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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Khadjavi, Menusch; Sipangule, Kacana; Thiele, Rainer |
| Abstract: | Large-scale agricultural investments (LSAIs) typically depend on strong formal institutions and market-oriented intensive farming, whereas informal institutions tend to characterize the traditional villages located around them. We investigate changes to social capital in such villages when LSAIs materialize in their vicinity. Specifically, we employ a lab-in-the-field and a natural field experiment to elicit cooperation levels in villages that lie in the direct proximity of two LSAIs and compare them to villages further away. Our results reveal more cooperative outcomes for villages around the LSAIs. Smallholders who have worked on large-scale farms also show greater levels of cooperation than those who have no such work experience. Moreover, villages closer to the LSAIs demonstrate a higher propensity to share the public good provided in the natural field experiment. Taken together, these results suggest that beyond direct effects on employment, LSAIs yield positive externalities on cooperation, which are likely to be driven by increased exposure to more market-oriented forms of agriculture. |
| Keywords: | social capital,market exposure,cooperation,large-scale agricultural investments,field experiment,smallholders,Zambia |
| JEL: | C93 O10 O13 P14 Q12 Q15 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:2056&r=exp |
| By: | Cettolin, Elena; Riedl, Arno (General Economics 1 (Micro)); Tran, Thu Giang (General Economics 1 (Micro)) |
| Abstract: | The decision how to share resources with others often needs to be taken under uncertainty on its allocational consequences. Although risk preferences are likely important, existing research is silent about how social and risk preferences interact in such situations. In this paper we provide experimental evidence on this question. In a first experiment givers are not exposed to risk while beneficiaries’ final earnings may be larger or smaller than the allocation itself, depending on the realized state of the world. In a second experiment, risk affects the earnings of givers but not of beneficiaries. We find that individuals’ risk preferences are predictive for giving in both experiments. Increased risk exposure of beneficiaries tends to decrease giving whereas increased risk exposure of givers has no effect. Giving under risk is strongly correlated with giving in the absence of risk. We find limited support for existing models of ex-post and ex-ante fairness. Our results point to the importance of incorporating risk preferences in models of social preferences. |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D64 D81 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2016035&r=exp |
| By: | Oechssler, Jörg; Rau, Hannes; Roomets, Alex |
| Abstract: | We run an experiment that gives subjects the opportunity to hedge away ambiguity in an Ellsberg-style experiment. Subjects are asked to make two bets on the same draw from an ambiguous urn, with a coin flip deciding which bet is paid. By modifying the timing of the draw, coin flip, and decision, we are able to test the reversal-of-order axiom, particularly as it relates to the ability of the Random-Lottery Incentive System (RLIS) to prevent cross-task contamination in an ambiguity setting. We find that we cannot reject that the reversal-of-order axiom holds. This suggests that hedging could still be possible when carefully implementing RLIS. However, we also find low levels of ambiguity hedging across the board, suggesting the existence of the hedging possibility does not necessarily represent a common problem in ambiguity experiments. |
| Keywords: | Ellsberg paradox; hedging; reversal of order axiom; experiment. |
| Date: | 2016–11–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0621&r=exp |
| By: | Oechssler, Jörg; Rau, Hannes; Roomets, Alex |
| Abstract: | We run an experiment that gives subjects the opportunity to hedge away ambiguity in an Ellsberg-style experiment. Subjects are asked to make two bets on the same draw from an ambiguous urn, with a coin flip deciding which bet is paid. By modifying the timing of the draw, coin flip, and decision, we are able to test the reversal-of-order axiom, particularly as it relates to the ability of the Random-Lottery Incentive System (RLIS) to prevent cross-task contamination in an ambiguity setting. We find that we cannot reject that the reversal-of-order axiom holds. This suggests that hedging could still be possible when carefully implementing RLIS. However, we also find low levels of ambiguity hedging across the board, suggesting the existence of the hedging possibility does not necessarily represent a common problem in ambiguity experiments. |
| Keywords: | Ellsberg paradox; hedging; reversal of order axiom; experiment. |
| Date: | 2016–11–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:621&r=exp |
| By: | Kamei, Kenju |
| Abstract: | A large volume of theoretical and experimental studies have suggested that making information on people’s past behaviors visible to others may lead to the evolution of cooperation in finitely-repeated environments. But, do people endogenously cooperate with randomly-matched peers by revealing their past when they have an option to hide it? This paper experimentally shows that cooperation does not evolve in a random-matching environment because a large fraction of people do not choose to reveal their past behavior. However, when a costly sorting mechanism (where disclosers are matched with other disclosers; and likewise non-disclosers with other non-disclosers) is present, a stable number of subjects decide to costly disclose their past to join the reputation community and cooperate with other disclosers. Our study at the same time shows that when the sorting process is free, the high efficiency in the reputation community decreases as strategic subjects tend to join the reputation community and attempt to exploit cooperators. These findings suggest an important role of costly sorting mechanisms in the formation of communities (including online platforms) in order for people to sustain a high level of cooperation norms. |
| Keywords: | experiment, cooperation, finitely-repeated dilemma, repeated games, reputation |
| JEL: | C73 C9 D0 H41 |
| Date: | 2016–09–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75100&r=exp |
| By: | Konstantinos Georgalos; Enrica Carbone; Gerardo Infante |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on comparing individual and group decision making, in a stochastic inter-temporal problem in two decision environments, namely risk and ambiguity. Using a consumption/saving laboratory experiment, we investigate behaviour in four treatments: (1) individual choice under risk; (2) group choice under risk; (3) individual choice under ambiguity and (4) group choice under ambiguity. Comparing decisions within and between decision environments, we find an anti-symmetric pattern. While individuals are choosing on average closer to the theoretical optimal predictions, compared to groups in the risk treatments, groups tend to deviate less under ambiguity. Within decision environments, individuals deviate more when they choose under ambiguity, while groups are better planners under ambiguity rather than under risk. We argue that the results might be driven by differences in the levels of ambiguity and risk attitudes between individuals and groups, extending the frequently observed pattern of groups behaving closer to risk and ambiguity neutrality, to its dynamic dimension. |
| Keywords: | Risk, Ambiguity, Inter-temporal Optimisation, Group Decision Making, Learning, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D11 D91 E21 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:138739716&r=exp |
| By: | Jan Heufer (Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands); Paul van Bruggen (Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | Varian (1988) showed that the utility maximization hypothesis cannot be falsified when only a subset of goods is observed. We show that this result does not hold under the assumptions that unobserved prices and expenditures remain constant. These assumptions are naturally satisfied in laboratory settings where the world outside the lab remains unchanged during the experiment. Hence for so-called induced budget experiments the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference is a necessary and sufficient condition for utility maximization in general, not just in the lab. Lab experiments are therefore a valid tool to put the utility maximization hypothesis to the test. |
| Keywords: | Afriat's Theorem; Experimental Economics; GARP; Revealed Preference; Utility Maximization |
| JEL: | C14 C91 D11 D12 |
| Date: | 2016–11–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160095&r=exp |
| By: | Lorna Zischka (Department of Economics, University of Reading) |
| Abstract: | A controlled experiment establishes that differences in relational proximity can evoke or suppress a willingness to give to an unrelated cause. Four treatment groups underwent the same set of exercises but two in a closer relational environment and two in a more distant relational environment. Half of the subjects in each relational environment further received an unannounced doubling of pay. On exit, all participants had the option to give to charity. The experiment showed that the charitable giving was driven by relational factors, not by pay. We can learn that pro-social (pro-giving) inclinations interact with the wider social environment, and that these complex relational parameters may be evaluated by easy-to-measure giving patterns. |
| Keywords: | giving, experiment, pro-social, charity, endowment, social capital |
| Date: | 2016–07–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2016-07&r=exp |
| By: | Hoffmann, Timo; Renes, Sander |
| Abstract: | Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual preferences. In this paper we present the results of an experiment on the influence of private payoff information and the role of the available alternatives on individuals’ mechanism choices in such group choice situations. While efficient mechanisms are desirable, we experimentally show that participation constraints can prevent their implementation. We find strong indications that individual preferences for choice rules are sensitive to individual expected payoffs. Our results highlight the importance of considering participation constraints when designing choice institutions. |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D70 D82 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:41104&r=exp |
| By: | Furtner, Nadja C. (University of Munich, Munich, Germany); Kocher, Martin G. (University of Munich, Munich, Germany); Martinsson, Peter (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Matzat, Dominik (University of Munich, Munich, Germany); Wollbrant, Conny (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Evidence of gender differences in cooperation in social dilemmas is inconclusive. This paper experimentally elicits unconditional contributions, a contribution vector (cooperative preferences), and beliefs about the level of others’ contributions in variants of the public goods game. We show that existing inconclusive results can be understood and completely explained when controlling for beliefs and underlying cooperative preferences. Robustness checks based on data from around 450 additional independent observations around the world confirm our main empirical results: Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be free riders. Beliefs play an important role in shaping unconditional contributions, and they seem to be more malleable or sensitive to subtle cues for women than for men. |
| Keywords: | Public goods; conditional cooperation; gender; experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0677&r=exp |
| By: | Lingfang Li; Luis Cabral |
| Abstract: | We run a series of controlled field experiments on eBay where buyers are re-warded for providing feedback. Our results provide little support for the hypothesis of buyer's rational economic behavior: the likelihood of feedback barely increases as we increase feedback rebate values; also, the speed of feedback, bid levels and the number of bids are all insensitive to rebate values. By contrast, we find evidence consistent with reciprocal buyer behavior. Lower trans-action quality leads to a higher probability of negative feedback as well as a speeding up of such negative feedback. However, when transaction quality is low (as measured by slow shipping), offering a rebate significantly decreases the likelihood of negative feedback. All in all, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that buyers reciprocate the seller's "good deeds" (feedback rebate, high transaction quality) with more frequent and more favorable feedback. As a result, sellers can "buy" feedback, but such feedback is likely to be biased. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00578&r=exp |
| By: | Peiran Jiao; Amos Nadler |
| Abstract: | Abstract: Financial markets deviate from efficiency due to behavioral causes and there is growing evidence that biological factors affect individual financial decisions that could be reflected in markets. Many behavioral influences on asset prices have underlying biological mechanisms associated with fluctuations in the levels of the male sex hormone testosterone. Testosterone, a chemical messenger especially influential in male physiology, varies cyclically and in response to challenge, fluctuates according to victory and defeat, and is taken as a performance-enhancer among some financial professionals, yet no study has tested how it causally affects trading decisions. We exogenously elevated testosterone in traders in an experimental asset market and found that it causes significantly higher and longer-lasting asset overpricing compared to placebo. Using both aggregated and individual trading data we demonstrate that testosterone administration generates bubbles by causing persistently high bids and slow incorporation of asset fundamental value among traders. |
| Keywords: | Asset price bubbles, Experiment, Testosterone |
| JEL: | G11 G12 C23 C91 C92 D87 |
| Date: | 2016–10–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:806&r=exp |
| By: | Belzil, Christian (Ecole Polytechnique, Paris); Sidibé, Modibo (Duke University) |
| Abstract: | Using a unique field experiment from Canada, we estimate individual preference over risk and time and show considerable heterogeneity in both dimensions and relatively stable distributions across our various specifications, which include hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic discounting as well as subjective failure probability over future payments. We investigate the predictive power (transportability) of the estimated preference parameters when used to explain the take-up decision of higher education grants where financial stakes are approximately seven to fifty times larger than the cash transfers used to elicit preferences. We find that both long-run discount factors and subjective payment failure risk parameters have a high degree of transportability across tasks, while parameters characterizing short-run discount preferences are irrelevant when considering higher-stakes decisions. |
| Keywords: | discounting, risk aversion, time inconsistency, transportability |
| JEL: | C91 D12 D81 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10348&r=exp |
| By: | Thomas Buser (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands); Huaiping Yuan (University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | We conduct three lab experiments and use field data from the Dutch Math Olympiad to study how the gender gap in willingness to compete evolves in response to experience. The main result is that women are more likely than men to stop competing if they lose. In the Dutch Math Olympiad, this means that girls who do not make the top 1000, and therefore do not advance to the next round, are less likely to compete again one year later while there is no effect on boys. In an additional experiment, we show that men are more likely than women to start and keep competing after receiving positive feedback. In a third experiment, we show that the gender difference in the reaction to losing is not present when winning and losing are random rather than the outcome of competition. The fact that women are more likely to give up competing after a setback may help to explain why fewer women make it to the top in business and academia. |
| Keywords: | willingness to compete; gender; feedback; career decisions; laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D03 J01 J16 |
| Date: | 2016–11–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160096&r=exp |
| By: | Lydia Mechtenberg (Faculty of Business Economics and Social Sciences, University of Hamburg); Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | The quality of democratic choice critically depends on voter motivation, i.e. on voters’ willingness to cast an informed vote. If voters are motivated, voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant, delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes. We experimentally study a common interest situation in which we vary voters’ information cost and the competence of the expert. We find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects. |
| Keywords: | voting, experiment, information acquisition, information aggregation |
| JEL: | C91 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2016–09–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1613&r=exp |
| By: | Sheng, Liang |
| Abstract: | When people attempt to recall their pre-feedback estimation of a general knowledge question, they are often biased toward the feedback. This is portrayed as hindsight bias (HB) memory distortion type. The current study is a theory-driven exploratory research that aims to discover the fundamental underlying mechanisms of such bias. Experiment 1 and 2 confirm and verify the appropriate interference task and depletion procedure used for the main experiments. Experiment 3 applies the depletion procedure on the HB memory paradigm and finds a descriptive increasing trend of HB after depletion. Experiment 4 combines the labeling effect (within-subjects manipulation) and depletion procedure on HB and further confirms the result of experiment 3. A single-dissociation pattern of HB magnitude after depletion with different labeling conditions is obtained, indicating a dynamic dual-process mechanism underlying HB, with knowledge-updating behavior and interference resistance action as the two controlled and flexible processes yielding HB. Results of HB are obtained from both traditional inference analyses and the multinomial modeling analyses. Comparisons are discussed demonstrating the superiority of the latter analyzing method applying HB. |
| Keywords: | Hindsight Bias , Depletion , Interference , Knowledge updating |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:39948&r=exp |
| By: | Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Alexander K. Wagner (The Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, University of Vienna) |
| Abstract: | Standard economic reasoning assumes that people vote instrumentally, i.e., that the sole motivation to vote is to influence the outcome of an election. In contrast, voting is expressive if voters derive utility from the very act of expressing support for one of the options by voting for it, and this utility is independent of whether the vote affects the outcome. This paper surveys experimental tests of expressive voting with a particular focus on the low-cost theory of expressive voting. The evidence for the low-cost theory of expressive voting is mixed. |
| Keywords: | Expressive Voting, Experiment, Public Choice, Political Economy |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D72 |
| Date: | 2016–09–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1612&r=exp |
| By: | Sanjit Dhami; Mengxing Wei; Ali al-Nowaihi |
| Abstract: | We consider a public goods game which incorporates guilt-aversion/surprise- seeking and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Khalmetski et al., 2015). We implement the induced beliefs method (Ellingsen et al., 2010) and a within-subjects design using the strategy method. Previous studies mainly use dictator games - whose results may not be robust to adding strategic components. We …nd that guilt-aversion is far more important than surprise-seeking; and that the attribution of intentions behind guilt- aversion/surprise-seeking is important. Our between-subjects analysis confirms the results of the within-subjects design. |
| Keywords: | Public goods games; psychological game theory; surprise-seeking/guilt- aversion; attribution of intentions; induced beliefs method; strategy method; within- subjects design. |
| JEL: | D01 D03 H41 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:16/17&r=exp |
| By: | Sang-Hyun Kim (University of East Anglia); Fernanda L. Lopez de Leon (University of Kent) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of group identity on discrimination by conducting an audit study in electronics markets in Sao Paulo, Brazil during the 2014 Brazil World Cup (WC). To manipulate the visibility of buyers? group membership we made them wear shirts of national football teams, and exploit the outcomes of the WC matches, which arguably affected the salience of sellers?group identity. Although we ?nd that foreigners are overcharged, we do not detect discrimination against buyers wearing a rival team shirt. In contrast, we do detect in-group market favouritism (i.e., lower prices) towards buyers wearing the Brazil shirt when Brazil had won a match in the very recent past. Our analysis rejects the explanation that sellers?behaviour were always motivated by economic pro?ts. Instead, the results indicate taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957) and shed light on the ways in which in-group and out-group biases occur in market outcomes. |
| Keywords: | in-group and out-group discrimination, bargaining in the marketplace |
| JEL: | C93 D71 J15 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2016rwp-100&r=exp |
| By: | McElroy, Todd (Florida Gulf Coast University); Dickinson, David L. (Appalachian State University) |
| Abstract: | In this study we test predictions from Unconscious Thought Theory (UTT) that unconscious thought will lead to better decision making in complex decision tasks relative to conscious thought. Different from prior work testing this prediction, we use a method of manipulating conscious and unconscious thinking that is free from distraction. Specifically, we use a 3-week protocol to experimentally induce adverse sleep and circadian states, both of which should reduce deliberative, conscious thinking and therefore increase the relative importance of more automatic unconscious processes. Our findings fail to support UTT predictions and instead coalesce with other replication attempts that cast doubt on the superiority of unconscious processing in complex decision making. |
| Keywords: | sleep restriction, circadian, complex decisions, decision making, unconscious reasoning, sleep, experiments, behavioral economics |
| JEL: | C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10347&r=exp |
| By: | Luigi Mittone; Fabrizio Panebianco; Alessandro Santoro |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we run a laboratory experiment where the information set is relatively rich, and, in particular, it includes audits on other taxpayers. At the same time, the implementation of the Bayesian updating process for the subjective probability to be audited is fairly simple. By doing so, we are able to elicit a range of consistent but heterogeneous probability beliefs and to distinguish between Bayesian and non-Bayesian subjects. We obtain two major results concerning Bayesian subjects. First, they exhibit strong and robust short-run BoCE. Second, they are seemingly not affected by audits on other taxpayers in their compliance decision. These results are robust to different definitions of Bayesianity and to different specifications. They confl ict with the evidence that Bayesian agents do perceive correctly the chance to be audited. In turn, this suggests that existing explanations of the BoCE are not entirely satisfactory and that alternative theories, possibly based on the Duality approach, are needed. KEYWORDS: Bomb-crater effect, Bayesian Updating, Behavioral Duality. JEL CODES: C91,D81,H26 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:583&r=exp |
| By: | Liu, Tianwei |
| Abstract: | In interactions under strategic complementarity, naive players have a disproportionally large effect on the aggregate outcome, resulting in a nonlinear relationship between the proportion of sophisticated and naive players and the aggregate outcome. This paper studies this relationship in a beauty contest game by informing some players the game theoretic solution and systematically varying the proportion of informed players. The results show that the conditions predicted by strategic complementarity stand empirical test. |
| Keywords: | Beauty contest, Strategic complementarity, Beliefs, Bounded rationality |
| JEL: | C72 D03 D8 |
| Date: | 2016–11–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:75001&r=exp |
| By: | Carmona, Natalia Estrada; Michler, Jeffrey D. |
| Abstract: | Much of the population in rural sub-Saharan African relies of firewood or charcoal to prepare food. Population pressure is speeding the rate of deforestation, raising the monetary and opportunity costs of cooking meals. We use a field experiment in Zambia to investigate the impact of solar cook on the money households spend on charcoal and the time allocated to collecting firewood. Additionally, we examine changes in diet that result from the reduction in the cost of meal preparation. Preliminary results indicate that the provisioning of solar cookers is cost effective (household savings on charcoal over a 12 month period exceed the cost of the stove) and increases dietary diversity by reducing the cost of preparing grain legumes. |
| Keywords: | Deforestation, Dietary Diversity, Field Experiment, Zambia, Environmental Economics and Policy, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, C93, D12, O13, Q10, |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaae16:249342&r=exp |
| By: | De Groote, Hugo; Kariuki, Sarah; Traore, Djibril; Taylor, John R.N.; Mario, Ferruzi; Hamaker, Bruce |
| Abstract: | Cereals are the major staples in most African countries, where food processing industries are emerging fast. New low-cost extruders allow small enterprises to enter the market for processed cereal products, including instant, fortified and flavored mixes. Before engaging in the marketing of these products, consumers’ interest needs to be assessed. This study used a combination of affective tests and experimental auctions with 200 consumers in Touba, Senegal, to evaluate four new products with conventional millet four as control: instant millet flour, instant millet flour with added mango and carrot extract, and the previous product with added micronutrients from either synthetic or natural origin. During affective tests, consumers made little distinction between the five products for appearance, aroma, taste and overall appreciation. The experimental auctions showed that, without providing additional information on the products, there is no difference in WTP between them. However, after that information is provided, consumers are willing to pay a modest premium for instant flour, and a large premium for added mango and carrot extract and for added micronutrients, but not for micronutrients from natural sources. Income increases overall WTP, while education increases WTP for instant flour. We conclude that there is a potential market for instant and fortified millet flour in Touba, but likely in the higher income and education groups. The increased cost needs to be compared to the premiums consumers are willing to pay. In the next step, the new and promising products could be tested in pilot markets, with target consumers. |
| Keywords: | Consumer/Household Economics, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaae16:246973&r=exp |