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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2016‒12‒04
24 papers chosen by |
| By: | Arianna Galliera |
| Abstract: | The incentive scheme in a multi-task experiment might trigger different types of behavior in participants. This experimental study allows participants to decide between being paid for a random task or the average across all tasks. In a bargaining game buyer and seller have partly conflicting interests and are asymmetrically informed. Participants choose the incentive scheme based on past experience where we also control for individual characteristics. Although payment method is likely correlated to risk preferences it also might be influenced by egodefensive concerns. Will, for example, participants avoid cumulative payment which reveals, more reliably, own performance? So far little research is devoted to the analysis of self-selected Random Lottery Incentives and Cumulative Scheme both on individual and social results. This paper aims to fill the gap. |
| Keywords: | bargaining, experiment, gender, payment scheme. |
| JEL: | C78 C91 D82 J16 J33 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1602&r=exp |
| By: | Daniela Di Cagno; Arianna Galliera; Werner Güth; Francesca Marzo; Noemi Pace |
| Abstract: | A risky choice experiment is based on one-dimensional choice variables and risk neutrality induced via binary lottery incentives. Each participant confronts many parameter constellations with varying optimal payoffs. We assess (sub)optimality, as well as (non)optimal satisficing, partly by eliciting aspirations in addition to choices. Treatments differ in the probability that a binary random event, which are payoff- but not optimal choice–relevant, is experimentally induced and whether participants choose portfolios directly or via satisficing, i.e., by forming aspirations and checking for satisficing before making their choice. By incentivizing aspiration formation, we can test satisficing, and in cases of satisficing, determine whether it is optimal. |
| Keywords: | (un)Bounded Rationality, Satisficing, Risk, Uncertainty, Experiments |
| JEL: | D03 D81 C91 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1603&r=exp |
| By: | Catherine C. Eckel; David H. Herberich; Jonathan Meer |
| Abstract: | One of the most important outstanding questions in fundraising is whether donor premiums, or gifts to prospective donors, are effective in increasing donations. Donors may be motivated by reciprocity, making premium recipients more likely to donate and give larger donations. Or donors may dislike premiums, preferring instead to maximize the value of their donations to the charity; in this case donor premiums would be ineffective. We conduct a field experiment in conjunction with the fundraising campaign of a major university to examine these questions. Treatments include a control, an unconditional premium with two gift quality levels, and a set of conditional premium treatments. The conditional treatments include opt-out and opt-in conditions to test whether donors prefer to forego premiums. Compared with the control, donors are twice as likely to give when they receive an unconditional, high-quality gift. The low-quality unconditional and all conditional premiums have little impact on the likelihood or level of giving. Donors do not respond negatively to premiums: rates of giving do not suffer when premiums are offered. In addition, few opt out given the opportunity to do so, indicating that they like gifts, and suggesting that reciprocity rather than altruism determines the impact of premiums on giving. |
| JEL: | C93 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22867&r=exp |
| By: | Kechagia, Varvara; Drichoutis, Andreas C. |
| Abstract: | Several studies show that sensory cues influence consumer decision making processes. While scent is a key component of a market's physical environment, it has received far less attention in the academic literature as compared, for example, with visual cues. In addition, most of the studies that examine the effect of ambient scents fail on one or both of these criteria: to properly control the influence of nuisance factors and/or to elicit preferences under real monetary incentives. We collected data from a laboratory experiment where we varied on a between subjects basis the dispersion of a citrus fragrance. We then elicited subjects' willingness to pay for two unbranded products - a mug and a chocolate - by having subjects participate in a 2nd price Vickrey auction. We also elicited subjects' risk preferences using lottery choice tasks. Our results show a statistically and economically significant effect on subjects' willingness to pay: valuations increased between 37% - 43% for subjects who were exposed to a citrus scent as compared to the control group. We do not find a statistically significant effect of the citrus scent on subjects' risk aversion. |
| Keywords: | scent cues; fragrance; olfactory; willingness to pay; risk preferences; risk aversion; laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D44 D81 D87 |
| Date: | 2016–10–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75293&r=exp |
| By: | Goeschl, Timo; Lohse, Johannes |
| Abstract: | Recent experiments suggest that contribution decisions in a public goods game (PGG) are more likely to be cooperative if based on intuition rather than reflection. This paper (i) reinvestigates the behavioral impact of so-called cognitive style in the PGG; and (ii) connects it with an earlier literature on the role of cognitive failure (confusion). This is motivated by the possibility that the method of time pressure, commonly used to identify cognitive style, invites confusion as a confounding factor. Two channels for such confounds are identified and experimentally tested: A heterogeneous treatment effect of time pressure depending on subject's confusion status and a direct impact of time pressure on subjects' likelihood of being confused. Our reinvestigation on the behavioral impact of time pressure confirms that cognitive style matters, but that deliberation rather than intuition drives cooperation. The confounding effect of confusion is not found to be direct, but to operate through a heterogeneous treatment effect. Time pressure selectively reduces average contributions among those subjects whose contributions can confidently be interpreted as cooperative rather than confused. |
| Date: | 2016–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0626&r=exp |
| By: | Andreas C. Drichoutis (Agricultural University of Athens); Varvara Kechagia (Agricultural University of Athens) |
| Abstract: | Several studies show that sensory cues influence consumer decision making processes. While scent is a key component of a market's physical environment, it has received far less attention in the academic literature as compared, for example, with visual cues. In addition, most of the studies that examine the e ect of ambient scents fail on one or both of these criteria: to properly control the in infuence of nuisance factors and/or to elicit preferences under real monetary incentives. We collected data from a laboratory experiment where we varied on a between subjects basis the dispersion of a citrus fragrance. We then elicited subjects' willingness to pay for two unbranded products | a mug and a chocolate | by having subjects participate in a 2nd price Vickrey auction. We also elicited subjects' risk preferences using lottery choice tasks. Our results show a statistically and economically signi cant e ect on subjects' willingness to pay: valuations increased between 37% - 43% for subjects who were exposed to a citrus scent as compared to the control group. We do not nd a statistically signi cant effect of the citrus scent on subjects' risk aversion. |
| Keywords: | scent cues; fragrance; olfactory; willingness to pay; risk preferences; risk aversion; laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D44 D81 D87 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aua:wpaper:2016-4&r=exp |
| By: | Jacopo Bonan (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)); Philippe LeMay-Boucher (Heriot-Watt University); Michel Tenikue (Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER)) |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the effects of different marketing and distribution techniques on the purchase of Long-Lasting Insecticide-Treated Nets (LL-ITN). Using a randomized controlled trial in urban Senegal, we look at the impacts of receiving information on malaria-related issues and of different sale treatments. We find that overall information has no significant effect on the demand for LL-ITNs, but has a significant effect on individuals who have never attended school and have poor knowledge of malaria. Receiving an offer to purchase an LL-ITN with a voucher valid for 7 days increases purchases by 23 percentage points, compared to an on-the-spot sale offer. |
| Keywords: | Malaria, Senegal, Randomized Experiment, Bednets, Distribution Campaign |
| JEL: | C93 I12 I15 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2016.69&r=exp |
| By: | Natalia Borzino (UEA - University of East Anglia (Norwich)); Enrique Fatas (UEA - University of East Anglia (Norwich)); Emmanuel Peterle (UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate trust and trustworthiness in a networked investment game in which two senders interact with a receiver. We investigate to what extent senders and receivers comply with an exogenous and non-binding recommendation. We also manipulate the level of information available to senders regarding receiver’s behavior in the network. We compare a baseline treatment in which senders are only informed about the actions and outcomes of their own investment games to two information treatments. In the reputation treatment, senders receive ex ante information regarding the average amount returned by the receiver in the previous period. In the transparency treatment, each sender receives ex post additional information regarding the returning decision of the receiver to the other sender in the network. Across all treatments and for both senders and receivers, the non-binding rule has a significant and positive impact on individual decisions. Providing senders with additional information regarding receiver’s behavior affects trust at the individual level, but leads to mixed results at the aggregate level. Our findings suggest that reputation building, as well as allowing for social comparison could be efficient ways for receivers to improve trust within networks. |
| Keywords: | Information, Taxation, Trust,Experimental economics, Investment game |
| Date: | 2016–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01375081&r=exp |
| By: | Furtner, Nadja C.; Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Matzat, Dominik; Wollbrant, Conny |
| Abstract: | Evidence of gender differences in cooperation in social dilemmas is inconclusive. This paper experimentally elicits unconditional contributions, a contribution vector (cooperative preferences), and beliefs about the level of others’ contributions in variants of the public goods game. We show that existing inconclusive results can be understood and completely explained when controlling for beliefs and underlying cooperative preferences. Robustness checks based on data from around 450 additional independent observations around the world confirm our main empirical results: Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be free riders. Beliefs play an important role in shaping unconditional contributions, and they seem to be more malleable or sensitive to subtle cues for women than for men. |
| Keywords: | Public goods; conditional cooperation; gender; experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:30226&r=exp |
| By: | Juergen Bracht (University of Aberdeen [Aberdeen] - University of Aberdeen); Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We study questionnaire responses to moral dilemmas hypothetical situations in which sacrificing one life may save many other lives. We demonstrate gender differences in moral judgments: male participants are more supportive of the sacrifice than female participants. We investigate the importance of the previously studied source of the endorsement of the sacrfice: antisocial attitudes. First, we elicit the individual proneness to spiteful behavior using an incentivized experimental game. We demonstrate that spitefulness can be sizable but it is not associated with gender. Second, we find that gender is associated with moral judgments even when we account for individual differences in antisocial attitudes. Our results suggest that the performance of many institutions (related to the distribution of wealth or punishment, for instance) may be affected by the gender of the decision-makers. Abstract We study questionnaire responses to moral dilemmas hypothetical situations in which sacric-ing one life may save many other lives. We demonstrate gender dierences in moral judgments: male participants are more supportive of the sacrice than female participants. We investigate the importance of the previously studied source of the endorsement of the sacrice: antisocial attitudes. First, we elicit the individual proneness to spiteful behavior using an incentivized experimental game. We demonstrate that spitefulness can be sizable but it is not associated with gender. Second, we nd that gender is associated with moral judgments even when we account for individual dierences in antisocial attitudes. Our results suggest that the performance of many institutions (related to the distribution of wealth or punishment, for instance) may be aected by the gender of the decision-makers. |
| Keywords: | gender,moral dilemmas,moral judgments,spite,antisocial attitudes,experiment |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01382464&r=exp |
| By: | Christine Choirat; Daniela Di Cagno; Arianna Galliera |
| Abstract: | Near-miss outcomes are real-life situations which increase the perceived probability of the occurrence of future successes. The Almost-Winning (AW) bias is the well-known cognitive bias that makes individuals unable to distinguish between situations in which near misses signal ability and situations in which near misses are completely meaningless, in the sense of being unrelated to future (likelihood of) winning. The empirical and neurological evidence shows that a near-miss increases gamblers’ willingness to play: AW triggers a dopamine response similar to winning, in spite of no actual reward. Therefore, in a chance game, a sequence of AW outcomes easily generates an “irrational” willingness to continue playing, and might become a key factor in the development and maintenance of certain betting habits. We implement an experimental setting aimed at checking the relevance of the AW bias among ordinary students on order to evaluate its potential strength in absence of gambling pathologies. Two treatments are implemented in two different frames, an investment game (IG) and a slot machine game (SM), which try to avoid persistence at gaming. |
| Keywords: | experiment, gambling, decision making under risk and uncertainty |
| JEL: | C91 L83 D81 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1508&r=exp |
| By: | Andrej Angelowski (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome); Daniela Di Cagno (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome); Werner Güth (Luiss Guido Carli, Rome; Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt; Max Planck Institute on Collective Goods, Bonn); Francesca Marazzi (Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata); Luca Panaccione (Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata) |
| Abstract: | In a circular neighborhood, each member contributes repeatedly to two local public goods with the left and the right neighbor. All two-person public good games are structurally independent in spite of their overlapping player sets. Heterogeneity across neighbors is introduced by two randomly selected participants, the "Bad" Apples, either by being less productive or by being excluded from periodic information feedback about their neighbors' contributions. We study how "Bad" Apples affect their neighbors and through them also other group members. Both types of "Bad" Apples spoil the basket, reducing total voluntary contributions compared to a baseline with no "Bad" Apples. Furthermore, we find that "Bad" Apples not only affects their direct neighbors, but also, through behavioral spillovers, the whole neighborhood. However, the two types of "Bad" Apples affect their neighborhood in opposite ways. Whereas less productive "Bad" Apples are least cooperative, "Bad" Apples excluded from feedback information are most cooperative. In the latter case, the reduction of total contributions is caused by the direct neighbors of "Bad" Apples. |
| Keywords: | Public goods, behavioral spillovers, experiments, voluntary contribution mechanism, heterogeneity. |
| JEL: | C91 C72 H41 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:1604&r=exp |
| By: | Merkel, Anna; Lohse, Johannes |
| Abstract: | Economists are increasingly interested in the cognitive basis of pro-social behavior. Using response time data, several authors have claimed that "fairness is intuitive". In light of conflicting empirical evidence, we provide theoretical arguments showing under which circumstances an increase in "fair" behavior due to time pressure provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis. Drawing on recent applications of the Drift Diffusion Model (Krajbich et al., 2015a), we demonstrate how the subjective difficulty of making a choice affects choices under time pressure and time delay, thereby making an unambiguous interpretation of time pressure effects contingent on the choice situation. To explore our theoretical considerations and to retest the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis, we analyze choices in two-person prisoner’s dilemma and binary dictator games. As in previous experiments, we exogenously manipulate response times by placing subjects under time pressure or forcing them to delay their decisions. In addition, we manipulate the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair relative to the selfish option across all choice situations. Our main finding is that time pressure does not increase the fraction of fair choices relative to time delay irrespective of the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair option. Hence, our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that "fairness is intuitive". |
| Keywords: | distributional preferences; cooperation; response times; time pressure; cognitive processes; drift diffusion models |
| Date: | 2016–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0627&r=exp |
| By: | Mechtenberg, Lydia; Tyran, Jean-Robert |
| Abstract: | The quality of democratic choice critically depends on voter motivation, i.e. on voters' willingness to cast an informed vote. If voters are motivated, voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant, delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes. We experimentally study a common interest situation in which we vary voters' information cost and the competence of the expert. We find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects. |
| Keywords: | Experiment; Information Acquisition; information aggregation; voting |
| JEL: | C91 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11622&r=exp |
| By: | Hamet Sarr (UMR GESTE - Gestion Territoriale de l'Eau et de l'environnement - Irstea - ENGEES, Université de Strasbourg); Mohamed Bchir (UMR GESTE - Gestion Territoriale de l'Eau et de l'environnement - Irstea - ENGEES, Université de Strasbourg); Francois Cochard (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Anne Rozan (UMR GESTE - Gestion Territoriale de l'Eau et de l'environnement - Irstea - ENGEES, Université de Strasbourg) |
| Abstract: | The “Average Pigouvian Tax” (APT) was proposed by Suter et al. (2008) to reduce the financial burden of the standard ambient tax. This instrument consists in a standard ambient tax divided by the number of firms, which requires polluters to cooperate in order to achieve the social optimum. To enable polluters to cooperate, communication is allowed. We introduce different types of communication: cheap talk, exogenous costly communication (communication is imposed), and endogenous costly communication (conducted on a voluntary basis after a vote). Our experiment confirms that the instrument induces polluters to reduce their emissions under cheap talk. However, we find that group emissions are less reduced when communication is costly. This result still holds even when we endogenize communication by introducing a voting phase. |
| Keywords: | nonpoint source pollution, ambient tax, social dilemma, cooperation, cheap talk, costly communication, vote |
| Date: | 2016–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01375078&r=exp |
| By: | Takanori Ida; Naoya Motegi; Yoshiaki Ushifusa |
| Abstract: | This study conducts a quasi-randomized controlled trial in a workplace with personalized lighting control and investigates the impact of automated demand responses on employees. To meet this objective, we set up four treatment groups: opt-in performance incentive, opt-in fixed incentive, opt-out performance incentive, and opt-out fixed incentive. Then, we estimate the average treatment effects (intent-to-treat and treatment-on-treated) of demand response. The results reveal a significant reduction in electricity consumption during peak hours for all four treatment groups. |
| Keywords: | Field Experiment, Behavioral Economics, Default Effect |
| JEL: | C23 C93 D03 Q41 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kue:epaper:e-16-010&r=exp |
| By: | Ritwik Banerjee; Nabanita Datta Gupta (Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Denmark); Marie Claire Villeval |
| Abstract: | We conduct an artefactual field experiment to examine various spillover effects of Affirmative Action policies in the context of castes in India. We test a) if individuals who compete in the presence of Affirmative Action policies remain competitive in the same proportion after the policy has been removed, and b) whether having been exposed to the policy generates unethical behavior and spite against subjects from the category who has benefited from the policy. We find that these policies increase substantially the confidence of the lower caste members and motivate them to choose significantly more frequently a tournament payment scheme. However, we find no spillover effect on confidence and competitiveness once Affirmative Action is withdrawn: any lower caste’s gain in competitiveness due to the policy is then entirely wiped out. Furthermore, the strong existing bias of the dominant caste against the lower caste is not significantly aggravated by Affirmative Action. |
| Keywords: | Affirmative Action, castes, competitiveness, unethical behavior, field experiment |
| JEL: | C70 C91 J16 J24 J31 M52 |
| Date: | 2016–11–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2016-11&r=exp |
| By: | René van Bavel (European Commission - JRC); Nuria Rodríguez-Priego (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | This study is part of a larger effort to better understand online behaviour. We tested the effect on people’s security behaviour of different ways of warning them about cybersecurity threats with an online experiment (n=5,065) in Germany, Sweden, Poland, the UK and Spain. Participants had to make a purchase in a mock online store, and their behaviour was observed through 4 behavioural measures. Results show that making users aware of the steps they can take to minimise their exposure to risk is effective in generating more secure behaviour, as posited by protection motivation theory. Gain and loss-framed messages, and a message with a male anthropomorphic character, also had some effect on behaviour compared to the control group. The study included a questionnaire. Results suggest that more risk-averse participants will exhibit more cautious behaviour and that, on the whole, warning messages did not affect their knowledge of how to prevent cyber-attacks. Warning messages based on behavioural insights might not increase consumers' knowledge, but they can help improve their experience and build online trust. |
| Keywords: | cybersecurity, nudging, online behaviour, behavioural economics |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc103223&r=exp |
| By: | Liza Charroin (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2) |
| Abstract: | In the benchmark model of Bala and Goyal (2000) on network formation, the equilibrium network is asymmetric and unfair as agents have different payoffs. While they are prominent in reality, asymmetric networks do not emerge in the lab mainly because of fairness concerns. We extend this model with a sequential linking decision process to ease coordination and with heterogeneous agents. Heterogeneity is introduced with the presence of a special agent who has either a higher monetary value or a different status. The equilibrium is asymmetric and unfair. Our experimental results show that thanks to sequentiality and fairness concerns, individuals coordinate on fair and efficient networks in homogeneous settings. Heterogeneity impacts the network formation process by increasing the asymmetry of networks but does not decrease the level of fairness nor efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Network formation, sequentiality, heterogeneity, fairness, asymmetry |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01368067&r=exp |
| By: | Francois Cochard (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - UFC - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté, UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Hélène Couprie (THEMA - Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise); Astrid Hopfensitz (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Female specialization on household work and male specialization on labor-market work is a widely observed phenomenon across time and countries. Gender differences regarding characteristics (preferences, productivity) and context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recognized to explain this fact. We experimentally investigate work division by true co-habiting couples participating in a newly developed specialization task. Efficiency in this task comes at the cost of inequality, giving higher earnings to the “advantaged” player. We compare behavior when men (or women) are in the advantaged position, which correspond to the traditional (or power) couple case where he (or she) earns more. We show that women do not contribute more than men to the household public good whatever the situation. This result allows us to rule-out some of the standard explanations of the work division puzzle. |
| Keywords: | Experiment on couples, Time allocation, Work division |
| Date: | 2015–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01376912&r=exp |
| By: | Vladislav Damjanovic (Durham Business School) |
| Abstract: | For Traveler's Dilemma and Minimal Effort Coordination games, the unconditional regret matching (URM) procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones. This supports a claim that the URM procedure can be well suited to predict the behavior of experimental subjects in repeated games |
| Keywords: | Adaptive Heuristics, Regret Matching, Coarse-Correlated Equilibrium, Travelerís Dilemma Game, Minimal Effrt Coordination Game |
| JEL: | D8 C7 D7 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dur:cegapw:2016_06&r=exp |
| By: | Malte Sandner (University College London) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the results of a randomized study of a home visiting programme implemented in Germany for low-income, first-time mothers. A major goal of the programme is to improve the participants’ economic self-sufficiency and family planning. I use administrative data from the German social security system and detailed telephone surveys to examine the effects of the intervention on maternal employment, welfare benefits, and household composition. The study reveals that the intervention decreased maternal employment and increased subsequent births. These results contradict those of previous studies from the United States, where home visiting programmes successfully increased employment and decreased fertility. Low employment incentives and generous welfare state arrangements for disadvantaged mothers with young children in Germany may explain the different results. |
| Keywords: | Early Childhood Intervention, Randomized Experiment, Fertility |
| JEL: | J13 J12 I21 H52 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:duh:wpaper:1606&r=exp |
| By: | Noemi Pace (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations); Silvio Daidone (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations); Benjamin Davis (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations); Luca Pellerano (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) |
| Abstract: | Cash transfers programs have been shown to have positive effects on a variety of outcomes. While much of the literature focuses on the role of conditionality in achieving desired impact, this paper focuses on the role of ‘soft conditionality’ implemented through both ‘labeling’ and ‘messaging’ in evaluating the impact of the Child Grants Program in Lesotho, an unconditional cash transfer targeting poor households with orphans and vulnerable children. Beneficiary households received a clear message that the transfer should be spent on the interest and needs of children. Our findings are based on a randomized experiment and suggest that ‘soft conditionality’ does play a strong role in increasing expenditure for children, especially on education, clothing and footwear. Results indicate in fact that transfer income is spent differently from general income as it exerts both an income and a substitution effect. This behavioral change is confirmed by comparing the ex-ante expected behaviors with the ex-post actual response to the program. We find that for expenditure categories linked to the wellbeing of children the ex-post response was much higher than the ex-ante expected behavior. |
| Keywords: | cash transfers, consumption, food security, impact evaluation, randomized experiment, soft conditionality |
| JEL: | C93 D12 I38 O18 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2016:33&r=exp |
| By: | Nuria Rodríguez-Priego (European Commission - JRC); René van Bavel (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | Objective: The level of online security is affected by technical factors, natural events and human behaviour. The purpose of this research is to contribute to policy actions that lead consumers to increase online security. It tests several warning messages based on the literature of behavioural insights that may persuade consumers to behave more securely while online, thus diminishing their chances of suffering a cyber-attack. Methods: A lab experiment was conducted in Spain (n=600). Participants had to make some online shopping decisions, and were assigned a quantity of money. The incentive for participating in the experiment depended on how secure their behaviour was during the purchasing process as regards: choosing a safe connection, providing less information during the sign-up process, choosing a strong password, choosing a trusted vendor, and logging-out. Each decision they made could increase their chances of suffering a cyber-attack at the end of the experiment and losing part of the incentive if it was less safe. Other factors that may affect secure behaviour were measured through a pre-purchase and a post-purchase questionnaire. Findings: Results show that long security messages and messages accompanied by a male anthropomorphic character will lead consumers to disclose less personal information when signing-up to an e-commerce website. A loss-framed security message will make subjects choose a trusted vendor over an untrusted one, to log-out after purchasing on an e-commerce website. It will also make them behave more securely, if cyber security is treated as a composite indicator built on three behavioural measures (use trusted sites, use secure passwords and log-out of sites after finishing our session). None of the treatments was effective in making subjects choose a safe connection, or a stronger password. Conclusions: The design of security messages has an effect on security behaviour. The policy implications are that security awareness messages should be carefully designed and piloted before they are implemented. The lack of effect of the messages on choosing a stronger password should be further examined. This result may be related to consumers lacking information on what a strong password is, or lacking knowledge that could help them to relate stronger passwords with more secure behaviour online. |
| Keywords: | cybersecurity, nudging, online behaviour, behavioural economics |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc103188&r=exp |