nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2016‒04‒23
23 papers chosen by
Daniel Houser
George Mason University

  1. Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? Some experimental evidence By Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
  2. Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence By Fehr, Dietmar
  3. Skills in the Marketplace: Market Equilibrium, Personality and Ability in a Field-Based Experiment By Fiala, Nathan
  4. Dynamic decision making under ambiguity By Konstantinos Georgalos
  5. Quality competition and hospital mergers: An experiment By Han, Johann; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Vomhof, Markus
  6. Not All Income is the Same to Everyone: Cognitive Ability and the House Money Effect in Public Goods Games By Hackinger, Julian
  7. Facebook-to-Facebook: Online Communication and Economic Cooperation By Anna Lou Abatayo; John Lynham; Katerina Sherstyuk
  8. Network Cognition By Roberta Dessi; Edoardo Gallo; Sanjeev Goyal;
  9. The Effect of Kinship on Intergenerational Cooperation: A Lab Experiment with Three Generations By Molina, José Alberto; Ferrer, Alfredo; Gimenez-Nadal, J. Ignacio; Gracia-Lazaro, Carlos; Moreno, Yamir; Sanchez, Angel
  10. Is there a hidden cost of imposing a minimum contribution level for public good contributions? By Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Persson, Emil; Wang, Xianghong
  11. Market Imitation and Win-Stay Lose-Shift strategies emerge as unintended patterns in market direction guesses By Mario Guti\'errez-Roig; Carlota Segura; Jordi Duch; Josep Perell\'o
  12. Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory By Yutaka Kayaba; Hitoshi Matsushima; Tomohisa Toyama
  13. Reward and punishment in a team contest By Heine F.A.; Strobel M.
  14. What you don't know... Can't hurt you? A field experiment on relative performance feedback in higher education By Azmat, Ghazala; Bagues, Manuel; Cabrales, Antonio; Iriberri, Nagore
  15. Intergenerational Games with Dynamic Externalities and Climate Change Experiments By Ekaterina Sherstyuk; Nori Tarui; Majah-Leah Ravago; Tatsuyoshi Saijo
  16. How does bank capital affect the supply of mortgages? Evidence from a randomized experiment By Valentina Michelangeli; Enrico Sette
  17. The Perception of Dependence and Investment Decisions By Ungeheuer, Michael; Weber, Martin
  18. Collusion with a Greedy Center in Position Auctions By Emmanuel LORENZON
  19. A Glimpse into the World of High Capacity Givers: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign By Tova Levin; Steven D. Levitt; John A. List
  20. Referenda Under Oath By Nicolas Jacquemet; Alexander James; Stéphane Luchini; Jason Shogren
  21. Sustainability of common pool resources: A field-experimental approach By Raja Timilsina; Koji Kotani; Yoshio Kamijo
  22. Using Feedback as a Tool for Household Energy Conservation: An Experimental Approach By Kannika Thampanishvong

  1. By: Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
    Abstract: This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that these markets are fragile. The reasons are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff. We show that this is not because subjects play a different (babbling) equilibrium. By analyzing subjects’ behavior in another game, we find that those adopting deceptive strategies tend to have envious or non-pro-social traits. The poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets.
    Keywords: Experiment, Cheap talk, Auction, Information Acquisition, Information Sale
    JEL: D83 C72 G14
    Date: 2016
  2. By: Fehr, Dietmar
    Abstract: Increasing inequality is commonly associated with social unrest and conflict between social classes. This paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment to study the implications of rising inequality on the tendency to burn others' income. The experiment considers an environment where higher earnings are typically associated with higher effort and varies how fair and transparent this relationship is. The findings indicate that increasing inequality does not per se lead to more money burning. Rather, it depends on whether the increase in inequality can be unequivocally attributed to exerted effort. If subjects can tweak the income-generating process in their favor, money burning is substantially higher. Low-income subjects are more likely to burn others' income and most of the money burning is aimed at subjects with higher incomes.
    Keywords: inequality,money burning,fairness
    JEL: C72 C92
    Date: 2015
  3. By: Fiala, Nathan (University of Connecticut)
    Abstract: Classic economic theory predicts that markets will clear, leaving little or no marginal gains from trade left on the table. Laboratory experiments have largely confirmed this, though the results of recent field experiments have been mixed, with some artefactual markets in developing countries performing relatively inefficiently. I create a multi-round trading market in Uganda in order to explore the efficiency of trading and test if individual traits predict market efficiency and bargaining success. I use a rich dataset on individual characteristics, including indicators on personality, wealth and human capital. I find that measures of personality and human capital of the buyers and sellers predict levels of efficiency within rounds. The personality indicators are less correlated with individual success, though human capital remains important. Finally, rents obtained in the experiment correlate with wealth levels of participants two years later. The results suggest that market prowess can predict some lifetime outcomes and suggest an important role for individual personality in social efficiency outcomes. Future work on market and social efficiency outcomes will need to include an explicit role for individual personality.
    Keywords: Experimental market, market interactions, market efficiency, developing markets, personality, individual ability
    JEL: J24 D14 C91
    Date: 2014–09
  4. By: Konstantinos Georgalos
    Abstract: Neoclassical economic theory assumes that when agents tackle dynamic decisions under ambiguity, preferences are represented by Expected Utility and prior beliefs are updated according to Bayes rule, upon the arrival of partial information. Nevertheless, when one considers non-neutral ambiguity attitudes, either the axiom of dynamic consistency or of consequentialism should be relaxed. We report the results of a new experiment, designed to investigate how people behave in a dynamic choice problem under ambiguity, where decisions are made both before and after the resolution of some uncertainty. We study which of the two rationality axioms people violate, along with the question of whether this violation is part of a conscious planning strategy or not. The combination of the two, allows us to classify subjects to three behavioural types: resolute, naïve and sophisticated. Using data from a portfolio choice experiment where ambiguity is represented in a transparent and non-manipulable way, we cannot reject the hypothesis of Bayesian updating for half of our experimental population. For ambiguity non-neutral subjects, we find that the majority are sophisticated, a few are naïve and few are resolute.
    Keywords: Ambiguity, Subjective Beliefs, Dynamic Consistency, Consequentialism, Portfolio Choice, Experiment
    JEL: C91 D81 D83 D90
    Date: 2016
  5. By: Han, Johann; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Vomhof, Markus
    Abstract: Based on a Salop model with regulated prices, we investigate quality provision behavior of competing hospitals before and after a merger. For this, we use a controlled laboratory experiment where subjects decide on the level of treatment quality as head of a hospital. We find that the post-merger average quality is significantly lower than the average pre-merger quality. However, for merger insiders and outsiders, average quality choices are significantly higher than predicted for pure profit maximizing hospitals. We show that the upward deviation is potentially driven by altruistic behavior towards patients. Furthermore, we fi nd that in case sufficient cost synergies are realized by the merged hospitals, this yields a significant increase in average quality choices compared to the scenario without synergies. Finally, we find that our results do not change when comparing individual to team decisions.
    Abstract: Auf Grundlage eines Salop-Modells mit regulierten Preisen wird in dieser Arbeit das Qualitätssetzungsverhalten konkurrierender Krankenhäuser vor und nach einer Fusion untersucht. Hierfür wird ein kontrolliertes Laborexperiment verwendet, in welchem die Probanden in der Rolle eines Leiters eines Krankenhauses über die Behandlungsqualität entscheiden. Dabei finden wir nach der Fusion einen signifikanten Rückgang in der durchschnittlichen Höhe der bereitgestellten Qualität im Vergleich zur Wettbewerbssituation vor der Fusion. Jedoch setzen die Markakteure nach der Fusion - unabhängig davon, ob sie zu den fusionierten Krankenhäusern gehören oder als allein operierendes Krankenhaus agieren - durchschnittlich eine signifikant höhere Marktqualität als die für profitmaximierende Krankenhäuser vorhersagte. Wir zeigen, dass man diese Abweichung nach oben auf altruistische Motive gegenüber den Patienten zurückführen kann. Des Weiteren finden wir in einem Vergleichsszenario mit hinreichend starken Kostensynergien auf Seiten der fusionierten Krankenhäuser signifikant höhere Qualitäten als im Fall ohne Kostensynergien. Unsere Resultate bleiben auch robust, wenn Gruppenentscheidungen statt Individualentscheidungen betrachtet werden.
    Keywords: hospital mergers,quality competition,altruism,laboratory experiment
    JEL: C91 C92 I11 L13 L44
    Date: 2016
  6. By: Hackinger, Julian
    Abstract: The provision of public goods often suffers from a social dilemma generating too little contributions. Yet, it remains an open question how positive contributions materialise. Existing studies suggest that individuals' decisions on how much to contribute depend on cognitive skills. Furthermore, mental accounting research indicates that the source of income matters for economic decision making. I show experimentally that subjects' contributions in a one-shot linear public goods game depend on an interplay of the two factors. While a house money effect exists for subjects with low cognitive skills there is no such effect for those with high cognitive skills. My findings have important implications for taxation, redistribution, and voting behaviour, as well as past and future experiments.
    Keywords: Public Goods; Experiment; Cognitive Skills; House Money Effect; Mental Accounting; Endowment Source;
    JEL: C91 D03 H41
    Date: 2016–04–19
  7. By: Anna Lou Abatayo (University of Hawaii at Manoa); John Lynham (University of Hawaii at Manoa); Katerina Sherstyuk (University of Hawaii at Manoa)
    Abstract: Communication is often critical for economic cooperation and enhancement of trust. Traditionally, direct face-to-face communication has been found to be more effective than any form of indirect, mediated communication. We study whether this is still the case given that many people routinely use texting and online social media to conduct economic transactions. In out laboratory experiment, groups of participants communicate either (i) face-to-face, (ii) through the most popular online social network – Facebook, or (iii) using text messaging, before participating in a public goods or a trust game. While people talk significantly more under traditional face-to-face, discussion through Facebook and text messages prove as effective as face-to-face communication in enhancing cooperation and increasing trust. For all three media, discussions that focus on the game of use more positive emotion words are correlated with enhanced trust. It appears that young American adults are now just as adept at communicating and reducing social distance online as they are in person.
    Keywords: communication technology; laboratory experiments; public good games; trust games
    JEL: C91 C92 D03 D71
    Date: 2015–09
  8. By: Roberta Dessi; Edoardo Gallo; Sanjeev Goyal;
    Abstract: We study individual ability to memorize and recall information about friendship networks using a combination of experiments and survey-based data. In the experiment subjects are shown a network, in which their location is exogenously assigned, and they are then asked questions about the network after it disappears. We find that subjects exhibit three main cognitive biases: (i) they underestimate the mean degree compared to the actual network; (ii) they overestimate the number of rare degrees; (iii) they underestimate the number of frequent degrees. We then analyse survey data from two `real' friendship networks from a Silicon Valley firm and from a University Research Center. We find, somewhat remarkably, that individuals in these real networks also exhibit these biases. The experiments yield three further: findings: (iv) network cognition is a affected by the subject's location, (v) the accuracy of network cognition varies with the nature of the network, and (vi) network cognition has a significant effect on economic decisions.
    Date: 2014–08–27
  9. By: Molina, José Alberto (University of Zaragoza); Ferrer, Alfredo (University of Zaragoza); Gimenez-Nadal, J. Ignacio (University of Zaragoza); Gracia-Lazaro, Carlos (University of Zaragoza); Moreno, Yamir (University of Zaragoza); Sanchez, Angel (University of Zaragoza)
    Abstract: In this paper, we analyze how kinship among family members affects intergenerational cooperation in a public good game. 165 individuals from 55 families, comprising three generations (youths, parents, and grandparents), play a public good game in three different treatments: one in which three members of the same family play each other (family), a second with the youth and two non-family members but preserving the previous generational structure (intergenerational), and a third in which three randomly-selected players play each other (random). We find that players contribute more to the public good when they play with other family members, than when they play with non-family members. This effect is present in all three generations, and is independent of the gender of the players. We also observe the significant result that older generations contribute more to the public good, relative to their children.
    Keywords: intergenerational cooperation, evolutionary game theory, public goods game, kinship, social networks
    JEL: D03 D64 D70
    Date: 2016–03
  10. By: Kocher, Martin G. (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Martinsson, Peter (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Persson, Emil (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Wang, Xianghong (School of Economics, Renmin University of China)
    Abstract: We examine the effects of either exogenously imposing or endogenously letting subjects choose whether to impose minimum contribution levels (MCLs) in a linear public goods experiment using the strategy method. Our results on contribution levels to the public goods are fairly independent of how MCLs are imposed. We find that the main effect of an MCL on unconditional contributions is that it increases low contribution levels to the MCL imposed, while the effect of those contributing more than the MCL before its introduction depends on the size of the MCL. Unexpectedly, there is much more crowding out for a low MCL than for a relatively high MCL. However, the distribution of contribution types is stable across different MCLs.
    Keywords: Cooperation; China; experiment; minimum level; public good
    JEL: C91 D03 D64
    Date: 2016–04–05
  11. By: Mario Guti\'errez-Roig; Carlota Segura; Jordi Duch; Josep Perell\'o
    Abstract: Decisions taken in our everyday lives are based on a wide variety of information so it is generally very difficult to assess what are the strategies that guide us. Stock market therefore provides a rich environment to study how people take decision since responding to market uncertainty needs a constant update of these strategies. For this purpose, we run a lab-in-the-field experiment where volunteers are given a controlled set of financial information -based on real data from worldwide financial indices- and they are required to guess whether the market price would go up or down in each situation. From the data collected we explore basic statistical traits, behavioural biases and emerging strategies. In particular, we detect unintended patterns of behavior through consistent actions which can be interpreted as {\it Market Imitation} and {\it Win-Stay Lose-Shift} emerging strategies, being {\it Market Imitation} the most dominant one. We also observe that these strategies are affected by external factors: the expert advice, the lack of information or an information overload reinforce the use of these intuitive strategies, while the probability to follow them significantly decreases when subjects spends more time to take a decision. The cohort analysis shows that women and children are more prone to use such strategies although their performance is not undermined. Our results are of interest for better handling clients expectations of trading companies, avoiding behavioural anomalies in financial analysts decisions and improving not only the design of markets but also the trading digital interfaces where information is set down. Strategies and behavioural biases observed can also be translated into new agent based modelling or stochastic price dynamics to better understand financial bubbles or the effects of asymmetric risk perception to price drops.
    Date: 2016–04
  12. By: Yutaka Kayaba (Hitotsubashi University); Hitoshi Matsushima (University of Tokyo); Tomohisa Toyama (Kogakuin University)
    Abstract: We experimentally examine repeated prisoners' dilemma with random termination, where monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of subjects follow generous Tit-For-Tat (g-TFT) strategies, straightforward extensions of Tit-For-Tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the g-TFT equilibria. Contrarily to the theory, subjects tend to retaliate more with high accuracy than with low accuracy. They tend to retaliate more than the theory predicts with high accuracy, while they tend to retaliate lesser with low accuracy. In order to describe these results as unique equilibrium, we demonstrate an alternative theory that incorporates naivete and reciprocity.
    Date: 2016–03
  13. By: Heine F.A.; Strobel M. (GSBE)
    Abstract: A team contest entails both public good situations within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other group members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment One in which two groups compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the team contest. Unlike what experimental studies in isolated public goods games indicate, we find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the group project. Furthermore, comparing treatment groups, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing. This is particularly pronounced for the between-group contest.
    Keywords: Cooperative Games; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles;
    JEL: C92 D01 C71
    Date: 2015
  14. By: Azmat, Ghazala; Bagues, Manuel; Cabrales, Antonio; Iriberri, Nagore
    Abstract: This paper studies the effect of providing feedback to college students on their position in the grade distribution by using a randomized control experiment. This information was updated every six months during a three-year period. In the absence of treatment, students'; underestimate their position in the grade distribution. The treatment significantly improves the students'; self-assessment. We find that treated students experience a significant decrease in their educational performance, as measured by their accumulated GPA and number of exams passed, and a significant improvement in their self-reported satisfaction, as measured by survey responses obtained after information is provided but before students take their exams. Those effects, however, are short lived, as students catch up in subsequent periods. Moreover, the negative effect on performance is driven by those students who underestimate their position in the absence of feedback. Those students who overestimate initially their position, if anything, respond positively.
    Keywords: randomized field experiment; ranking; Relative performance feedback; school performance.
    Date: 2016–03
  15. By: Ekaterina Sherstyuk (University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics); Nori Tarui (University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics); Majah-Leah Ravago (School of Economics, University of the Philippines Diliman); Tatsuyoshi Saijo (Kochi University of Technology)
    Abstract: Dynamic externalities are at the core of many long-term environmental problems, from species preservation to climate change mitigation. We use laboratory experiments to compare welfare outcomes and underlying behavior in games with dynamic externalities under two distinct settings: traditionally studied games with infinitely-lived decision makers, and more realistic intergenerational games. We show that if decision makers change across generations, resolving dynamic externalities becomes more challenging for two distinct reasons. First, decision makers' actions may be short-sighted due to their limited incentives to care about the future generations' welfare. Second, even when the incentives are perfectly aligned across generations, increased strategic uncertainty of the intergenerational setting may lead to an increased inconsistency of own actions and beliefs about the others, making own actions more myopic. Access to history and advice from previous generations may improve dynamic efficiency, but may also facilitate coordination on non-cooperative action paths.
    Keywords: economic experiments; dynamic externalities; intergenerational games; climate change
    Date: 2015–05
  16. By: Valentina Michelangeli; Enrico Sette
    Abstract: We study the effect of bank capital on the supply of mortgages. We fully control for endogenous matching between borrowers, loan contracts, and banks by submitting randomized mortgage applications to the major online mortgage broker in Italy. We find that higher bank capital is associated with a higher likelihood of application acceptance and lower offered interest rates; banks with lower capital reject applications by riskier borrowers and offer lower rates to safer ones. Finally, nonparametric estimates of the probability of acceptance and of the offered rate show that the effect of bank capital is stronger when capital is low.
    Keywords: Mortgages, banks, household finance, randomized experiment
    Date: 2016–04
  17. By: Ungeheuer, Michael; Weber, Martin
    Abstract: We study the perception of dependence between asset returns and its impact on investment decisions. Our findings suggest that, while changes in dependence are not neglected, correlation does not properly capture investors' perception of dependence. In several laboratory experiments we vary dependence between two assets. When dependence is linear, participants understand it and consistently diversify less at higher correlations. However, when we vary non-linear dependence---increasing dependence in extreme returns while decreasing dependence in moderate returns---most participants do not understand dependence in extreme returns. Consequently, they diversify less when dependence in moderate returns increases, even if overall correlation decreases due to less dependence in extreme returns. This finding suggests that investors could improve portfolio selection by taking into account biased beliefs about dependence.
    Keywords: Biased Beliefs; Correlation Neglect; Dependence; Diversification; Investment Decisions; Risk Taking
    JEL: C91 G02 G11
    Date: 2016–03
  18. By: Emmanuel LORENZON
    Abstract: In this paper we aim at studying the sensitivity of the Generalized Second-Price auction to bidder collusion when monetary transfers are allowed. We propose a model of position auction that incorporates third-parties as agents facilitating collusion in complete information. We show that the first-best collusive outcome can be achieved under any Nash condition. Under the locally envy-free criterion, we find that if the collusive gain is uniformly redistributed among members, the best that can be achieved is Vickrey-Clarkes-Groves outcome. Bidders do not have sufficient incentives to reduce even more their expressed demand. We then provide elements upon which an incentive compatible fee can be set by the center. We provide conditions under which bidders can enhance efficient collusion. Doing so we also contribute to the literature on collusion in multiple-objects simultaneous auctions.
    Keywords: Auctions, Online advertising, Position auctions; Bidding ring, Cartel
    JEL: D44 C72 M3 L41
    Date: 2016
  19. By: Tova Levin; Steven D. Levitt; John A. List
    Abstract: The wealthiest 10% of donors now give 90% of charitable dollars in the U.S., but little is known about what motivates them. Using a natural field experiment on over 5,000 high capacity donors, we find persistence in giving patterns, that signals of program quality influence giving, and that the price of giving is not unduly important. Unlike typical small donors, our givers respond only on the intensive margin, and often with a longer time lag. Our study highlights the value to practitioners of partnering with academics, as our intervention has generated $30 million in incremental donations to the University.
    JEL: C93 H4
    Date: 2016–03
  20. By: Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics); Alexander James (University of Oxford [Oxford]); Stéphane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille 3 - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jason Shogren (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - University of Wyoming)
    Abstract: Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.
    Keywords: Dichotomous Choice Mechanism,Hypothetical bias,Oath,Preference revelation
    Date: 2016
  21. By: Raja Timilsina (Kochi University of Technology); Koji Kotani (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Yoshio Kamijo (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology)
    Abstract: Sustainability has become a key issue in managing natural resources together with growing concerns for capitalism, environmental and resource problems. We hypothesize that ongoing modernization of competitive societies, which we call "capitalism," affects human nature and preference in utilizing common pool resources, further endangering the sustainability. To test the hypothesis, this paper designs and implements a dynamic common pool resource game in the two types of Nepalese fields: (i) rural (non capitalistic) and (ii) urban (capitalistic) areas. We find that a proportion of prosocial people in the urban is lower than that in the rural, and urban people deplete resources more quickly than rural people. The composition of proself and prosocial people in a group and the degree of capitalism (rural vs. urban) are crucial in the sense that an increase of prosocial members in a group and the rural dummy positively affect resource sustainability by approximately 65% and by 45%, respectively. Overall, this paper concludes that when societies move toward more capitalistic environments, sustainability of common pool resources tends to be lost through changes in people’s preferences, social norms, customs and assumptions for other people. It implies that people may gradually be losing their coordination abilities for social dilemmas of resource sustainability in capitalistic societies.
    Keywords: sustainability, dynamic common pool resource, capitalism, field experiment
    Date: 2016–04
  22. By: Kannika Thampanishvong (Thailand Development Research Institute)
    Keywords: Household Energy Conservation,Experimental Approach, Thailand
    Date: 2016–03
  23. By: Rakesh Shirsat; Sony Kumari
    Abstract: The present study is assessing the effect yoga of acceptance and mindfulness on adolescence. The participants were divided into two groups – yoga (30) & Control (30). Yoga group has introduced 15 days yoga intervention program. The result has shown no significant changes in yoga group. Though mean value of yoga group has shown slight changes than control group. Key words: acceptance, mindfulness, adolescence
    Date: 2016–03

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