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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2016‒08‒07
twenty-one papers chosen by |
| By: | Dalton, Patricio (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Gonzalez Jimenez, Victor (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Noussair, Charles (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | We study whether poverty can induce affective states that decrease productivity. In a controlled laboratory setting, we find that subjects randomly assigned to a treatment, in which they view a video featuring individuals that live in extreme poverty, exhibit lower subsequent productivity compared to subjects assigned to a control treatment. Questionnaire responses, as well as facial recognition software, provide quantitative measures of the affective state evoked by the two treatments. Subjects exposed to images of poverty experience a more negative affective state than those in the control treatment. Further analyses show that individuals in a more positive emotional state exhibit less of a treatment effect. Also, those who exhibit greater attentiveness upon viewing the poverty video are less productive. The results are consistent with the notion that exposure to poverty can induce a psychological state in individuals that adversely affects productivity. |
| Keywords: | poverty; productivity; mood; emotions; limited attention; experiments |
| JEL: | D03 J24 C91 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:fcd7ed5d-22ed-4142-8143-b7533b40044e&r=exp |
| By: | Sutter, Matthias (University of Cologne); Huber, Jürgen (University of Innsbruck); Kirchler, Michael (University of Innsbruck); Stefan, Matthias (University of Innsbruck) |
| Abstract: | Markets are ubiquitous in our daily life and, despite many imperfections, they are a great source of human welfare. Nevertheless, there is a heated recent debate on whether markets erode social responsibility and moral behavior. In fact, competitive pressure on markets may create strong incentives for unethical practices (like using child labor) to increase competitiveness. While markets have been considered as detrimental for moral behavior, it has turned out a challenging task to identify where moral behavior is reflected in a market. Recent work has suggested that falling prices in markets with externalities are an indicator of declining morals. Here we examine the relation between trading volume, prices and moral behavior by presenting an experimental study where we let buyers and sellers interact on a double auction market. In one set of treatments, concluding a trade has no externality; in the other set, there is a negative externality by voiding donations for a potentially life-saving measles vaccine to UNICEF. We find that moral behavior reveals itself in lower trading volume in markets with an externality, but that market prices are hardly different between markets with or without an externality. We also vary the number of buyers and sellers and show that prices depend mainly on the relative number of buyers and sellers, but not on the existence of an externality. Hence, the market forces of supply and demand work equally well in determining prices whether or not trading has an externality. |
| Keywords: | morals, markets, competition, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D03 D62 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10105&r=exp |
| By: | Raphaële Préget (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM3 - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA Montpellier - Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Phu Nguyen Van (UMR Beta - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marc Willinger (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM3 - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA Montpellier - Institut national de la recherche agronomique [Montpellier] - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université de Montpellier) |
| Abstract: | We rely on the methodology of Fischbacher et al. (2001) in order to identify subjects’ behavioral types. We then link the likelihood to act as a leader in a repeated public goods game to the elicited behavioral types. The leader in a group is defined as the subject who voluntarily decides in the first place about his contribution. The leader’s contribution is then reported publicly to the remaining group members who take their contribution decisions simultaneously. Our main findings are that leaders emerge in almost all rounds and that subjects who are identified as conditional cooperators are more likely to act as leaders than other types, e.g. free-riders or triangle-contributors. We also find that voluntary leaders, irrespective of their behavioral type, contribute always more than followers. However the presence of leadership does not prevent the decay that is commonly observed in linear public goods experiments. |
| Keywords: | Voluntary Contribution Mechanism,Leadership,Public Goods,Experimental Economics |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01300195&r=exp |
| By: | Tiziana Medda (University of Cagliari); Vittorio Pelligra (University of Cagliari); Tommaso Reggiani (LUMSA University) |
| Abstract: | One of the most common criticisms about the external validity of lab experiments in economics concerns the representativeness of participants usually considered in these studies. The ever-increasing number of experiments and the prevalent location of research centers in university campuses produced a peculiar category of subjects: Students with high level of laboratory experience built through repeated participations in experimental sessions. We investigate whether the experience accumulated in this way biases subjects’ behaviour in a set of simple games widely used to study social preferences (Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, and Prisoner’s Dilemma Game). Our main finding shows that subjects with a high level of experience in lab experiments do not behave in a significantly different way from novices. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Methodology, External Validity, Experience, Lab Experiment |
| JEL: | D03 D83 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lsa:wpaper:wpc09&r=exp |
| By: | Ismaël Rafaï (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Sébastien Duchêne (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Eric Guerci (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky (Paris School of Economics); Fabien Mathy (Université Côte d'Azur; BCL CNRS) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we will put forward an original experiment to reveal empirical "anomalies" in the process of acquisition, elaboration and retrieval of information in the context of reading. We show that the acquisition and elaboration of information leads to the formation of a mental picture that may be incompatible with the information stored in memory. To answer some specific questions, individuals make use of a mental picture rather than combine their stored information appropriately. Our hypothesis is that quantum cognition theory provides a fruitful interpretative framework to account for these anomalies. Finally, we provide evidence that individuals with a low CRT (Cognitive Reflection Test) score tend to demonstrate, more often than not, this particular behavior. |
| Keywords: | quantum cognition, learning, experimental economics |
| JEL: | C91 C90 D83 C21 |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2016-23&r=exp |
| By: | Andrea Morone (Università degli Studi di Bari, Italy & LEE-Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain); Simone Nuzzo (Dipartimento di Studi Aziendali e Giusprivatistici, Università degli Studi di Bari, Aldo Moro, Italy) |
| Abstract: | We investigate traders’ behaviour in an experimental asset market where uninformed agents cannot be sure about the presence of insiders. In this framework we compare two trading institutions: the continuous double auction and the call market. The purpose of this comparison is to test which of the two trading mechanisms performs better in promoting a convergence towards the efficient equilibrium price. In a framework where the presence of insiders is neither certain nor common knowledge, inspired by Plott and Sunder (1982) and Camerer and Weigelt (1991), we first test whether a discrete time mechanism of trading, like the call market, might be able to prevent the occurrence of information mirages and promote a greater level of efficiency when no inside information is in the market. Second, we also compare the efficiency of the two trading institutions during periods when insiders are present in the market. |
| Keywords: | Experimental; Experimental Markets, Market Efficiency, Information Mirages, Trading Institutions |
| JEL: | C91 D53 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2016/12&r=exp |
| By: | Morone, Andrea; Temerario, Tiziana |
| Abstract: | The recent literature on individual and group choices over risk has led to different results. In some studies under unanimity, groups were found to be less risk averse than individuals, while those under majority did not highlight significant differences. However, both the types of studies impose the decision rule to the group. In the present work we elicited groups’ preference under risk using a consensus rule, i.e. groups are free to solve disagreement endogenously, just as in the real life. Results from our pairwise choices experiment shows that when group members are free to use any rule they want in order to reach unanimity, there is no statistical difference between individuals’ and groups’ risk aversion. |
| Keywords: | Risk; uncertainty; decision-making; group decision; lottery; experimental economics; experiment; |
| JEL: | C92 D81 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:72747&r=exp |
| By: | Chen, Daniel L. |
| Abstract: | Some theories about the positive impact of markets on morality suggest that competition increases empathy, not between competitors, but between them and third parties. However, empathy may be a necessary evolutionary antecedent to guile, which is when someone knows what the other person wants and intentionally deceives him or her, and deception may have evolved as a means of exploiting empathy. This paper examines how individuals primed for empathy behave towards third parties in a simple economic game of deception. It reports the results of a data entry experiment in an online labor market. Individuals enter data randomized to be a prime for empathy, for guile, or a control. Empathy is then measured using a Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test and guile is measured using a simple economic game. Individuals primed for empathy become less deceptive towards third parties. Individuals primed for guile become less likely to perceive that deceiving an individual is unfair in a vignette. These results are robust to a variety of controls and to restricting to workers who entered the prime accurately. These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that empathy causes guile and suggests that empathy may cause those who are making judgements to become less deceptive. |
| Keywords: | Normative Commitments, Other-Regarding Preferences, Empathy, Deception, Guile |
| JEL: | D03 D64 K00 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:30643&r=exp |
| By: | Andreas C. Drichoutis (Agricultural University of Athens); Stathis Klonaris (Agricultural University of Athens); Georgia Papoutsi (Agricultural University of Athens) |
| Abstract: | "We evaluate the claim that bottle size formats signal quality changes, using a controlled laboratory experiment where we simultaneously auctioned two di erent sweet wines: a pomegranate wine and a grape wine. We varied on a between subjects basis the size of the bottle, from 500ml to 750ml, but kept the wine content of the bottle constant across bottle size formats. We also explored in a within subjects design the effect of expectations for the wines, blind tasting and information on willingness to pay. For the grape wine we nd evidence consistent with diminishing marginal utility while for the pomegranate wine we nd a premium for the smaller bottle size which is consistent with changes in perceived scarcity of the wine. We also find that information is adequate in o setting the negative effect from the tasting treatment." |
| Keywords: | second price auction, laboratory experiment, wine, sensory analysis, willingness to pay, bottle size effect. |
| JEL: | C23 C24 C91 D12 M31 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aua:wpaper:2016-2&r=exp |
| By: | Xiaochuan Huang (DT Capital Management Co., Ltd.); Takehito Masuda (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University); Yoshitaka Okano (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Tatsuyoshi Saijo (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally test a two-stage mechanism called the stay-leave mechanism to achieve cooperation in n-plyer prisoner's dilemma situations. Under this mechanism, each cooperator has the chance to revise his choice when players' choices are not unanimous. We say a player is selfish if he eliminates dominated choices in each stage. If all participants of the stay-leave mechanism are selfish, for any value of public good benefit that arises, the unique equilibrium is unanimous cooperation. The average cooperation rate in the stay-leave mechanism experiment averaged 86.6% across 15 periods, with an upward trend, increasing to 96.0% after period 5. By examining earlier period data, we detected that selfish and conditionally cooperative subjects coexist at a proportion of approximately 3:1. Finally, we extended our model to incorporate a mixture of the observed two types and misbeliefs about others' types. Paradoxically, unanimous cooperation is less likely to occur as the number of conditionally cooperative players increase. The model also partially explains the observed upward trend in the cooperation rate in the stay-leave mechanism sessions. |
| Keywords: | social dilemma; experiment; conditional cooperator; behavioral heterogeneity |
| JEL: | C72 C72 D74 H41 P43 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:944&r=exp |
| By: | Chen, Daniel L.; Horton, John |
| Abstract: | In some online labor markets, workers are paid by the task, choose what tasks to work on, and have little or no interaction with their (usually anonymous) buyer/employer. These markets look like true spot markets for tasks rather than markets for employment. Despite appearances, we find via a field experiment that workers act more like parties to an employment contract: workers quickly form wage reference points and react negatively to proposed wage cuts by quitting. However, they can be mollified with “reasonable” justifications for why wages are being cut, highlighting the importance of fairness considerations in their decision making. We find some evidence that “unreasonable” justifications for wage cuts reduce subsequent work quality. We also find that not explicitly presenting the worker with a decision about continuing to work eliminates “quits,” with no apparent reduction in work quality. One interpretation for this finding is that workers have a strong expectation that they are party to a quasi-employment relationship where terms are not changed, and the default behavior is to continue working. |
| Keywords: | Economics of IS; Electronic Commerce; Field Experiments; IT and new organizational form |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:30638&r=exp |
| By: | Johannes Buckenmaier; Eugen Dimant (Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania); Luigi Mittone |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study the effectiveness of a principal witness regulation on tax compliance when tax evasion is nested within a corruption framework. Subjects repeatedly declare taxes in institutional environments with and without a principal witness regulation. Our experimental design allows us not only to compare tax compliance under both regimes, but also to investigate whether a transition from one regime to the other can increase compliance or break up established collusive patterns. The results suggest that tax compliance is higher in the presence of a principal witness regulation when the regime is fixed. However, the transition towards a regime with a principal witness regulation has the opposite effect, i.e. introducing it in later rounds causes a drop in compliance. We provide evidence that the effectiveness of new political measures cannot reliably be judged in isolation, but must be considered in view of the actual institutional history, that is the particular institutional framework in place before the measure is introduced. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Institutions, Principal Witness Regulation, Tax Compliance, Tax Evasion |
| JEL: | D03 D73 D81 H26 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0007&r=exp |
| By: | Sprenger, Julia |
| Abstract: | The current study examines individual decision making in the fi eld of personal finance. How do people arrive at a financial decision? A laboratory experiment investigates the way external information is integrated into the decision making process. The objective is to explore the link between financial literacy and information acquisition behavior. The results show that participants with low financial literacy generally try to compensate for their low decision-specific knowledge with a higher demand for external information but give up this strategy when the information environment is restricted to impersonal information. For female participants, low financial literacy increases demand for advice. These findings reveal that a low knowledge base in finance can translate into low engagement in information search which might further increase the risk of low decision quality. The study links these findings to the debate on consumer empowerment and discusses implications for the financial services industry. |
| Keywords: | financial literacy,information acquisition,decision making,experiment |
| JEL: | C91 G02 D83 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:626&r=exp |
| By: | Belot, Michèle (University of Edinburgh); Kircher, Philipp (University of Edinburgh); Muller, Paul (University of Gothenburg) |
| Abstract: | We develop and evaluate experimentally a novel tool that redesigns the job search process by providing tailored advice at low cost. We invited job seekers to our computer facilities for 12 consecutive weekly sessions to search for real jobs on our web interface. For half, instead of relying on their own search criteria, we use readily available labor market data to display relevant alternative occupations and associated jobs. This significantly broadens the set of jobs they consider and significantly increases their job interviews. Effects are strongest for participants who otherwise search narrowly and have been unemployed for a few months. |
| Keywords: | online job search, occupational broadness, search design |
| JEL: | D83 J62 C93 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10068&r=exp |
| By: | Singh, Prakarsh (Amherst College); Mitra, Sandip (Indian Statistical Institute) |
| Abstract: | We carry out a randomized controlled experiment in West Bengal, India to test three separate performance pay treatments in the public health sector. Performance is judged on improvements in child malnutrition. We exogenously change wages of government employed child care workers through either absolute or relative incentives. We also test for the impact of high and low absolute incentives. Results show that high absolute incentives reduce severe malnutrition by 6.3 percentage points over three months. Result is consistent with a reported increase in protein-rich diet at home in the high absolute treatment. There are no significant effects on health outcomes of other incentive arms. Results remain robust to propensity score matching, reversion- to-mean and a placebo check. |
| Keywords: | performance pay, child malnutrition, absolute and relative incentives |
| JEL: | M52 I12 I38 J38 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10084&r=exp |
| By: | Piergiuseppe Morone (University of Rome & Unitelma Sapienza, Italy); Pasquale Marcello Falcone (University of Ancona, Italy); Enrica Imbert (University of Rome & Unitelma Sapienza, Italy); Marcello Morone (Independent); Andrea Morone (Università degli Studi di Bari, Italy & LEE-Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain) |
| Abstract: | Food security, along with growing population and the associated environmental concerns, make food waste and loss a central topic in economic analysis. While food losses occur mostly at the production, postharvest and processing phases of the supply chain, food waste takes place mainly at the end of the chain and therefore concerns primarily the habits and behaviour patterns of retailers and consumers. Many solutions and practices have been proposed and oftentimes implemented in order to “keep food out of landfills”, thus reducing food waste at the source. However, little attention has been paid to the possible sharing of consumer-side food surplus. In this context, food sharing could represent an effective way to tackle food waste at the consumers’ level, with both environmental and economic potential positive effects. Currently, several initiatives and start-ups are being developed in the US and Europe, involving the collection and use of the excess of food from consumers and retailers and the promotion of collaborative consumption models (e.g. Foodsharing, Growington, Feastly, etc.). Nevertheless, there is still little empirical evidence testing the effectiveness of introducing sharing economy approaches to reduce food waste. This study seeks to fill this gap through a framed field experiment. We run two experimental treatments; in the control treatment students were asked to behave according to their regular food consumption habits, and in the food sharing treatment the same students were instructed to purchase food, cook and consume it collectively. Preliminary results showed that the adoption by households of food sharing practices do not automatically translate into food waste reduction. A number of factors (environmental and economic awareness, domestic skills and collaborative behaviors) might act as ‘enablers’ to make sharing practices effective. |
| Keywords: | Food waste, sharing economy, food sharing, framed field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 L66 Q50 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2016/11&r=exp |
| By: | Gurven, Michael; Hopfensitz, Astrid; Kaplan, Hillard; Stieglitz, Jonathan |
| Abstract: | Two disparate views of the sexual division of labour have dominated the 53 representation of intra-household resource allocations. These joint and separate interests 54 views differ in their interpretation of the relative roles of men and women, and make different 55 predictions about the extent to which marriage promotes economic efficiency (i.e. maximized 56 household production). Using an experimental “distribution task” stipulating a trade-off 57 between household efficiency and spousal equality in allocating surpluses of meat and 58 money, we examine factors influencing spousal distribution preferences among Tsimane 59 forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia (n=53 couples). Our primary goal is to understand whether 60 and how access to perfectly fungible and liquid resources – which increases with greater 61 participation in market economies – shifts intra-household distribution preferences. We 62 hypothesize that greater fungibility of money compared to meat results in greater squandering 63 of money for individual fitness gain at a cost to the family. Money therefore requires costly 64 strategies to insure against a partner’s claims for consumption. Whereas nearly all Tsimane 65 spouses prefer efficient meat distributions, we find a substantially reduced efficiency 66 preference for money compared to meat controlling for potential confounders (adjusted 67 OR=0.087, 95% CI: 0.02-0.38). Reported marital conflict over paternal disinvestment is 68 associated with a nearly 13-fold increase in odds of revealing a selfish money distribution 69 preference. Selfish husbands are significantly more likely than other husbands to be paired 70 with selfish wives. Lastly, Tsimane husbands and wives are more likely than Western 71 Europeans to prefer an efficient money distribution, but Tsimane wives are more likely than 72 Western European wives to exhibit a selfish preference. In sum, preferences for the 73 distribution of household production surplus support joint and separate interests views of 74 marriage; a hybrid approach best explains how ecological-, family-, and individual-level 75 factors influence spousal preferences through their effects on perceptions of marginal gains 76 within and outside the household. |
| Keywords: | Intra-household distribution, sexual division of labour, family, marriage, bargaining, Tsimane |
| JEL: | C90 D13 F |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:30549&r=exp |
| By: | Singh, Prakarsh (Amherst College); Masters, William A. (Tufts University) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides evidence of effectiveness for performance pay among government caregivers to improve child health in India. In a controlled study of 160 daycare centers serving over 4,000 children, we randomly assign individual workers to receive either fixed bonuses or incentive payments based on the weight‐for‐age nutritional status of children in their care, and also collect data from a control group receiving only their standard salary. Mothers of children in all three study arms receive nutrition information. We find that performance pay reduces the prevalence of underweight by about 5 percentage points over 3 months, and height improves by about one centimeter. Impacts are sustained in the medium term when incentives are renewed but fade when they are discontinued. Fixed bonuses lead to smaller effects. Both treatments appear to improve worker effort and communication with mothers, who in turn feed a more calorific diet to their children at home. |
| Keywords: | performance pay, incentives, malnutrition, undernutrition, underweight, child development, child health, Anganwadis, ICDS, nutrition |
| JEL: | O1 I1 M5 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10083&r=exp |
| By: | John Gibson (University of Waikato); David McKenzie (World Bank); Halahingano Rohorua (University of Waikato); Steven Stillman (Free University of Bozen-Bolzano) |
| Abstract: | We study how migration from a poor to a rich country affects key economic beliefs, preference parameters, and transnational household decision-making efficiency. Our setting is the migration of Tongans to New Zealand through a migration lottery program. In a ten-year follow-up survey of individuals applying for this program we elicit risk and time preferences and pro-market beliefs. We also link migrants and potential migrants to a partner household consisting of family members who would stay behind if they moved. We play lab-in-the-field games designed to measure the degree of intra-family trust and the efficiency of intra-family decision-making. Migration provides a large and permanent positive shock to income, a large change in economic institutions, and a reduction in interactions with partner household members. Despite these changes, we find no significant impacts of migration on risk and time preferences, pro-market beliefs, or in the decision-making efficiency of transnational households. This stability in the face of such a large and life-changing event lends credence to economic models of migration that treat these determinants of decision-making as time-invariant, and contrasts with recent evidence on preference changes after negative shocks. |
| Keywords: | Migration, economic beliefs, preferences, household efficiency, transnational household |
| JEL: | O12 F22 D13 D81 P1 |
| Date: | 2016–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:1614&r=exp |
| By: | Robert Garlick; Kate Orkin; Simon Quinn |
| Abstract: | High-frequency data is useful to measure volatility, reduce recall bias, and measure dynamic treatment effects. We conduct the first experimental evaluation of high-frequency phone surveys in a developing country or with microenterprises. We randomly assign microenterprise owners to monthly in-person, weekly inperson, or weekly phone interviews. We find high-frequency phone surveys are useful and accurate. Phone and in-person surveys yield similar measurements, with few large or significant differences in reported outcome means or distributions. Neither interview frequency nor medium affects reported outcomes in a common in-person endline. Phone surveys reduce costs without increasing permanent attrition from the panel. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2016-14&r=exp |
| By: | Nobuyuki Hanaki (Université Côte d'Azur; GREDEG CNRS; Skema Business School; IUF); Alan Kirman (CAMS-EHESS; Aix Marseille University); Paul Pezanis-Christou (School of Economics, University of Adelaide) |
| Abstract: | The literature on learning in unknown environments emphasises reinforcing on actions which produce positive results. But, in some cases, success requires shifting from a currently successful actions to others. We examine, experimentally and theoretically in a very simple framework, how individuals initially learn by exploiting information from the pay-offs of actions taken but also from exploring new actions. We analyse if and how they learn that pay-offs are inter-temporally dependent. We then ran the same experiments but where individuals could observe the actions taken or the pay-offs obtained by others or both. Such observations improved pay-offs if one of the pair had learned to obtain the maximum pay-off. |
| Keywords: | Multi-armed bandit, reinforcement learning, eureka moment, pay-off patterns, observational learning |
| JEL: | D81 D83 |
| Date: | 2016–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2016-24&r=exp |