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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Nobuyuki Hanaki (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur); Eizo Akiyama (University of Tsukuba); Ryuichiro Ishikawa (Waseda University) |
| Abstract: | In this study, we investigate (a) whether eliciting future price forecasts influences market outcomes and (b) whether differences in the way in which subjects are incentivized to submit " accurate " price forecasts influence market outcomes as well as the forecasts in an experimental asset market. We consider four treatments: one without forecast elicitation and three with forecast elicitation. In two of the treatments with forecast elicitation, subjects are paid based on their performance in both forecasting and trading, while in the other treatment with forecast elicitations, they are paid based on only one of those factors, which is chosen randomly at the end of the experiment. We found no significant effect of forecast elicitation on market outcomes in the latter case. Thus, to avoid influencing the behavior of subjects and market outcomes by eliciting price forecasts, paying subjects based on either forecasting or trading performance chosen randomly at the end of the experiment is better than paying them based on both. In addition, we consider forecast-only experiments: one in which subjects are rewarded based on the number of accurate forecasts and the other in which they are rewarded based on a quadratic scoring rule. We found no significant difference in terms of forecasting performance between the two. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01712305&r=exp |
| By: | Mbiti, Isaac M. (University of Virginia); Serra, Danila (Southern Methodist University) |
| Abstract: | We use a lab-in-the-field experiment to examine the effectiveness of accountability systems that rely on patient reporting in Kenyan health clinics. We recruit patients and health care providers from public and private health clinics to play a series of modified Trust Games. In the game, patients can send money to providers, who are then able to reciprocate. Patients can then file complaints if they are unhappy with the provider's level of reciprocity. We examine patient and provider behavior in a system where complaints lead to non-monetary consequences in the form of disclosing the complaints to professional peers, a system where complaints lead to monetary penalties, and a system where there are no direct consequences on providers, such as standard complaint boxes (our "control"). We focus on provider reciprocity and patient reporting (or complaining) as our primary behavioral measures in the game. Combining the experimental variation in provider consequences with non-experimental variation in provider and client characteristics such as sector of work, and the existence of personal relationships between clients and providers, we find that: 1) disclosing patients' complaints to providers' professional peers increases providers' pro-social behavior toward patients as much as imposing monetary penalties based on patients' complaints; 2) when complaints lead to tangible consequences (either monetary or non-monetary) for providers, patients are less willing to file such complaints, mainly due to the existence of personal relationships with providers. Overall, our findings support the implementation of citizen reporting systems that leverage peer pressure and reputational concerns. |
| Keywords: | health services, bottom-up accountability, patient reporting, peer shaming |
| JEL: | C90 I15 M59 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11352&r=exp |
| By: | Brice Corgnet (EMLYON Business school - EMLYON Business School - AgroSup Dijon - Institut National Supérieur des Sciences Agronomiques, de l'Alimentation et de l'Environnement, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Cary Deck (UA - University of Alabama [Tuscaloosa], Chapman University); Mark Desantis (Chapman University); David Porter (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Markets are often viewed as a tool for aggregating disparate private knowledge, a stance supported by past laboratory experiments. However, traders’ acquisition cost of information has typically been ignored. Results from a laboratory experiment involving six treatments varying the cost of acquiring signals of an asset’s value suggest that when information is costly, markets do not succeed in aggregating it. At an individual level, having information improves trading performance, but not enough to offset the cost of obtaining the information. Although males earn more through trading than females, this differential is offset by the greater propensity of males to buy information such that total profit is similar for males and females. Looking at individual skills, we find that higher theory of mind is associated with greater trading profit, greater overall profit, and an increased likelihood of acquiring information while cognitive reflection is associated with greater profit but not a greater propensity to acquire information. |
| Keywords: | Prediction Markets, Information Acquisition, Laboratory Experiments, Behavioral Finance |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01686493&r=exp |
| By: | Bjorvatn, Kjetil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | We report from the first randomized controlled trial of a development program targeting people with disabilities: a village savings‐ and loans program in rural Uganda. We find that it has had a strong, positive impact on the lives of the disabled participants,through providing access to financial services and strengthening locus of control. Our results suggest that such programs may represent a promising tool to empowering people living with disabilities in developing countries, but also that more comprehensive measures may be needed to overcome taste‐based discrimination against disabled individuals. |
| Keywords: | Uganda; Development program; disabled people |
| JEL: | J14 |
| Date: | 2018–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2018_005&r=exp |
| By: | Breitmoser, Yves (HU Berlin); Vorjohann, Pauline (HU Berlin) |
| Abstract: | Why do people give when asked, but prefer not to be asked, and even take when possible? We show that standard behavioral axioms including separability, narrow bracketing, and scaling invariance predict these seemingly inconsistent observations. Specifically, these axioms imply that interdependence of preferences (\"altruism\") results from concerns for the welfare of others, as opposed to their mere payoffs, where individual welfares are captured by the reference-dependent value functions known from prospect theory. The resulting preferences are non-convex, which captures giving, sorting, and taking directly. Re-analyzing choices of 981 subjects in 83 treatments covering many variants of dictator games, we find that individual reference points are distributed consistently across studies, allowing us to classify subjects as either non-givers, altruistic givers, or social pressure givers and use welfare-based altruism to reliably predict giving, sorting, and taking across experiments. |
| Keywords: | social preferences; axiomatic foundation; robustness; giving; charitable donations; |
| JEL: | C91 D64 D03 |
| Date: | 2018–03–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:89&r=exp |
| By: | Achilleas Vassilopoulos (ICRE8: International Centre for Research on the Environment and the Economy); Andreas C. Drichoutis (Department of Agricultural Economics & Rural Development, Agricultural University of Athens); Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr (Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, University of Arkansas) |
| Abstract: | We present the results of an economic laboratory experiment that tests behavioral biases that have been associated with the BDM mechanism. By manipulating the highest random competing bid, the maximum possible loss, the distribution of prices and the elicitation format, we attempt to disentangle the e ects of reference-dependence, expectations as well as price and loss anchoring on subjects' bids. The results show that bids are a ected by expectations and anchoring on the highest price but not by anchoring on the maximum possible loss. In addition, results are supportive of the no-loss-in-buying hypothesis of Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) |
| Keywords: | Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism; expectations; anchoring; valuation; experiment. |
| JEL: | C91 D44 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aua:wpaper:2018-1&r=exp |
| By: | Alessandra Casarico; Mirco Tonin |
| Abstract: | Pay-what-you-want schemes can be a useful tool to finance high quality and independent news media without restricting readership, therefore guaranteeing maximum diffusion. We conduct a field experiment with the Italian information site lavoce.info to explore how to structure a campaign in a way that maximises readers’ willingness to contribute. We compare messages stressing two possible motivations to contribute, namely the public good component of the news or the importance of the individual contributions. We also test the effect of including information about the tax allowance associated with donations. While the particular motivation stressed does not have a significant impact, information about tax allowances surprisingly reduces overall donations, due to a reduction in the number of (small) donors. Stable unsubscriptions from the newsletter suggest that the campaign does not have an adverse effect on readers. |
| Keywords: | field experiment, pay-what-you-want, tax allowances, media |
| JEL: | C93 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6939&r=exp |
| By: | Casarico, Alessandra (Bocconi University); Tonin, Mirco (Free University of Bozen/Bolzano) |
| Abstract: | Pay-what-you-want schemes can be a useful tool to finance high quality and independent news media without restricting readership, therefore guaranteeing maximum diffusion. We conduct a field experiment with the Italian information site lavoce.info to explore how to structure a campaign in a way that maximises readers' willingness to contribute. We compare messages stressing two possible motivations to contribute, namely the public good component of the news or the importance of the individual contributions. We also test the effect of including information about the tax allowance associated with donations. While the particular motivation stressed does not have a significant impact, information about tax allowances surprisingly reduces overall donations, due to a reduction in the number of (small) donors. Stable unsubscriptions from the newsletter suggest that the campaign does not have an adverse effect on readers. |
| Keywords: | field experiment, pay-what-you-want, tax allowances, media |
| JEL: | C93 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11366&r=exp |
| By: | Ying Xue Li; Burkhard Schipper (Department of Economics, University of California Davis) |
| Abstract: | We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or iterated admissibility predict unraveling of information. Iterative admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. Overall we observe behavior consistent with relatively high levels of reasoning. While iterative admissibility implies that the level of reasoning required for unraveling is increasing in the number of quality levels, we find only insignificantly more unraveling in a game with two quality levels compared to a game with four quality levels. There is weak evidence for learning higher-level reasoning in later rounds of the experiments. Participants display difficulties in transferring learning to unravel in a game with two quality levels to a game with four quality levels. Finally, participants who score higher on cognitive abilities in Raven's progressive matrices test also display significantly higher levels of reasoning in our persuasion games although the effect-size is small. |
| Keywords: | Persuasion games, verifiable information, communication, disclosure, unraveling, iterated admissibility, prudent rationalizability, common strong cautious belief in rationality, level-k reasoning, experiments, cognitive ability. |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2018–02–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cda:wpaper:18-1&r=exp |
| By: | Schindler, David (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Kocher, M.G.; Lucks, Konstantin E. |
| Abstract: | One explanation for overpricing on asset markets is a lack of traders’ self-control. Selfcontrol is the individual capacity to override or inhibit undesired impulses that may drive prices. We implement the first experiment to address the causal relationship between selfcontrol abilities and systematic overpricing on financial markets. Our setup can detect some of the channels through which individual self-control restrictions could transmit into irrational exuberance in markets. Our data indicate a large direct effect of restricted self-control abilities on market overpricing. Low self-control traders report stronger emotions after the market. |
| Keywords: | behavioral finance; trader behavior; self control; experimental asset markets; overpricing |
| JEL: | G02 G11 G12 D53 D84 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:e12ee51d-b4a7-4a6b-8e5b-257c67ee509c&r=exp |
| By: | Kießling, Lukas (University of Bonn); Radbruch, Jonas (IZA); Schaube, Sebastian (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | In many natural environments, carefully chosen peers influence individual behavior. In this paper, we examine how self-selected peers affect performance in contrast to randomly assigned ones. We conduct a field experiment in physical education classes at secondary schools. Students participate in a running task twice: first, the students run alone, then with a peer. Before the second run,we elicit preferences for peers. We experimentally vary the matching in the second run and form pairs either randomly or based on elicited preferences. Self-selected peers improve individual performance by .14-.15 SD relative to randomly assigned peers. While self-selection leads to more social ties and lower performance differences within pairs, this altered peer composition does not explain performance improvements. Rather, we provide evidence that self-selection has a direct effect on performance and provide several markers that the social interaction has changed. |
| Keywords: | field experiment, self-selection, peer effects, social comparison, peer assignment |
| JEL: | C93 D01 I20 J24 L23 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11365&r=exp |
| By: | Nobuyuki Hanaki (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur); Eizo Akiyama (Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba - University of Tsukuba); Ryuichiro Ishikawa (School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University) |
| Abstract: | By how much does the presence of behavioral uncertainty in an experimental asset market reduce subjects' confidence in their price forecasts? An incentivized interval forecast elicitation method is employed to answer this question. Each market consists of six traders, and the value of dividends is known. Two treatments are considered: six human traders (6H), and one human interacting with five computer traders whose behavior is known (1H5C). We find that while the deviation of the initial price forecasts from fundamental value is smaller in the 1H5C treatment than in the 6H treatment, albeit not statistically significantly, the average confidence regarding the forecasts is not. We further analyze the relationships between subjects' confidence in their forecasts and their trading behavior, as well as their trading performance, in the 6H treatment. While subjects' high confidence in their short-term forecasts shows a negative correlation with their trading performance, high confidence in their long-term forecasts shows a positive correlation with trading performance. |
| Keywords: | D84,Price forecasts,interval elicitation,experimental asset markets,behavioral uncertainty JEL Code: C90 |
| Date: | 2018–01–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01712301&r=exp |
| By: | Bjedov, Tjaša (Distance Learning University of Switzerland); Lapointe, Simon (VATT, Helsinki); Madies, Thierry (University of Fribourg); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE) |
| Abstract: | Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a break-up of the global group. Voting for a break-up of the global group is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes. |
| Keywords: | break-up of groups, decision rights, voting behavior, public goods, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D72 H77 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11364&r=exp |
| By: | Shyamal Chowdhury; Matthias Sutter; Klaus F. Zimmermann |
| Abstract: | Economic preferences – like time, risk and social preferences – have been shown to be very influential for real-life outcomes, such as educational achievements, labor market outcomes, or health status. We contribute to the recent literature that has examined how and when economic preferences are formed, putting particular emphasis on the role of intergenerational transmission of economic preferences within families. Our paper is the first to run incentivized experiments with fathers and mothers and their children by drawing on a unique dataset of 1,999 members of Bangladeshi families, including 911 children, aged 6-17 years, and 544 pairs of mothers and fathers. We find a large degree of intergenerational persistence as the economic preferences of mothers and fathers are significantly positively related to their children’s economic preferences. Importantly, we find that socio-economic status of a family has no explanatory power as soon as we control for parents’ economic preferences. A series of robustness checks deals with the role of older siblings, the similarity of parental preferences, and the average preferences within a child’s village. |
| Keywords: | intergenerational transmission of preferences, time preferences, risk preferences, social preferences, children, parents, Bangladesh, socio-economic status, experiment |
| JEL: | C90 D10 D90 D81 D64 J13 J24 J62 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6914&r=exp |
| By: | Ya’akov M. Bayer, Bradley J. Ruffle, Ze’ev Shtudiner, Ro’i Zultan (Wilfrid Laurier University) |
| Abstract: | Expectant parents experience a variety of emotions, including joy, anticipation as well as anxiety and fear related to the health of the fetus, the delivery and the newborn. These sources of uncertainty and stress render expectant mothers suspectible to the influence of popular beliefs. We design an experiment to evaluate the widespread Israeli belief that a baby’s room should remain unfurnished until after the baby is born. We test the impact of this belief on the economic decisions of pregnant Jewish women in Israel. Our findings show that many pregnant women, especially in the second half of pregnancy, prefer to avoid challenging popular beliefs – even at a financial cost. The negative affective consequences of “tempting fate†lead to a preference for a small monetary amount over new furniture for the newborn. The strength of popular beliefs and its influence on individual choice vary in accordance with ethnic origin and degree of religiosity. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics, individual choice, pregnancy, popular beliefs, superstition, repugnance |
| JEL: | C90 Z10 |
| Date: | 2018–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wlu:lcerpa:0114&r=exp |
| By: | Rémi Suchon (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | While considered as appealing for positive and normative reasons, anecdotal evidence suggests that upward social mobility may harm interpersonal interactions. We report on an experiment testing the effect of upward social mobility on interpersonal trust. Individuals are characterized both by a natural group identity and by a status awarded by means of relative performance in a task in which natural identities strongly predict performance. Upward mobility is characterized by the access to the high status of individuals belonging to the natural group associated with a lower expected performance. We find that socially mobile individuals trust less than those who are not socially mobile, especially when the trustee belongs to the same natural group. In contrast, upward mobility does not affect trustworthiness. We find no evidence that interacting with an upwardly mobile individual impacts trust or trustworthiness. |
| Keywords: | experiment, social identity, trustworthiness, social mobility,Trust |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01687271&r=exp |
| By: | Adena, Maja (WZB); Huck, Steffen (WZB) |
| Abstract: | We provide the first field evidence for the role of pure self-image, independent of social image, in charitable giving. In an online fundraising campaign for a social youth project run on an opera ticket booking platform we document how individuals engage in self-deception to preserve their self-image. In addition, we provide evidence on stark adverse long-run effects of the fundraising campaign for ticket sales. \"Avoiding the ask,\" opera customers who faced more insistent online fundraising buy fewer tickets in the following season. Our results suggest that fundraising management should not decide in isolation about their campaigns, even if very successful. Rather broader operational concerns have to be considered. |
| Keywords: | online fundraising; quasi-experiment; self-image; |
| JEL: | D64 D03 D12 C93 L31 |
| Date: | 2018–03–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:86&r=exp |
| By: | Nicolas Houy (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jean-Philippe Nicolaï (ETH Zürich - Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule [Zürich]); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Achieving an ambitious goal frequently requires succeeding in a sequence of intermediate tasks, some being critical for the final outcome, and others not. However, individuals are not always able to provide a level of effort sufficient to guarantee success in all such intermediate tasks. The ability to manage effort throughout the sequence of tasks is therefore critical when resources are limited. In this paper we propose a criterion that defines the importance of a task and identifies how an individual should optimally allocate a limited stock of exhaustible efforts over tasks. We test this importance criterion in a laboratory experiment that reproduces the main features of a tennis match. We show that our importance criterion is able to predict the individuals’ performance and it outperforms the Morris importance criterion that defines the importance of a point in terms of its impact on the probability of achieving the final outcome. We also find no evidence of choking under pressure and stress, as proxied by electrophysiological measures. |
| Keywords: | Critical ability, choking under pressure, Morris-importance, Skin Conductance Responses, experiment |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01686501&r=exp |
| By: | Bedi, Arjun S. (ISS, Erasmus University Rotterdam); Majilla, Tanmoy (ISS, Erasmus University Rotterdam); Rieger, Matthias (ISS, Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Abstract: | This paper uses a field experiment to study the effect of perceived gender norms on the motherhood penalty in the Indian labor market. We randomly reported motherhood on fictitious CVs sent to service sector job openings. We generated exogenous variation in gender norms by prominently signaling patrilineal or matrilineal community origins of applicants. Employers are less likely to callback mothers relative to women or men without children, but only if they are of patrilineal origin. Mothers of matrilineal origin face no such penalty. We discuss the results in relation to the competing influence of ethnicity, the Indian context and theories of discrimination. |
| Keywords: | gender, culture, motherhood penalty, ethnic discrimination, field experiment, India |
| JEL: | J16 J71 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11360&r=exp |
| By: | Maurer-Fazio, Margaret (Bates College); Wang, Sili (Columbia University) |
| Abstract: | This field experiment explores whether single and married female job candidates' un/employment histories differentially affect their chances of obtaining interviews through China's Internet job boards. It also considers whether firms' discrimination against, and/or preference for, candidates who are un/employed vary with the duration of unemployment spells. Resumes of fictitious applicants are carefully crafted in terms of realistic work histories and educational backgrounds. Candidates' experiences of unemployment and declaration of marital status are carefully controlled. Over 7000 applications are submitted to real job postings. Callbacks are tracked and recorded. Linear probability models are employed to assess the effects of particular resume characteristics in terms of obtaining interviews. The marital status of female candidates affects how recruiters screen their applications. While current spells of unemployment, whether short- or long-term, significantly reduce married women's chances of obtaining job interviews in the Chinese context, they strongly increase the likelihood that single women will be invited for interviews. Chinese firms appear to "forgive" long-term gaps in women's employment histories as long as those gaps are followed by subsequent employment. This paper is the first to explore how marital status affects the ways that firms, when hiring, interpret spells of unemployment in candidates' work histories. It is also the first to explore the effects of both marital status and unemployment spells in hiring in the context of China's dynamic Internet job board labor market. |
| Keywords: | field experiments, unemployment, discrimination in employment, hiring, chinese labor markets, internet job boards, résumé correspondence audit study, marital status |
| JEL: | C93 J71 J23 O53 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11363&r=exp |
| By: | Ronald Peeters (Department of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand); Anastas P. Tenev (Department of Economics, Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders and the winner’s curse in terms of its occurrence and its expected harm. From a design perspective, we find that both the number of bidders and the level of affiliation are instrumental when choosing an auction format and whether to encourage or discourage bidder participation. |
| Keywords: | Winner’s curse; number of bidders; affiliated value auctions |
| JEL: | D44 D82 H57 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:otg:wpaper:1802&r=exp |
| By: | Adnan Q. Khan; Asim Ijaz Khwaja; Benjamin A. Olken |
| Abstract: | Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30-41 percent. Inspectors that our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance. |
| JEL: | D73 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24383&r=exp |
| By: | Tjaša Bjedov (Swiss Distance Learning University); Simon Lapointe (VATT - Government Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki - VATT); Thierry Madiès (University of Fribourg); Marie Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a break-up of the global group. Voting for a break-up of the global group is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes. Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a break-up of the global group. Voting for a break-up of the global group is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes. |
| Keywords: | Break-up of groups,decision rights, voting behavior, public goods |
| Date: | 2018–01–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01691475&r=exp |
| By: | Marinescu, Ioana E. (University of Pennsylvania); Klein, Nadav (University of Chicago); Chamberlain, Andrew (Glassdoor, Inc.); Smart, Morgan (Glassdoor, Inc.) |
| Abstract: | Online reviews are a powerful means of propagating the reputations of products, services, and even employers. However, existing research suggests that online reviews often suffer from selection bias – people with extreme opinions are more motivated to share them than people with moderate opinions, resulting in biased distributions of reviews. Providing incentives for reviewing has the potential to reduce this selection bias, because incentives can mitigate the motivational deficit of people who hold moderate opinions. Using data from one of the leading employer review companies, Glassdoor, we show that voluntary reviews have a different distribution from incentivized reviews. The likely bias in the distribution of voluntary reviews can affect workers' choice of employers, because it changes the ranking of industries by average employee satisfaction. Because observational data from Glassdoor are not able to provide a measure of the true distribution of employer reviews, we complement our investigation with a randomized controlled experiment on MTurk. We find that when participants' decision to review their employer is voluntary, the resulting distribution of reviews differs from the distribution of forced reviews. Moreover, providing relatively high monetary rewards or a pro-social cue as incentives for reviewing reduces this bias. We conclude that while voluntary employer reviews often suffer from selection bias, incentives can significantly reduce bias and help workers make more informed employer choices. |
| Keywords: | employer reviews, bias, incentives |
| JEL: | J2 J28 L14 L86 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11367&r=exp |
| By: | Schüssler, Katharina (LMU Munich) |
| Abstract: | I investigate whether two mechanisms leading to biased beliefs about success, overconfidence and competition neglect, influence decisions to enter competitive environments. I use a controlled laboratory setting that allows to elicit belief distributions related to absolute as well as relative overconfidence to study it comprehensively and introduce two treatment variations: First, some participants receive detailed performance feedback addressing absolute and relative overconfidence before making their decision. Second, I vary whether the competition group consists of all potential competitors or only of individuals who also chose to compete. I find that there is systematic heterogeneity in perception biases. In addition, both mechanisms influence individuals\' decisions. However, choices are closely tied to previous performance and assessments, and there are no significant gender differences. |
| Keywords: | competition neglect; competitive behavior; feedback; overconfidence; |
| JEL: | C91 D83 J16 |
| Date: | 2018–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:87&r=exp |
| By: | Stefano Farolfi (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - CIHEAM - Centre International des Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - AgroParisTech - IRSTEA - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement, CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement, UM - Université de Montpellier); Dimitri Dubois (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UM3 - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - INRA Montpellier - Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, UM - Université de Montpellier); Sylvie Morardet (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - CIHEAM - Centre International des Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - AgroParisTech - IRSTEA - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement, IRSTEA - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture, UM - Université de Montpellier); Imen Nouichi (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - CIHEAM - Centre International des Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - AgroParisTech - IRSTEA - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement); Serge Marlet (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - CIHEAM - Centre International des Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - AgroParisTech - IRSTEA - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement, CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement, UM - Université de Montpellier) |
| Abstract: | L'eau d'irrigation est une ressource cruciale pour le développement économique et social en Tunisie. Dans un contexte de décentralisation et de dévolution du rôle de l'Etat, une part importante de la gestion de cette eau d'irrigation a été confiée aux Groupements de Développement Agricole (GDA). Ces groupements souffrent cependant d'un manque de reconnaissance de la part des usagers, qui se manifeste essentiellement par un faible consentement de leur part à payer les redevances. Dans cet article nous nous demandons dans quelle mesure l'information fournie aux usagers sur le fonctionnement du système (information « institutionnelle ») et/ou sur les décisions prises par les autres usagers (information « sociale ») peut impacter leur consentement à payer. Notre analyse s'est faite en deux temps. Nous avons commencé par une enquête sur le terrain, laquelle révèle effectivement une demande des irrigants en matière de diffusion d'informations. Nous avons ensuite élaboré une expérience permettant d'isoler l'impact de différents types d'information sur les décisions prises par les individus dans le cadre d'un jeu qui a des propriétés proches de la situation de terrain. Les données collectées en laboratoire confirment l'existence d'une relation de causalité entre l'information fournie aux usagers et leur consentement à payer pour une ressource commune comme l'eau d'irrigation. Abstract Irrigation water is a crucial resource for economic and social development in Tunisia. In a context of decentralization and State devolution, the local associations for agricultural development or 'Groupements de Développement Agricole (GDA)' manage today a large share of irrigation water in the country. However, these institutions are experiencing a lack of acknowledgment by water users, resulting in a low willingness to pay (WTP) for water. In this article we study to what extent information provided to users on the functioning of the system (« institutional » information) and/or on the decisions taken by other users (« social » information) can affect their WTP. Our analysis is twofold. A field survey first revealed the farmers' demand for better information provision. A laboratory experiment allowed then to isolate the impact of the two types of information on subjects' decisions through a game with similar properties to those observed in the field. Data collected in the lab confirm the existence of a causality relation between information provided to users and their WTP for a common resource such as irrigation water. |
| Keywords: | Information ,experimental economics ,water,irrigation,Tunisia,économie expérimentale,eau,Tunisie |
| Date: | 2018–01–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01685347&r=exp |
| By: | Schüssler, Katharina (LMU Munich); Schüssler, Michael (LMU Munich); Mühlbauer, Daniel (function(HR)) |
| Abstract: | Following the notion that organizations often face public good dilemmas when collective action is needed, we use a real-time provision-point mechanism to experimentally explore the process of achieving cooperative equilibria. Specifically, besides exploring group outcomes, we identify individual antecedents for the timing of the contribution to the public good. In addition, we study the role of different situational factors for sustaining high rates of cooperation: information about others\' actions and the number of individuals necessary for public good provision. We find that contribution and implementation rates are relatively high, with only a moderate decline over time, and that social value orientation as well as several personality traits help to explain the observed contribution sequences. |
| Keywords: | provision-point mechanism; real-time protocol; personality traits; |
| JEL: | C92 D70 H41 |
| Date: | 2018–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:88&r=exp |
| By: | Edward McFowland III; Sriram Somanchi; Daniel B. Neill |
| Abstract: | The randomized experiment is an important tool for inferring the causal impact of an intervention. The recent literature on statistical learning methods for heterogeneous treatment effects demonstrates the utility of estimating the marginal conditional average treatment effect (MCATE), i.e., the average treatment effect for a subpopulation of respondents who share a particular subset of covariates. However, each proposed method makes its own set of restrictive assumptions about the intervention's effects, the underlying data generating processes, and which subpopulations (MCATEs) to explicitly estimate. Moreover, the majority of the literature provides no mechanism to identify which subpopulations are the most affected--beyond manual inspection--and provides little guarantee on the correctness of the identified subpopulations. Therefore, we propose Treatment Effect Subset Scan (TESS), a new method for discovering which subpopulation in a randomized experiment is most significantly affected by a treatment. We frame this challenge as a pattern detection problem where we maximize a nonparametric scan statistic (measurement of distributional divergence) over subpopulations, while being parsimonious in which specific subpopulations to evaluate. Furthermore, we identify the subpopulation which experiences the largest distributional change as a result of the intervention, while making minimal assumptions about the intervention's effects or the underlying data generating process. In addition to the algorithm, we demonstrate that the asymptotic Type I and II error can be controlled, and provide sufficient conditions for detection consistency---i.e., exact identification of the affected subpopulation. Finally, we validate the efficacy of the method by discovering heterogeneous treatment effects in simulations and in real-world data from a well-known program evaluation study. |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1803.09159&r=exp |
| By: | Edwin Ip; Andreas Leibbrandt; Joseph Vecci |
| Abstract: | Gender quotas are frequently proposed to address persistent gender imbalances in managerial roles. However, it is unclear how quotas for female managers affect organizations and whether quotas improve or damage relationships between managers and their subordinates. We conduct a representative survey to study opinions on quotas for female managers and based upon design a novel set of experiments to investigate how quotas influence wage setting and effort provision. Our findings reveal that both opinions about gender quotas and workplace behavior crucially depend on the workplace environment. In our survey, we observe that approval for gender quotas is low if women are not disadvantaged in the manager selection process, regardless of whether there are gender differences in performance. Complementing this evidence, we observe in our experiments that quotas lead to lower effort levels and lower wages in such environments. By contrast, in environments in which women are disadvantaged in the selection process, we observe a higher approval of quotas as well as higher effort levels and higher wages. These findings are consistent with the concept of meritocracy and suggest that it is important to evaluate the existence of gender disadvantages in the workplace environment before implementing quotas. |
| Keywords: | gender quota, hierarchical relationships, fairness, meritocracy |
| JEL: | C92 J71 J30 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6915&r=exp |
| By: | Mago, Shakun; Sheremeta, Roman |
| Abstract: | Sequential multi-battle contests are predicted to induce lower expenditure than simultaneous contests. This prediction is a result of a “New Hampshire Effect” – a strategic advantage created by the winner of the first battle. Although our laboratory study provides evidence for the New Hampshire Effect, we find that sequential contests generate significantly higher (not lower) expenditure than simultaneous contests. This is mainly because in sequential contests, there is significant over-expenditure in all battles. We suggest sunk cost fallacy and utility of winning as two complementary explanations for this behavior and provide supporting evidence. |
| Keywords: | election, sequential contests, simultaneous contests, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C91 D72 |
| Date: | 2018–03–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:85337&r=exp |
| By: | Brecht Boone; Ewoud Quaghebeur (-) |
| Abstract: | We explore the transitional dynamics in an Overlapping Generations framework with and without heuristic switching. Agents use simple heuristics to forecast the interest rate and the real wage. The fraction of agents using a specific heuristic depends on its relative forecasting performance. In the absence of heuristic switching, the results indicate that there is a lot of variation in the transitional dynamics over different parameter values and heuristics. They might even oscillate or diverge. Including heuristic switching has two advantages. First, it decreases the variation in the transitional dynamics significantly. Second, it has a stabilising effect on oscillating or diverging transitional dynamics. |
| Keywords: | Heuristic Switching, Heterogeneous Agents, Fiscal Policy, Transitional Dynamics, Overlapping Generations |
| JEL: | D83 D84 E60 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:18/943&r=exp |
| By: | Nicolas Moreau (CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de la Réunion) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a SAS macro to estimate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATET) based on propensity score with nearest neighbor matching. The robust standard errors derived in Abadie and Imbens (2016) are computed. |
| Date: | 2018–01–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01691528&r=exp |
| By: | Dean Karlan; Adam Osman; Jonathan Zinman |
| Abstract: | Two for-profit Philippine social enterprises, aiming to demonstrate corporate social responsibility by increasing microlending to the poor, incorporated a widely-used poverty measurement tool into their loan applications and tested the tool using randomized training content. Treated loan officers were instructed why and how to use the tool for targeting; control group training merely labelled the tool “additional household information”. The targeting training backfired, leading to no additional poor applicants and lower-performing loans. Descriptive evidence suggests the targeting training exacerbated loan officer misperceptions and multitasking problems. Our results help explain why corporate social responsibility efforts are often siloed from core operations. |
| JEL: | D12 D22 D92 G21 O12 O16 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24379&r=exp |
| By: | John E. Roemer (Dept. of Political Science & Cowles Foundation, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | Economic theory has focused almost exclusively on how humans compete with each other in their economic activity, culminating in general equilibrium (Walras) and game theory (Nash). Cooperation in economic activity is, however, important, and is virtually ignored. Because our models influence our view of the world, this theoretical lacuna biases economists’ interpretation of economic behavior. Here, I propose models that provide micro-foundations for how cooperation is decentralized by economic agents. It is wrong, in particular, to view competition as decentralized and cooperation as organized only by central diktat. My approach is not to alter preferences, which is the strategy behavioral economists have adopted to produce cooperation, but rather to alter the way that agents optimize. Whereas Nash optimizers view other players in the game as part of the environment (parameters), Kantian optimizers view them as part of action. When formalized, this approach resolves the two major failures of Nash optimization from a welfare viewpoint -- the Pareto inefficiency of equilibria in common-pool resource problems (the tragedy of the commons) and the inefficiency of equilibria in public-good games (the free rider problem). An application to market socialism shows that the problems of efficiency and distribution can be completely separated: the dead-weight loss of taxation disappears. |
| Keywords: | Kantian equilibrium, cooperation, tragedy of the commons, free rider problem, market socialism |
| JEL: | D50 D60 D70 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2125&r=exp |
| By: | Nicolas Moreau (CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de la Réunion) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a SAS macro to estimate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average Treatment Effect for the Treated (ATET) with nearest-neighbor matching. |
| Date: | 2018–01–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01691489&r=exp |
| By: | Stefanie Stantcheva (Harvard University); Edoardo Teso (Harvard University); Alberto Alesina (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | Using newly collected cross-country survey and experimental data, we investigate how beliefs about intergenerational mobility affect preferences for redistribution in five countries: France, Italy, Sweden, U.K., and U.S.. Americans are more optimistic than Europeans about intergenerational mobility, and too optimistic relative to actual mobility. Our randomized treatment that shows respondents pessimistic information about mobility increases support for redistribution, mostly for equality of opportunity policies. A strong political polarization exists: Left-wing respondents are more pessimistic about intergenerational mobility, their preferences for redistribution are correlated with their mobility perceptions, and they respond to pessimistic information by increasing support for redistribution. None of these apply to right-wing respondents, possibly because of their extremely negative views of government. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed017:1635&r=exp |
| By: | Shilpa Aggarwal; Eilin Francis; Jonathan Robinson |
| Abstract: | Many farmers in the developing world lack access to effective savings and storage devices. Such devices might be particularly valuable for farmers since income is received as a lump sum at harvest but expenditures are incurred throughout the year, and because grain prices are low at harvest but rise over the year. We experimentally provided two saving schemes to 132 ROSCAs in Kenya, one designed around communally storing maize and the other around saving cash for inputs. About 56% of respondents took up the products. Respondents in the maize storage intervention were 23 percentage points more likely to store maize (on a base of 69%), 37 percentage points more likely to sell maize (on a base of 36%) and (conditional on selling) sold later and at higher prices. We find no effects of the individual input savings intervention on input usage, likely because baseline input adoption was higher than expected. |
| JEL: | D14 O12 O13 O16 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24391&r=exp |