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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Auerswald, Heike; Schmidt, Carsten; Thum, Marcel; Torsvik, Gaute |
| Abstract: | Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team treatments exhibit a less frequent use of anti-social punishment and lower levels of social as well as anti-social punishment. Extreme preferences for punishment are eliminated by the majority decision rule. Overall, team decisions are closer to the social optimum and teams yield higher net payoffs when compared to individuals. |
| Keywords: | Public Good,Group Decision-Making,Punishment,Experiment,Öffentliche Güter,Entscheidungsverhalten in Gruppen,Bestrafung,Experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tudcep:0216&r=exp |
| By: | Laura Gee; Michael Schreck |
| Abstract: | Charitable giving has been about 2% of US GDP since the turn of the century. A popular fundraising tool is donation matching where every dollar is matched by a third party. But field experiments find that matching does not always increase donations. This may occur because individuals believe that peer donors will exhaust the matching funds. We develop a theory of how beliefs about peers' donations affect one's own likelihood of donation. We test our theory using novel "threshold match" treatments in field and laboratory experiments. These treatments form small groups and offer a flat matching bonus if a threshold number of donations is received. One "threshold match" treatment more than doubles the donation rate in the field relative to no match. To better understand the mechanism behind this huge increase, we use a lab study to replicate the field results and further show that beliefs about peers' donations matter. Our theoretical, lab, and field results combined suggest people are more likely to donate when they believe they are more pivotal to securing matching money. Beliefs about others matter, and they should be taken into account when trying to increase donations. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00538&r=exp |
| By: | Weijia (Daisy) Dai (Lehigh University); Michael Luca (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit) |
| Abstract: | Paid search has become an increasingly common form of advertising, comprising about half of all online advertising expenditures. To shed light on the effectiveness of paid search, we design and analyze a large-scale field experiment on the review platform Yelp.com. The experiment consists of roughly 18,000 restaurants and 24 million advertising exposures - randomly assigning paid search advertising packages to more than 7,000 restaurants for a three-month period, with randomization done at the restaurant level to assess the overall impact of advertisements. We find that advertising increases a restaurant's Yelp page views by 25% on average. Advertising also increases the number of purchase intentions - including getting directions, browsing the restaurant's website, and calling the restaurant - by 18%, 9%, and 13% respectively, and raises the number of reviews by 5%, suggesting that advertising also affects the number of restaurant-goers. All advertising effects drop to zero immediately after the advertising period. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that advertising would produce a positive return on average for restaurants in our sample. |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:17-025&r=exp |
| By: | Luke Condra; Mohammad Isaqzadeh; Sera Linardi |
| Abstract: | Does willingness to aid "others" change when in their physical presence? We argue that studies cueing non-coethnics through names and photos may underestimate discrimination resulting from actual interethnic interaction. In an experiment in Kabul, Afghanistan, Dari-speaking day-laborers contribute their earnings to a hospital under one of three randomly-assigned experimental conditions. In In-group, the hospital is in a Dari-speaking province; in Out-group-Abstract and Out-group-Real, it is in a Pashto-speaking (Pashtun) province. While subjects in In-group and Outgroup- Abstract wait for the experiment with only Dari-speakers present, subjects in Out-group-Real wait among both Dari-speakers and Pashto-speakers. When Pashtuns are absent, the findings accord with other experiments that find little to no out-group discrimination. However, the physical presence of Pashtuns (Out-group-Real) decreases contributions by 25%. Consistent with the threat hypothesis, contributions decrease the longer Dari-speakers wait with Pashtuns, though subjects' youth and ability to speak Pashto mediate this effect. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00546&r=exp |
| By: | Sandra Polania-Reyes |
| Abstract: | Although social capital has been considered of the utmost importance for development it remains a complex and elusive concept. Different dimensions of social capital form part of the puzzle: cooperation is an individual other-regarding preference; social norms stem from beliefs about others' behavior; and the formation of such beliefs is mediated by attributes of the social network. To disentangle social capital we conduct an artefactual field experiment with 714 households at the inset of a Conditional Cash Transfer program in an urban context. To our knowledge this is the first paper that disentangles cooperation from coordination by conducting a minimum effort coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria. Willingness to cooperate is teased out using a public goods game. By controlling for the density of network information we capture the role of connections, which is the third element of the mixture. We also look at the relation between our experimental data and traditional survey measures of social capital. Our identification strategy allows us to assess whether exposure to the program could be helping individuals overcome strategic uncertainty and select the most efficient equilibrium in the coordination game. The regressions suggest that the program helps overcome the coordination failure through different channels. In particular, the evidence suggests there is a spillover effect of the monetary incentive as it facilitates a social norm, which itself allows individuals to overcome the coordination failure. We rule out confounding factors such as individual socio-economic characteristics, social capital accumulation, willingness to cooperate and connectivity. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00565&r=exp |
| By: | Sahni, Navdeep (Stanford University); Zou, Dan (University of Chicago); Chintagunta, Pradeep (University of Chicago) |
| Abstract: | The prevalence and widespread usage of email has given businesses a direct and cost effective way of providing consumers with targeted discount offers. While these discounts are expected to increase the demand for the promoted products, are they effective in increasing revenues? Do they have effects beyond acting as price reductions? We study these questions using individual-level data from 70 randomized experiments run by a large online ticket resale platform. We estimate the redemption rates of the offers and also measure the broader impact of emailed promotions by comparing purchases by individuals who received the experimental promotions with purchases by those who did not receive the offers because of the experimental randomization. We find that the offers cause the average expenditure to increase significantly, by $3.03 (a 37.2% increase) during the promotion window. However, the redemption rate of these offers is low. Importantly, ninety percent of these gains are not through redemption of the offers. The individuals who spent more on the platform in the past are more responsive to the offers; and the effect of the offers is significantly higher among individuals who did not transact on the platform in the year before the offer was given. Interestingly, the promotion causes carryover to the week after the promotion expires; we find that spending increases by $1.55 in the week after the offer expires. Additionally, we find evidence for cross category spillovers to non-promoted products--offers not applicable to a ticket genre cause an increase in spending in that genre. We conclude that emailed offers can serve as a form of "advertising" for the firm's products rather than tools of price discrimination. |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3331&r=exp |
| By: | Elberg, Andres (Universidad Diego Portales); Gardete, Pedro M. (Stanford University); Macera, Rosario (Pontificia Universidad Catolica); Noton, Carlos (University of Chile) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether promotion depth has dynamic effects on subsequent promotion sensitivity. In a large-scale field experiment we vary the promotion depth of top sale products across 17 categories in 12 supermarket stores. During the first half of the experiment we manipulate promotion depth by assigning staggered promotions with 30% and 10% discounts to treated and control stores, respectively. In the second half the staggering scheme assigns an even 10% to all stores. We find that treated customers are 14% more likely to buy promoted items during the second half of the experiment, and that the basket proportion of promoted items bought increases in approximately 21%. This purchase behaviour is consistent with a model of sequential search in which higher discounts alter the beliefs of rational consumers, who favours search over promoted items during the second half. The heightened promotion sensitivity leaves retailers facing a sort of prisoners dilemma: every retailer would be better off in the absence of promotions, deviations, however, are profitable. |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3401&r=exp |
| By: | Sahni, Navdeep S. (Stanford University); Wheeler, S. Christian (Stanford University); Chintagunta, Pradeep (University of Chicago) |
| Abstract: | In collaboration with three companies selling a diverse set of products, we conduct randomized field experiments in which experimentally tailored email messages are sent to millions of individuals. We find consistently that personalizing the emails, while adding no informative content about the product or the company, benefits the advertisers. In our main experiment, we find that adding the name of the message recipient to the email's subject-line increases the probability of the recipient opening it by 20%, which translates to an increase in sales leads by 31% and a reduction in the number of individuals unsubscribing from the email campaign by 17%. We present similar experiments conducted with other companies, which show that the effects we document extend from objectives ranging from acquiring new customers to retaining customers who have purchased from the company in the past. The effects also extend to other content of similar nature. Our investigation of several possible mechanisms suggests that such content increases the attention consumers pay to the other content in the rest of the advertising message. Our paper quantifies the benefits from personalization, and contributes to understanding the role of advertising content. It contributes to the psychology-based research in marketing by establishing the robustness of lab findings in field settings. It has clear implications for the firms that are designing their advertising campaigns. |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3409&r=exp |
| By: | Baron, David P. (Stanford University); Bowen, Renee (Stanford University); Nunnari, Salvatore (Bocconi University) |
| Abstract: | We present a laboratory experiment to study the formation of dynamic coalitions in a bargaining setting where the current status quo policy is determined by the policy implemented in the previous period. Our main experimental treatment is the ability of subjects to negotiate with one another through unrestricted cheap-talk communication before a proposal comes to a vote. We compare committees with no communication, committees where communication is public and messages are observed by all committee members, and committees where communication is private and any committee member can send private messages to any other committee member. We find that the ability to communicate has a significant impact on outcomes and coalitions. When communication is public, committees more frequently agree on outcomes which give a significant fraction of the resources to every member. With private communication, we observe a significant increase in the share of allocations that give a positive amount to a minimal winning coalition. When either type of communication is allowed, dynamic coalitions emerge more frequently and majoritarian coalitions last longer. The content of communication is correlated with outcomes and with the persistence of a dynamic coalition. These findings suggest a coordination role for communication that varies with the mode of communication. |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3380&r=exp |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | For decades, experimental economics has been very interested in behavior that could be characterized as practicing solidarity (although the term is rarely used). Solidarity is a key concept in Catholic Social Teaching. This paper builds a bridge between these two endeavors that, thus far, had little contact with each other. Catholic Social Teaching is essentially normative. People are informed what they should do if they are good Christians. Experimental Economics is descriptive. Experimenters want to learn how much solidarity experimental participants exhibit when this is costly. But from a Catholic perspective it is interesting how strongly their norms are reflected in actual behavior. The many distinctions uncovered by behavioral economics may also help refine Catholic thinking. And behavioral economics is confronted with new questions, in particular regarding deontological motives. |
| Keywords: | Solidarity, Dictator Game, Stealing Game, Public Good Game, Social Preferences, Deontological Motives |
| JEL: | A12 A13 C91 D03 D63 D64 Z12 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2016_14&r=exp |
| By: | Sahni, Navdeep S. (Stanford University); Nair, Harikesh S. (Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | In a large-scale field experiment, we demonstrate that advertising can serve as a signal that enhances consumers' evaluations of advertised goods. We implement the experiment on a mobile search platform that provides listings and reviews for an archetypal experience good, restaurants. In collaboration with the platform, we randomize more than 200,000 consumers into exposure or no exposure of ads for about 600+ local restaurants. In conditions in which consumers are exposed to advertising, we also randomly vary the disclosure to the consumer of whether a restaurant's listing is an ad. This enables us to isolate the effect on outcomes of a consumer knowing that a listing is sponsored--a pure signaling effect. We find that this disclosure alone increases calls to the restaurant by 77%, holding fixed all other attributes of the ad. This effect is higher when the consumer uses the platform away from his typical city of search, when the uncertainly about restaurant quality is larger, and for restaurants that have received fewer ratings in the past. Further, on the supply side, newer, higher rated and more popular restaurants advertise more on the platform. Taken together, we interpret these results as consistent with a signaling equilibrium in which ads serve as implicit signals that enhance the appeal of the advertised restaurants. Both consumers and firms seem to benefit from the signaling. Consumers shift choices systematically towards restaurants that are better rated (at baseline) in the disclosure condition compared to the no disclosure condition, and advertisers gain from the improved conversion induced by disclosure. Further, our results imply that search-platforms would gain from clear sponsorship disclosure, and thus holds implications for platform design. |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3392&r=exp |
| By: | Athey, Susan (Stanford University); Imbens, Guido W. (Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study the problems of estimating heterogeneity in causal effects in experimental or observational studies and conducting inference about the magnitude of the differences in treatment effects across subsets of the population. In applications, our method provides a data-driven approach to determine which subpopulations have large or small treatment effects and to test hypotheses about the differences in these effects. For experiments, our method allows researchers to identify heterogeneity in treatment effects that was not specified in a pre-analysis plan, without concern about invalidating inference due to multiple testing. In most of the literature on supervised machine learning (e.g. regression trees, random forests, LASSO, etc.), the goal is to build a model of the relationship between a unit's attributes and an observed outcome. A prominent role in these methods is played by cross-validation which compares predictions to actual outcomes in test samples, in order to select the level of complexity of the model that provides the best predictive power. Our method is closely related, but it differs in that it is tailored for predicting causal effects of a treatment rather than a unit's outcome. The challenge is that the "ground truth" for a causal effect is not observed for any individual unit: we observe the unit with the treatment, or without the treatment, but not both at the same time. Thus, it is not obvious how to use cross-validation to determine whether a causal effect has been accurately predicted. We propose several novel cross-validation criteria for this problem and demonstrate through simulations the conditions under which they perform better than standard methods for the problem of causal effects. We then apply the method to a large-scale field experiment re-ranking results on a search engine. |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3350&r=exp |
| By: | Baptiste Massenot; Maria Maraki; Christian Thoeni |
| Abstract: | We investigate fee-shifting rules in litigation with regard to their impact on legal compliance, settlement, and litigation spending. We develop a model to compare the English rule, according to which the winning party is compensated by the losing party, to the American rule, according to which parties pay their own expenses independent of the outcome of the trial. We conduct an experiment to put the predictions to an empirical test. In accordance with the model, we find that litigants spend substantially more under the English rule than under the American rule. Defendants are significantly more compliant under the English rule when out-of-court settlement is not possible, but not when settlement is possible. Settlement rates do not significantly differ between the two rules, nor do they differ within the subsets of strong or weak cases. |
| Keywords: | litigation, experiment, American rule, English rule, fee-shifting, loser-pays, legal compliance, settlement, litigation spending |
| JEL: | K13 K41 C91 C72 D44 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:16.19&r=exp |
| By: | Noémi Berlin (University of Edinburgh - School of Economics - University of Edinburgh); Anna Bernard (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Guillaume Fürst (University of Geneva - Department of Psychology and Educational Sciences - University of Geneva [Switzerland]) |
| Abstract: | The stardom system characterizes creative industries: the demand and revenues are concentrated on a few bestselling books, movies or music. In this paper, we study the demand structure between bestsellers and new artists' productions in the music industry. We set up an experiment where participants face real choices situations. We crate three treatments to isolate the effect of information and incentives on diversity. In a first treatment, music is consumed for free without information. In a second one, subjects receive a prior information on others' evaluation of songs to study the effect of word-of-mouth. Finally, in a third one, a real market is introduced and music is bought. Significant evidence shows that word-of-mouth lowers diversity, while price incentives tend to lift it. In both treatments, subjects also react to the information or incentives nature. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics,cultural goods,music industry,Stardom system |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01163907&r=exp |
| By: | Christopher Blattman; Julian Jamison; Margaret Sheridan |
| Abstract: | We show that a number of "non cognitive" skills and preferences, including patience and identity, are malleable in adults, and that investments in them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally-engaged men and randomized half to eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy designed to foster self-regulation, patience, and a noncriminal identity and lifestyle. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash alone and therapy alone initially reduced crime and violence, but effects dissipated over time. When cash followed therapy, crime and violence decreased dramatically for at least a year. We hypothesize that cash reinforced therapy's impacts by prolonging learning-by-doing, lifestyle changes, and self-investment. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00544&r=exp |
| By: | Christopher Blattman; Julian Jamison; Margaret Sheridan |
| Abstract: | We show that a number of "non cognitive" skills and preferences, including patience and identity, are malleable in adults, and that investments in them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally-engaged men and randomized half to eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy designed to foster self-regulation, patience, and a noncriminal identity and lifestyle. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash alone and therapy alone initially reduced crime and violence, but effects dissipated over time. When cash followed therapy, crime and violence decreased dramatically for at least a year. We hypothesize that cash reinforced therapy's impacts by prolonging learning-by-doing, lifestyle changes, and self-investment. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00545&r=exp |
| By: | Farah Said; Giovanna d'Adda; Marcel Fafchamps; Uzma Afzal |
| Abstract: | Theoretical and empirical work on intra-household decision making capture empowerment through bargaining weights given to individual preferences, and infer such weights from household consumption allocations. In this paper we test two key hypotheses underlying this work: first, that spousal influence is the same for all private consumption goods; and second, that women have pent up demand for pure agency. We use data from a survey and a novel laboratory experiment implemented with adult couples in Pakistan. We find that women's influence on household decisions is decreasing in the importance of the decision. We find no evidence that women have pent up demand for agency. Instead, women are less willing to pay for agency when facing an unknown man. We interpret this evidence as suggesting that women in our study population have internalized gender norms, and that these norms regulate interactions between genders most strongly outside of the household. We also find little evidence, within our experimental setting, that willingness to pay for agency is affected by the instrumental value of agency. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00555&r=exp |
| By: | Eszter Czibor; Mirjam van Praag; Randolph Sloof; Sander Onderstal |
| Abstract: | We conduct a framed field experiment in a Dutch university to compare student effort provision and exam performance under the two most prevalent evaluation practices: absolute (criterion-referenced) and relative (norm-referenced) grading. Based on the empirical stylized fact of gender differences in competitiveness we hypothesize that the rank-order tournament created by relative grading will increase male, but not female, performance. Contrary to our expectations, we find no impact of competitive grading on preparation behavior or exam scores among either gender. Our result may be attributed to the low value students in our sample attach to academic excellence. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00548&r=exp |
| By: | Maitra, Pushkar; Mitra, Sandip; Mookherjee, Dilip; Motta, Alberto; Visaria, Sujata |
| Abstract: | Recent evaluations have found that traditional microloans have iinsignificant impacts on incomes and output. Randomly selected villages in West Bengal, India participated in a field experiment with a novel variant of microcredit called TRAIL, where the selection of borrowers of individual liability loans was delegated to local trader-lender agents incentivized by repayment-based commissions. Other randomly selected villages participated in a group-based microcredit program called GBL. TRAIL loans increased the production of the leading cash crop and farm incomes by 27-37%, but GBL loans had insignificant effects. To understand underlying mechanisms, we develop and test a theoretical model that explains borrower selection into the two schemes as well as borrower incentives to invest the loans for productive purposes. We find that borrowers selected by the TRAIL agents were more able farmers than those who self-selected into the GBL scheme; this pattern of selection explains about a third of the observed di fference in income impacts. |
| Keywords: | Agent-based Lending; Agricultural Finance; Group Lending; Repayment; selection |
| JEL: | D82 O16 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11549&r=exp |
| By: | David Ong; Mengxia Zhang |
| Abstract: | A large body of research has attempted to demonstrate that people can exhibit psychological choice averse behavior (CAB) when faced with many choices. However, meta-analyses of these studies (which are of a small number of individual product lines) reveal conflicting results. Findings of CAB with some products lines are balanced by findings of choice loving behavior (CLB) with other products. The mean effect across product lines is zero. We hypothesize that CAB is driven by beliefs of unfamiliar shoppers about the risk of getting an ex-post undesired product. We constructed a measure of sampling risk by surveying 1,440 shoppers for their "likes", "neutrals", "dislikes", and "tried" for 339 varieties across 24 product lines at a large supermarket. We then recorded 35,694 shoppers' pass bys, stops, or purchases after we randomly reduced the varieties they faced on shelves. Again, the mean effect of reduced varieties across product lines was zero. However, we show that both the probability and intensity of CAB/CLB across product lines is predicted by our measure of sampling risk. We show that our findings are consistent with consumers exploiting the averaging effect of repeated gambles in order to maximize the probability of achieving a required rate of success in sampling untried varieties. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00547&r=exp |
| By: | Christian Basteck; Marco Mantovani; ; |
| Abstract: | We take school admission mechanisms to the lab to test whether the widely-used manipulable Boston-mechanism disadvantages students of lower cognitive ability and whether this leads to ability segregation across schools. Results show this is the case: lower ability participants receive lower payoffs and are over-represented at the worst school. Under the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism, payoff differences are reduced, and ability distributions across schools harmonized. Hence, we find support for the argument that a strategy-proof mechanisms “levels the playing-field”. Finally, we document a trade-off between equity and efficiency in that average payoffs are larger under Boston than under Deferred Acceptance. |
| JEL: | C78 C91 D82 I24 |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-037&r=exp |
| By: | Hélène Couprie (THEMA - Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise); Elisabeth Cudeville (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Catherine Sofer (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Most household models assume that decisions taken inside the family are Pareto optimal. However, empirical studies cast doubts upon the efficiency assumption. The sharing of time among men and women between market work and household work is highly differentiated by gender. In this paper we examine whether couples deviate from efficiency in household production decisions, using an experimental design in which subjects are real couples. The aim of the experiment is to mimic the sharing of highly-gendered household tasks. We compare the sharing of gendered tasks to that of more neutral tasks. By measuring individual productivity in each task, we can see if couples tend to deviate from efficiency, and by how much in each case. As we show that they deviate more when sharing gendered tasks, we also explore why, looking at different possible explanations, and we find evidence of the impact of stereotypes on inefficiencies. |
| Abstract: | La plupart des modèles de ménages supposent que les décisions prises à l'intérieur de la famille sont Pareto-optimales. Cependant, les études empiriques mettent en doute l'hypothèse d'efficience. Le partage du temps passé par les hommes et les femmes entre le marché du travail et les tâches domestiques est très différencié selon le sexe. Dans cet article, nous examinons si les couples s'écartent de l'efficience pour les décisions de production, en utilisant un protocole expérimental dont les sujets sont de vrais couples. Le but de l'expérience consiste à mimer le partage de tâches domestiques très genrées. Nous comparons le partage des tâches genrées à celui des tâches plus neutres. En mesurant la productivité individuelle dans chaque tâche, nous pouvons voir si les couples ont tendance à s'écarter de l'efficience et de combien dans chaque cas. Comme nous montrons qu'ils devient plus lorsqu'ils effectuent des tâches genrées, nous nous efforçons d'en trouver des explications, en examinant différentes causes possibles et nous mettons en évidence un impact des stéréotypes sur l'inefficience. |
| Keywords: | social norms,household production,time allocation,experiment,production function,household behavior,intra-household decision-making,stéréotypes,normes sociales,production domestique,allocation du temps,expérience,fonction de production,comportement des ménages,prise de décision dans les ménages |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01162474&r=exp |
| By: | Athey, Susan (Stanford Unviersity); Eckles, Dean (Facebook); Imbens, Guido W. (Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | We study the calculation of exact p-values for a large class of non-sharp null hypotheses about treatment effects in a setting with data from experiments involving members of a single connected network. The class includes null hypotheses that limit the effect of one unit's treatment status on another according to the distance between units; for example, the hypothesis might specify that the treatment status of immediate neighbors has no effect, or that units more than two edges away have no effect. We also consider hypotheses concerning the validity of sparsification of a network (for example based on the strength of ties) and hypotheses restricting heterogeneity in peer effects (so that, for example, only the number or fraction treated among neighboring units matters). Our general approach is to define an artificial experiment, such that the null hypothesis that was not sharp for the original experiment is sharp for the artificial experiment, and such that the randomization analysis for the artificial experiment is validated by the design of the original experiment. |
| JEL: | C14 C21 C52 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3351&r=exp |
| By: | Lorenzo Cerda Planas (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is twofold. Starting from the population dynamics literature, which usually finds the resulting distribution of a trait in a population, according to some parents' preferences, I answer the inverted question: Which preference function would yield into a given trait distribution? I solve this using a continuous trait, instead of finite types of agents. Using this result, I connect this transmission theory of social traits with the well-known results of Dictator Game (DG) experiments. I use a specific definition of a Kantian trait applied to DG results, and determine the distribution of this trait that is commonly found in these experiments. With these two ingredients, I show that homo-œconomicus parents have a greater' dislike' or disutility of having offspring with different traits from them compared to their Kantian counterparts. This could be a result of myopic empathy being stronger in homo-œconomicus parents, driving this dislike of difference. |
| Keywords: | population dynamics,Kantian morale,evolutionary equilibrium |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01163937&r=exp |
| By: | Mitra, Sandip; Mookherjee, Dilip; Torero, Maximo; Visaria, Sujata |
| Abstract: | In the Indian state of West Bengal, potato farmers sell to local middlemen because they lack direct access to wholesale markets. High-frequency marketing surveys reveal large middleman margins and negligible pass-through from wholesale to farmgate prices. Farmers are uninformed about downstream wholesale and retail prices.To test alternative models of farmer-middlemen trades, we conduct a field experiment where farmers in randomly chosen villages are provided with wholesale price information. Information had negligible average effects on farmgate sales and revenues, but increased pass-through from wholesale to farmgate prices. These results are consistent with a model of ex post bargaining between farmers and village middlemen where farmers also have the option of selling to other middlemen outside the village. They are inconsistent with models of risk-sharing contracts between middle-men and farmers, standard oligopolistic models of pass-through or search frictions. |
| Keywords: | cellphones; Middlemen; Pass-Through; price information; supply chains |
| JEL: | L14 O12 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11548&r=exp |
| By: | Amanda Kowalski |
| Abstract: | I examine treatment effect heterogeneity within an experiment to inform external validity. The local average treatment effect (LATE) gives an average treatment effect for compliers. I bound and estimate average treatment effects for always takers and never takers by extending marginal treatment effect methods. I use these methods to separate selection from treatment effect heterogeneity, generalizing the comparison of OLS to LATE. Applying these methods to the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, I find that the treatment effect of insurance on emergency room utilization decreases from always takers to compliers to never takers. Previous utilization explains a large share of the treatment effect heterogeneity. Extrapolations show that other expansions could increase or decrease utilization. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00560&r=exp |
| By: | Christian Basteck; Marco Mantovani; ; |
| Abstract: | Unsophisticated applicants can be at a disadvantage under manipulable and hence strategically demanding school choice mechanisms. Disclosing information on applications in previous admission periods makes it easier to asses the chances of being admitted at a particular school, and hence may level the playing field between applicants who differ in their cognitive ability. We test this conjecture experimentally for the widely used Boston mechanism. Results show that, absent this information, there exist a substantial gap between subjects of higher and lower cognitive ability, resulting in significant differences in payoffs, and ability segregation across schools. The treatment is effective in improving applicants’ strategic performance. However, because both lower and higher ability subjects improve when they have information about past demands, the gap between the two groups shrinks only marginally, and the instrument fails at levelling the playing field. |
| JEL: | C78 C91 D82 I24 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-036&r=exp |
| By: | Björkman Nyqvist, Martina; Corno, Lucia; de Walque, Damien; Svensson, Jakob |
| Abstract: | The need for effective HIV prevention programs, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, remains urgent. We investigate the effect of a financial lottery program in Lesotho with relatively low expected payments but a chance to win a high prize conditional on negative test results for sexually transmitted infections. The intervention resulted in a 21.4% reduction in HIV incidence over two years. Lottery incentives appear to be particularly effective in targeting individuals with ex ante risky sexual behavior, consistent with the hypothesis that lotteries are more valued by individuals willing to take risks. |
| Keywords: | Financial incentives; HIV prevention; lotteries |
| JEL: | I12 I15 O15 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11542&r=exp |
| By: | Daniel Lee; John List; Michael Price; Shachar Kariv |
| Abstract: | We build on previous work in the charitable giving literature by examining not only how much subjects give to charity, but also which charities subjects prefer. We operationalize this choice in an artefactual field experiment with a representative sample of respondents. We then use these data to structurally model motives for giving. The novelty of this design allows us to ask several interesting questions regarding the choices one undertakes when deciding both whether and how much to give to charity. Further, we ask these questions in the context of a standard utility framework. Given the unique set up of this experiment, we also explore how these distributional preference parameters differ by charity choice and from what we have observed in the past. We find that there is more variation within demographics and charity types than across distributions. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00559&r=exp |
| By: | Michael Price; Shagata Mukherjee |
| Abstract: | This study takes a first step to advance our understanding of the strategic interaction between the constituent components of default in microfinance and how to mitigate them. We conduct controlled microfinance field experiments in rural India to provide a systematic analysis of the relationship between gender, group liability and moral hazard. By varying the contract structure across different microfinance games, our experiment decomposes the two moral hazard (ex-ante and ex-post) channels and find that their effect on default are counteractive rather than additive for women clients. The study facilitates heterogeneity analysis of gender on moral hazard across comparable matrilineal and patrilineal societies in two neighboring states of India. We find that matrilineal women are less risk averse and are more likely to invest in the risky project (ex-ante moral hazard) than women in patrilineal societies. Moreover, we find a reversal of gender effect on strategic default (ex-post moral hazard) across the two societies, suggesting the importance of social norms and gender roles on financial behavior. Our results indicate that policymaking in microfinance should be designed by considering the heterogeneity of diverse societies, gender roles, norms and the underlying socio-economic factors that motivate financial behavior among borrowers. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00554&r=exp |
| By: | Casey, Katherine (Stanford University) |
| Abstract: | Individuals draw inferences from thin slices of information--a glance at a photo, a twenty second audio clip--that have been shown to predict real world outcomes of interest in a variety of markets. This paper presents results from a series of lab-in-the-field experiments that elicit these inferences in political labor markets by asking voters to evaluate candidates based on short exposure to photos and video clips. Participants were registered voters in a low income, limited information environment, where ballot photos may be both the first and last visual impression many voters have of candidates. I find that these snap judgments predict election outcomes with accuracy greater than chance, reproducing results from leading studies of American elections in a markedly different empirical context. I then test whether these judgments predict differences in the professional qualifications of candidates and the performance of elected politicians. I find little evidence that snap judgments discriminate along measures of politician productivity. |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3360&r=exp |
| By: | Agranov, Marina; Goeree, Jacob K.; Romero, Julian; Yariv, Leeat |
| Abstract: | We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm - that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on costly participation decisions. We find that voting propensity increases systematically with subjects' predictions of their preferred alternative's advantage. Consequently, pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental welfare effects that extant theoretical work predicts. They lead to more participation by the expected majority and generate more landslide elections. |
| Keywords: | Collective Choice,Polls,Strategic Voting |
| JEL: | C92 D02 D72 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2016206&r=exp |
| By: | Gardete, Pedro M. (Stanford University); Bart, Yakov (Northeastern University) |
| Abstract: | We consider a cheap-talk game in which the persuader is able to collect information about the receiver's preferences in order to tailor communication and induce a favorable action. We find that the sender prefers not to learn the receiver's preferences with certainty, but to remain in a state of partial willful ignorance. The receiver prefers complete privacy except when information is necessary to induce communication from the sender. Surprisingly, joint welfare is always maximized by the sender's first-best level of information acquisition. The implications of our results are discussed in the contexts of online advertising, sales, dating and job search. |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:stabus:3400&r=exp |
| By: | Alberto Cavallo; Guillermo Cruces; Ricardo Perez-Truglia |
| Abstract: | Information frictions play a central role in the formation of household inflation expectations, but there is no consensus about their origins. We address this question with novel evidence from survey experiments. We document two main findings. First, individuals in lower-inflation contexts have significantly weaker priors about the inflation rate. This finding suggests that rational inattention may be an important source of information frictions. Second, cognitive limitations also appear to be a source of information frictions: even when information about inflation statistics is made readily available, individuals still place a significant weight on less accurate sources of information, such as their memories of the price changes of the supermarket products they purchase. We discuss the implications of these findings for macroeconomic models and policy-making. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00542&r=exp |
| By: | Markwardt, Gunther; Seidel, André; Thum, Marcel |
| Abstract: | We have developed a computerized version of Charles Holt’s classical market game that can be used even in classes with a large audience. The Pit market game gives students intuitive access to the interaction of supply and demand in real-world markets. Even though trade can take place at non-uniform prices in the classroom game, the average price and the quantity traded are usually very close to the equilibrium values predicted by supply and demand curves. The classroom game can also be used for a lively discussion about the efficiency of markets or to show the consequences of taxes and regulatory interventions. |
| Keywords: | Pit Market,Market Game,Classroom Game,Economic Education,Supply and Demand,Pit Market,Angebot und Nachfrage,Marktspiel |
| JEL: | A22 C88 D01 D40 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tudcep:0416&r=exp |