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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Matthew Robson |
| Abstract: | Preferences relating to inequality aversion, self-interest and oneness (the closeness of connection to others) are incorporated in a structural model and estimated in order to explain prosocial behaviour. An incentivised lab-in-the-field experiment was run in Mbale, Uganda (n=156), with both general population and student samples. The experiment was a modified three-person dictator game, run on touch-screen tablets. Decision problems were repeated (54 rounds) to ensure individual-level preferences could be estimated; using the Dirichlet distribution to rationalise noisy behaviour. Two within-subject treatments varied if the identity of the ‘recipients’ was anonymous or known. Results find extensive heterogeneity in prosocial behaviour, which is accounted for through individual preference parameters. On average, there is a substantial regard for others with a preference for reducing inequality, rather than increasing efficiency. Oneness is found to have large and significant effects on giving; with distinctions between self-other and between-other trade-offs emerging. |
| Keywords: | Distributional Preferences, Prosocial Behaviour, Experimental Economics, Social Distance, Inequality, Altruism, Social Welfare Function. |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D63 D64 I31 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:17/12&r=exp |
| By: | Steven Tucker (University of Waikato); Shuze Ding (Indiana University); Volodymyr Lugovskyy (Indiana University); Daniela Puzzello (Indiana University); Arlington Williams (Indiana University) |
| Abstract: | The research community in experimental economics has been increasingly encouraged to replicate studies and increase the sample size. While these suggestions have strong advantages, they also potentially increase the financial costs associated with data collection and, as a result, tamper the growth of experimental economics and limit the questions that may be addressed using experimental methods. In this paper, we explore the effectiveness of extra-credit as a reward medium, since it is financially less taxing. We focus on experimental asset markets since data is more costly to collect for these experiments, for example, a market (consisting of 8 to 12 traders) is an observation. Our treatment variable is the reward medium, either extra-credit or cash. We compare bubble measures in the two treatments and we find that bubbles observed in the extra-credit sessions are not significantly different from bubbles observed in the cash sessions. These results suggest that extra-credit is an effective reward medium in experimental asset markets. |
| Keywords: | asset market experiments; experiment incentives |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2017–10–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wai:econwp:17/21&r=exp |
| By: | Ji Yong Lee (Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness,, University of Arkansas); Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr (The National Bureau of Economic Research); Cary Deck (Department of Economics, Finance, and Legal Studies, University of Alabama); Andreas Drichoutis (Department of Agricultural Economics & Rural Development, Agricultural University of Athens) |
| Abstract: | Behavioral biases are more pronounced for individuals with lower cognitive abilities. This paper examines what connection if any there is between cognitive ability and bidding strategy in second price auctions. Despite truthful revelation being a weakly dominant strategy, previous experiments have consistently observed overbidding, which makes use of such auctions for inferring homegrown value problematic. Examining the effect of cognitive ability is important as it may help identify when one can reliably recover values from bids. The results indicate that more cognitively able subjects behave in closer accordance with theory, and that cognitive ability partially explains heterogeneity in bidding behavior. |
| Keywords: | Cognitive ability, Second price auction, Bid deviation, Overbidding, Laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aua:wpaper:2017-3&r=exp |
| By: | Schmidt, Felix; Berger, Eva; Schunk, Daniel; Müller, Henning; König, Günther |
| Abstract: | We conducted a randomized natural field experiment embedded in an existing labor market reactivation program to examine the effect of a self-regulation training on long-term unemployed individuals. First, we find a positive treatment effect on the quality of submitted CVs. Second, there is no overall treatment effect on (short-term) labor market reintegration, but heterogeneous effects with respect to participants’ Locus of Control that are consistent with psychological theory. |
| JEL: | C93 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168177&r=exp |
| By: | Jacopo Bonan (FEEM and CMCC); Pietro Battiston (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna); Jaimie Bleck (University of Notre Dame); Philippe LeMay-Boucher (Heriot Watt University); Stefano Pareglio (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and FEEM); Bassirou Sarr (Paris School of Economics); Massimo Tavoni (Politecnico di Milano and FEEM) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the role of social interaction in technology adoption by conducting a field experiment in neighborhoods of Bamako. We invited women to attend a training/marketing session, where information on a more efficient cooking stove was provided and the chance to purchase the product at market price was offered. We randomly provided an information nudge on a peer’s willingness to buy an improved cookstove. We find that women purchase and use the product more when they receive information on a peer who purchased (or previously owned) the product, particularly if she is viewed as respected. In general, we find positive direct and spillover effects of attending the session. We also investigate whether social interaction plays a role in technology diffusion. We find that women who participated in the session, but did not buy during the intervention, are more likely to adopt the product when more women living around them own it. We investigate the mechanisms and provide evidence supporting imitation effects, rather than social learning or constraint interaction. |
| Keywords: | Technology Adoption, Social Interaction, Cookstoves, Mali |
| JEL: | D03 M31 O13 O33 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2017.47&r=exp |
| By: | Francisco Gomez-Martinez |
| Abstract: | A usual assumption in the theory of collusion is that cartels are all-inclusive. In contrast, most real-world collusive agreements do not include all firms that are active in the relevant industry. This paper studies both theoretically and experimentally the formation and behavior of partial cartels. The theoretical model is a variation of Bos and Harringtonâs (2010) model where firms are heterogeneous in terms of production capacities and individual cartel decisions are endogenized. The experimental study has two main objectives. The first goal is examine whether partial cartels emerge in the lab at all, and if so, which firms are part of it. The second aim of the experiment is to study the coordinated effects of a merger when partial cartels are likely to operate. The experimental results can be summarized as follows. We find that cartels are typically not all-inclusive and that various types of partial cartels emerge. We observe that market prices decrease by 20% on average after a merger. Our findings suggest that merger analysis that is based on the assumption that only full cartels forms produces misleading results. Our analysis also illustrates how merger simulations in the lab can be seen as a useful tool for competition authorities to back up merger decisions. |
| JEL: | C92 L13 L41 L44 G34 |
| Date: | 2017–10–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jmp:jm2017:pgo786&r=exp |
| By: | Sven Fischer (Newcastle University Business School); Werner Güth (LUISS Rome, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, and Max Planck Institute on Collective Goods Bonn); Todd R. Kaplan (University of Exeter and University of Haifa); Ro'i Zultan (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) |
| Abstract: | (Revised Version of JERP 2014-027) In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first-price auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first-over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions generate significantly more revenue. |
| Keywords: | auction, espionage, collusion,, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D44 |
| Date: | 2017–10–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2017-012&r=exp |
| By: | Alistair Wilson |
| Abstract: | Across a variety of contexts decision-makers exhibit a robust failure to understandthe interaction of private information and strategy, with one prominent example being the winner’scurse. Such failures have generally been observed in static settings, where participants fail to thinkthrough a future hypothetical. We use a laboratory experiment to examine a common-value matchingenvironment where strategic thinking is entirely backward looking, and adverse selection is adynamic, non-stationary process. Our results indicate the majority of subjects in our environmentuse a sub-optimal stationary response—even after extended experience and feedback. In terms oflearning, even stationary subjects learn to adjust their behavior in response to the adverse selection,though adjusting their unconditional response. In contrast the minority using non-stationaryresponses do so very quickly, reflecting an introspective rather than learned solution to the problem. |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:6250&r=exp |
| By: | El Bialy, Nora; Nicklisch, Andreas; Voigt, Stefan |
| Abstract: | We ran a number of experiments among refugees and Germans.In a first step, we ask whether refugees and Germans behave differently and find that risk preferences do not significantly differ between them. However, refugees are less trusting than Germans. In a second step, we seek to identify the factors determining the behavior of refugees and find that attributing a high importance to religion as well as having lived in a tent or container in Germany are associated with lower trust levels. |
| JEL: | C93 D74 O15 Z12 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168221&r=exp |
| By: | Konrad, Kai; Lohse, Tim; Simon, Sven |
| Abstract: | We conduct a laboratory experiment of self-serving deceptive behavior and exogenously vary the level of reflection time. We find that time pressure leads to more honesty compared to sufficient contemplation time. Moreover, more reflection time increases awareness of the misreporting opportunity. However, it has no effect on the conscious decision of whether to misreport or not. Due to subjects' lack of awareness under time pressure we conclude that misreporting is not the intuitive response. |
| JEL: | C91 D83 K42 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168171&r=exp |
| By: | Schneider, Tim; Bizer, Kilian |
| Abstract: | Moral hazard in expert diagnoses is more complicated in credence goods markets because ex-post verification of service optimality is usually not possible. We provide an experimental framework to investigate expert and consumer behavior as well as market efficiency in a setting in which experts need to invest in costly but unobservable effort to identify consumer problems and consumers are able to visit multiple experts for diagnosis. We introduce heterogeneously-qualified experts, varying in their necessary effort to diagnose consumers. We examine how subjects react to expert qualification and the introduction of price competition. We find that our baseline market is more efficient and qualification is not necessarily the Sisyphean task, as theory predicted. Nevertheless, we observe high skilled experts investing significantly less effort in diagnoses than their low skilled counterparts. Qualifying experts increases efficiency with fixed prices but remains almost without influence in markets with price competition. Introducing price competition does not lead to the predicted market breakdown, but rather has negative effects on market efficiency. In sum, whether expert qualification should be pursued in credence goods markets depends on the market composition and existing institutions. |
| Keywords: | credence goods,expert market,laboratory experiment,expert qualification,second opinions,price competition |
| JEL: | D12 D82 C91 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:323&r=exp |
| By: | Partick Nüß |
| Abstract: | Based on a correspondence experiment covering 3,124 fictitious job applications, the paper identifies and quantifies duration dependence in Germany, with a particular emphasis on company and vacancy characteristics as potential determinants. The experiment reveals that duration dependence manifests itself in a sharp decline of 26% to 35% in callbacks when an individual has been unemployed for 10 months, pointing to the existence of an unemployment stigma for Germany. The results are driven by labor market tightness, companies' access to applicants and screening behavior related to company size, with no evidence for an unemployment stigma determined by the contract type. |
| Keywords: | Field Experiments, Labor Demand, Unemployment, Unemployment Duration, Labor Discrimination |
| JEL: | C93 J23 J60 J64 J71 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imk:wpaper:184-2017&r=exp |
| By: | Daniel A. Brent (Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, Business Education Complex, Baton Rouge, LA 70803-6306, U.S.A.); Lata Gangadharan (Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, Australia); Anca Mihut (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France) |
| Abstract: | In the presence of social dilemmas, cooperation is more difficult to achieve when populations are heterogeneous because of conflicting interests within groups. We examine cooperation in the context of a non-linear common pool resource game, in which individuals have unequal extraction capacities and have to decide on their extraction of resources from the common pool. We introduce monetary and nonmonetary policy instruments in this environment. One instrument is based on two variants of a mechanism that taxes extraction and redistributes the tax revenue. The other instrument varies the observability of individual decisions. We find that the two tax and redistribution mechanisms reduce extraction, increase efficiency and decrease inequality within groups. The scarcity pricing mechanism, which is a per-unit tax equal to the marginal extraction externality, is more effective at reducing extraction than an increasing block tax that only taxes units extracted above the social optimum. In contrast, observability impacts only the Baseline condition by encouraging free-riding instead of creating moral pressure to cooperate. |
| Keywords: | Common Pool Resource game, taxation mechanisms, observability, cooperation, heterogeneity, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 H23 D74 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1726&r=exp |
| By: | Gürerk, Özgür; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rockenbach, Bettina |
| Abstract: | We study gender diversity and performance in endogenously formed teams. Participants choose to either perform a cooperation task with members of the own gender only or in a mixed-gender team. We find that independent of the team choice, initially men cooperate significantly more than women. In subsequent periods, men prefer the successful men-only teams, resulting in significantly higher profits for men compared to women. Only over time, this endogenously emerged “gender profit gap” closes. |
| JEL: | C92 J71 M54 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168067&r=exp |
| By: | Ben Gilbert (Division of Economics and Business, Colorado School of Mines); Alexander James (Department of Economics and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage); Jason Shogren (Department of Economics, University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Apologies are a powerful way to restore trust and reduce punishment costs in bilateral settings. But what do we know about public apologies for large scale man-made disasters? Herein we report on results from an experiment with apologies in a multilateral setting: a firm-caused environmental disaster. Subjects read about an oil spill scenario, and learned whether the oil firm made a full apology, a partial apology, or no apology, and whether the firm had a good, bad, or no environmental reputation. A partial apology is one that fails to accept full material responsibility for damages, such as by shifting the blame to another party. We find that full apologies and better reputation reduce the demand for punishment. However, full apologies and reputation are substitutes, with reputation being significantly more important. Additionally, apologies do not reduce the demand for compensation and may increase it if the firm is clearly a bad actor, or if admission of guilt is the only information subjects have. Our results help explain corporate social responsibility investments and greenwashing, and why many public apologies over an environmental disaster are only partial apologies. |
| Keywords: | apologies, environmental disaster, oil spill, cheap talk |
| JEL: | Q54 L14 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ala:wpaper:2017-02&r=exp |
| By: | Engelmann, Dirk; Grüner, Hans Peter; Hoffmann, Timo; Possajennikov, Alex |
| Abstract: | In democracies, an absolute majority of the population may choose policies that are harmful to the rest of the population. A purpose of super-majority rules is to prevent this from happening. We study whether individuals optimally choose sub- or super-majority rules when the rights of minorities should be protected. Subjects propose more extreme voting rules for more skewed distributions, but we also find that rule choices are biased towards balanced rules, leading substantial welfare losses. |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168295&r=exp |
| By: | Manoj Mohanan (Duke University); Grant Miller (Stanford University & NBER); Katherine Donato (Harvard University); Yulya Truskinovsky (Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health); Marcos Vera-Hernández (University College London & IFS) |
| Abstract: | A central issue in designing performance incentive contracts is whether to reward the production of outputs versus use of inputs: the former rewards efficiency and innovation in production, while the latter imposes less risk on agents. Agents with varying levels of skill may perform better under different contractual bases as well—more skilled workers may be better able to innovate, for example. We study these issues empirically through an experiment enabling us to observe and verify outputs (health outcomes) and inputs (guideline adherence) in Indian maternity care. We find that both output and input incentive contracts achieved comparable reductions in post-partum hemorrhage (PPH) rates, the dimension of maternity care most sensitive to provider behavior and the largest cause of maternal mortality. Interestingly, and in line with the theory, providers with advanced qualifications performed better and used new health delivery strategies under output incentives, while providers with and without advanced qualifications performed equally under input incentives. |
| JEL: | D86 J41 O15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgd:wpaper:464&r=exp |
| By: | Maaser, Nicola; Traub, Stefan; Paetzel, Fabian |
| Abstract: | In real world bargaining the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect real power. Game-theory predictions are insensitive to nominal differences. We refer to the converse idea that nominal differences matter as power illusion. We experimentally study the Baron-Ferejohn model with variation in nominal power. We find strong evidence for the existence of power illusion. Thus, attention needs to be paid to nominal power in the design of weighted voting systems. |
| JEL: | D72 C92 C7 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168155&r=exp |
| By: | Johannes Buckenmaier (University of Cologne); Eugen Dimant (University of Pennsylvania); Luigi Mittone (University of Trento, Department of Economics and Management) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes tax payers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We do this through a leniency program. In our experiment we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only study the effect of the presence of such a mechanism on behavior, but also the dynamic effect caused by the introduction and the removal of leniency. We find that in the presence of a leniency mechanism, subjects collude and accept bribes less, while paying more taxes. We find no evidence that it encourages bribe offers. Our results show that the introduction of the opportunity to blow the whistle decreases collusion and bribe acceptance rate, and it increases the collected tax yield. It also does not encourage bribe offers. In contrast, the removal of the institutional mechanism does not induce negative effects, suggesting a positive spillover effect of leniency that persists even after the mechanism has been removed. |
| Keywords: | collective action; cooperation; voluntary participation; experiment |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2017-13&r=exp |
| By: | Dengler, Sebastian (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Gerlagh, Reyer (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Trautmann, Stefan (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); van de Kuilen, Gijs (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a ‘libertarian’ baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate-change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem. |
| Keywords: | climate policy instruments; intertemporal cooperation; climate game; experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D62 D99 Q38 Q54 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a2362a52-35cf-4e23-90c9-5ba024f19391&r=exp |
| By: | Maximilian Rüdisser (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Raphael Flepp (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Egon Franck (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | We study how temporal separations affect recurring decision-making under risk and thus ask when reference points update. Using both experimental and panel data from a casino, we analyze how individual risk-taking behavior during a casino visit depends on the outcomes of temporally separated prior visits. Our results show that small prior gains lead to more risk-averse behavior in the next visit, but small prior losses have no effect on subsequent risk-taking. These results suggest an asymmetric temporal effect of small prior gains and losses, whereby gains affect subsequent choices for longer than losses. Thus, the reference point—which determines subsequent risk-taking behavior—updates much faster after small losses than after small gains. Further, we find that risk-taking greatly depends on the size of prior outcomes. Whereas large prior losses also impact subsequent choices and strongly reduce risk-taking, large prior gains only have a marginal effect, if any. |
| Keywords: | Decision-making,Risk-taking, Field experiment, Longitudinal data, Casino gambling |
| JEL: | C23 C93 D81 D90 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zrh:wpaper:369&r=exp |
| By: | Lea Petters (University of Cologne); Marina Schroeder (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We study the immediate effect of a quota on performance, sabotage, and representation of the different groups affected. In an experimental study, we vary whether a quota is implemented and whether it is justified with ex-ante discrimination or not. We find that unjustified quotas result in a decrease in the performance of affirmed types, an increase in sabotage activity targeted at affirmed types, and a reduction in help received by affirmed types. We do not find such negative effects when the implemented quota is justified. Our findings suggest that information about the justification of a quota crucially determines the success of this intervention. |
| Keywords: | affirmative action, quota, sabotage, real effort, peer evaluation, fairness, discrimination |
| JEL: | C92 J33 J71 M51 |
| Date: | 2017–10–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgr:cgsser:08-01&r=exp |
| By: | Sebastian Dengler (Tilburg University); Reyer Gerlagh (Tilburg University and CREE - Oslo Centre for Research on Environmentally friendly Energy); Stefan T. Trautmann (Tilburg University and University of Heidelberg); Gijs van de Kuilen (Tilburg University) |
| Abstract: | We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a ‘libertarian’ baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate-change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem. |
| Keywords: | Climate Policy Instruments, Intertemporal Cooperation, Climate Game, Experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D62 D99 Q38 Q54 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2017.49&r=exp |
| By: | Abhijit Banerjee; Sylvain Chassang; Sergio Montero; Erik Snowberg |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a decision-theoretic framework for experiment design. We model experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision-makers, who make trade-offs between subjective expected performance and robustness. This framework accounts for experimenters' preference for randomization, and clarifies the circumstances in which randomization is optimal: when the available sample size is large enough or robustness is an important concern. We illustrate the practical value of such a framework by studying the issue of rerandomization. Rerandomization creates a trade-off between subjective performance and robustness. However, robustness loss grows very slowly with the number of times one randomizes. This argues for rerandomizing in most environments. |
| JEL: | C90 D81 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23867&r=exp |
| By: | Philipp Kircher (European University Institute and University of Edinburgh); Paul Muller (Gothenburg University); Michele Belot (University of Edinburgh) |
| Abstract: | In this study we introduce a small number of artificial vacancies with randomised characteristics in an otherwise standard job search platform. This allows us to study how job seekers react to job characteristics - in analogy of usual randomised audit studies of employers' reactions to applicant characteristics. We focus on the reaction to wage announcements, and test the main implications of directed search: high wages should attract more and better applicants, but some applicants apply only to low wages even if higher wage offers are present. Both parts of the theory and support among the randomised job offers, suggesting an allocative role for wage competition in search markets. We calibrate a directed search model with multiple applications and on-the-job search and and that it can reproduce our findings quantitatively. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed017:722&r=exp |
| By: | Sebbane, M.; Costa, S.; Sirieix, L. |
| Abstract: | In this study, The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) was used to develop and evaluate a behavioral intervention that aimed to reduce food waste in a worksite cafeteria. Based on a quasi-experimental design, two questionnaires were used to measure the personal motivations of 216 participants, before and after the intervention. Responses were related to observed behaviors and a measure of actual control. Our results validate the effectiveness of the action implemented with a 20% reduction of waste. Moreover, our study supports the utility of TCP in modeling behaviors, but reveals weaknesses in its ability to explain evolutions: in particular, the relationship between the evolution of perceived control and behavior. ....French Abstract: Dans la présente étude, la théorie du comportement planifié (TCP) a été mobilisée afin de mettre en place et évaluer une intervention comportementale visant à réduire le gaspillage alimentaire dans un restaurant d’entreprise. S’appuyant sur un plan quasi-expérimental, deux questionnaires ont permis de mesurer les motivations personnelles de 216 participants, avant et après l’intervention. Les réponses ont été reliées aux comportements observés et à une mesure du contrôle réel. Nos résultats valident l’efficacité de l’action mise en œuvre avec une réduction du gaspillage de l’ordre de 20%. Par ailleurs, notre étude soutient l’utilité de la TCP pour modéliser des comportements, mais font apparaitre des faiblesses dans sa capacité à expliquer des évolutions : en particulier, la relation entre l’évolution du contrôle perçu et du comportement. |
| Keywords: | FOOD WASTE; MASS CATERING; THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR; QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN; GASPILLAGE ALIMENTAIRE; RESTAURATION COLLECTIVE; THEORIE DU COMPORTEMENT PLANIFIE; QUASI EXPERIMENTATION |
| JEL: | A13 D12 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:umr:wpaper:201706&r=exp |
| By: | Dietrich, Stephan (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University); Malerba, Daniele (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik); Barrientos, Armando (University of Manchester); Gassmann, Franziska (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | A growing literature measures the impact of antipoverty transfer programmes on variables of interest among participants in low- and middle-income countries. To date, few studies provide information on net benefits or rates of return from these programmes. This paper constructs estimates of rates of return to an antipoverty transfer programme in Uganda using appropriate welfare weights. Survey and experimental methods empirically validate the range of welfare weights applied. We find that rates of return estimates applying appropriate prioritarian welfare weights are significantly higher than utilitarian rates of return. |
| Keywords: | poverty, income distribution, preference for redistribution, welfare, welfare weights, cash transfers, rates of return, Uganda |
| JEL: | D61 D63 I38 O15 |
| Date: | 2017–09–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2017040&r=exp |
| By: | Adrian Hillenbrand (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Svenja Hippel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | Online platforms provide search tools that help consumers to get betterfitting product offers. But this technology makes consumer search behavior also easily traceable for the platform and allows for real-time price discrimination. Consumers face a trade-off: Search intensely and receive better fits at potentially higher prices or restrict search behavior – be strategically inattentive – and receive a worse fit, but maybe a better deal. We study the strategic buyer-seller interaction in such a situation theoretically as well as experimentally. The search technology we use in the laboratory leads by construction to better-fitting products, but we indeed find that only sellers profit from the buyers’ use of the offered search tools. |
| Keywords: | strategic inattention, price discrimination, information transmission, consumer choice, experiment |
| JEL: | D11 D42 D82 D83 L11 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2017_21&r=exp |
| By: | Ahrens, Steffen; Lustenhouwer, Joep; Tettamanzi, Michele |
| Abstract: | We study if central banks can manage market expectations by means of forward guidance in a New Keynesian learning-to-forecast experiment. Subjects observe public inflation projections by the central bank along with the historic development of the economy and subsequently submit their own inflation forecasts. We find that the central bank can significantly manage market expectations through forward guidance and that this management strongly supports monetary policy in stabilizing the economy. |
| JEL: | C92 E32 E37 E58 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168063&r=exp |
| By: | Mechtenberg, Lydia; Büchel, Berno |
| Abstract: | We study private communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some (or all) agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can, but need not, recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We show that communication can undermine effciency of the vote and hence reduce welfare in a common interest setting. We test the model in a lab experiment and find strong support for the predicted effects. |
| JEL: | D72 D83 D85 C91 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168094&r=exp |
| By: | Malte Sandner (University College London) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the results of a randomized study of a home visiting program implemented in Germany for low-income, first-time mothers. A major goal of the program is to improve the participants' economic self-sufficiency and family planning. I use administrative data from the German social security system and detailed telephone surveys to examine the effects of the intervention on maternal employment, welfare benefits, and household composition. The study reveals that the intervention unintentionally decreased maternal employment by 8.7 percentage points and increased subsequent births by 6.6 percentage points, in part through a reduction in abortions. |
| Keywords: | early childhood intervention, randomized experiment, fertility |
| JEL: | J13 J12 I21 H52 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2017-074&r=exp |
| By: | Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee) |
| Abstract: | The American economist Richard H. Thaler is a pioneer in behavioural economics, a research field in which insights from psychological research are applied to economic decision-making. A behavioural perspective incorporates more realistic analysis of how people think and behave when making economic decisions, providing new opportunities for designing measures and institutions that increase societal benefit. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics; |
| JEL: | D03 D90 G02 |
| Date: | 2017–10–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2017_002&r=exp |
| By: | Khalmetski, Kiryl; Rockenbach, Bettina; Werner, Peter |
| Abstract: | In a sender-receiver game we investigate if sanctions for lying induce more truth-telling. Senders may not only choose between truth-telling and (explicit) lying, but may also engage in evasive lying by credibly pretending not to know. Sanctions promote truth-telling if senders cannot engage in evasive lying. If evasive lying is possible, explicit lying is largely substituted by evasive lying, in line with the notion that evasive lying is perceived as sufficiently less psychologically costly. |
| JEL: | C91 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168119&r=exp |
| By: | Committee, Nobel Prize (Nobel Prize Committee) |
| Abstract: | Economists aim to develop models of human behavior and interactions in markets and other economic settings. But we humans behave in complex ways. Although we try to make rational decisions, we have limited cognitive abilities and limited willpower. While our decisions are often guided by self-interest, we also care about fairness and equity. Moreover cognitive abilities, self-control, and motivation can vary significantly across different individuals. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics; |
| JEL: | D03 D90 G02 |
| Date: | 2017–10–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:nobelp:2017_001&r=exp |