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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2017‒10‒01
twenty-one papers chosen by |
| By: | Marco Faillo (University of Trento); Matteo Rizzolli (LUMSA University); Stephan Tontrup (New York University) |
| Abstract: | Abstract Some recent experimental literature on the taking game (a variation of the dictator game) suggests that human subjects may generally be taking averse, implying that the moral cost of taking exceeds the moral cost of not giving. In our experiment, our subjects could decide to take tangible objects (lottery scratchcards) brought from outside the lab and thus legally owned by other subjects. This legal treatment was compared with a more standard one where subjects earned their scratchcards inside the lab. Evidence is provided of a (weak) taking aversion that is greater when property is established inside the lab via an effort task than when it is pre-existing and legally enforceable outside the lab |
| Keywords: | property rights, dictator game, bully game, taking game, taking aversion, stealing, anonymity, effort, scratchcards. |
| JEL: | C91 D23 K11 P14 P26 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp63&r=exp |
| By: | Fuhai HONG (Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332.); Yohanes E. RIYANTO (Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332.); Ruike ZHANG (Division of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive, Singapore 637332.) |
| Abstract: | Social identity is embedded in social structures, generated by various social processes, and has multiple dimensions. We report ?ndings from a laboratory experiment eliciting two-dimensional social identities: a horizontal identity determined either randomly or by preferences and a vertical identity de?ned by income status and determined either by luck or performance. We also vary income gaps between vertical identity groups. Participants make redistributive allocation decisions between two others di¤ering in identity attributes. We ?nd robust evidence of in-group favoritism and that both the identity distance between the allocator and the in-group recipient and income gaps in?uence the degree of in-group favoritism. |
| Keywords: | Social Identities, Horizontal and Vertical Identity Attributes, In-group Favoritism, Income Inequality |
| JEL: | C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nan:wpaper:1701&r=exp |
| By: | Qiu, Jianying; Ong, Qiyan |
| Abstract: | Abstract We develop a new approach to directly and strictly distinguish indecisiveness from indifference. In our approach experimental subjects face a list of pairs of options. Besides the standard choice of choosing one option out of the pair (the binary choice), we also allow experimental subjects to randomize over the two options by choosing probabilities according to which either option determines the payoffs (the randomized choice). Furthermore, we elicit subjects' willingness to pay (WTP) of using the randomized choice via a modified multiple price list method. We show that subjects might strictly prefer the randomized choice over the binary choice when they are indecisive. Our results suggest that (1) the vast majority of subjects randomized actively; (2) subjects took longer time to make strictly randomized decisions; (3) subjects were willing to pay a strictly positive amount of money to randomize, and they were willing to pay more for randomized choices with randomizing probabilities close to 0.5 than those with randomizing probabilities close to 0 or 1. These results provide strong evidence for the existence of indecisiveness in choices. More importantly, it suggests that there might exist significant welfare losses when indecisive individuals are forced to make all-or-nothing decisions against their potentially incomplete preferences. |
| Keywords: | indecisiveness, indifference, experiment, randomized choices |
| JEL: | C9 C91 D81 |
| Date: | 2017–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:81440&r=exp |
| By: | Nobuyuki Hanaki (Université Nice Sophia Antipolis; GREDEG-CNRS; IUF); Eizo Akiyama (University of Tsukuba, Japan); Ryuichiro Ishikawa (University of Tsukuba, Japan) |
| Abstract: | In this study, we investigate (a) whether eliciting future price forecasts influences market outcomes and (b) whether differences in the way in which subjects are incentivized to submit ``accurate'' price forecasts influence market outcomes as well as the forecasts in an experimental asset market. We consider four treatments: one without forecast elicitation and three with forecast elicitation. In two of the treatments with forecast elicitation, subjects are paid based on their performance in both forecasting and trading, while in the other treatment with forecast elicitations, they are paid based on only one of those factors, which is chosen randomly at the end of the experiment. We found no significant effect of forecast elicitation on market outcomes in the latter case. Thus, to avoid influencing the behavior of subjects and market outcomes by eliciting price forecasts, paying subjects based on either forecasting or trading performance is better than paying them based on both. |
| Keywords: | Price forecast elicitation, Experimental asset markets |
| JEL: | B41 B26 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2017-26&r=exp |
| By: | Lee, Ji Yong; Nayga, Rodolfo; Deck, Cary; Drichoutis, Andreas C. |
| Abstract: | Behavioral biases are more pronounced for individuals with lower cognitive abilities. This paper examines what connection if any there is between cognitive ability and bidding strategy in second price auctions. Despite truthful revelation being a weakly dominant strategy, previous experiments have consistently observed overbidding, which makes use of such auctions for inferring homegrown value problematic. Examining the effect of cognitive ability is important as it may help identify when one can reliably recover values from bids. The results indicate that more cognitively able subjects behave in closer accordance with theory, and that cognitive ability partially explains heterogeneity in bidding behavior. |
| Keywords: | Cognitive ability; Second price auction; Bid deviation; Overbidding; Laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2017–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:81495&r=exp |
| By: | De Paola, Maria (University of Calabria); Gioia, Francesca (University of Edinburgh); Piluso, Fabio (University of Calabria) |
| Abstract: | We ran a field experiment to investigate whether nudge policies, consisting in behavioural insight messaging, help to improve performance in financial trading. Our experiment involved students enrolled in a financial trading course in an Italian University who were invited to trade on Borsa Italiana's virtual platform. Students were randomly assigned to a control group and a treatment group. Treated students received a message reminding them of the existence of behavioural biases in financial trading. We find that treated students significantly improve the performance of their portfolio. Several behaviours may explain the increase in performance. We find evidence pointing to a reduction in the home and status quo biases for risk averse nudged participants. |
| Keywords: | financial trading, behavioural biases, reminders, nudges, home bias, status quo bias, risk aversion |
| JEL: | D14 E21 E22 O16 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10983&r=exp |
| By: | Julien Benistant (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Using a real-effort experiment, we studied how minimal group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We varied (i) whether individuals had to report their own output or the output of their competitor, (ii) whether group identity was induced or not, and (iii) whether pairs of competitors shared the same group identity or not. We show that individuals misreported in the same proportion and to the same extent by inflating their output or by decreasing their opponent's output. Misreporting was affected neither by the competitor's group identity nor by the individual's beliefs about misreporting. This suggests that in such competitive settings, unethical behavior is mainly driven by an unconditional desire to win. Abstract: Using a real-effort experiment, we studied how minimal group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We varied (i) whether individuals had to report their own output or the output of their competitor, (ii) whether group identity was induced or not, and (iii) whether pairs of competitors shared the same group identity or not. We show that individuals misreported in the same proportion and to the same extent by inflating their output or by decreasing their opponent's output. Misreporting was affected neither by the competitor's group identity nor by the individual's beliefs about misreporting. This suggests that in such competitive settings, unethical behavior is mainly driven by an unconditional desire to win. |
| Keywords: | lying, group identity, competition, experiment,Unethical behavior |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01592007&r=exp |
| By: | Alia Gizatulina (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Olga Gorelkina (University of Liverpool) |
| Abstract: | We study the division of trade surplus in a natural field experiment on German eBay. Acting as a seller, we offer Amazon gift cards with face values of up to 500 Euro. A random selection of buyers, the subjects of our experiment, make price offers according to the rules of eBay. Using a novel decomposition method, we infer the offered shares of trade surplus from the data and find that the average share proposed to the seller amounts to about $30 \%$. Additionally, we document: (i) insignificant effects of stake size; (ii) poor use of strategically relevant public information; and (iii) differences between East and West German subjects. |
| Keywords: | Field experiment, surplus division, bargaining, Internet trade, eBay |
| JEL: | C72 C93 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:3004&r=exp |
| By: | Lenel, Friederike (Leibniz University of Hannover); Steiner, Susan (Leibniz University of Hannover) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the crowding out of informal support among peers by the introduction of formal insurance. We show that the availability of insurance changes people's intrinsic motivation to support others. We report results from a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted in Cambodia. Half of the subjects face the risk to lose a large proportion of their endowment. It is varied whether they can purchase an insurance before the loss is determined. The other half of the subjects can transfer part of their endowment to those who lose. We find that significantly lower transfers are provided to subjects who had the option to purchase insurance but did not use this option than to subjects who did not have the insurance option available. We show that the reduction in transfers is not affected by whether subjects were informed about the possibility of informal support when making their insurance decision. Our findings indicate that the extent of crowding out may be larger than previously thought, because insurance does not only change economic incentives but also affects intrinsic motivations. |
| Keywords: | insurance, informal support, crowding-out, social preferences, Cambodia |
| JEL: | D03 C91 O12 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10986&r=exp |
| By: | Dickinson, David L. (Appalachian State University); Chaudhuri, Ananish (University of Auckland); Greenaway-McGrevy, Ryan (University of Auckland) |
| Abstract: | Traders in global markets operate at different local times-of-day. Suboptimal times-of-day may produce sleepiness due to daily variations in sleep/wake patterns and possibly also increased accumulation of hours awake. Global asset markets imply significantly increased heterogeneity in circadian timing, and likely sleepiness, of trader decisions compared to localized markets. We examine these factors by administering single-location and global sessions of an online asset market experiment that regularly produces valuation bubble and crash events. Global sessions involved real time trades between subjects in two locations 16 time zones apart (i.e., "global" markets) and at varied local times of day across sessions. We find asset market bubbles occur in all sessions, but global markets had significantly more extreme and longer duration valuation bubbles. Additionally, subjects at the most suboptimal times-of-day held significantly more asset shares in their portfolios in late trading rounds compared to other subjects – a risky strategy with overvalued shares. Overall, our results highlight a unique but underappreciated factor present across traders in global market environments. They also point to the importance of a relatively common cognitive state (i.e., suboptimal time-of-day) in attempting to understand trader behavior and, ultimately, market outcomes. |
| Keywords: | asset markets, experiments, bubbles, sleep, circadian rhythm |
| JEL: | C92 G12 G15 D84 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10984&r=exp |
| By: | Julien Benistant (Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France) |
| Abstract: | Using a real-effort experiment, we studied how minimal group identity affects unethical behavior in a contest game. We varied (i) whether individuals had to report their own output or the output of their competitor, (ii) whether group identity was induced or not, and (iii) whether pairs of competitors shared the same group identity or not. We show that individuals misreported in the same proportion and to the same extent by inflating their output or by decreasing their opponent’s output. Misreporting was affected neither by the competitor’s group identity nor by the individual’s beliefs about misreporting. This suggests that in such competitive settings, unethical behavior is mainly driven by an unconditional desire to win. |
| Keywords: | Unethical behavior, lying, group identity, competition, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 M54 D63 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1725&r=exp |
| By: | Reshmaan Hussam (Harvard Business School, Business, Government and the International Economy Unit); Atonu Rabbani (Dhaka University, Dept. of Economics); Giovanni Reggiani (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Natalia Rigol (Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | Regular handwashing with soap is believed to have substantial impacts on child health in the developing world. Most handwashing campaigns have failed, however, to establish and maintain a regular practice of handwashing. Motivated by scholarship that suggests handwashing is habitual, we design, implement and analyze a randomized field experiment aimed to test the main predictions of the rational addiction model. To reliably measure handwashing, we develop and produce a novel soap dispenser, within which a time-stamped sensor is embedded. We randomize distribution of these soap dispensers as well as provision of monitoring (feedback reports) or monitoring and incentives for daily handwashing. Relative to a control arm in which households receive no dispenser, we find that all treatments generate substantial improvements in child health as measured by child weight and height. Our key test of rational addiction is implemented by informing a subset of households about a future boost in monitoring or incentives. We find that (1) both monitoring and incentives increase handwashing relative to receiving only a dispenser; (2) these effects persist after monitoring or incentives are removed; and (3) the anticipation of monitoring increases handwashing rates significantly, implying that individuals internalize the habitual nature of handwashing and accumulate habit stock accordingly. Our results are consistent with the key predictions of the rational addiction model, expanding its relevance to settings beyond what are usually considered 'addictive' behaviors. |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:18-030&r=exp |
| By: | Thomas Boyer-Kassem (TiLPS - Tilburg Center for Logic, General Ethics, and Philosophy of Science - https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/ - Tilburg University); Sébastien Duchêne (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Eric Guerci (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Human agents happen to judge that a conjunction of two terms is more probable than one of the terms, in contradiction with the rules of classical probabilities—this is the conjunction fallacy. One of the most discussed accounts of this fallacy is currently the quantum-like explanation, which relies on models exploiting the mathematics of quantum mechanics. The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical adequacy of major quantum-like models which represent beliefs with quantum states. We first argue that they can be tested in three different ways, in a question order effect configuration which is different from the traditional conjunction fallacy experiment. We then carry out our proposed experiment, with varied methodologies from experimental economics. The experimental results we get are at odds with the predictions of the quantum-like models. This strongly suggests that this quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy fails. Future possible research paths are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Conjunction fallacy, Quantum-like model, Experimental economics, Empirical adequacy |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01380684&r=exp |
| By: | Dickinson, David L. (Appalachian State University); McElroy, Todd (Florida Gulf Coast University) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of a commonly experienced adverse cognitive state on decision making under uncertainty. Specifically, we administer an at-home sleep restriction protocol combined with random assignment to the time-of-day for decision making. Thus, we induce sleepiness in our subjects via sleep restriction as well as suboptimal time-of-day prior to administration of a Bayesian choice task. The specific task used discriminates between Bayesian choices that coincide with more simple reinforcement heuristic choices (in "Easy" trials) versus those that do not (in "Hard" trials), which is ideal given our underlying hypothesis that sleepy subjects are more likely to use simple heuristics. We first show that both circadian mismatch and sleep restriction significantly increase subjective sleepiness – this documents protocol validity. Our key behavioral results are that sleepy subjects are more likely to make a Bayesian inaccurate decision and more likely to make decisions consistent with a simple reinforcement heuristic, particularly in more cognitively difficult "Hard" trials. Secondary results show that stimulation of subject affect increased used of the simple decision heuristic but, when combined with sleep restriction, increased affect may increase task motivation and improve choice accuracy. These results offer new insights into the likely impact of sleepiness on decision making under uncertainty and highlight the potential negative impact on such cognitive states may have on accurate formation of probability assessments. |
| Keywords: | sleep restriction, sleep deprivation, reinforcement heuristic, Bayesian choice, experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D81 D91 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10985&r=exp |
| By: | Pedro Carneiro; Sokbae Lee; Daniel Wilhelm |
| Abstract: | In a randomized control trial, the precision of an average treatment effect estimator can be improved either by collecting data on additional individuals, or by collecting additional covariates that predict the outcome variable. We propose the use of pre-experimental data such as a census, or a household survey, to inform the choice of both the sample size and the covariates to be collected. Our procedure seeks to minimize the resulting average treatment effect estimator's mean squared error, subject to the researcher's budget constraint. We rely on a modification of an orthogonal greedy algorithm that is conceptually simple and easy to implement in the presence of a large number of potential covariates, and does not require any tuning parameters. In two empirical applications, we show that our procedure can lead to substantial gains of up to 58%, measured either in terms of reductions in data collection costs or in terms of improvements in the precision of the treatment effect estimator. |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1603.03675&r=exp |
| By: | Tomas Sjöström (Department of Economics, Rutgers University); Levent Ülkü (Department of Economics, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México); Radovan Vadovic (Department of Economics, Carleton University) |
| Abstract: | We conduct an experimental test of the long-standing conjecture that autonomy increases motivation and job performance. Subjects face a menu consisting of two projects: one risky and one safe. The probability that the risky project succeeds depends on the subject’s e?ort. In one treatment, subjects choose a project from the menu; in the other treatment, they are assigned a project from the menu. Using a di?erence-in-di?erence approach that controls for selection e?ects, we show that autonomy (the right to choose a project) has a signi?cant pure motivation e?ect on e?ort. The e?ect is consistent with aversion to anticipated regret, but not with standard expected-utility maximization. Futher, as predicted by regret theory, e?ort on the (chosen) risky project is increasing in the return to the (unchosen) safe project, and the pure motivation e?ect is greater, the riskier is the risky project. Finally, we ?nd a signi?cant negative relationship between the strength of the pure motivation e?ect and the subjects’ expected earnings. Classification- |
| Date: | 2017–09–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:car:carecp:17-11&r=exp |
| By: | Shoji, Masahiro |
| Abstract: | This study tests guilt aversion by experimentally eliciting guilt sensitivity of villagers in Bangladesh and evaluating its impact on real-world behavior. In a trust game with hidden action, villagers in this study are asked about their reciprocal behavior toward seven potential opponents with different levels of trusting belief. Guilt sensitivity is elicited from the threshold belief to switch from selfish to reciprocal behavior. It appears that males exhibit higher guilt sensitivity. I also find robust supporting evidence for guilt aversion but not for pure altruism or trustworthiness; guilt-averse villagers can borrow from and repay to community members after a disaster. Individuals also suffer less from property crime in villages with a higher guilt-sensitivity neighborhood. However, guilt sensitivity is uncorrelated with contribution to community events. A potential reason for the insignificant effect is discussed. |
| Keywords: | Guilt aversion; peer effects; antisocial behavior; experiment; Bangladesh |
| JEL: | C91 C93 |
| Date: | 2017–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:81451&r=exp |
| By: | Valeria Maggian (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France); Natalia Montinari (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università degli Studi di Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126, Bologna, Italy); Antonio Nicolò (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Manageriali, Università degli Studi di Padova, via del Santo 33, 35123 Padova, Italy; School of Social Sciences University of Manchester, M13 9PL Manchester, UK) |
| Abstract: | Women are underrepresented in leadership positions in business, politics, and in the academic and scientific community. Not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of talent and, consequently, a loss of economic growth potential. To design effective policy interventions that empower women to reach leadership positions, it is crucial to identify at which levels of the career ladder they should be introduced. In a laboratory experiment, we run a two-stage tournament to evaluate the impact of three different interventions on women’s willingness to compete for top positions. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced at the initial stage is ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top, while quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or in both stages increase women’s willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners. |
| Keywords: | Gender quotas, affirmative action, gender gap, competition, multi-stage tournament, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D91 J16 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1724&r=exp |
| By: | Karthik Muralidharan; Paul Niehaus; Sandip Sukhtankar |
| Abstract: | Public employment programs play a large role in many developing countries' anti-poverty strategies, but their net impact on the incomes of the poor will depend on both direct program earnings as well as indirect effects through changes induced in market wages and employment. We estimate this composite effect, exploiting a large-scale randomized experiment across 157 sub-districts and 19 million people that substantially improved the implementation of India's rural employment guarantee scheme. Despite no changes in government expenditure on the program itself, the earnings of low-income households rose 13%, driven overwhelmingly by market (90%) as opposed to program earnings (10%). Low-skilled wages increased 6% and days without paid work fell 7%, while migration and prices were unaffected. Effects on wages, employment, and income also spilled over into neighboring sub-districts, and estimates of program impact that adjust for these spillovers are substantially larger, typically double the unadjusted magnitudes. These results suggest that well-implemented public works programs can be highly effective at reducing poverty. They also highlight the importance of general equilibrium effects in program evaluation, and the feasibility of studying them using large-scale experiments. |
| JEL: | D50 D73 H53 J38 J43 O18 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23838&r=exp |
| By: | Johan Vikstr\"om; Geert Ridder; Martin Weidner |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the identification of treatment effects on conditional transition probabilities. We show that even under random assignment only the instantaneous average treatment effect is point identified. Since treated and control units drop out at different rates, randomization only ensures the comparability of treatment and controls at the time of randomization, so that long-run average treatment effects are not point identified. Instead we derive informative bounds on these average treatment effects. Our bounds do not impose (semi)parametric restrictions, for example, proportional hazards. We also explore various assumptions such as monotone treatment response, common shocks and positively correlated outcomes that tighten the bounds. |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1709.08981&r=exp |
| By: | Valeria Maggian (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Natalia Montinari (Université de Bologne - UNIBO - Università di Bologna [Bologna]); Antonio Nicolò (Universita degli Studi di Padova, The University of Manchester [Manchester]) |
| Abstract: | Women are underrepresented in leadership positions in business, politics, and in the academic and scientific community. Not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of talent and, consequently, a loss of economic growth potential. To design effective policy interventions that empower women to reach leadership positions, it is crucial to identify at which levels of the career ladder they should be introduced. In a laboratory experiment, we run a two-stage tournament to evaluate the impact of three different interventions on women's willingness to compete for top positions. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced at the initial stage is ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top, while quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or in both stages increase women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners. |
| Keywords: | Gender quotas, affirmative action, gender gap, competition, multi-stage tournament, laboratory experiment |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01590379&r=exp |