree to which they mitigate negative external impacts at the expense of higher production costs. Our treatments exogenously vary consumers’ incomes. Our experimental results reveal that growth in consumer income causes an increase in the share of socially responsible consumption in the laboratory. Such a causal relationship is significant from a policy perspective, as it implies that some negative external impacts of consumption activity can be mitigated as societies experience economic growth.
    Keywords: social responsibility, income growth, normal goods, laboratory experiment, market game
    JEL: C92 D31 D62 M14
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7263&r=exp
  14. By: Channa, H.; Ricker-Gilbert, J.; De Groote, H.; Marenya, P.; Bauchet, J.
    Abstract: This paper describes an experimental auction conducted among maize traders and farmers in Western Kenya to measure adoption for two low-cost technologies that can measure grain moisture content. Willingness-to-pay auctions (WTP) were combined with a risk preference lottery, allowing an opportunity to study the impact of risk preferences on technology adoption. The specifics of this technology also allows us to identify the impact of risk aversion on willingness to pay for a technology when production uncertainty is not part of the equation. We also randomized two variations of the BDM method for collecting WTP data allowing for a mechanism by which to study the impact of the method on valuation data. We find some evidence that risk aversion increased willingness to pay. Another result with implications in implementation of field experiments in the developing world is that farmers were sensitive to the method in which the auction was presented but traders were not. Acknowledgement :
    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277406&r=exp
  15. By: Patil, V.; Veettil, P.C.
    Abstract: Covariate production risks are some of the central features of the agriculture sector especially in developing countries that merit further economic research. Risk attitudes of the farmers play a crucial role in designing and targeting mechanisms to mitigate risks. As a part of our larger research project towards developing a comprehensive crop insurance product, we conduct risk preferences elicitation experiment with rice-growing farmers in eastern India. The experiment is relatively unique in that it introduces a minimum entry fee which help in eliciting risk preferences that are close to their behaviour in real decision makings. Using zero-inflated ordered probit mode, we analysed the experimental data. The results show that small and marginal farmers tend to opt for options associated with high risk aversion. As majority of the farmers in the sampled states have small and marginal landholdings, in general farmers tend to be risk averse. In addition, compared to young farmers, elder farmers are found to be more risk averse. Education and household size of respondents have also positive effect on riskier options and negative effect on risk averse options. Farmers who belong to minority caste/social class (SC and ST) are more likely to opt the risk aversion strategy. Acknowledgement :
    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277331&r=exp
  16. By: Fabian Dvorak; Sebastian Fehrler
    Abstract: Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in environments where signals about others’ actions are noisy. However, empirically the exact role of communication is not well understood. We study cooperation under different monitoring and communication structures in the laboratory. Under all monitoring structures – perfect, imperfect public, and imperfect private – communication boosts efficiency. However, under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise, cooperation is stable only when subjects can communicate before every round of the game. Beyond improving coordination, communication increases efficiency by making subjects’ play more lenient and forgiving. We further find clear evidence for the exchange of private information – the central role ascribed to communication in recent theoretical contributions.
    Keywords: infinitely repeated games, monitoring, communication, cooperation, strategic uncertainty, prisoner’s dilemma
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0112&r=exp
  17. By: Zounemat-Kermani, M.; Asadi, R.
    Abstract: A field experiment was carried out over two years to investigate the effects of deficit irrigation applied with surface and subsurface drip irrigation systems on water use efficiency and yield of cotton. The experiments were carried out during 2014-2015 in Kerman Province (Iran) in a split plot based on a randomized complete block design with three replications. Treatments considered three levels of irrigation, based on 100 (L1, full irrigation), 80 (L2) and 60 (L3) percent of crop water demand at each irrigation event, as main plots, as well as two drip irrigation methods, including surface (S1) and subsurface (S2), as subplots. All treatments were assessed in terms of yield, water use efficiency, as well as of economic aspects, including investment preference determination. Two-year comparison showed that yield, water use efficiency, boll weight, number of boll and plant height in subsurface drip irrigation system (S2) were increased 10.8, 11, 7.45, 12.8 and 11.2 percent compared to surface drip irrigation system (S1), respectively. Economic analysis showed that applying 100 percent of crop water requirement in subsurface drip irrigation (L1S2) was superior to the other treatments. Acknowledgement :
    Keywords: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277067&r=exp
  18. By: Singerman, A.; Useche, P.
    Abstract: We conducted a choice experiment based on the theory of global games to analyze the impact of strategic uncertainty on participation decisions of Florida citrus growers in area-wide pest management programs to control the vector of citrus greening. We found that the farmers average certainty equivalent in a strategically uncertain setting under a high coordination requirement for obtaining a Pareto superior payoff, was lower compared to that of a lottery. Moreover, we found some evidence that the perceived risk of farmers in the strategically uncertain alternative increased as the size of the group increased. Thus, our results help explain why, despite the efficiency of area-wide pest management to control the vector of citrus greening across Florida, farmers participation is not as widespread as one would expect. To avoid the strategic uncertainty involved in relying on neighbors, many farmers choose self-reliance in spraying despite the lower payoff. As a recommendation for policy makers, we propose a top-down regulation so as to generate a bottom-up collective action to deal with the issue of strategic uncertainty in area-wide pest management to avoid the sub-optimal outcome. Acknowledgement :
    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277045&r=exp
  19. By: Gilles Grandjean; Mathieu Lefebvre; Marco Mantovani
    Abstract: We analyze experimentally behavior in a finitely repeated public goodsgame. One of the main results of the literature is that contributions are initially high, and gradually decrease over time. Two explanations of this pattern have been developed: (i) the population is composed of free-riders, who never contribute, and conditional cooperators, who contribute if others do so as well; (ii) strategic players contribute to sustain mutually beneficial future cooperation, but reduce their contributions as the end of the game approaches. This paper contributes to bridging the gap between these views. We analyze preferences and strategic ability in one design by manipulating group composition to form homogeneous groups on both dimensions. Our results highlight the interaction between the two: groups that sustain high levels of cooperation are composed of members who share a common inclination toward cooperation and have the strategic abilities to recognize and reap the benefits of enduring cooperation.
    Keywords: Voluntary contribution, conditional cooperation, free riding, strategic sophistication.
    JEL: H41 C73 C91 C92
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2018-47&r=exp
  20. By: Marine Hainguerlot (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jean-Christophe Vergnaud (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Vincent De Gardelle (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: Learning how certain cues in our environment predict specific states of nature is an essential ability for survival. However learning typically requires external feedback, which is not always available in everyday life. One potential substitute for external feedback could be to use the confidence we have in our decisions. Under this hypothesis, if no external feedback is available, then the agents' ability to learn about predictive cues should increase with the quality of their confidence judgments (i.e. metacognitive efficiency). We tested and confirmed this novel prediction in an experimental study using a perceptual decision task. We evaluated in separate sessions the metacognitive abilities of participants (N = 65) and their abilities to learn about predictive cues. As predicted, participants with greater metacognitive abilities learned more about the cues. Knowledge of the cues improved accuracy in the perceptual task. Our results provide strong evidence that confidence plays an active role in improving learning and performance.
    Date: 2018–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01761531&r=exp
  21. By: Child, Travers Barclay; Nikolova, Elena
    Abstract: We study the long-run effects of con ict on social attitudes, with World War II in Central and Eastern Europe as our setting. Much of earlier work has relied on self- reported measures of victimization, which are prone to endogenous misreporting. With our own survey-based measure, we replicate established findings linking victimization to political participation, civic engagement, optimism, and trust. Those findings are reversed, however, when tested instead with an objective measure of victimization based on historical reference material. Thus, we urge caution when interpreting survey- based results from this literature as causal.
    Keywords: conflict,social attitudes,World War II
    JEL: D74 N44 P20
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:279&r=exp
  22. By: Irenaeus Wolff
    Abstract: In contrast to standard theory, experimental participants often do not best-respond to their stated beliefs. Potential reasons are inaccurate belief reports or unstable preferences. Focusing on games in which participants can observe the revealed preferences of their opponents, this paper points out an additional reason for the lack of belief-action consistency. Whether a participant’s best-response—or a Nash-equilibrium—predicts her behaviour depends heavily on the participant believing in others’ preference stability. Believing in others’ preference stability fosters predictability because it is associated with a lower variance in the participant’s belief about her opponents’ actions, and low-variance beliefs entail more best-responding.
    Keywords: Preference stability, best-response, Nash-equilibrium, rational beliefs, public good, social dilemma, conditional cooperation, social preferences.
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0113&r=exp
  23. By: Danso, G.; Boaitey, A.; Otoo, M.
    Abstract: Abstract This paper used choice experiment to assess households preferences for wastewater fed fish in Lima, Peru. The study considered four fish attributes, price, source, certification and information on additives. In total, 443 households participated in the field experiment. Results from the estimation of the random parameter logit (RPL) model in both the willingness to pay (WTP) and preference space showed that in general, households expressed positive preferences for fish raised in wastewater, freshwater and wild fish as well as certification and use of additives. Our findings show that household WTP for fish raised in the wild and in freshwater were positive and more robust as compared to WTP for wastewater fed fish which was influenced by factors such as certification. We find that households are willing to pay premiums of $0.69, $1.06 and $2.98 for wastewater, freshwater and wild fish respectively. We also find evidence to suggest that health and food safety concerns are the most important consideration in household preferences for wastewater fed fish amongst a set of perceptions variables examined in this study. Acknowledgement :
    Keywords: Research Methods/ Statistical Methods
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277338&r=exp
  24. By: Aaron Schurger (UNICOG-U992 - Neuroimagerie cognitive - CEA - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives - Université Paris-Saclay - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale - UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11, LNCO - Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience - EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, CNP - Center for Neuroprosthetics [Geneva] - EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Nathan Faivre (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LNCO - Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience - EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, CNP - Center for Neuroprosthetics [Geneva] - EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Leila Cammoun (LNCO - Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience - EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, CNP - Center for Neuroprosthetics [Geneva] - EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne); Bianca Trovó (UNICOG-U992 - Neuroimagerie cognitive - CEA - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives - Université Paris-Saclay - INSERM - Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale - UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11); Olaf Blanke (LNCO - Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience - EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, CNP - Center for Neuroprosthetics [Geneva] - EPFL - Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne)
    Abstract: In physics "entrainment" refers to the synchronization of two coupled oscillators with similar fundamental frequencies. In behavioral science, entrainment refers to the tendency of humans to synchronize their movements with rhythmic stimuli. Here, we asked whether human subjects performing a tapping task would entrain their tapping to an undetected auditory rhythm surreptitiously introduced in the guise of ambient background noise in the room. Subjects performed two different tasks, one in which they tapped their finger at a steady rate of their own choosing and one in which they performed a single abrupt finger tap on each trial after a delay of their own choosing. In both cases we found that subjects tended to tap in phase with the inducing modulation, with some variability in the preferred phase across subjects, consistent with prior research. In the repetitive tapping task, if the frequency of the inducing stimulus was far from the subject's own self-paced frequency, then entrainment was abolished, consistent with the properties of entrainment in physics. Thus, undetected ambient noise can influence self-generated movements. This suggests that uncued decisions to act are never completely endogenous, but are subject to subtle unnoticed influences from the sensory environment.
    Date: 2017–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01668133&r=exp
  25. By: Schreiner, J.A.
    Abstract: This study assesses pig farmers willingness-to-accept (WTA) higher farm animal welfare (FAW) standards and consumers willingness-to-pay (WTP) for thus enhanced standards. The analysis is based on Discrete Choice Experiments with nearly identical choice sets for both farmers (N=140) and consumers (N=775). Based on preference estimates from a random parameter logit (RPL) model, supply and demand curves for high-welfare pork in Germany are estimated and market equilibria are derived for alternative levels of FAW. We find that estimates of WTP are significantly positive for all FAW attributes. By contrast, our model revealed significant WTA estimates only for surface area per pig and the amount of bedding material on offer, but not for the other FAW attributes. Market simulations for high-welfare pork indicate increasing divergence between demand and supply with rising FAW standards. We estimate a market share of 49% for pork produced in compliance with an entry-level FAW programme with standards only slightly above the legal minimum. Programmes with more demanding standards are estimated to gain much smaller market shares. Keywords Farm animal welfare, Discrete Choice Experiment, Random Parameter Logit, market simulation, common elicitation format. Acknowledgement :
    Keywords: Livestock Production/Industries
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277467&r=exp
  26. By: Ahrens, Steffen; Lustenhouwer, Joep; Tettamanzi, Michele
    Abstract: Expectations are among the main driving forces for economic dynamics. Therefore, managing expectations has become a primary objective for monetary policy seeking to stabilize the business cycle. In this paper, we study whether central banks can manage market expectations by means of forward guidance in a New Keynesian learning-to-forecast experiment. Forward guidance takes the form of one-period ahead inflation projections that are published by the central bank in each period. Subjects in the experiment observe these projections along with the historic development of the economy and subsequently submit their own one-period ahead inflation forecasts. In this context, we find that the central bank can significantly manage market expectations through forward guidance and that this management strongly supports monetary policy in stabilizing the economy. Moreover, forward guidance drastically reduces the probability of a deflationary spiral after strong negative shocks to the economy.
    Keywords: learning-to-forecast experiment,forward guidance,heterogeneous expectations
    JEL: C92 E32 E37 E58
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bamber:137&r=exp
  27. By: Michèle Belot; Philipp Kircher; Paul Muller
    Abstract: We study how job seekers respond to wage announcements by assigning wages randomly to pairs of otherwise similar vacancies in a large number of professions. High wage vacancies attract more interest, in contrast with much of the evidence based on observational data. Some applicants only show interest in the low wage vacancy even when they were exposed to both. Both findings are core predictions of theories of directed/competitive search where workers trade off the wage with the perceived competition for the job. A calibrated model with multiple applications and on-the-job search induces magnitudes broadly in line with the empirical findings.
    Keywords: online job search, directed search, wage competition, field experiments
    JEL: J31 J63 J64 C93
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7302&r=exp
  28. By: Michele Battisti; Yvonne Giesing; Nadzeya Laurentsyeva
    Abstract: We conducted a field experiment to evaluate the impact of job-search assistance on the employment of recently arrived refugees in Germany. The treatment group received job-matching support: an NGO identified suitable vacancies and sent the refugees' CVs to employers. Results of follow-up phone surveys show a positive and significant treatment effect of 13 percentage points on employment after twelve months. These effects are concentrated among low-educated refugees and those facing uncertainty about their residence status. These individuals might not search effectively, lack access to alternative support programmes, and may be disregarded by employers due to perceived higher hiring costs.
    Keywords: refugees, labour market integration, job search assistance, field experiment
    JEL: E24 F22 J61 J68
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7292&r=exp
  29. By: Carl Singleton (University of Reading); J. James Reade (University of Reading); Alsdair Brown (University of East Anglia)
    Abstract: This paper studies 150 individuals who each chose to forecast the outcome of 380 fixed events, namely all football matches during the 2017/18 season of the English Premier League. The focus is on whether revisions to these forecasts before the matches began improved the likelihood of predicting correct scorelines and results. Against what theory might expect, we show how these revisions tended towards significantly worse forecasting performance, suggesting that individuals should have stuck with their initial judgements, or their ‘gut instincts’. This result is robust to both differences in the average forecasting ability of individuals and the predictability of matches. We find evidence this is because revisions to the forecast number of goals scored in football matches are generally excessive, especially when these forecasts were increased rather than decreased.
    Keywords: Sports forecasting, Fixed-event forecasts, Judgement revision
    JEL: C53 C23 D84
    Date: 2018–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gwc:wpaper:2018-006&r=exp

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