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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2016‒06‒25
27 papers chosen by |
| By: | Luigi Butera (Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics (BFI), Department of Economics, University of Chicago); Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University) |
| Abstract: | Philanthropy, and particularly ensuring that ones giving is effective, can require substantial time and effort. One way to reduce these costs, and thus encourage greater giving, could be to encourage delegation of giving decisions to better-informed others. At the same time, because it involves a loss of agency, delegating these decisions may produce less warm-glow and thus reduce one’s charitable impulse. Unfortunately, the importance of agency in charitable decisions remains largely unexplored. In this paper, using a laboratory experiment with real donations, we shed light on this issue. Our main finding is that agency, while it does correlate with self-reported warm-glow, nevertheless seems to play a small role in encouraging giving. In particular, people do not reduce donations when giving decisions are made by (costly) algorithms that guarantee efficient recipients. Moreover, we find participating in giving groups a weaker form of delegation is also effective in that they are appealing to donors who would not otherwise make informed donations, and thus improves overall effective giving. Our results suggest that one path to promoting effective giving may be to create institutions that facilitate delegated generosity. |
| Keywords: | Altruism, Laboratory Experiment, Agency, Charitable Giving |
| JEL: | C9 D64 D71 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gms:wpaper:1060&r=exp |
| By: | John List; Steven Levitt; Tova Levin |
| Abstract: | The wealthiest 10% of donors now give 90% of charitable dollars in the U.S., but little is known about what motivates them. This study uses a natural field experiment, tracking over five thousand high capacity donors, to lend preliminary insights into the world of high capacity givers. On some dimensions, high capacity donors mirror modal donors: there is persistence in giving patterns, signals of program quality influence giving, and the price of giving is not unduly important. Unlike typical small donors, the givers in our data respond only on the intensive margin, and often with a longer time lag. Our study highlights the value to practitioners of partnering with academics, as our intervention has generated $30 million in incremental donations to the University. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00409&r=exp |
| By: | Mark Schneider (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Jonathan Leland (National Science Foundation); Nathaniel T. Wilcox (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | In his exposition of subjective expected utility theory, Savage (1954) proposed that the Allais paradox could be reduced if it were recast into a format which made the appeal of the independence axiom of expected utility theory more transparent. Recent studies consistently find support for this prediction. We consider a salience-based choice model which explains this frame-dependence of the Allais paradox and derive the novel prediction that the same type of presentation format which was found to reduce Allais-style violations of expected utility theory will also reduce Ellsberg-style violations of subjective expected utility theory since that format makes the appeal of Savage’s “sure thing principle” more transparent. We design an experiment to test this prediction and find strong support for such frame dependence of ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg-style choices. In particular, we observe markedly less ambiguity-averse behavior in Savage’s matrix format than in a more standard ‘prospect’ format. This finding poses a new challenge for the leading models of ambiguity aversion. |
| Keywords: | Ellsberg paradox; Ambiguity Aversion; Framing Effects; Expected Utility |
| JEL: | C91 D81 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:16-11&r=exp |
| By: | Anagol, Santosh; Balasubramaniam, Vimal; Ramadorai, Tarun |
| Abstract: | Winners of randomly assigned initial public offering (IPO) lottery shares are significantly more likely to hold these shares than lottery losers 1, 6, and even 24 months after the random allocation. This effect persists in samples of wealthy and highly active investors, suggesting along with additional evidence that this type of "endowment effect" is not solely driven by portfolio inertia or wealth effects. The effect decreases as experience in the IPO market increases, but persists even for the most experienced investors. These results suggest that agents'; preferences and/or beliefs about an asset are not independent of ownership, providing field evidence derived from the behavior of 1.5 million Indian stock investors which is in line with the large laboratory literature documenting endowment effects. We evaluate the extent to which prominent models of endowment effects and/or investor behavior can explain our results. A combination of inattention and non-standard preferences (realization utility) or non-standard beliefs (salience based probability distortions) appears most consistent with our findings. |
| Keywords: | causal inference; endowment effect; exchange asymmetry; inattention; India; loss aversion; lotteries; reference dependence; salience |
| JEL: | C93 D12 G11 G14 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11328&r=exp |
| By: | Christian Basteck; Marco Mantovani |
| Abstract: | Unsophisticated applicants can be at a disadvantage under manipulable and hence strategically demanding school choice mechanisms. Disclosing information on applications in previous admission periods makes it easier to assess the chances of being admitted at a particular school, and hence may level the playing field between applicants who differ in their cognitive ability. We test this conjecture experimentally for the widely used Boston mechanism. Results show that, absent this information, there exists a substantial gap between subjects of higher and lower cognitive ability, resulting in significant differences in payoffs, and ability segregation across schools. The treatment is effective in improving applicants. strategic performance. However, because both lower and higher ability subjects improve when they have information about past demands, the gap between the two groups shrinks only marginally, and the instrument fails at levelling the playing field. |
| Keywords: | laboratory experiment, school choice, strategy-proofness, cognitive ability, mechanism design |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2016-065&r=exp |
| By: | Johan Vikström (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Geert Ridder (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University of Southern California); Martin Weidner (Institute for Fiscal Studies and cemmap and UCL) |
| Abstract: | This paper considers identif cation of treatment eff ects on conditional transition probabilities. We show that even under random assignment only the instantaneous average treatment e ffect is point identi fied. Because treated and control units drop out at diff erent rates, randomization only ensures the comparability of treatment and controls at the time of randomization, so that long run average treatment e ffects are not point identifi ed. Instead we derive informative bounds on these average treatment e ffects. Our bounds do not impose (semi)parametric restrictions, as e.g. proportional hazards. We also explore various assumptions such as monotone treatment response, common shocks and positively correlated outcomes that tighten the bounds. |
| Keywords: | Partial identification, duration model, randomized experiment, treatment effect |
| JEL: | C14 C41 |
| Date: | 2016–04–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:cemmap:17/16&r=exp |
| By: | Claudia Keser; Gerrit Kimpel; Andreas Oestreicher |
| Abstract: | In this paper we look into the probability that, given the choice, corporate groups would opt for taxation on a consolidated basis. We further consider what effects separate accounting and taxation on a consolidated basis (formula apportionment) might have on the location of investments and exploitation of remaining leeway for profit shifting. To this end, we present an experimental framework that captures the most relevant aspects of theses decision for EU multinationals. In a controlled laboratory experiment we use a basic 2-by-2 treatment design with two levels of tax-rate differential between two investment locations and two different remuneration functions allowing the participants to act as owners or managers of a company. In addition, we control for the way in which information on possible extra costs associated with profit shifting is presented to participants. Our results show that taxation using formula apportionment, while being a viable alternative, does not emerge as the preferred regime. In both separate accounting and formula apportionment, the allocation of production factors depends on the tax-rate differential. Higher tax rates lead to lower amounts of investment, in particular if formula apportionment (CCCTB) is used. Moreover, profit shifts to companies not eligible for consolidation (i.e., companies not resident in the EU) are significantly higher under formula apportionment than under separate accounting. We do not observe significant differences in the behavior of managers and owners. However, the form in which information is provided on possible extra costs has an impact on the extent of profits shifted to low tax countries. |
| Keywords: | International Company Taxation; Separate Accounting; Formula Apportionment; Transfer Pricing; Experimental Economics, |
| JEL: | C91 H25 M41 |
| Date: | 2016–06–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2016s-29&r=exp |
| By: | Sauter, Philipp; Hermann, Daniel; Musshoff, Oliver |
| Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy, |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aare16:235515&r=exp |
| By: | Astebro , Thomas B; Hoos, Florian |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of a new nationally advertised six-month intensive training program to encourage leadership in social entrepreneurship among youth. Program costs were on the order of 12,000 euros per participant. We conduct a randomized field experiment where 50 applicants were randomly allocated to the program and 50 similar applicants were rejected. Despite large training efforts we find no robust treatment effects on leadership motivation, leadership style, social entrepreneurial aspirations and intentions, skills, sustainable behaviour, entrepreneurial actions and venture progression. Those that had made more progress on their venture prior to the start of the program were more likely to make progress afterwards, irrespective of treatment. There were also large Hawthorne effects. Those having the highest expectations before selection to treatment, as measured by their self-ratings on a battery of scores, experienced the biggest drop across all scores after selection, irrespective of treatment. Training people to become entrepreneurs seems to be difficult and costly. |
| Keywords: | social entrepreneurship; entrepreneurship; field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 L26 |
| Date: | 2016–01–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:1128&r=exp |
| By: | Yola Engler; Rudolf Kerschbamer; Lionel Page |
| Abstract: | For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the correlation between back-transfers and second- order beliefs of the trustor: While reciprocity models predict a negative correlation, guilt-aversion models predict a positive one. This paper tests the hypothesis that the inconclusive results in previous studies investigating the reaction of trustees to their beliefs are due to the fact that reciprocity and guilt-aversion are behaviorally relevant for different subgroups and that their impact cancels out in the aggregate. We find little evidence in support of this hypothesis and conclude that type heterogeneity is unlikely to explain previous results. |
| JEL: | C25 C70 C91 D63 D64 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2016-17&r=exp |
| By: | Bayrak, Oben |
| Abstract: | Although there are alternative models which can explain the Allais paradox with non-standard preferences, they do not take the emerging evidence on preference imprecision into account. The imprecision is so far incorporated into these models by adding a stochastic specification implying the errors that subjects make. However, there is also the inherent part of the preference imprecision which does not diminish with experience provided in repeated experiments and these stochastic specifications cannot explain a significant portion of the observed behavior in experiments. Moreover, evidence on imprecision suggests that subjects exhibit higher imprecision for a lottery with a higher variance. This paper presents a new model for decision under risk which takes into account the findings of the literature. Looking at the indifference curves predicted by the new model, the new model acts like a mixture of Expected Utility Theory and Rank Dependent Utility Theory depending on which part of the probability triangle the lottery is located. |
| Keywords: | Allais Paradox, Independence Axiom, Preference Imprecision, Anomalies, Decision Theory, Decision under Risk and Uncertainty, Alternative Models |
| JEL: | A1 A10 B0 C0 C9 D0 D00 D01 D02 D03 D04 D10 D11 D8 D80 D81 D83 D89 G0 G02 |
| Date: | 2016–05–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:71780&r=exp |
| By: | Drazen, Allan; Ozbay, Erkut |
| Abstract: | We present experimental evidence that policies chosen by leaders depend on whether they were elected or appointed. Consistent with previous studies of the "dictator game" , we find that unitary policymakers do not always act selfishly, that is, choose a policy that maximizes their own payoffs. However, the way in which one became the leader matters. Leaders who are elected are significantly more likely to choose a policy not equal to their "type" than leaders who are appointed. Elected leaders who act non-selfishly will favor the voter rather than the losing candidate, while appointed leaders show no tendency to favor the voter over the losing candidate. Our results provide support for the view that non-selfish behavior of leaders reflects a reciprocity motive. They also show that candidates do not simply implement their own preferences once in office, as suggested by the basic citizen-candidate model. |
| Keywords: | Citizen-Candidate; Dictator Game; leaders; Reciprocity |
| JEL: | C91 D64 D72 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11338&r=exp |
| By: | Grund, Christian (RWTH Aachen University); Harbring, Christine (RWTH Aachen University); Thommes, Kirsten (Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus) |
| Abstract: | We analyze how different previous roles as partners or strangers in public good games affect an individual's subsequent cooperation in a partner setting. We systematically vary a group's composition from all individuals being partner over blended groups of partners and strangers to all individuals being stranger in each round. Our results show that previous group composition does not affect cooperation in the subsequent partner setting with one exception: Groups cooperate significantly less compared to all other settings, when one stranger entered the group. We further analyze this situation in-depth and find that individuals may labor under an ultimate attribution error: They feel that the newcomer is a "bad apple". The cooperativeness towards the newcomer, but also among oldtimers is disturbed in this case. We conduct additional treatments to back up this result and to show how certain information can prevent such an error. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, economic experiments, group composition, public good game, teams |
| JEL: | C9 M5 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9982&r=exp |
| By: | Gregory DeAngelo (West Virginia University, Department of Economics); Hannes Lang (Evolution Institute); Bryan McCannon (West Virginia University, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We explore the relationship between common psychological traits, such as Theory of the Mind, Rational†Experiential Inventory, and Big Five Personality styles, and willingness to contribute to public goods. Then, motivated by research that has indicated a relationship between past social interactions and cooperativeness, we consider the interaction between past game outcomes and psychological traits on free riding. We show that psychological traits of individuals have both a direct effect on free riding behavior, as well as an indirect effect as it enhances the correlation between past strategic behavior and public goods giving. Thus, the measurement tools of social psychology and management can be beneficial in understanding individual†level differences in free riding. |
| Keywords: | Big Five, competence, experiment, free riding, personality traits, psychological traits, public goods, Rational†Experiential Inventory, risk preferences, Theory of Mind |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wvu:wpaper:16-08&r=exp |
| By: | Daniel J. Lee |
| Abstract: | Implicit associations and biases are carried without awareness of conscious direction. In this paper, I develop a model to study giving behaviours under conditions of implicit bias. I test this model by implementing a novel laboratory experiment.a Dictator Game with sorting to study both these giving behaviours, as well as a subject.s willingness to be exposed to a giving environment. In doing so, I adapt the Implicit Association Test (IAT), commonplace in other social sciences, for use in economics experiments. I then compare IAT score to dictator giving and sorting as a necessary test of its validity. I find that the presence of sorting environments identify a reluctance to share and negatively predict giving. However, despite the IAT.s evergrowing popularity, it fails to predict even simple economic behaviours such as dictator giving. These results are indicative that implicit bias fails to overcome selfish interests and thus the IAT lacks external validity. Keywords: Implicit Association Test, implicit bias, race, prosocial behaviour |
| Keywords: | affirmative action, discrimination, decomposition techniques, South Africa |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2016-053&r=exp |
| By: | Roberta De Filippis (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Antonio Guarino (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Philippe Jehiel (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Toru Kitagawa (Institute for Fiscal Studies and cemmap and University College London) |
| Abstract: | We present a novel experimental design to study social learning in the laboratory. Subjects have to predict the value of a good in a sequential order. We elicit each subject’s belief twice: first (“prior belief”), after he observes his predecessors’ action; second (“posterior belief”), after he observes a private signal on the value of the good. We are therefore able to disentangle social learning from learning from a private signal. Our main result is that subjects update on their private signal in an asymmetric way. They weigh the private signal as a Bayesian agent would do when the signal confirms their prior belief; they overweight the signal when it contradicts their prior belief. We show that this way of updating, incompatible with Bayesianism, can be explained by ambiguous beliefs (multiple priors on the predecessor’s rationality) and a generalization of the Maximum Likelihood Updating rule. |
| Keywords: | Social learning |
| Date: | 2016–05–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:cemmap:18/16&r=exp |
| By: | Duffy, Sean; Naddeo, JJ; Owens, David; Smith, John |
| Abstract: | It is well-known that laboratory subjects often do not play mixed strategy equilibrium games according to the equilibrium predictions. In particular, subjects often mix with the incorrect proportions and their actions often exhibit serial correlation. However, little is known about the role of cognition in these observations. We conduct an experiment where subjects play a repeated hide and seek game against a computer opponent programmed to play either a strategy that can be exploited by the subject (a naive strategy) or designed to exploit suboptimal play of the subject (an exploitative strategy). The subjects play with either fewer available cognitive resources (under a high cognitive load) or with more available cognitive resources (under a low cognitive load). While we observe that subjects do not mix in the predicted proportions and their actions exhibit serial correlation, we do not find strong evidence these are related to their available cognitive resources. This suggests that the standard laboratory results on mixed strategies are not associated with the availability of cognitive resources. Surprisingly, we find evidence that subjects under a high load earn more than subjects under a low load. However, we also find that subjects under a low cognitive load exhibit a greater rate of increase in earnings across rounds than subjects under a high load. |
| Keywords: | bounded rationality, experimental economics, working memory load, cognition, learning, mixed strategies |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2016–06–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:71878&r=exp |
| By: | Thomas Buser (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands); Leonie Gerhards (University of Hamburg, Germany); Joël J. van der Weele (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | People typically update their beliefs about their own abilities too little in response to feed-back, a phenomenon known as “conservatism”, and some studies suggest that they overweight good relative to bad signals (“asymmetry”). We measure individual conservatism and asymmetry in three tasks that test different cognitive skills, and study entry into a winner-takes-all competition based on similar skills. We show that individual differences in feedback responsiveness explain an important part of the variation in confidence and competition entry decisions. Conservatism is correlated across tasks and predicts competition entry both by influencing beliefs and independently of beliefs, suggesting it can be considered a personal trait. Subjects tend to be more conservative in tasks that they see as more ego-relevant and women are more conservative than men. Asymmetry is less stable across tasks, but predicts competition entry by increasing self-confidence. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian updating; feedback; confidence; identity; competitive behavior |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D83 |
| Date: | 2016–06–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160043&r=exp |
| By: | Christiane Bradler (ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany); Susanne Neckermann (Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This paper makes use of two field experiments to explore individual effort responses to gifts. We extend the literature by looking at nonfinancial gifts and gifts that combine financial and nonfinancial elements with or without adding a ``personal touch.'' We find that non-pecuniary gifts that signal worker appreciation induce reciprocity. Most importantly, we find that there are interaction effects between money and appreciation. While money and appreciation are individually effective, they only work well together when they are combined with a personal touch. This points to the importance of interpersonal elements in gift giving and has important implications for how to effectively elicit worker effort. |
| Keywords: | gift exchange; reciprocity; personnel economics; gratitude; personal touch; field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 M52 |
| Date: | 2016–06–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160045&r=exp |
| By: | Matteo Ploner; Viola Saredi |
| Abstract: | The study reports on the agency problem embedded in delegated risky decisions, by analyzing discrepancies in risk-taking and decision quality. It also combines delegation with a description-experience comparison. Subjects deciding on behalf of others tend to make inefficient investment decisions: principals are more ambitious, and make fewer and less dominated choices, irrespective of the process of information acquisition. While principals adapt their effort to the complexity of the situation, agents are reluc- tant to collect information to evaluate prospects. Principals predict agents poor performance and are ready to pay a substantial fee to avoid delegation. However, the fee is generally excessive and negatively impacts on final earnings. These results suggest that principals attitudes and negative beliefs on agents may prevent the emergence of delegation relationships. |
| Keywords: | Description-Experience Gap, delegated decision-making, control premium, risk taking; experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D81 D83 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:1606&r=exp |
| By: | Jeffrey A. Flory; Andreas Leibbrandt; John A. List |
| Abstract: | Workplace misbehaviors are often governed by explicit monitoring and strict punishment. Such enforcement activities can serve to lessen worker productivity and harm worker morale. We take a different approach to curbing worker misbehavior—bonuses. Examining more than 6500 donor phone calls across more than 80 workers, we use a natural field experiment to investigate how different wage contracts influence workers’ propensity to cheat and sabotage one another. Our findings show that even though standard relative performance pay contracts, relative to a fixed wage scheme, increase productivity, they have a dark side: they cause considerable cheating and sabotage of co-workers. Yet, even in such environments, by including an unexpected bonus, the employer can substantially curb worker misbehavior. In this manner, our findings reveal how employers can effectively leverage bonuses to eliminate undesired behaviors induced by performance pay contracts. |
| JEL: | C9 C93 J3 J41 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22342&r=exp |
| By: | Pedro Carneiro (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London); Sokbae Lee (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Institute for Fiscal Studies); Daniel Wilhelm (Institute for Fiscal Studies and cemmap and UCL) |
| Abstract: | In a randomized control trial, the precision of an average treatment e ffect estimator can be improved either by collecting data on additional individuals, or by collecting additional covariates that predict the outcome variable. We propose the use of pre-experimental data such as a census, or a household survey, to inform the choice of both the sample size and the covariates to be collected. Our procedure seeks to minimize the resulting average treatment e ect estimator's mean squared error, subject to the researcher's budget constraint. We rely on an orthogonal greedy algorithm that is conceptually simple, easy to implement (even when the number of potential covariates is very large), and does not require any tuning parameters. In two empirical applications, we show that our procedure can lead to substantial gains of up to 58%, either in terms of reductions in data collection costs or in terms of improvements in the precision of the treatment eff ect estimator, respectively. The original version of the working paper, posted on 01 April, 2016, is available here. |
| Keywords: | randomized control trials, big data, data collection, optimal surveydesign, orthogonal greedy algorithm, survey costs. |
| JEL: | C55 C81 |
| Date: | 2016–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:cemmap:15/16&r=exp |
| By: | Ireneaus Wolff |
| Abstract: | Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one-shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-to-omnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria. |
| Keywords: | Public good, social dilemma, Nash-equilibrium, conditional cooperation, social preferences |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0105&r=exp |
| By: | Juan A. Lacomba (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.); Francisco M. Lagos (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.); Ernesto Reuben (Columbia University.); Frans Van Winden (University of Amsterdam.) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study two games of conflict characterized by unequal access to productive resources and finitely repeated interaction. In the Noisy Conflict game, the winner of the conflict is randomly determined depending on a players’ relative conflict expenditures. In the Decisive Conflict game, the winner of the conflict is simply the player who spends more on conflict. By comparing behavior in the two games, we evaluate the effect that “decisiveness” has on the allocation of productive resources to conflict, the resulting inequality in the players’ final wealth, and the likelihood that players from long-lasting peaceful relations.. |
| Keywords: | conflict; decisiveness; inequality; peace; rent seeking |
| JEL: | D72 D74 C92 |
| Date: | 2016–05–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gra:wpaper:16/04&r=exp |
| By: | Hopfensitz, Astrid; Mantilla, Cesar; Miquel-Florensa, Josepa |
| Abstract: | We design and conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to test the effect of a conditional contract on the sustainability of an open access fishery, where unit prices are conditional on aggregate catch. The contract provides collective incentives to decrease extraction but maintain the individual incentives of extraction maximization. We conduct the experiment with two communities of artisanal fishermen differing in their market and technological restrictions. We find that the conditional contract, compared to a fixed price scheme, increases efficiency, the duration of the resource and the total yield. The contract has a greater effect upon groups from the less restricted community. |
| Keywords: | artifactual field experiment, dynamic resource, artisanal fishery, stochastic production function |
| JEL: | C92 Q22 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:30488&r=exp |
| By: | Dorner, Zach; Brent, Daniel A.; Leroux, Anke |
| Abstract: | Risk is an important attribute of goods, whereby the utility derived from that attribute is determined by one's attitude to risk. We develop a novel approach to leverage data on risk attitudes from a fully incentivized risk elicitation task to model intrinsic riskiness of alternatives in a choice experiment. In a door-to-door survey, 981 respondents participated in a discrete choice experiment to elicit pref- erences over alternative sources of municipal water, conditional on water price and quality. Additional source attributes, such as supply risks due to the water source being weather dependent or technology risks are treated as intrinsic as they cannot be plausibly disassociated from the water supply source. The risk task allows the estimation of a coefficient of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) for an indi- vidual, which is incorporated into the preference estimation to test the hypotheses that supply risk and new technology risk are important intrinsic attributes for new water sources. Participants are not given information about supply or technological risks of the sources to avoid framing effects driving the results. Controlling for water quality and cost, we find that supply risk is an important determinant of participants' choices, while respondents are not concerned about technology risk. |
| Keywords: | Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Risk and Uncertainty, |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea16:236644&r=exp |
| By: | Buehren,Niklas; Goldstein,Markus P.; Leonard,Kenneth; Montalvao,Joao; Vasilaky,Kathryn |
| Abstract: | This study looks at how a community event?adolescent women's economic and social empowerment -- and a family factor -- sibling sex composition?interact in shaping gender differences in preferences for competition. To do so, a lab-in-the-field experiment is conducted using competitive games layered over the randomized rollout of a community program that empowered adolescent girls in Uganda. In contrast with the literature, the study finds no gender differences in competitiveness among adolescents, on average. It also finds no evidence of differences in competitiveness between girls in treatment and control communities, on average. However, in line with the literature, in control communities the study finds that boys surrounded by sisters are less competitive. Strikingly, this pattern is reversed in treatment communities, where boys surrounded by (empowered) sisters are more competitive. |
| Keywords: | Anthropology,Gender and Development,Gender and Social Development,Gender and Law,Adolescent Health |
| Date: | 2016–06–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7699&r=exp |