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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Ifcher, John (Santa Clara University); Zarghamee, Homa (Barnard College); Houser, Daniel (George Mason University); Diaz, Lina (George Mason University) |
| Abstract: | John Stuart Mill claimed that "men do not desire merely to be rich, but richer than other men." Do people desire to be richer than others? Or is it that people desire favorable comparisons to others more generally, and being richer is merely a proxy for this ineffable relativity? We conduct an online experiment absent choice in which we measure subjective wellbeing (SWB) before and after an exogenous shock that reveals to subjects how many experimental points they and another subject receive, and whether or not points are worth money. We find that subjects like receiving monetized points significantly more than non-monetized points but dislike being "poorer" than others in monetized and non-monetized points equally, suggesting relative money is valued only for the relative points it represents. We find no evidence that subjects like being "richer" than others. Subgroup analyses reveal women have a strong(er) distaste for being "richer" and "poorer" (than do men), and conservatives have a strong(er) distaste for being "poorer" (than do progressives). Our experimental-SWB approach is easy to administer and can provide some insights a revealed-preference approach cannot, suggesting that it may complement choice-based tasks in future experiments to better estimate preference parameters. |
| Keywords: | subjective well-being, relative income, others' income, income comparisons, happiness, experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D31 D63 I31 |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11763&r=exp |
| By: | Claudia M. Landeo; Kathryn E. Spier |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an enforcement agency to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With ordered-leniency policies, early cooperators receive reduced sanctions. We replicate the strategic environment described by Landeo and Spier (2018). In theory, the optimal ordered-leniency policy depends on the refinement criterion applied in case of multiplicity of equilibria. Our findings are as follows. First, we provide empirical evidence of a "race-to-the-courthouse" effect of ordered leniency: Mild and Strong Leniency induce the injurers to self-report promptly. These findings suggest that the injurers' behaviors are aligned with the risk-dominance refinement. Second, Mild and Strong Leniency significantly increase the likelihood of detection of harmful activities. This fundamental finding is explained by the high self-reporting rates under ordered-leniency policies. Third, as a result of the increase in the detection rates, the averages fines are significantly higher under Mild and Strong Leniency. As expected when the risk-dominance refinement is applied, Mild Leniency exhibits the highest average fine. |
| JEL: | C72 C90 D86 K10 L23 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25094&r=exp |
| By: | Claudia M. Landeo (University of Alberta); Kathryn E. Spier (Harvard Law School and NBER) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an enforcement agency to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With ordered-leniency policies, early cooperators receive reduced sanctions. We replicate the strategic environment described by Landeo and Spier (2018). In theory, the optimal ordered-leniency policy depends on the refinement criterion applied in case of multiplicity of equilibria. Our findings are as follows. First, we provide empirical evidence of a “race-to-the-courthouse” effect of ordered leniency: Mild and Strong Leniency induce the injurers to self-report promptly. These findings suggest that the injurers' behaviors are aligned with the risk-dominance refinement. Second, Mild and Strong Leniency significantly increase the likelihood of detection of harmful activities. This fundamental finding is explained by the high self-reporting rates under ordered-leniency policies. Third, as a result of the increase in the detection rates, the averages fines are significantly higher under Mild and Strong Leniency. As expected when the risk-dominance refinement is applied, Mild Leniency exhibits the highest average fine. |
| Keywords: | Law Enforcement, Ordered Leniency, Self-Reporting, Experiments, Leniency, Coordination Game, Prisoners' Dilemma Game, Risk Dominance, Pareto Dominance, Equilibrium Selection, Non-Cooperative Games, Harmful Externalities, Corporate Misconduct, White-Collar Crime, Securities Fraud, Insider Trading, Market Manipulation, Whistleblowers, Plea Bargaining, Tax Evasion, Environmental Policy Enforcement |
| JEL: | C72 C90 D86 K10 L23 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apc:wpaper:127&r=exp |
| By: | Andreas Leibbrandt; John A. List |
| Abstract: | Labor force composition and the allocation of talent remain of vital import to modern economies. For their part, governments and companies around the globe have implemented equal employment opportunity (EEO) regulations to influence labor market flows. Even though such regulations are pervasive, surprisingly little is known about their impacts. We use a natural field experiment conducted across 10 U.S. cities to investigate if EEO statements in job advertisements affect the first step in the employment process, application rates. Making use of data from nearly 2,500 job seekers, we find considerable policy effects, but in an unexpected direction: the presence of an EEO statement dampens rather than encourages racial minorities’ willingness to apply for jobs. Importantly, the effects are particularly pronounced for educated job seekers and in cities with white majority populations. Complementary survey evidence suggests the underlying mechanism at work is “tokenism”, revealing that EEO statements backfire because racial minorities avoid environments in which they are perceived as regulatory, or symbolic, hires rather than being hired on their own merits. Beyond their practical and theoretical importance, our results highlight how field experiments can significantly improve policymaking. In this case, if one goal of EEO regulations is to enhance the pool of minority applicants, then it is not working. |
| JEL: | C93 J71 J82 J88 K31 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25035&r=exp |
| By: | Bigoni, Maria (University of Bologna); Bortolotti, Stefania (University of Cologne); Rattini, Veronica (University of Pittsburgh) |
| Abstract: | In an online experiment, we exploit the existing disparities in socio-economic status within an Italian city, to study how these differences correlate with preferences in strategic and non-strategic situations. Our findings indicate that participants living in an area characterized by a high socio-economic environment tend to trust more and are more inclined to reciprocate higher levels of trust, as compared to those coming from less wealthy neighborhoods. This behavioral difference is, at least in part, driven by heterogeneities in beliefs: subjects from the most affluent part of the city have more optimistic expectations on their counterpart's trustworthiness than those living in a lower socio-economic environment. By contrast, no significant differences emerge in other preferences: generosity, risk-attitudes, and time preferences. Finally, we do not find any systematic evidence of out-group discrimination based on neighborhood identity. |
| Keywords: | beliefs, discrimination, generosity, risk attitudes, time preferences, trust, trustworthiness |
| JEL: | C90 D31 D63 R23 |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11758&r=exp |
| By: | Sandro Ambuehl; B. Douglas Bernheim; Fulya Ersoy; Donna Harris |
| Abstract: | Previous research shows that many people seek financial advice from non-experts, and that peer interactions influence financial decisions. We investigate whether such influences are beneficial, harmful, or simply haphazard. In our laboratory experiment, face-to-face communication with a randomly assigned peer significantly improves the quality of private decisions, measured by subjects' ability to choose as if they properly understand their opportunity sets. Subjects do not merely mimic those who know better, but also make better private decisions in novel tasks. People with low financial competence experience greater improvements when their partners also exhibit low financial competence. Hence, peer-to-peer communication transmits financial decision-making skills most effectively when peers are equally uninformed, rather than when an informed decision maker teaches an uninformed peer. Qualitative analysis of subjects' discussions supports this interpretation. The provision of effective financial education to one member of a pair influences the nature of communication but does not lead to additional improvements in the quality of the untreated partner's decisions, particularly in novel tasks. |
| JEL: | D03 D12 D69 G02 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25034&r=exp |
| By: | Rémi Suchon (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University - George Mason University [Fairfax]) |
| Abstract: | We test whether individuals internalize the effects that their behavior may have on the social image of their group. In our experiment, we recruit pairs of real-life friends and study whether rule breaking in the form of misreporting decreases when misreporting may have negative spillovers on the image of the friend. We find that participants hurt their friends' social image by misreporting because external observers update their beliefs: they rightfully expect that a participant whose friend misreported is likely to misreport himself. However, participants misreport as often when their behavior can hurt the friend's image as when it cannot, even though hurting their friends' image reduces their own monetary gains. Our interpretation is that they underestimate the impact of their behavior on external observers' beliefs about their friends. Our results cast doubts on the capacity of groups to sustain a good image absent the possibility of punishment, which is bad news. The good news is that external observers may use image spillovers to update their beliefs and interact with members of social groups more efficiently. |
| Keywords: | Social image,Group image,Misreporting |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01876569&r=exp |
| By: | Maria De Paola; Francesca Gioia; Vincenzo Scoppa (Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF, Università della Calabria) |
| Abstract: | We ran a field experiment to investigate whether individual performance in teams depends on the gender of the leader. About 430 students from an Italian University took an intermediate exam that was partly evaluated on the basis of teamwork. Students were randomly matched in teams of three and in each team we randomly chose a leader with the task of coordinating the work of the team. We find a positive and significant effect of female leadership on team performance. This effect is driven by the higher performance of team members in female led teams rather than due to an improvement in the leader’s performance. We also find that, in spite of the higher performance of female led teams, male members tend to evaluate female leaders as less effective, whereas female members are more sympathetic towards them. |
| Keywords: | Team, Leadership, Gender, Stereotypes, Randomized Experiment |
| JEL: | J16 M12 M54 C93 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clb:wpaper:201801&r=exp |
| By: | Lars J. Lefgren; Olga B. Stoddard; John E. Stovall |
| Abstract: | We present a theoretical framework which explains the optimizing behavior of individuals who are exposed to many latent stimuli but prone to experience only the most salient one. We show that individuals with such preferences may find it optimal to engage in seemingly dysfunctional behavior such as self-harm. Our model also explains the behavior of individuals experiencing depression or trapped by multiple competing problems. We present experimental evidence suggesting such preferences explain the behavior of more than two thirds of subjects exposed to single and multiple painful stimuli. |
| JEL: | D9 I1 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25060&r=exp |
| By: | Elena Serfilippi; Michael Carter; Catherine Guirkinger |
| Abstract: | In discussing the paradoxical violation of expected utility theory that now bears his name, Maurice Allais noted that individuals tend to “greatly value” payoffs that are certain. Allais' observation would seem to imply that people will undervalue insurance relative to the predictions of expected utility theory because as conventionally constructed, insurance offers an uncertain benefit in exchange for a certain cost that certainty-loving individuals will overvalue. Pursuing this logic, we implemented insurance games with cotton farmers in Burkina Faso. On average, farmer willingness to pay for insurance increases significantly when a premium rebate framing is used to render both costs and benefits of insurance uncertain. We show that the impact of the rebate frame on the willingness to pay for insurance is driven by those farmers who exhibit a well-defined discontinuous preference for certainty, a concept that we adapt from the u-v model of utility and measure with a novel behavioral experiment. Given that the potential impacts of insurance for small scale farmers are high, and yet demand for conventionally framed contracts is often low, the insights from this paper suggest welfare-enhancing ways of designing insurance for low-income farmers. |
| JEL: | D03 Q12 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25026&r=exp |
| By: | Ahmed, Ali (Department of Management and Engineering); Hammarstedt, Mats (Linnaeus University Centre for Discrimination and Integration Studies) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies customer discrimination against fictive male and female food truck owners with Arabic names on a Swedish University campus using a web-based experiment. Students at a Swedish university campus were asked to participate in a market survey and state if they think it is a good idea to have a food truck establishment on the campus. Further, they were also asked about their own beliefs, and their beliefs about others’ willingness to pay for a baguette and a kebab sold by the food truck on the campus. Four names—one male Swede, one female Swede, one male Arab, and one female Arab—were randomly assigned to the food truck. We found no evidence of customer discrimination against food truck owners with Arabic names. In fact, the respondents were slightly more positive to a food truck establishment run by an Arabic male than by a Swedish male. We conclude that our results are representative in an environment with relatively young and highly educated customers and that customer discrimination may vary across different markets. More research in this area is needed. |
| Keywords: | Customer discrimination; Self-employment; Immigrants; Sweden |
| JEL: | J15 J16 J79 |
| Date: | 2018–09–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1232&r=exp |
| By: | Maria J. Ruiz Martos (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.) |
| Abstract: | Economics calls for monetary incentives to induce participants to exhibit truthful behaviour. This experiment investigates the effect of reducing incentives on dynamic choices, which encompass the individual and chance in a sequence of decisions. This experiment compares choices with the commonly used random lottery incentive system (RLIS) to hypothetical choices in the dynamic choice setting surrounding the common consequence effect (CCE), both horizontal and vertical. In addition, the RLIS is partially controlled for by eliciting with single choice individual preferences over the two horizontal CCE static choice problems. Results suggest that lessening incentives do not induce a systematic shift in preferences when emotional responses are not at stake. |
| Keywords: | experiments, monetary incentives, non-expected utility and risk, dynamic choice principles, common consequence effect |
| JEL: | B49 C91 D11 D81 |
| Date: | 2018–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gra:wpaper:18/04&r=exp |
| By: | Lee, Yu Na; Bellemare, Marc F.; Just, David R. |
| Keywords: | Risk and Uncertainty, Experimental Economics, Production Economics |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274475&r=exp |
| By: | Felix Koelle (University of Cologne); Thomas Lauer (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | Numerous studies have investigated how people resolve intertemporal trade-offs in individual decision making, but little is known about how the timing of costs and benefits affects behavior in strategic decision situations. Here, we experimentally study how delayed costs and/or benefits affect cooperation in a social dilemma situation. We find that cooperation is substantially reduced (increased) when only the benefits (costs) of cooperation are shifted towards the future. We show that the change in contributions can be explained by (i ) a shift in the beliefs about others' cooperativeness, (ii ) a shift in subjects' willingness to conditionally cooperate, and (iii ) a subject's degree of impatience. We further demonstrate that the amount of economic incentives needed to close the cooperation gap are substantial, indicating discount rates in our strategic context of about 50 percent, much higher than the ones typically observed in individual decision contexts. Finally, when both costs and benefits are delayed to the same extent, contribution levels do not change, indicating that cooperation is time-consistent. |
| Keywords: | Public goods, cooperation, discounting, time preferences, delay |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2018-10&r=exp |
| By: | Deschenes, Olivier (University of California, Santa Barbara); Meng, Kyle C. (University of California, Santa Barbara) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the application of quasi-experimental methods in environmental economics. We begin with two observations: i) standard quasi-experimental methods, first applied in other microeconomic fields, typically assume unit-level treatments that do not spill over across units; (ii) because public goods, such as environmental attributes, exhibit externalities, treatment of one unit often affects other units. To explore the implications of applying standard quasi-experimental methods to public good problems, we extend the potential outcomes framework to explicitly distinguish between unit-level source and the resulting group-level exposure of a public good. This new framework serves as a foundation for reviewing and interpreting key papers from the recent empirical literature. We formally demonstrate that two common quasi-experimental estimators of the marginal social benefit of a public good can be biased due to externality spillovers, even when the source of the public good itself is quasi-randomly assigned. We propose an unbiased estimator for the valuation of local public goods and discuss how it can be implemented in future studies. Finally, we consider how to preserve the advantages of the quasi-experimental approach when valuing global public goods, such as climate change mitigation, for which no control units are available. |
| Keywords: | quasi-experimental methods, environmental economics, externalities |
| JEL: | C21 H23 H41 Q50 Q51 Q52 Q53 Q54 |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11797&r=exp |
| By: | René Böheim; Dominik Grübl; Mario Lackner |
| Abstract: | We analyze performance under pressure and estimate the causal effect of audience size on the success of free throws in top-level professional basketball. We use data from the National Basketball Association (NBA) for the seasons 2007/08 through 2015/16. We exploit the exogenous variation in weather conditions on game day to establish a causal link between attendance size and performance. Our results confirm a sizeable and strong negative effect of the number of spectators on performance. Home teams in (non-critical) situations at the beginning of games perform worse when the audience is larger. This result is consistent with the theory of a home choke rather than a home field advantage. Our results have potentially large implications for general questions of workplace design and help to further understand how the social environment affects performance. We demonstrate that the amount of support, i.e. positive feedback, from a friendly audience does affect performance. |
| Keywords: | performance under pressure, choking, paradoxical performance effects on incentives, social pressure |
| JEL: | D03 J24 M54 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7237&r=exp |
| By: | Böheim, René (University of Linz); Grübl, Dominik (University of Linz); Lackner, Mario (University of Linz) |
| Abstract: | We analyze performance under pressure and estimate the causal effect of audience size on the success of free throws in top-level professional basketball. We use data from the National Basketball Association (NBA) for the seasons 2007/08 through 2015/16. We exploit the exogenous variation in weather conditions on game day to establish a causal link between attendance size and performance. Our results confirm a sizeable and strong negative effect of the number of spectators on performance. Home teams in (non-critical) situations at the beginning of games perform worse when the audience is larger. This result is consistent with the theory of a home choke rather than a home field advantage. Our results have potentially large implications for general questions of workplace design and help to further understand how the social environment affects performance. We demonstrate that the amount of support, i.e. positive feedback, from a friendly audience does affect performance. |
| Keywords: | performance under pressure, choking, paradoxical performance effects on incentives, social pressure |
| JEL: | D03 J24 M54 |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11761&r=exp |
| By: | Orazio Attanasio; Helen Baker-Henningham; Raquel Bernal; Costas Meghir; Diana Pineda; Marta Rubio-Codina |
| Abstract: | This paper evaluates the effects of the implementation of a structured early stimulation curriculum combined with a nutritional intervention through public large-scale parenting support services for vulnerable families in rural Colombia, known as FAMI, using a clustered randomized controlled trial. We randomly assigned 87 towns in rural areas to treatment and control and 1,460 children younger than 1 year of age were assessed at baseline. The interventions were also complemented with training, supervision and coaching of FAMI program facilitators. We assessed program effects on children’s nutritional status, and on cognitive and socio-emotional development; as well as on parental practices. The interventions had a positive and significant effect on a cognitive development factor based on the Bayley-III of 0.15 standard deviations. We also report a reduction of 5.8 percentage points in the fraction of children whose height-for-age is below -1 standard deviation. We do not find any effects on socio-emotional development. We report positive and statistically significant effects on the quality of the home environment (0.34 SD). |
| JEL: | H43 I10 I20 J13 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25059&r=exp |
| By: | De Brauw, Alan D.; Kramer, Berber |
| Keywords: | Behavioral & Institutional Economics, Experimental Economics, International Development |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274139&r=exp |
| By: | Nikolas Tsakas; Dimitrios Xefteris; Nicholas Ziros |
| Abstract: | In theory, decentralized vote trading in power-sharing systems promotes: a) efficiency, by assigning greater decision-making power to individuals that care a lot about the election’s outcome, and b) dispersion of benefits, since even individuals that have little interest about the electoral result can profit by selling their votes. We experimentally test these intuitions in the laboratory and find that, indeed, allowing real subjects to trade votes for money in such systems increases collective welfare, and substantially redistributes it towards those that are less concerned about the election. Importantly, these findings hold true under alternative trading institutions, thus, reinforcing their empirical relevance. |
| Keywords: | vote trading; power sharing; experiment; collective welfare |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucy:cypeua:13-2018&r=exp |
| By: | HOELZEMANN, Johannes; KLEIN, Nicolas |
| Abstract: | We test Keller, Rady, Cripps’ (2005) game of strategic experimentation with exponential bandits in the laboratory. We find strong support for the prediction of free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find strong evidence for behavior that is characteristic of Markov perfect equilibrium: non-cutoff behavior, lonely pioneers and frequent switches of action. |
| Keywords: | Strategic experimentation; exponential bandits; learning; dynamic games; Markov perfect equilibrium; continuous time; laboratory experiments; eye tracking |
| JEL: | C73 C92 D83 O32 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montde:2018-09&r=exp |
| By: | Chen Liang (Department of Information Systems, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, USA); Yili Hong (Department of Information Systems, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, USA); Bin Gu (Department of Information Systems, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, USA); Jing Peng (Department of Operations and Information Management (OPIM), School of Business, University of Connecticut, USA) |
| Abstract: | We explore whether there is a gender wage gap in the gig economy and examine to what degree gender differences in job application strategy could account for the gap. With a large-scale dataset from a leading online labor market, we show that females only earn around 81.4% of the hourly wage of their male counterparts. We further investigate three main aspects of job application strategy, namely bid timing, job selection, and avoidance of monitoring. After matching males with females using the propensity score matching method, we find that females tend to bid later and prefer jobs with a lower budget. In particular, the observed gender difference in bid timing can explain 7.6% of the difference in hourly wage, which could account for 41% of the gender wage gap (i.e. 18.6%) observed by us. Moreover, taking advantage of a natural experiment wherein the platform rolled out the monitoring system, we find that females are less willing to bid for monitored jobs than males. To further quantify the economic value of the gender difference in avoidance of monitoring, we run a field experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), which suggests that females tend to have a higher willingness to pay (WTP) for the avoidance of monitoring. The gender difference in WTP for the avoidance of monitoring can explain 8.1% of the difference in hourly wage, namely, 44% of the observed gender wage gap. Overall, our study reveals the important role of job application strategies in the persistent gender wage gap. |
| Keywords: | gender wage gap; job application strategy; gig economy; quasi-natural experiment |
| JEL: | J16 J31 J24 D31 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:1803&r=exp |
| By: | Li, Zhi; Zhang, Xin; Xu, Wenchao |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Natural Resource Economics, Resource and Environmental Policy Analysis |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274048&r=exp |
| By: | Peter Z. Schochet |
| Abstract: | This article builds on this framework to develop design-based estimators for evaluations with multiple research groups. |
| Keywords: | multi-armed RCTs, average treatment effects, design-based estimators, impact and variance estimation |
| JEL: | I |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:e97b9a1a56a84d79aec5859e44bf110b&r=exp |
| By: | Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman |
| Abstract: | We experimentally test the qualitatively different equilibrium predictions of two theoretical models of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets. In such a network, the attacker’s objective is to assault at least one target successfully and the defender’s objective is to defend all targets. The models differ in how the conflict at each target is modeled — specifically, the lottery and auction contest success functions (CSFs). Consistent with equilibrium in the auction CSF model, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerrilla-warfare” strategy, which involves attacking at most one target arbitrarily with a random level of force. Inconsistent with equilibrium in the lottery CSF model, attackers use the “guerrilla-warfare” strategy and assault only one target instead of the equilibrium “complete-coverage” strategy that attacks all targets. Consistent with equilibrium in both models, as the attacker’s valuation increases, the average resource expenditure, the probability of winning, and the average payoff increase (decrease) for the attacker (defender). |
| Keywords: | Colonel Blotto, weakest-link, best-shot, multi-dimensional resource allocation, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2018–05–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:89292&r=exp |
| By: | Saikai, Yuji; Mitchell, Paul D.; Colquhoun, Jed |
| Keywords: | Production Economics, Ag Finance and Farm Management, Productivity Analysis and Emerging Technologies |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274353&r=exp |
| By: | Gilmour, Daniel N.; Nayga, Rodolfo M.; Bazzani, Claudia; Price, Heather |
| Keywords: | Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Marketing |
| Date: | 2018–01–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saea18:266668&r=exp |
| By: | Hermann Pythagore Pierre Donfouet (African Population Health Research Centre, Nairobi, Kenya ; Univ Rennes, CNRS, CREM - UMR 6211, F-35000 Rennes, France); Moses Ngware (African Population Health Research Centre, Nairobi, Kenya); Njora Hungi (African Population Health Research Centre, Nairobi, Kenya); Patricia Kitsao-Wekulo (African Population Health Research Centre, Nairobi, Kenya) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the cost and cost-effectiveness of an early childhood development and education (ECDE) program in Kenya which aimed at preparing pre-primary children for primary school. A cluster randomized controlled trial design was used. Enrolled schools were provided with three different treatment packages that aimed at improving the instructional quality of ECDE centres complemented with a health component. We find that for every additional US$ 1 spent on the second treatment package, the intervention yields 0.16 extra percentage points in public ECDE centres over two years of participation. This translates to a cost of US$ 14.83 per child. Similarly, in private ECDE centres, results suggest that the yield of extra learning score per US$ 1 spent on the second treatment package is 0.36 percentage points, which translates to a cost of US$ 17.01 per child. Our findings indicate that combining the training of teachers, supervision staff, teacher support, books and teachers’ guides may be cost-effective. Hence, this pre-primary program could be scaled-up in different counties of Kenya. |
| Keywords: | Theory of fundamental causes, tobacco consumption, socioeconomic inequalities, concentration index |
| JEL: | D C2 L66 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:2018-09&r=exp |
| By: | Zhang, Peilu; Palma, Marco A |
| Keywords: | Risk and Uncertainty |
| Date: | 2018–01–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saea18:266654&r=exp |
| By: | Chen, Qihui; Liu, Xiaoyue; Zhao, Qiran |
| Keywords: | Food Safety and Nutrition, Household and Labor Economics, Experimental Economics |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:273907&r=exp |
| By: | Henson, Chloe'; Collart, Alba J.; Interis, Matthew; Maples, Joshua G. |
| Abstract: | In recent years, food waste has become an increasingly discussed topic in both developed and developing countries. In developed countries, approximately 222 million tons of food is wasted at the consumer level per year (FAO, 2011). These amounts of food waste have large social, economic, and environmental impacts. Studies have shown that one of the main causes of food waste in developed countries is consumer preferences toward food appearances. In fresh fruit and produce, consumers have elevated expectations for appearances and will reject those that are blemished. In this study, we estimate consumer willingness to pay for sweet potatoes with five different skinning injury levels in a Vickrey 2nd price non- hypothetical auction. Our experimental controls include treatments designed to test whether consumer knowledge (1) about the relationship between blemished produce and food waste and (2) about the environmental impacts of food waste influence willingness to pay for blemished produce. We find that consumer bids increased after gaining knowledge about food waste and its environmental implications. This study has implications for governmental agencies as they further research methods and opportunities to mitigate food waste at various sources of the supply chain system, most specifically, at the consumer and farmer levels. |
| Keywords: | Consumer/Household Economics, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
| Date: | 2018–01–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saea18:266556&r=exp |
| By: | Lexie Reynolds Walsh; Tingsen Xian; David Levinson (TransportLab, School of Civil Engineering, University of Sydney) |
| Abstract: | By testing the walking speed of groups of pedestrians and of phone users, followers of groups and of phone users, and of people uninfluenced by phone users and groups, from different sites it could been seen that groups of people and phone users, and often followers of phone users, walk significantly slower than people uninfluenced by phone. In a narrow path people in groups and phone users not only slow themselves down but also slow the people behind. The rise of the smartphone correlates with a reduction in walking speed. |
| Keywords: | walking speed, pedestrian behaviour, phone use, distracted walking, group behaviour |
| JEL: | R40 L96 D83 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nex:wpaper:walkingtalking&r=exp |
| By: | Doidge, Mary; Hennessy, David A.; Feng, Hongli |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Risk and Uncertainty, Natural Resource Economics |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274037&r=exp |
| By: | Gentimis, Thanos; Tanger, Shaun; Bampasidou, Maria |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness, Demand and Price Analysis, Marketing, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods |
| Date: | 2018–01–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saea18:266644&r=exp |
| By: | Adam Kapor; Christopher A. Neilson; Seth D. Zimmerman |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized school choice depend on the assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school choice participants in a strategic setting, we show that beliefs about admissions chances differ from rational expectations values and predict choice behavior. To quantify the welfare costs of belief errors, we estimate a model of school choice that incorporates subjective beliefs. We evaluate the equilibrium effects of switching to a strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm, and of improving households’ belief accuracy. Allowing for belief errors reverses the welfare comparison to favor the deferred acceptance algorithm. |
| JEL: | I20 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25096&r=exp |
| By: | Yuan, Xiaotong; Zhang, Yu Yvette; Palma, Marco A.; Ribeca, Luis A. |
| Keywords: | Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
| Date: | 2018–01–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saea18:266720&r=exp |
| By: | Huseynov, Samir; Krajbich, Ian; Palma, Marco A. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral & Institutional Economics, Food and Agricultural Marketing, Food and Agricultural Policy Analysis |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274135&r=exp |
| By: | Oscar Claveria (AQR-IREA AQR-IREA, University of Barcelona (UB). Tel. +34-934021825; Fax. +34-934021821. Department of Econometrics, Statistics and Applied Economics, University of Barcelona, Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain.) |
| Abstract: | In this study we present a metric of consensus for Likert-type scales. The measure gives the level of agreement as the percentage of consensus among respondents. The proposed framework allows to design a positional indicator that gives the degree of agreement for each item independently of the number of reply options. In order to assess the performance of the proposed metric of consensus, in an iterated one-period ahead forecasting experiment we test whether the inclusion of the degree of agreement in consumers’ expectations regarding the evolution of unemployment improves out-of-sample forecast accuracy in eight European countries. We find that this is the case in five countries (Finland, France, Ireland, Italy and Spain). These results show that the degree of agreement in consumers’ expectations contains useful information to predict unemployment rates and underline the usefulness of consensus-based metrics to track the evolution of economic variables. |
| Keywords: | Likert scales; consensus; geometry; economic tendency surveys; consumer expectations; unemployment. JEL classification:C14; C51; C52; C53; D12; E24. |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ira:wpaper:201821&r=exp |
| By: | Dwenger, Nadja; Treber, Lukas |
| Abstract: | Can public shaming increase tax compliance through social pressure? Many tax authorities make ample use of public shaming. However, empirical evidence from outside the laboratory on how a new shaming law affects overall compliance is lacking. We provide the first evidence from the field, exploiting comprehensive administrative tax data and the introduction of a novel naming-and-shaming policy in Slovenia in 2012. The policy aims to reduce outstanding tax debt among the self-employed and corporations. Our empirical strategy exploits the variation across taxpayers in ex ante exposure to the shaming policy. We find that taxpayers reduce their tax debt by 8.5% to avoid shaming, particularly in industries where reputational concerns are likely to be important. The publication of the first naming-and-shaming list further reduces tax debt among shamed taxpayers because of social learning. This effect, however, is marginal in terms of revenue and tapers off quickly. |
| Keywords: | compliance,tax debt,shaming,enforcement,social image concerns,penalty |
| JEL: | H26 D1 K34 K42 Z13 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hohdps:212018&r=exp |
| By: | Kevin Berry (Institute of Social and Economic Reesarch, Department of Economics, University of Alaska Anchorage); Anthony R. Delmond (The University of Tennessee at Martin); Rémi Morin Chassé (University of Quebec at Chicoutimi); John C. Strandholm (University of South Carolina Upstate); Jason F. Shogren (Department of Economics, University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | We explore how three parties bargain over a public good created by development on only one party’s property. With strong property rights, parties secure equal payment. With weak rights, parties reimburse costs and divide surplus so the developer is indifferent. |
| Keywords: | public good, bargaining, experiment |
| JEL: | C7 C92 H41 D63 |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ala:wpaper:2018-03&r=exp |
| By: | Ramon Caminal (Institute of Economic Analysis, CSIC, and Barcelona GSE.); Lorenzo Cappellari (Catholic University of Milan and IZA.); Antonio Di Paolo (AQR-IREA, University of Barcelona & IZA. Dpt. Econometrics, Statistics and Applied Economics. Av. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona (Spain)) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the pattern of intergenerational transmission of language in a bilingual society. We consider the case of Catalonia, where the two main speech communities, Spanish and Catalan, are of similar sizes, both languages are official, and each one enjoys the protection of a different layer of government. However, whereas all native Catalan speakers are bilingual, only a fraction of native Spanish speakers are fully proficient in Catalan. In this environment, transmission decisions are far from trivial. We provide a simple theory showing that changing the costs of acquiring a second language affects language skills as well as the language parents speak to their children. Empirically, we exploit the natural experiment generated by a language-in-education reform that introduced Catalan–Spanish bilingualism at school to estimate the causal effects of language skills on intergenerational transmission. Results show that the increased proficiency in Catalan among native Spanish speakers induced by the reform augmented their propensity to speak Catalan to their offspring. The causal effect of the policyinduced increase in language proficiency on language transmission is not confounded by spurious trends, potential changes in language identity, and linguistically mixed partnership formation. |
| Keywords: | language, intergenerational transmission, language proficiency, language-ineducation reform. JEL classification:I28, J13, J24, J62, Z13. |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ira:wpaper:201820&r=exp |
| By: | Nogueira Meirelles De Souza, Mateus; Myers, Erica |
| Keywords: | Behavioral & Institutional Economics, Experimental Economics, Natural Resource Economics |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274130&r=exp |