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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Adrian Bruhin; Ernst Fehr; Daniel Schunk |
| Abstract: | There is vast heterogeneity in the human willingness to weigh others’ interests in decision making. This heterogeneity concerns the motivational intricacies as well as the strength of other-regarding behaviors, and raises the question how one can parsimoniously model and characterize heterogeneity across several dimensions of social preferences while still being able to predict behavior over time and across situations. We tackle this task with an experiment and a structural model of preferences that allows us to simultaneously estimate outcome-based and reciprocity-based social preferences. We find that non-selfish preferences are the rule rather than the exception. Neither at the level of the representative agent nor when we allow for several preference types do purely selfish types emerge in our sample. Instead, three temporally stable and qualitatively different other-regarding types emerge endogenously, i.e., without pre-specifying assumptions about the characteristics of types. When ahead, all three types value others’ payoffs significantly more than when behind. The first type, which we denote as strongly altruistic type, is characterized by a relatively large weight on others’ payoffs – even when behind – and moderate levels of reciprocity. The second type, denoted as moderately altruistic type, also puts positive weight on others’ payoff, yet at a considerable lower level, and displays no positive reciprocity, while the third type is behindness averse, i.e., puts a large negative weight on others’ payoffs when behind and behaves selfishly otherwise. We also find that there is an unambiguous and temporally stable assignment of individuals to types. In addition, we show that individual-specific estimates of preferences offer only very modest improvements in out-of-sample predictions compared to our three-type model. Thus, a parsimonious model with only three types captures the bulk of the information about subjects’ social preferences. |
| Keywords: | social preferences, heterogeneity, stability, finite mixture models |
| JEL: | C49 C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7240&r=exp |
| By: | Marcu, Emanuel (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Noussair, Charles (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | We study the economics of price freeze options (PFOs), by introducing them into a model of sequential search. The model makes a number of predictions, which we test in a laboratory experiment. The experiment varies (1) whether freezing is possible or not, (2) the cost of freezing, and (3) the length of the time horizon. We consider both settings in which prior offers cannot be recalled, and those in which recall is imperfect. We find that the observed treatment effects are consistent with the predictions of our model, though on average searches are terminated earlier than predicted. Interestingly, the extent of undersearching is magnified by the presence of an affordable PFO. |
| Keywords: | sequential search; prize freezing; experiment; imperfect recall |
| JEL: | D83 C91 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:dacf4815-c001-44c3-bda3-f85977fc7655&r=exp |
| By: | Brade, Raphael; Himmler, Oliver; Jäckle, Robert |
| Abstract: | Feedback can help individuals put their performance into perspective, especially when transitioning into a new environment such as university or a different job. In a randomized field experiment we give first-year university students normatively framed relative performance feedback about their accumulated course credits. We find an increase in subsequent performance, but only when the feedback is positive. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that the improved performance is not driven by unobserved characteristics of those receiving positive feedback, but that it is indeed due to the positive rather than negative nature of the feedback. We administer a replication experiment with the next wave of first-year students one year later and reproduce the results. Survey data provides suggestive evidence that positive feedback has an effect on behavior when students underestimate their relative performance, and that consistent with a mechanism of selective information processing, individuals focus on positive feedback to adjust their beliefs. |
| Keywords: | Relative Performance Feedback; Higher Education; Randomized Field Experiment; Replication; Selective Information Processing |
| JEL: | C93 I23 |
| Date: | 2018–09–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:88830&r=exp |
| By: | Lingbo Huang (Monash University); Zarah Murad (University of Portsmouth) |
| Abstract: | People who compete alone may entertain different psychological motivations from those who compete for a team. Using a real-effort experiment, we examine the behavioural consequences of these psychological motivations, absent strategic interdependence and uncertainty among team members. We exploit a dynamic pairwise team contest in which strategic uncertainties among team members play a minimised role in individual rational behaviour; and we create strategically-equivalent individual contests to isolate the pure psychological effects of team situation on individual competitive behaviour. We find that behaviour in individual contests and in sterile team contests follows a psychological momentum effect in which leaders work harder than trailers. In contrast, in team contests enriched with intra-team communication, behaviour follows a neutral effect. We discuss the implications of our results for theoretical modelling of contests and practical implications for the optimal design of team incentive schemes and personnel management. |
| Keywords: | individual versus team behaviour, real-effort experiment, pairwise team contest, best-of-three team contest, communication, psychological momentum effect |
| JEL: | C33 C72 D79 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2018–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pbs:ecofin:2018-06&r=exp |
| By: | Zarah Murad (University of Portsmouth); Charitini Stavropoulou (City University of London); Graham Cookson (Surrey Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the behavioural effects of competitive, social and image incentives on men’s and women’s allocation of effort in a multitask environment. Specifically, using two real-effort laboratory tasks, we investigate how competitive prizes, social value generation and public awards affect effort allocation decisions between the tasks. We find that all three types of incentives significantly focus effort allocation towards the task they are applied in, but the effect varies significantly between men and women. The highest effort distortion lies with competitive incentives, which is due to the effort allocation decision of men. Women exert similar amount of effort across the three incentive conditions, with slightly lower effort levels in the social-image incentivized tasks. Our results inform how and why genders differences may persist in competitive workplaces. |
| Keywords: | Incentives, Gender Differences, Multitasking, Experiments |
| JEL: | C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2018–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pbs:ecofin:2018-07&r=exp |
| By: | Roman Sheremeta (Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static predictions, such as the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are supported in the laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, including dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-dimensional contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. This article provides a short review of such studies. |
| Keywords: | Contest; All-pay auction; Tournament; Dynamic Contest; Multi-battle Contest; Multidimensional Contest; Group Contest; Rent-seeking; Experiment; Overbidding; Over-dissipation; Incentive Effect; Size Effect; Discouragement Effect; Strategic Momentum |
| JEL: | C7 C9 D4 D7 D9 H4 J4 K4 L2 M5 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:18-07&r=exp |
| By: | Ola Andersson (Uppsala University and IFN); Håkan J. Holm (Lund University, Department of Economics); Jean-Robert Tyran (University of Vienna, Department of Economics and University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics); Erik Wengström (University of Vienna, Department of Economics and University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Recent experimental evidence suggests that noisy behavior correlates strongly with cognitive ability. This puts previous studies that found a negative relation between cognitive ability and risk aversion into perspective and in particular raises the question of how to achieve robust inference in this domain. This paper shows that using structural estimation that models heterogeneity of noise in combination with a balanced design allows us to mitigate the bias problem. Our estimations show that cognitive ability is related to noisy behavior rather than risk preferences. We also find age and education to be strongly related to noise, but the personality characteristics obtained using the Big Five inventory, are less related to noise and more robustly correlated to risk preferences. |
| Keywords: | Risk preference, cognitive ability, experiment, noise |
| JEL: | C81 C91 D81 |
| Date: | 2018–09–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1809&r=exp |
| By: | Matthew Robson; John Bone |
| Abstract: | Within a modified N person dictator game, we test the extent to which giving behaviour changes as the number of recipients varies. Using a within-subject design, in an incentivised laboratory experiment, individual-level preference parameters are estimated within five alternative utility functions. Both goodness-of-fit and predictive accuracy of each model are analysed, with the "best" model identified for each individual. The Dirichlet distribution is proposed as a random behavioural model to rationalise noise; with parameters accounting for differential error arising from the complexity of decision problems. Results show that, on average, participants are willing to give more total payoffs to others as the number of players increase, but not maintain average payoffs to others. Extensive heterogeneity is found in individual preferences, with no model "best" fitting all individuals. |
| Keywords: | Distributional Preferences, Prosocial Behaviour, Group Size, Experimental Economics, Altruism, Social Welfare Function. |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D63 D64 I31 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:18/11&r=exp |
| By: | Alan Benson (University of Minnesota, Carlton School of Management); Aaron Sojourner (University of Minnesota); Akhmed Umyarov (University of Minnesota) |
| Abstract: | Just as there are good and bad workers, there are also good and bad employers that will opportunistically depart from expectations, norms, or laws. However, prior research in economics and information sciences has focused sharply on the employer’s problem of identifying good workers and service providers rather than vice versa. This issue is especially pronounced in markets for gig work, including online labor markets, where platforms are developing strategies to help workers identify good employers. We build a theoretical model for the value of such reputation systems and test its predictions in on Amazon Mechanical Turk, where employers may decline to pay workers while keeping their work product and workers protect themselves using third-party reputation systems (such as Turkopticon). We find that: (1) in an experiment on worker arrival, a good reputation allows employers to operate on a larger scale and at a faster speed, higher quality, or lower cost; (2) in an experimental audit of employers, working for good-reputation employers pays 40 percent higher effective wages due to faster completion times and lower likelihoods of rejection; and (3) exploiting reputation system crashes, the reputation system is particularly important to small, good-reputation employers, which rely on the reputation system to compete for workers against more established employers. This is the first clean field evidence of the effects of employer reputation in any labor market and is suggestive of the special role that reputation-diffusing technologies can play in promoting gig work, where conventional labor and contract laws are weak. |
| Keywords: | labor, job search, screening, contracts, Reputation, online ratings, personnel, online labor markets |
| JEL: | L14 M55 J41 J20 L86 D82 K12 K42 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2018-066&r=exp |
| By: | Li, Xiaofei; Varco, Jac; Fox, Amelia |
| Abstract: | Cotton lint yield response to nitrogen levels has been studied extensively based on randomized complete block design experiments. In order to estimate the response curve, the most widely used statistical model is the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. Yield errors at specific plots conditioning on nitrogen treatments are canceled out by the model. However, statistically OLS estimates are the most efficient only when the yield errors are completely random. In the experiment practice, the yields errors are often spatially correlated across plots, mainly driven by the unobserved (and uncontrolled) soil characteristics in the field. In the presence of spatially non-random errors, spatial econometric models provide more accurate estimates than OLS. This study applies the Spatial Error model to the estimation of cotton yield response to nitrogen. Our data are from field experiments conducted during three crop years from 2012 through 2014 in three separate locations in Mississippi. Results show that the response coefficients estimated by Spatial Error model are significantly different from those of OLS model. Statistical theory and numerical simulation both prove the spatial model outperforms OLS. This study suggests spatial econometric model is more desirable in analyzing cotton field experiment data compared to OLS. |
| Keywords: | Public Economics |
| Date: | 2018–01–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saea18:266734&r=exp |
| By: | Marvin Deversi; Alessandro Ispano; Peter Schwardmann |
| Abstract: | Unfavorable news are often delivered under the disguise of vagueness. But are people sufficiently naive to be fooled by such positive spin? We use a theoretical model and a laboratory experiment to study the strategic use of vagueness in a voluntary disclosure game. Consider a sender who aims at inflating a receiver’s estimate of her type and who may disclose any interval that contains her actual type. Theory predicts that when facing a possibly naive receiver, the sender discloses an interval that separates her from worse types but is upwardly vague. Senders in the experiment adopt this strategy and some (naive) receivers are systematically misled by it. Imposing precise disclosure leads to less, but more easily interpretable, disclosure. Both theory and experimental data further suggest that imposing precision improves overall information transmission and is especially beneficial to naive receivers. Our results have implications for the rules that govern the disclosure of quality-relevant information by firms, the disclosure of research findings by scientists, and testimonies in a court of law. |
| Keywords: | communication, naivete, flexibility, regulation |
| JEL: | D82 D83 C92 L15 D04 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7244&r=exp |
| By: | Davidson, Kelly A.; Kropp, Jaclyn D.; Mullally, Conner C.; Rahman, M. Wakilur |
| Keywords: | Behavioral & Institutional Economics, International Development, Food and Agricultural Marketing |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274134&r=exp |
| By: | Shusaku Sasaki; Yoshifumi Funasaki; Hirofumi Kurokawa; Fumio Ohtake |
| Abstract: | We examined whether the knowledge that your private donation has a large number of potential recipients causes you to give more or less. We found that the people with blood type O are more likely to have donated blood than those with the other blood types, by using a Japan’s nationally representative survey. This association was found to be stronger in a subsample of individuals who knew and believed that blood type O can be medically transfused into individuals of all blood groups. However, we found that blood type O does not have any significant relationship with the other altruistic behaviors (registration for bone-marrow donation, intention to donate organs, and the making of monetary donations) and altruistic characteristics (altruism, trust, reciprocity, and cooperativeness). After further analyses, we confirmed that the wider number of potential recipients of blood type O donations promote the blood-donation behaviors of the people with this blood type. |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1029r&r=exp |
| By: | Sophie Clot; Gilles Grolleau; Lisette Ibanez |
| Abstract: | Rather than just examining moral licensing and cleansing at an aggregate level, we investigate experimentally the moral dynamics at an individual level. We also propose a formal definition of moral consistency or inconsistency (i.e., moral licensing and/or moral cleansing). We found that half our sample present inconsistent pro-environmental behaviour, independently of the way behavior is elicited (positive or negative framing). Men seem to behave more consistently over time, but when they compensate, they license (respectively cleanse) in a higher (respectively lesser) extent than women. We suggest that policies can improve their performances by avoiding a ‘one size fits all approach’ and take into account this heterogeneity of moral dynamics.. |
| Keywords: | cleansing, dictator game, licensing, moral in(consistency), taking game |
| JEL: | C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lam:wpceem:18-17&r=exp |
| By: | Jonas Nordström (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen; Lund University School of Economics and Management); Linda Thunström (Department of Economics, University of Wyoming); Klaas van ’t Veld (Department of Economics, University of Wyoming); Jason F. Shogren (Department of Economics, University of Wyoming); Mariah Ehmke (Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | We examine the causes and policy consequences of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to overengage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it, and measure their subsequent calorie intake. We find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. We find that strategically ignorant subjects downplay the health risk of their preferred meal being high-calorie, which we formally show is consistent with the theory of optimal expectations about risk. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effectiveness of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume about the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information. |
| Keywords: | strategic ignorance, willful ignorance, risk perception, optimal expectations, calories, information. |
| JEL: | D11 D12 D81 D83 D91 I12 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:foi:wpaper:2018_09&r=exp |
| By: | Laurent Denant-Boèmont (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Javier Faulin (UPNA - Universidad Pública de Navarra [Espagne]); Sabrina Hammiche (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Adrian Serrano-Hernandez (UPNA - Universidad Pública de Navarra [Espagne]) |
| Abstract: | The estimation of the noise impact caused by road freight transportation is critical to have acknowledgment of the ambiance pollution caused by road traffic crossing geographical areas containing important natural resources. Thus, our work proposes a within-subject survey where a Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is combined with a laboratory economic experimental auction. Our study objective is to measure the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for reducing traffic noise nuisances due to freight transportation in the region of Navarre, Spain. A special focus is made regarding the measurement of the hypothetical bias, when a comparison is done between hypothetical WTP, coming from the CVM study, with real-incentivized one, as the outcome of the economic experiment. Additionally, statistical analyses are conducted in order to find explanation factors for these outcomes. Results suggest a strong evidence for an upward hypothetical bias (from 50% to 160%) indicating the income, the educational level, the gender, and the age as the main factors which explain that bias. |
| Keywords: | Noise,Transportation externality,Willingness-to-pay,Laboratory economic experiment,Contingent valuation method |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01866869&r=exp |
| By: | Lurbe, Salvador; Burkhardt, Jesse; Goemans, Christopher; Manning, Dale |
| Keywords: | Behavioral & Institutional Economics, Natural Resource Economics, Resource and Environmental Policy Analysis |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274131&r=exp |
| By: | Adamowicz, Wiktor L.; Lloyd-Smith, Patrick; Zawojska, Ewa |
| Keywords: | Environmental and Nonmarket Valuation, Behavioral & Institutional Economics, Research Methods/Econometrics/Stats |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274015&r=exp |
| By: | Zeytoon Nejad Moosavian, Seyyed Ali; Hammond, Robert; Goodwin, Barry K. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Risk and Uncertainty, Behavioral & Institutional Economics |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274033&r=exp |
| By: | Priyo, Asad Karim Khan; Nuzhat, Kanti Ananta; Ahsanuzzaman, Ahsanuzzaman |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Risk and Uncertainty, Behavioral & Institutional Economics |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274034&r=exp |
| By: | Ximena Garcia-Rada; Heather E. Mann; Lars Hornuf; Matthias Sohn; Juan Tafurt; Edwin S. Iversen Jr; Dan Ariely |
| Abstract: | An extant debate in the morality literature centers on whether honesty is a stable and generalizable trait or whether honest behavior in one situation is independent from honest behavior in another situation. However, a third possibility is that tendencies toward dishonesty vary according to life domain. We conducted a cross-cultural study with participants in five countries (China, Colombia, Germany, Portugal, and the United States) to test whether dishonest tendencies vary according to domain. We hypothesized that countries vary in dishonesty according to domain, and that individuals’ tendencies toward dishonesty cluster by domain. Our survey asked participants to report the likelihood of engaging in dishonest behaviors across eight domains of life. The data support both our hypotheses. Our results thus corroborate that dishonesty is driven by the interplay of both individual differences and the circumstances surrounding deception. |
| Keywords: | dishonesty, moral behavior, cross-cultural study |
| JEL: | C83 P51 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7215&r=exp |
| By: | Bocci, Corinne F.; Lupi, Frank; Sohngen, Brent |
| Keywords: | Environmental and Nonmarket Valuation, Resource and Environmental Policy Analysis, Natural Resource Economics |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274011&r=exp |
| By: | Fafchamps, Marcel; Islam, Asadul; Malek, Abdul; Pakrashi, Debayan |
| Keywords: | Behavioral & Institutional Economics, International Development, Teaching, Communication, and Extension |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274128&r=exp |
| By: | Chavez, Daniel E.; Palma, Marco A.; Nayga, Rodolfo M. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Agribusiness Economics and Management, Research Methods/Econometrics/Stats |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274040&r=exp |
| By: | Bossler, Mario; Oberfichtner, Michael; Schnabel, Claus |
| Abstract: | The effects of large minimum wage increases, like those planned in the UK and in some US states, are still unknown. We conduct a survey experiment that randomly assigns increases or decreases in minimum wages to about 6,000 plants in Germany and asks the personnel managers about their expectations concerning employment adjustments. We find that employment reacts asymmetrically to positive and negative changes in minimum wages. The larger the increase in the minimum wage is, the larger the expected reduction in employment. Employment adjustments are more pronounced in those industries and plants which are more strongly affected by the current minimum wage and in those plants that have neither collective agreements nor a works council. In contrast, employment is not found to increase if the minimum wage is reduced by about 10 percent. This mainly reflects that plants with works councils and collective agreements would not cut wages. |
| Keywords: | minimum wage,wage cuts,establishment survey,Germany |
| JEL: | J31 J23 D22 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:faulre:106&r=exp |
| By: | Lin, Yu-Hsuan |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a classroom-experiment approach to interrogate the specific factors model. Its design differs from earlier work in that students can observe both the factor prices in two different sectors, and the society’s welfare. Students participate as factor owners and can produce both of two kinds of goods by allocating their resources to maximise their teams’ welfare. Their resource endowment, relative prices, and trade rules vary round by round. Based on the outcomes, students discuss the impacts of relatively abundant resources, relative prices and trade rules on team welfare, individual income and the gains from trade. This classroom experiment could foster better learner understanding of the specific factors model, both individually and collectively. |
| Keywords: | Specific factors model; experiment design; economics education; international trade |
| JEL: | A22 C90 F16 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:89013&r=exp |
| By: | Elisabeth Grewenig; Philipp Lergetporer; Lisa Simon; Katharina Werner; Ludger Wößmann |
| Abstract: | A general concern with the representativeness of online surveys is that they exclude the “offline” population that does not use the internet. We run a large-scale opinion survey with (1) onliners in web mode, (2) offliners in face-to-face mode, and (3) onliners in face-to-face mode. We find marked response differences between onliners and offliners in the mixed-mode setting (1 vs. 2). Response differences between onliners and offliners in the same face-to-face mode (2 vs. 3) disappear when controlling for background characteristics, indicating mode effects rather than unobserved population differences. Differences in background characteristics of onliners in the two modes (1 vs. 3) indicate that mode effects partly reflect sampling differences. In our setting, re-weighting online-survey observations appears a pragmatic solution when aiming at representativeness for the entire population. |
| Keywords: | online survey, representativeness, mode effects, offliner, public opinion |
| JEL: | C83 D91 I20 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7222&r=exp |
| By: | Jovanovic, Nina; Katare, Bhagyashree; Wetzstein, Michael E. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral & Institutional Economics, Food and Agricultural Policy Analysis, Food Safety and Nutrition |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274133&r=exp |
| By: | Mathieu Bunel (LARJE - Laboratoire de Recherches Juridique et Economique - Université de la Nouvelle-Calédonie); Yannick L'Horty (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12 - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée); Loïc Du Parquet (TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Pascale Petit (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12 - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée) |
| Date: | 2018–09–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01878869&r=exp |
| By: | Porter, Maria; Dillon, Andrew; Ouedraogo, Aissatou |
| Keywords: | Household and Labor Economics, International Development, Food and Agricultural Policy Analysis |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274179&r=exp |
| By: | Asioli, Daniele; Bazzani, Claudia; Bäuml, Karl-Heinz T.; Nayga, Rodolfo M. |
| Keywords: | Research Methods/Econometrics/Stats, Experimental Economics, Behavioral & Institutional Economics |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274389&r=exp |
| By: | Ballco, Petjon; Caputo, Vincenzina; De-Magistris, Tiziana |
| Keywords: | Food and Agricultural Policy Analysis, Experimental Economics, Food Safety and Nutrition |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:273861&r=exp |