|
on Experimental Economics |
|
Issue of 2016‒03‒23
thirty-one papers chosen by |
| By: | Luz Magdalena Salas |
| Abstract: | I study whether modifications to the framing of a commitment savings product affects savings accumulations and other poverty-linked outcomes for low-income individuals in newly-formed Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) in Colombia. The experiment tests whether behavioral responses vary depending on whether subjects are led to label and create ‘mental savings accounts’ in private versus public ways. Individuals in the private labeling treatment stated accumulation targets and earmarked savings for a particular purpose, but this was shared only privately with a member of the research team. Individuals in the public labeling treatment received the same intervention but publicly revealed and announced their goals to other members of their savings group. The average treatment effect of the public-labeling intervention are very strong and significant. Savings accumulations increased by an average of 35% and savings goals were 8.5% more likely to be reached in comparison to those untreated. Further explorations strongly suggest evidence of differentiated behavioral responses of individuals in the private-labeling treatment group: private commitment to a savings goal is more effective for individuals who, after random assignment but prior to the intervention, were less constrained by extant economic circumstances and institutional barriers. The analysis and interpretation of results was enriched by mixed methods for data collection: households’ survey data, administrative records and qualitative data from focus groups discussions. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics, microfinance, randomized controlled trial, savings, mental accounting, labeling, self-control. |
| JEL: | C93 D03 D14 D91 O16 |
| Date: | 2015–11–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000416:014296&r=exp |
| By: | Zuzana Brokesova (University of Economics in Bratislava); Cary Deck (College of Business and Public Policy University of Alaska Anchorage and Sam M. Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University,); Jana Peliova (Faculty of National Economy, University of Economics in Bratislava) |
| Abstract: | Controlled laboratory experiments have become a generally accepted method for studying economic behavior, but there are two issues that regularly arise with such work. The first pertains to the ability to generalize experimental results outside the laboratory. While laboratory experiments are typically designed to mimic naturally occurring situations, ceteris paribus comparisons are rare. Using data from a promotional campaign by a bank and a matching laboratory experiment, we find similar patterns of risk taking behavior controlling for gender and age. The second issue pertains to the impact that the payment procedure in an experiment has on observed risk taking behavior. Specifically, we compare behavior on a risk taking task where that is the only task and payment is assured, where it is one of several similar tasks of which one will be randomly selected for payment, and where it is the only task but there is only a small probability of receiving payment. We find similar behavior across these three payment procedures. |
| Keywords: | Natural Experiment, Laboratory Experiment, Experimental Methodology, Risk Attitudes |
| JEL: | C91 C99 D81 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:16-06&r=exp |
| By: | Sawada, Yasuyuki; Aida, Takeshi; Griffen, Andrew S; Kozuka, Eiji; Noguchi, Haruko; Todo, Yasuyuki |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate the role of School Management Committees (COGES) in Burkina Faso. These committees include elected members of each community, and are tasked with setting and implementing annual school plans. The study adopted a hybrid evaluation method incorporating a randomized controlled trial and a large-scale artefactual field experiment a la Levitt and List (2007) on public goods with monetary rewards, to closely examine unexplored issues impacting on the sustainability of community-driven projects, and to identify at least partially the mechanisms of this sustainability. We found that the COGES project significantly increased social capital in the form of voluntary contributions to public goods, especially by linking those that people can be connected to vertically. On average, the direct increase in voluntary contributions to public goods from the implementation of the COGES project was between 8.0 and 10.2%. For groups composed of school principals, teachers, and parents, the average contribution increased by between 12.7 and 24.1% through the democratic election of school management committee members, and by between 11.0 and 17.2% through the implementation of the COGES project. These results suggest that community management projects can improve local cost recovery by increasing local contributions of public goods, potentially leading to better fiscal sustainability in community-driven projects. Moreover, the results based on our hybrid experiments are largely in line with real-world decisions observed in the schools under our investigation. As a byproduct, our findings are supportive of models of other-regarding preferences. |
| Keywords: | school-based management , randomized controlled trials , artefactual field experiments , public goods game , social capital , sustainability of development project |
| Date: | 2016–03–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jic:wpaper:192&r=exp |
| By: | Stefano DellaVigna; John A. List; Ulrike Malmendier; Gautam Rao |
| Abstract: | We design a model-based field experiment to estimate the nature and magnitude of workers’ social preferences towards their employers. We hire 446 workers for a one-time task. Within worker, we vary (i) piece rates; (ii) whether the work has payoffs only for the worker, or also for the employer; and (iii) the return to the employer. We then introduce a surprise increase or decrease in pay (‘gifts’) from the employer. We find that workers have substantial baseline social preferences towards their employers, even in the absence of repeated-game incentives. Consistent with models of warm glow or social norms, but not of pure altruism, workers exert substantially more effort when their work is consequential to their employer, but are insensitive to the precise return to the employer. Turning to reciprocity, we find little evidence of a response to unexpected positive (or negative) gifts from the employer. Our structural estimates of the social preferences suggest that, if anything, positive reciprocity in response to monetary ‘gifts’ may be larger than negative reciprocity. We revisit the results of previous field experiments on gift exchange using our model and derive a one-parameter expression for the implied reciprocity in these experiments. |
| JEL: | C93 D64 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22043&r=exp |
| By: | Anouar El Haji (Amsterdam Business School, University of Amsterdam); Michał Krawczyk (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Marta Sylwestrzak (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Ewa Zawojska (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw) |
| Abstract: | Auctions often require risk taking under time pressure. However, little is known about how time pressure moderates the relationship between uncertainty of outcomes and bidding behavior. This study consists of a field experiment in which participants are invited to a Vickrey auction to elicit their willingness to pay for a lottery ticket. The time available to place a bid and also the skewness of the lottery (holding the expected value constant) are systematically manipulated. We find that under high time pressure participants are less likely to place a bid at all. Furthermore, participants who do place a bid under high time pressure bid significantly less than participants under low time pressure. The main finding is thus that increased time pressure significantly decreases risk taking. The effect seems to be particularly strong for the lottery with a high probability of winning and for female subjects. |
| Keywords: | Internet auctions, Vickrey auction, risk taking, time pressure |
| JEL: | C9 D44 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2016-04&r=exp |
| By: | Bolle, Friedel; Spiller, Jörg |
| Abstract: | In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games players contribute or not to the production of a public good which is produced if and only if there are "enough" contributors. There is a plethora of equilibria in BTPG games. We experimentally test general theoretical attributes of equilibria and proposals for equilibrium selection. As theory predicts, if the cost/benefit ratio is the same, then subjects play (almost) the same mixture of strategies and, after switching from a positive to a negative frame, the theoretically expected "mirrored" behavior can be observed, i.e. contrary to most linear Public Good experiments we do not find a framing effect. A finite mixture model successfully (i.e. without rejection in a chi-square test) describes behavior in all eight experimental games (same parameters for four thresholds and positive/negative frame). The Harsanyi-Selten theory of equilibrium selection is moderately supported. Efficiency as an equilibrium selection device and also risk dominance are clearly rejected. |
| Keywords: | Binary Threshold Public Goods,framing,equilibrium selection,payoff dominance,risk dominance,efficiency,experiment |
| JEL: | C72 D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:euvwdp:379&r=exp |
| By: | Hiromasa Takahashi (Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University); Junyi Shen (Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan); Kazuhito Ogawa (Faculty of Sociology and Center for Experimental Economics, Kansai University) |
| Abstract: | We examine gender-specific reference-dependent preferences in a trust game experiment. Different participation fees and one question eliciting subjects' reference points were used to categorize subjects into three frames: the gain frame, gain or loss frame, and loss frame. We find that (i) men are risk-seeking in both the gain and the loss frame; (ii) women are not always more risk-averse than men; and (iii) women display other-regarding preferences only when they are in the gain frame. These results demonstrate the importance of taking account of both gender differences and reference-dependent preferences when examining individuals' economic behavior. |
| Keywords: | Reference-dependent preference, Gender difference, Trust game experiment, Risk preference, Other-regarding preference |
| JEL: | C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2016–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2016-09&r=exp |
| By: | Giovanna d’Adda (Politecnico di Milano); Valerio Capraro (Center for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI)); Massimo Tavoni (Politecnico di Milano, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC)) |
| Abstract: | We examine whether spillovers of pro-social behavior depend on how behavioral changes are induced. We conduct a large experiment using economic games, with a Dictator Game (DG) followed by either an identical game or a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). We influence initial behavior through widely used policy instruments, either behaviorally informed (default, social norms) or with an economic/regulatory rationale (incentives, regulation). Our results provide evidence of positive spillovers to subsequent economic games (which are not treated), but only for the traditional economic/regulatory interventions and within the same game type. Specifically, inducing higher giving in the first stage leads to subsequent higher altruism in the DG, but not to more cooperation in the PD. The carry over of pro-social behavior appears to be driven by an anchoring on the initial donation. We also measure observers’ beliefs and we find that these results are not correctly anticipated by third parties, who systematically overestimate both the direct effect of behaviorally informed interventions on initial donations and their spillover to subsequent donations. |
| Keywords: | Pro-social Behavior, Traditional and Behavioral Policies, Spillover Effects, Online Experiment |
| JEL: | H4 I3 |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2015.108&r=exp |
| By: | Marco Pagnozzi (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF); Krista J. Saral (Webster University Geneva) |
| Abstract: | We analyze how the possibility of resale affects efficiency in multi-object uniform-price auctions with asymmetric bidders using a combination of theory and experiments. Our experimental design consists of four treatments that vary the (exogenous) probability that bidders participate in a post-auction resale market, which is implemented as an unstructured bargaining game between bidders. In all treatments, the possibility of resale increases efficiency after the auction, but it also induces demand reduction by high-value bidders during the auction, which reduces auction efficiency. In contrast to what is usually argued, resale does not necessarily increase final efficiency. When there is a low probability of a resale market, final efficiency is actually lower than in an auction without resale. We also analyze the quantitative and qualitative bargaining chat data to provide additional behavioral insights into the functioning of resale markets. |
| Keywords: | Efficiency, multi-object auctions, resale, asymmetric bidders, bargaining, economic experiments |
| JEL: | D44 C90 |
| Date: | 2016–03–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:432&r=exp |
| By: | Woods, Daniel; Servátka, Maroš |
| Abstract: | This paper studies psychological forward induction and the updating of beliefs in the lost wallet game (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000), which is required to derive a prediction for guilt averse agents. Our experiment tests whether the second movers psychologically induct forward and update their beliefs after observing their paired first movers’ decision by eliciting beliefs with different second mover knowledge of first mover decision, depending on treatment. We find that second movers do update their beliefs conditional on receiving information on the first mover’s action, supporting psychological forward induction. |
| Keywords: | beliefs, experiment, guilt aversion, lost wallet game, psychological forward induction, updating |
| JEL: | C70 C91 |
| Date: | 2016–03–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:69957&r=exp |
| By: | James Andreoni; Michael A. Kuhn; Larry Samuelson |
| Abstract: | We report experimental results for a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma in which the players can choose the allocation of the stakes across the two periods. Our point of departure is the assumption that some (but not all) people are principled to “do the right thing,” or cooperate, as long as their opponent is sufficiently likely to do so. The presence of such types can be exploited to enhance cooperation by structuring the twice-played prisoners’ dilemma to “start small,” so that the second-stage stakes are larger (but not too much larger) than the first-stage stakes. We compare conditions where the allocation of stakes is chosen exogenously to conditions where it is chosen by the players themselves. We show that players are able to find and choose the payoff maximizing strategy of starting small in a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma, and that the salutary payoff effects of doing so are larger than those that arise when the same allocation is exogenously chosen. |
| JEL: | C92 D64 Z13 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21934&r=exp |
| By: | Holger Gerhardt; Guido P. Biele; Hauke R. Heekeren; Harald Uhlig |
| Abstract: | We investigate how stable individuals’ risk attitudes are with respect to changes in cognitive load. In a laboratory experiment using pairwise lottery choice and a within-subject design, we showthat putting subjects under load via a concurrent working-memory task significantly increases their risk aversion. Subjects made significantly faster choices under load. Regardless of load, they responded faster when choosing the less risky option in safe–risky trials, but not in risky–risky trials. We discuss how these findings relate to both dual-system and unitarysystem theories of decision making.We observe that predictions of both recent dual-system and drift–diffusion models of the decision-making process are confirmed by our data and argue for a convergence of these to-date separate strands of the literature. |
| Keywords: | Risk aversion, cognitive load, working memory, dual-system approach, multiplesystem approach, dual-self model, drift–diffusion model, response times |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D81 D87 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-011&r=exp |
| By: | Bolhaar, Jonneke; Ketel, Nadine; van der Klaauw, Bas |
| Abstract: | This paper studies mandatory job-search periods for welfare applicants. During this period the benefits application is put on hold and the applicant is obliged to make job applications. We combine a randomized experiment with detailed administrative data to investigate the effects of imposing a job-search period. We find strong and persistent effects on the probability to collect welfare benefits. The reduced benefits are fully compensated by increased earnings from work. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of adverse consequences for the most vulnerable applicants. Our results therefore suggest that a job-search period is an effective instrument for targeting welfare-benefits applicants. |
| Keywords: | active labor-market policies; job search; randomized experiment; welfare-to-work |
| JEL: | C21 C93 I38 J08 J64 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11165&r=exp |
| By: | Jonneke Bolhaar (VU University Amsterdam, and CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Research, the Netherlands); Nadine Ketel (University of Gothenburg, Sweden); Bas van der Klaauw (VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies mandatory job-search periods for welfare applicants. During this period the benefits application is put on hold and the applicant is obliged to make job applications. We combine a randomized experiment with detailed administrative data to investigate the effects of imposing a job-search period. We find strong and persistent effects on the probability to collect welfare benefits. The reduced benefits are fully compensated by increased earnings from work. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of adverse consequences for the most vulnerable applicants. Our results therefore suggest that a job-search period is an effective instrument for targeting welfare-benefits applicants. |
| Keywords: | job search; welfare-to-work; active labor-market policies; randomized experiment |
| JEL: | C21 C93 I38 J64 J08 |
| Date: | 2016–03–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160013&r=exp |
| By: | Danz, David Nils; Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe |
| Abstract: | We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they make use of this information even if it is less precise than their own private statistics - except for very high stakes. Making public information more precise has two consequences: It is also used when the stakes are very high and it reduces the number of subjects who ignore any information - public and private. That is, precise public information crowds in the use of own information. Finally, our results shed some light on unravelling in centipede games. |
| Keywords: | backward induction,analogy-based expectation equilibrium,learning,experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D83 D84 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2016201&r=exp |
| By: | RyokoSato (Global Asia Institute, National University of Singapore); Yoshito Takasaki (Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | Understanding how and why social interactions matter for people's vaccination behavior is important for disease control. This paper conducts the first causal analysis of peer effects on vaccination in developing countries. We created exogenous variations in peers' vaccination behaviors by randomizing cash incentives for tetanus vaccine take-up among Nigerian women. Vaccine take-up among friends strongly increased women's take-up; having a friend getting vaccinated increases the likelihood that one receives a vaccination by 18.9 percentage points. The peer effects among friends are heterogeneous by one's belief about vaccine safety and access to health clinics in a way that is consistent with whether or not a woman visits a clinic with her friend. This provides evidence for collective action as a mechanism underlying the positive peer effect. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2016cf1002&r=exp |
| By: | McLaughlin, Kevin; Friedman, Daniel |
| Abstract: | A human subject laboratory experiment compares the real-time market performance of the two most popular auction formats for online ad space, Vickrey- Clarke-Groves (VCG) and Generalized Second Price (GSP). Theoretical predictions made in papers by Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007) seem to organize the data well overall. Efficiency under VCG exceeds that under GSP in nearly all treatments. The difference is economically significant in the more competitive parameter configurations and is statistically significant in most treatments. Revenue capture tends to be similar across auction formats in most treatments. |
| Keywords: | Laboratory Experiments,Auction,Online Auctions,Advertising |
| JEL: | C92 D44 L11 L81 M3 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmdn:spii2016501&r=exp |
| By: | John P. Papay; Eric S. Taylor; John H. Tyler; Mary Laski |
| Abstract: | We study on-the-job learning among classroom teachers, especially learning skills from coworkers. Using data from a new field experiment, we document meaningful improvements in teacher job performance when high- and low-performing teachers working at the same school are paired and asked to work together on improving the low-performer’s skills. In particular, pairs are asked to focus on specific skills identified in the low-performer’s prior performance evaluations. In the classrooms of low-performing teachers treated by the intervention, students scored 0.12 standard deviations higher than students in control classrooms. These improvements in teacher performance persisted, and perhaps grew, in the year after treatment. Empirical tests suggest the improvements are likely the result of low-performing teachers learning skills from their partner. |
| JEL: | I2 J24 M53 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21986&r=exp |
| By: | Heinz, Matthias; Schumacher, Heiner |
| Abstract: | We examine what an applicant´s vita signals to potential employers about her willingness to cooperate in teams. Intensive social engagement may credibly reveal that an applicant cares about the well-being of others and therefore is less likely to free-ride in teamwork situations. We find that contributions in a public goods game strongly increase in a subject´s degree of social engagement as indicated on her résumé (and rated by an independent third party). Engagement in other domains, such as student or sports associations, is not positively correlated with contributions. In a prediction experiment with human resource managers from various industries, we find that managers use résumé content effectively to predict relative differences in subjects´ willingness to cooperate. Thus, young professionals signal important behavioral characteristics to potential employers through the choice of their extracurricular activities. |
| Keywords: | signaling,public goods,labor markets,extracurricular activities |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D82 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:120&r=exp |
| By: | Libman, Alexander; Vollan, Björn |
| Abstract: | Anti-Western conspiracies are frequently used by Governments to strengthen their power. We investigate the impact of conspiracy thinking on expectations of collusion among individuals in Russia and China. For this purpose, we conduct a novel laboratory experiment to measure expectations of collusion and several survey items related to conspiracy thinking. Our survey results indicate that anti-Western conspiracy thinking is widespread in both countries and correlates with distrust. We find a significant effect of anti-Western conspiracy thinking in China: Anti-Western conspiracy thinking correlates with lower expectations of collusion. We explain this result by stronger ingroup feeling emanating from the anti-Western sentiment. Our paper provides a first step in analyzing the economic implications of conspiracy thinking for society. |
| Keywords: | conspiracy thinking, Russia, China, trust, collusion experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D83 O17 |
| Date: | 2015–04–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bof:bofitp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201505051167&r=exp |
| By: | Lackner M.; Stracke R.; Sunde U.; Winter-Ebmer R. (ROA) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates empirically whether decision makers are forward looking indynamic strategic interactions. In particular, we test whether decision makers in multistage tournaments take heterogeneity induced changes of continuation values and the ability of their immediate opponent into account when choosing effort. Usingdata from professional and semi-professional basketball tournaments, we find thateffort is negatively affected by the ability of the current opponent, consistent with thetheoretical prediction and previous evidence. More importantly, the results indicatethat the expected relative strength in future interactions does affect behavior in earlier stages, which provides support for the standard view that decision makers are forward looking in dynamic strategic interactions. |
| Keywords: | Expectations; Speculations; Intertemporal Choice and Growth: General; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions; |
| JEL: | D84 D90 M51 J33 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umaror:2015010&r=exp |
| By: | Marcel Fafchamps; Julien Labonne |
| Abstract: | We discuss a method aimed at reducing the risk that spurious results are published. Researchers send their datasets to an independent third party who randomly generates training and testing samples. Researchers perform their analysis on the former and once the paper is accepted for publication the method is applied to the latter and it is those results that are published. Simulations indicate that, under empirically relevant settings, the proposed method significantly reduces type I error and delivers adequate power. The method – that can be combined with pre-analysis plans – reduces the risk that relevant hypotheses are left untested. |
| JEL: | C12 C18 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21842&r=exp |
| By: | Marianne Bertrand; Esther Duflo |
| Abstract: | This article reviews the existing field experimentation literature on the prevalence of discrimination, the consequences of such discrimination, and possible approaches to undermine it. We highlight key gaps in the literature and ripe opportunities for future field work. Section 1 reviews the various experimental methods that have been employed to measure the prevalence of discrimination, most notably audit and correspondence studies; it also describes several other measurement tools commonly used in lab-based work that deserve greater consideration in field research. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature on the costs of being stereotyped or discriminated against, with a focus on self-expectancy effects and self-fulfilling prophecies; section 2 also discusses the thin field-based literature on the consequences of limited diversity in organizations and groups. The final section of the paper, Section 3, reviews the evidence for policies and interventions aimed at weakening discrimination, covering role model and intergroup contact effects, as well as socio-cognitive and technological de-biasing strategies. |
| JEL: | J0 J01 J1 J15 J16 J7 J71 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22014&r=exp |
| By: | Kakar, Venoo; Franco, Julisa; Voelz, Joel; Wu, Julia |
| Abstract: | The surge in Peer to Peer e-commerce has increasingly been characterized by changing the online marketplace to a more personalized environment for the buyer and seller. This personalization involves revealing information on buyer reviews, pictures and biographical information on the sellers to reduce the perceived ``purchase risk" or to facilitate trust with the buyers. However, this personalization has generated possibilities for discrimination in the online marketplace. In this paper, we examine the effect of host information available online (race, gender and sexual orientation etc.) on price listings on Airbnb.com in San Francisco. We find that hispanic hosts and asian hosts, on average, have a 9.6% and 9.3% lower list price relative to their white counterparts, after controlling for neighborhood property values, user reviews and rental unit characteristics. We don't find any significant impact of gender and sexual orientation on price listings. Overall, our findings corroborate the presence of racial discrimination in the online marketplace. |
| Keywords: | Airbnb, Discrimination, Race, Online marketplace |
| JEL: | D40 J71 |
| Date: | 2016–03–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:69974&r=exp |
| By: | Drew Fudenberg; David K Levine |
| Date: | 2016–01–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000001307&r=exp |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ahmed Doghmi (Université de Rabat) |
| Abstract: | The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc, which can be considered as generalisations of well-known single-winner scoring rules. The first comparison is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency which is defined as the conditional probability that a given voting rule picks out the Condorcet committee, given that such a committee exists. The second comparison is based on the likelihood of two paradoxes of committee elections: The Prior Successor Paradox and the Leaving Member Paradox which occur when a member of an elected committee leaves. In doing so, using the well-known Impartial Anonymous Culture condition, we extend the results of Kamwa and Merlin (2015) in two directions. First, our paper is concerned with the probability of the paradoxes no matter the ranking of the leaving candidate. Second, we do not only focus on the occurrence of these paradoxes when one wishes to select a committee of size k = 2 out of m = 4 candidates but we consider more values of k and m. Abstract The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k−Plurality, k−Negative Plurality, k−Borda, and Bloc, which can be considered as generalisations of well-known single-winner scoring rules. The first comparison is based on the Condorcet committee efficiency which is defined as the conditional probability that a given voting rule picks out the Condorcet committee, given that such a committee exists. The second comparison is based on the likelihood of two paradoxes of committee elections: The Prior Successor Paradox and the Leaving Member Paradox which occur when a member of an elected committee leaves. In doing so, using the well-known Impartial Anonymous Culture condition, we extend the results of Kamwa and Merlin (2015) in two directions. First, our paper is concerned with the probability of the paradoxes no matter the ranking of the leaving candidate. Second, we do not only focus on the occurrence of these paradoxes when one wishes to select a committee of size k = 2 out of m = 4 candidates but we consider more values of k and m. |
| Keywords: | Multi-winner voting rules,committee,Condorcet committee efficiency,paradoxes |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01285526&r=exp |
| By: | David Neumark |
| Abstract: | Understanding whether labor market discrimination explains inferior labor market outcomes for many groups has drawn the attention of labor economists for decades – at least since the publication of Gary Becker’s The Economics of Discrimination in 1957. The decades of research on discrimination in labor markets began with a regression-based “decomposition” approach, asking whether raw wage or earnings differences between groups – which might constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination – were in fact attributable to other productivity-related factors. Subsequent research – responding in large part to limitations of the regression-based approach – moved on to other approaches, such as testing direct predictions of the Becker model using data on discriminatory tastes, or using firm-level data to estimate both marginal productivity and wage differentials. In recent years, however, there has been substantial growth in experimental research on labor market discrimination – even though the earliest experiments were done decades ago. Some experimental research on labor market discrimination takes place in the lab. But far more of it is done in the field, which makes this particular area of experimental research unique relative to the explosion of experimental economic research more generally. This paper surveys the full range of experimental literature on labor market discrimination, places it in the context of the broader research literature on labor market discrimination, discusses the experimental literature from many different perspectives (empirical, theoretical, policy, and legal), and reviews what this literature has taught us thus far, and what remains to be done. |
| JEL: | J1 J7 K31 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22022&r=exp |
| By: | Deckers, Thomas; Falk, Armin; Kosse, Fabian; Szech, Nora |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how individual characteristics, institutions, and their interaction influence moral decisions. We validate a moral paradigm focusing on the willingness to accept harming third parties. Consequences of moral decisions are real. We explore how moral behavior varies with individual characteristics and how these characteristics interact with market institutions compared to situations of individual decision-making. Intelligence, female gender, and the existence of siblings positively influence moral decisions, in individual and in market environments. Yet in markets, most personalities tend to follow overall much lower moral standards. Only fluid intelligence specifically counteracts moraleroding effects of markets. |
| Keywords: | homo moralis,moral personality,real moral task,markets and personality,trade and morals |
| JEL: | D02 D03 J10 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2016302&r=exp |
| By: | Carlsson, Fredrik (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University); Kataria, Mitesh (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate a novel approach to reduce measurement error in subjective well-being (SWB) data. Using a between-subject design, half of the subjects are asked to promise to answer the survey questions truthfully in an attempt to make them commit to truth-telling. This allows us to experimentally test whether making a promise affects their responses. We find a statistically significant difference between mean stated well-being between the two groups (with and without a promise, although the effect sizes are rather small). We then investigate to what extent the differences in stated well-being also affect the inference from regressions models on the determinants of SWB. We find important differences in terms of size and statistical significance of the coefficients between the two models, despite the small effect sizes on the dependent stated well-being variable. |
| Keywords: | measurement error; social desirability; subjective well-being; truth-telling |
| JEL: | C90 I30 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0649&r=exp |
| By: | Subir Bose; Daniel Ladley; Xin Li |
| Abstract: | Steroid hormones, such as testosterone, have been shown to affect risk preferences in humans with high levels leading to excessive risk-taking. Hormone levels, in turn, affected by trading outcomes as well as by gender - males are more sensitive to stimuli than females. We investigate the effects of hormones on market behavior and trader performance. An increase in the proportion of female traders does not necessarily make markets less volatile; however, it reduces the occurrence of market crashes. Male traders on average under-perform females, although the best performing individuals are more likely to be male. |
| Keywords: | Hormones, Endogenous risk preference, Market stability, Trader performance |
| JEL: | G10 G02 D02 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:16/01&r=exp |
| By: | ARRONDEL, L.; DEBBICH, M.; SAVIGNAC, F. |
| Abstract: | Financial literacy is a specific component of human capital which allows individuals to deal with fundamental financial issues so as to take adequate financial decisions. This Rue de la Banque presents recent studies about the link between financial literacy and the financial decisions of the population in France. Using an original survey, individuals’ level of financial literacy is assessed. The results suggest that financial literacy varies across the population. It is correlated with education but also with gender, age and political affiliation. This latter point could reflect differences in opinion regarding the role of the welfare state and individual responsibility. Finally, the link between financial literacy and some financial behaviors (the propensity to formulate a specific financial plan in the long run on the one hand and the propensity to own stocks on the other hand) is evaluated: in both cases positive correlations with financial literacy variables are found. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:rueban:2&r=exp |