|
on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Cathy J. Bradley; David Neumark; Lauryn Saxe Walker |
| Abstract: | We conducted a randomized controlled trial, enrolling low-income uninsured adults to determine whether cash incentives are effective at encouraging a primary care provider (PCP) visit, and at lowering utilization and spending. Subjects were randomized to four groups: untreated controls, and one of three incentive arms with incentives of $0, $25, or $50 for visiting a PCP within six months of group assignment. Compared to the untreated controls, subjects in the incentive groups were more likely to have a PCP visit in the initial six months. They had fewer ED visits in the subsequent six months, but outpatient visits did not decline. We also used the exogenous variation generated by the experiment to obtain causal evidence on the effects of a PCP visit. We observed modest reductions in emergency department use and increased outpatient use, but no reductions in overall spending. |
| JEL: | I12 I14 I18 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24100&r=exp |
| By: | Elif E. Demiral; Johanna Mollerstrom |
| Abstract: | In a laboratory experiment subjects are matched in pairs and interact in an Ultimatum Game. In the Entitlement treatment, the right to be the proposer is allocated to the personin the pair who performed better in a previously conducted math task. Compared to behavior in the control treatment, where the roles are randomly allocated, the proposers increase their strategic demands and offer a smaller share of the pie to the responder in the Entitlement treatment. This result is drivenentirely by female proposers; when earning their role, they significantly lower their offers, whereas male proposers do not behave differently than when roles are randomly allocated. This is in line with previous research suggesting that women are more sensitive to contextual factors and social cues, meaning that strengthening feelings of entitlement could be a way to decrease gender differences innegotiation behavior. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1708&r=exp |
| By: | Fehr, Ernst (University of Zurich); Williams, Tony (University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable body of evidence suggests that informal peer sanctions cause large collateral damage and efficiency costs. This raises the question whether peer sanctioning systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the people. Here, we show that efficient peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce two relevant features of social life into the experiment: (i) subjects can migrate across groups with different sanctioning institutions and (ii) they have the chance to achieve consensus about normatively appropriate behavior. We also show that subjects universally reject peer sanctioning without a norm consensus opportunity – an institution that has hitherto dominated research in this field – in favor of our efficient peer sanctioning institution or an equally efficient institution where they delegate the power to sanction to an elected judge. Migration opportunities and normative consensus building are key to the quick emergence of an efficient culture of universal cooperation because the more prosocial subjects populate the two efficient institutions first, elect prosocial judges (if institutionally possible), and immediately establish a social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects' cooperation and punishment choices, including the virtually complete removal of antisocial punishment when judges make the sanctioning decision. |
| Keywords: | endogenous institutions, punishment, cooperation, public goods |
| JEL: | D02 D03 D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11131&r=exp |
| By: | Eva Ranehill; Roberto A. Weber |
| Abstract: | Many studies document systematic gender differences in a variety of important economic preferences, such as risk-taking, competition and pro-sociality. One potential implication of this literature is that increased female representation in decision-making bodies may significantly alter organizational and policy outcomes. However, research has yet to establish a direct connection from gender differences in simple economic choice tasks, to voting over policy and to the resulting outcomes. We conduct a laboratory experiment to provide a test of such a connection. In small laboratory “societies,” people repeatedly vote for a redistribution policy and engage in a real-effort production task. Women persistently vote for more egalitarian redistribution. This gender difference is large relative to other voting differences based on observable characteristics and is partly explained by gender gaps in preferences and beliefs. Gender voting gaps persist with experience and in environments with varying degrees of risk. We also observe policy differences between male- and female-controlled groups, though these are considerably smaller than the mean individual differences—a natural consequence of the aggregation of individual preferences into collective outcomes. Thus, we provide evidence for why substantial and robust gender differences in preferences may often fail to translate into differential policy outcomes with increased female representation in policymaking. |
| Keywords: | gender differences, risk, altruism, redistributive preferences, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C92 J16 H23 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6776&r=exp |
| By: | Angelova, Vera (TU Berlin); Giebe, Thomas (Linnaeus University); Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta (TU Berlin) |
| Abstract: | If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents\' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral response but does not boost total performance. |
| Keywords: | contest; tournament; real-effort; experiment; contract theory; forward-looking; |
| JEL: | C91 D91 J22 J33 |
| Date: | 2017–12–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:60&r=exp |
| By: | Xu, Yilong (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management) |
| Abstract: | This dissertation applies experimental methods to answer a number of questions in economics. Chapter 2 studies whether mispricing in an asset market can be mitigated by introducing a futures market and how trading behaviors in these markets relate to individuals’ cognitive ability. Chapter 3 answers why financial contagions are widely observed even among markets with little fundamental correlations. Chapter 4 concerns risky financial decision-making under time pressure. A set of personal traits relates to the ability to perform well under time pressure are explored. Chapter 5 examines whether the provision of social information regarding other agents’ behavior affects the trade-off between selfishness and generosity. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b39625c4-b6e2-4166-9788-42e39f2c55b6&r=exp |
| By: | Judit Alonso (Universidad de Alicante); Roberto Di Paolo (Universidad de Alicante); Giovanni Ponti (Universidad de Alicante); Marcello Sartarelli (Dpto. Fundamentos del Análisis Económico) |
| Abstract: | We study how the ratio between the length of the second and fourth digit (2D:4D) correlates with choices in risk and social preferences elicitation tasks by building a large dataset from six experimental projects with more than 900 subjects. We find that social preferences are weakly significantly lower when 2D:4D is above the median value and, in addition, we find that they vary significantly with cognitive ability. When we look at risk preferences, we find that a high 2D:4D is not significantly associated with the frequency of subjects’ risky choices. Finally, when we look at personality traits, we find no significant association, except for some significant association with individual questions used to obtain personality proxies. |
| Keywords: | 2D:4D, cognitive re¿ection, gender, personality, risk, social preferences |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D8 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2017-08&r=exp |
| By: | Lu, Yixin; Ou, Carol (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Angelopoulos, Spyros |
| Abstract: | We examine the impact of monetary incentives on user onboarding in online sharing platforms. Specifically, drawing upon the literature of monetary incentives, privacy, and consumer behavior, we conduct a randomized field experiment to explore users’ initial engagement and interaction with an online car-sharing platform. Our empirical analyses show that monetary incentives are no better than simple email reminders in encouraging users’ self- disclosure of private information nor their active engagement with the platform (i.e., actual booking via the platform). Our work sheds new light on the heated debate over the design and deployment of monetary incentives in digital platforms, and provides useful implications for both academia and the industry. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:b6030df8-d7ea-48b8-834b-813776424d31&r=exp |
| By: | Hermann, Daniel; Mußhoff, Oliver; Rau, Holger A. |
| Abstract: | The disposition effect is a well-established phenomenon which describes the behavior of investors that are more willing to sell capital gains than capital losses. In this article we present experimental evidence on a situation where an investor decides on behalf of another person. In our setting, trading effort should only be affected by investors' intrinsic motivation, as trading actions only influence the profits of a matched person. In a control treatment, trades directly influence investors' profits. Overall, we find that trading on behalf of others increases disposition effects. In this treatment, we find that the effect is caused by inexperienced investors, characterized by a greater concern for others. Thus, trading for others results in an emotional burden for these investors, which leads to weak trading performance. |
| Keywords: | disposition effect,experiment,decisions on behalf of others,social value orientation,loss aversion |
| JEL: | C91 D14 D81 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:332&r=exp |
| By: | Steffen Altmann; Christian Traxler; Philipp Weinschenk |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the interplay between deadlines and cognitive limitations. We analyze an agent’s decision to complete a one-off task under a deadline. Postponing the task can be beneficial for the agent; missing the deadline, however, leads to a drop in the agent’s rewards. If the agent exhibits cognitive limitations, postponing increases the risk of becoming inattentive and failing to complete the task in time. Our framework provides a rich set of predictions on the behavioral implications of deadlines. We test these predictions in a field experiment at a dental clinic, in which we exogenously vary deadlines and rewards for arranging check-up appointments. The empirical results underline the behavioral relevance of cognitive limitations. Imposing relatively tight deadlines induces patients to act earlier and at a persistently higher frequency than without a deadline. Evidence from a follow-up experiment and complementary surveys supports the notion that deadlines may serve as a powerful instrument when individuals’ cognitive capacity is limited. |
| Keywords: | deadlines, cognitive limitations, limited memory, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D03 D91 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6761&r=exp |
| By: | John List; Fatemeh Momeni |
| Abstract: | Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become a cornerstone of modern business practice, developing from a "why" in the 1960s to a "must" today. Early empirical evidence on both the demand and supply sides has largely confirmed CSR's efficacy. This paper combines theory with a large-scale natural field experiment to connect CSR to an important but often neglected behavior: employee misconduct and shirking. Through employing more than 3,000 workers, we find that our usage of CSR increases employee misbehavior - 20% more employees act detrimentally toward our firm by shirking on their primary job duty when we introduce CSR. Complementary treatments suggest that "moral licensing" is at work, in that the "doing good" nature of CSR induces workers to misbehave on another dimension that hurts the firm. In this way, our data highlight a potential dark cloud of CSR, and serve to forewarn that such business practices should not be blindly applied. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00618&r=exp |
| By: | Thomas Garcia (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Sébastien Massoni (QuBE - School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Australian Centre for Entrepreneurship Research) |
| Abstract: | When making a decision under uncertainty, individuals aim to achieve opti-mality. In general, an accurate decision is optimal. However, in real life situations asymmetric stakes induce an unusual divergence between optimality and accuracy. We highlight this optimality-accuracy trade-off and study its origins using two experiments on perceptual decision making. We use Signal Detection Theory as a normative benchmark. The first experiment confirms the existence of an optimality-accuracy trade-off with a leading role of accuracy. The second experiment explains this trade-off by the concern of people for being right. Abstract When making a decision under uncertainty, individuals aim to make the best |
| Keywords: | Optimality, accuracy, signal detection theory, incentives, experiment |
| Date: | 2017–11–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01631540&r=exp |
| By: | Matthias Heinz; Sabrina Jeworrek; Vanessa Mertins; Heiner Schumacher; Matthias Sutter |
| Abstract: | We present a field experiment in which we set up a call-center to study how the productivity of workers is affected if managers treat their co-workers in an unfair way. This question cannot be studied in long-lived organizations since workers may change their career expectations (and hence effort) when managers behave unfairly towards co-workers. In order to rule out such confounds and to measure productivity changes of unaffected workers in a clean way, we create an environment where employees work for two shifts. In one treatment, we lay off parts of the workforce before the second shift. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that, in the layoff treatment, the productivity of the remaining, unaffected workers drops by 12 percent. We show that this result is not driven by peer effects or altered beliefs about the job or the managers’ competence, but rather related to the workers’ perception of unfair behavior of employers towards co-workers. The latter interpretation is confirmed in a survey among professional HR managers. We also show that the effect of unfair behavior on the productivity of unaffected workers is close to the upper bound of the direct effects of wage cuts on the productivity of affected workers. This suggests that the price of an employer’s unfair behavior goes well beyond the potential tit-for-tat of directly affected workers. |
| Keywords: | gift exchange, layoffs, labor markets, fairness, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 J50 J63 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6760&r=exp |
| By: | Heinz, Matthias; Jeworrek, Sabrina; Mertins, Vanessa; Schumacher, Heiner; Sutter, Matthias |
| Abstract: | We present a field experiment in which we set up a call-center to study how the productivity of workers is affected if managers treat their co-workers in an unfair way. This question cannot be studied in long-lived organizations since workers may change their career expectations (and hence effort) when managers behave unfairly towards co-workers. In order to rule out such confounds and to measure productivity changes of unaffected workers in a clean way, we create an environment where employees work for two shifts. In one treatment, we lay off parts of the workforce before the second shift. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that, in the layoff treatment, the productivity of the remaining, unaffected workers drops by 12 percent. We show that this result is not driven by peer effects or altered beliefs about the job or the managers' competence, but rather related to the workers' perception of unfair behavior of employers towards co-workers. The latter interpretation is confirmed in a survey among professional HR managers. We also show that the effect of unfair behavior on the productivity of unaffected workers is close to the upper bound of the direct effects of wage cuts on the productivity of affected workers. This suggests that the price of an employer's unfair behavior goes well beyond the potential tit-for-tat of directly affected workers. |
| Keywords: | gift exchange,layoffs,labor markets,fairness,field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 J50 J63 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:262017&r=exp |
| By: | Heinz, Matthias (University of Cologne); Jeworrek, Sabrina (IWH Halle); Mertins, Vanessa (University of Vechta); Schumacher, Heiner (KU Leuven); Sutter, Matthias (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | We present a field experiment in which we set up a call-center to study how the productivity of workers is affected if managers treat their co-workers in an unfair way. This question cannot be studied in long-lived organizations since workers may change their career expectations (and hence effort) when managers behave unfairly towards co-workers. In order to rule out such confounds and to measure productivity changes of unaffected workers in a clean way, we create an environment where employees work for two shifts. In one treatment, we lay off parts of the workforce before the second shift. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that, in the layoff treatment, the productivity of the remaining, unaffected workers drops by 12 percent. We show that this result is not driven by peer effects or altered beliefs about the job or the managers' competence, but rather related to the workers' perception of unfair behavior of employers towards co-workers. The latter interpretation is confirmed in a survey among professional HR managers. We also show that the effect of unfair behavior on the productivity of unaffected workers is close to the upper bound of the direct effects of wage cuts on the productivity of affected workers. This suggests that the price of an employer's unfair behavior goes well beyond the potential tit-for-tat of directly affected workers. |
| Keywords: | field experiment, fairness, labor markets, layoffs, gift exchange |
| JEL: | C93 J50 J63 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11128&r=exp |
| By: | Drydakis, Nick (Anglia Ruskin University); Sidiropoulou, Katerina (Anglia Ruskin University); Patnaik, Swetketu (Anglia Ruskin University); Selmanovic, Sandra (Anglia Ruskin University); Bozani, Vasiliki (University of Cyprus) |
| Abstract: | In the current study, we utilized a correspondent test to capture the way in which firms respond to women who exhibit masculine and feminine personality traits. In doing so, we minimized the potential for reverse causality bias and unobserved heterogeneities to occur. Women who exhibit masculine personality traits have a 4.3 percentage points greater likelihood of gaining access to occupations than those displaying feminine personality traits. In both male- and female-dominated occupations, women with masculine personality traits have an occupational access advantage, as compared to those exhibiting feminine personality traits. Moreover, women with masculine personality traits take up positions which offer 10 percentage points higher wages, in comparison with those displaying feminine personality traits. Furthermore, wage premiums are higher for those exhibiting masculine personality traits in male-dominated occupations, than for female-dominated positions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first field experiment to examine the effect of masculine and feminine personality traits on entry-level pay scales. As feminine personality traits are stereotypically attributed to women, and these characteristics appear to yield fewer rewards within the market, they may offer one of many plausible explanations as to why women experience higher unemployment rates, whilst also receiving lower earnings, as compared to men. |
| Keywords: | masculine traits, feminine traits, occupational access, wages, field experiment |
| JEL: | J16 J31 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11179&r=exp |
| By: | Maxime Sebbane (SAE2 - Département Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, UMR MOISA - Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - INRA Montpellier - Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] - CIHEAM - Centre International des Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, ADEME - Agence de l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Energie); Sandrine Costa-Migeon (UMR MOISA - Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - INRA Montpellier - Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] - CIHEAM - Centre International des Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier); Lucie Sirieix (UMR MOISA - Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - INRA Montpellier - Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] - CIHEAM - Centre International des Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier) |
| Abstract: | In this study, The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) was used to develop and evaluate a behavioral intervention that aimed to reduce food waste in a worksite cafeteria. Based on a quasi-experimental design, two questionnaires were used to measure the personal motivations of 216 participants, before and after the intervention. Responses were related to observed behaviors and a measure of actual control. Our results validate the effectiveness of the action implemented with a 20% reduction of waste. Moreover, our study supports the utility of TCP in modeling behaviors, but reveals weaknesses in its ability to explain evolutions: in particular, the relationship between the evolution of perceived control and behavior. |
| Abstract: | Dans la présente étude, la théorie du comportement planifié (TCP) a été mobilisée afin de mettre en place et évaluer une intervention comportementale visant à réduire le gaspillage alimentaire dans un restaurant d’entreprise. S’appuyant sur un plan quasi-expérimental, deux questionnaires ont permis de mesurer les motivations personnelles de 216 participants, avant et après l’intervention. Les réponses ont été reliées aux comportements observés et à une mesure du contrôle réel. Nos résultats valident l’efficacité de l’action mise en œuvre avec une réduction du gaspillage de l’ordre de 20%. Par ailleurs, notre étude soutient l’utilité de la TCP pour modéliser des comportements, mais font apparaitre des faiblesses dans sa capacité à expliquer des évolutions : en particulier, la relation entre l’évolution du contrôle perçu et du comportement. |
| Keywords: | food service,belief,food waste,mass catering,theory of planned behavior,quasi-experimental design,quasi expérimentation,gaspillage alimentaire,théorie du comportement,croyance,restauration collective |
| Date: | 2017–10–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01616617&r=exp |
| By: | Magdalena Brzozowicz (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Michał Krawczyk (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Przemysław Kusztelak (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw) |
| Abstract: | In two field experiments the authors elicit willingness to pay for a mascara, systematically manipulating incentives to provide the true valuation (hypothetical vs. real) and anchors (high vs. low or high vs. none). Contrary to the key hypothesis, they find no interaction between the two effects: the anchoring effect is not attenuated when decisions actually matter. This finding speaks to validity of hypothetical market research methods and against the use of anchors to reduce hypothetical bias. It also contributes to the discussion of the mechanism underlying anchoring effect, suggesting it is not caused by insufficient conscious effort to drift away from the anchor. |
| Keywords: | anchoring effect, hypothetical bias, WTP, experiment |
| JEL: | D03 D91 M31 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2017-24&r=exp |
| By: | Victor Chernozhukov; Mert Demirer; Esther Duflo; Ivan Fernandez-Val |
| Abstract: | We propose strategies to estimate and make inference on key features of heterogeneous effects in randomized experiments. These key features include best linear predictors of the effects using machine learning proxies, average effects sorted by impact groups, and average characteristics of most and least impacted units. The approach is valid in high dimensional settings, where the effects are proxied by machine learning methods. We post-process these proxies into the estimates of the key features. Our approach is agnostic about the properties of the machine learning estimators used to produce proxies, and it completely avoids making any strong assumption. Estimation and inference relies on repeated data splitting to avoid overfitting and achieve validity. Our variational inference method is shown to be uniformly valid and quantifies the uncertainty coming from both parameter estimation and data splitting. In essence, we take medians of p-values and medians of confidence intervals, resulting from many different data splits, and then adjust their nominal level to guarantee uniform validity. The inference method could be of substantial independent interest in many machine learning applications. Empirical applications illustrate the use of the approach. |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1712.04802&r=exp |
| By: | Ryan W. Buell (Harvard Business School, Technology and Operations Management Unit) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether people exhibit last place aversion in queues and its implications for their experiences and behaviors in service environments. An observational analysis of customers queuing at a grocery store, and three online field experiments in which participants waited in virtual queues, revealed that waiting in last place diminishes wait satisfaction while increasing the probabilities of switching and abandoning queues. After controlling for other factors, people in last place were more than twice as likely to switch queues, which increased the duration of their wait and diminished their overall satisfaction. Moreover, people in last place were more than four times more likely to renege from queues, altogether giving up on the service for which they were queuing. The results indicate that this behavior is partially explained by the inability to make a downward social comparison; namely, when no one is behind a queuing individual, that person is less certain that continuing to wait is worthwhile. Furthermore, this paper provides evidence that queue transparency is an effective service design lever that managers can use to reduce the deleterious effects of last place aversion in queues. When people can't see that they're in last place, the behavioral effects of last place aversion are nullified, and when they can see that they're not in last place, the tendency to renege is greatly diminished. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral operations, queues, reference effects, last place aversion, transparency |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:18-053&r=exp |
| By: | Maria Laura Alzua; Noemi Katzkowicz; Maria Adelaida Lopera |
| Abstract: | Eliciting information from household surveys is important in order to better target social policies. In the presence of heterogeneity in answers between couples regarding issues related to household members’ welfare, policies intended to benefit some members, for example, gender targeted policies, may end up being ineffective. Our survey experiment varies the respondent (husband, wife or couple) randomly to an extensive household survey conducted in rural India. We found stark differences between respondents with respect to several household decisions, with women’s answers being significantly different to men’s and couple’s answers, which were similar. |
| Keywords: | Survey experiment, India, health economics |
| JEL: | J16 C8 C90 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:piercr:2017-20&r=exp |
| By: | Müller, Stephan; Rau, Holger A. |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes seasonal effects and their potential drivers in charitable giving. We analyze whether donations differ between the pre-Christmas shopping season and summer. Our experiment aims to minimize confounding factors and controls for donor heterogeneity. We find that prosocial subjects significantly reduce donations by almost one half in the pre-Christmas shopping season. We identify stress and savings as significant drivers of this result. First, the higher subjects' reported stress level in the Christmas season relative to the rest of the year, the lower donations. Second, the higher relative savings, the lower giving. The findings provide managerial insights for the timing and design of fundraising campaigns. |
| Keywords: | Charitable Giving,Experiment,Seasonal Effects |
| JEL: | C91 D64 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:331&r=exp |
| By: | Adelina Gshwandtner; Cheul Jang; Richard McManus |
| Abstract: | Increased pollution leads to a constant decrease of drinking water quality worldwide. Due to safety concerns, unpleasant taste and odour only about 3% of the population in South Korea is drinking untreated tap water. The present study uses choice experiments and cost-benefit analysis to investigate the feasibility of installing advanced water treatments in Cheongju waterworks in South Korea. The waterworks is situated in the middle of the country and is providing more than half a million people with drinking water. The study shows that the lower bound of the median WTP for installing a new advanced water treatment system is about $2 US/month, which is similar to the average expenditures for bottled water per household in South Korea. Scenarios under which the instalment of the advanced water treatments is feasible are discussed together with environmental solutions in the long-run. |
| Keywords: | Drinking Water Quality, Water Pollution, Choice Experiments, Willingness to Pay, Random Parameter and Latent Class Logit, Cost-Benefit Analysis |
| JEL: | C19 C83 C90 D12 D61 Q25 Q51 Q53 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:1720&r=exp |
| By: | Hafner, Lucas; Tauchmann, Harald; Wübker, Ansgar |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes whether moderate weight reduction improves subjective health perception in obese individuals. To cure possible endogeneity bias in the regression analysis, we use randomized monetary weight loss incentives as instrument for weight change. In contrast to related earlier work that also employed instrumental variables estimation, identification does not rely on long-term, between-individuals weight variation, but on short-term, within-individual weight variation. This allows for identifying short-term effects of moderate reductions in body weight on subjective health. In qualitative terms, our results are in line with previous findings pointing to weight loss in obese individuals resulting in improved subjective health. Yet, in contrast to these, we establish genuine short-term effects. This finding may encourage obese individuals in their weight loss attempts, since they are likely to be immediately rewarded for their efforts by subjective health improvements. |
| Keywords: | Self-rated health,BMI,obesity,randomized experiment,short-term effect,instrumental variable |
| JEL: | I12 C26 C93 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:730&r=exp |