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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Samek, Anya; Sheremeta, Roman |
| Abstract: | Recognizing donors by revealing their identities is important for increasing charitable giving. We conducted a field experiment to examine how different recognition methods impact giving, and found that all forms of recognition that we examined had a positive impact on increasing donations, whereby recognizing only highest donors (positive recognition) and recognizing only lowest donors (negative recognition) had the most pronounced effect. We argue that selective recognition (both positive and negative) creates tournament-like incentives. Recognizing the highest donors activates the desire to seek a positive prize of prestige, thus increasing the proportion of donors who contribute large amounts. Recognizing the lowest donors activates the desire to avoid a negative prize of shame, thus decreasing the proportion of donors who do not contribute or contribute very little. Therefore, selective recognition is an effective tool that can be used in the field by charities to increase donations. |
| Keywords: | charity donations, recognition, information, experiments |
| JEL: | C93 D64 |
| Date: | 2015–11–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68054&r=exp |
| By: | Baert, Stijn (Ghent University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate risk aversion as a driver of labour market discrimination against homosexual men. We show that more hiring discrimination by more risk-averse employers is consistent with taste-based and statistical discrimination. To test this hypothesis we conduct a scenario experiment in which experimental employers make a hiring decision concerning a heterosexual or homosexual job candidate. In addition, participants are surveyed on their risk aversion and other characteristics that might correlate with this risk aversion. Analysis of the (post-)experimental data confirms our hypothesis. The probability of a beneficial hiring decision for homosexual candidates decreases by 31.7% when employers are a standard deviation more risk-averse. |
| Keywords: | hiring discrimination, statistical discrimination, sexual orientation, scenario experiment, risk aversion |
| JEL: | C91 J15 J71 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9536&r=exp |
| By: | Benson, Alan (University of Minnesota); Sojourner, Aaron J. (University of Minnesota); Umyarov, Akhmed (University of Minnesota) |
| Abstract: | In two experiments, we examine the effects of employer reputation in an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk) in which employers may decline to pay workers while keeping their work product. First, in an audit study of employers by a blinded worker, we find that working only for good employers yields 40% higher wages. Second, in an experiment that varied reputation, we find that good-reputation employers attract work of the same quality but at twice the rate as bad-reputation employers. This is the first clean, field evidence on the value of employer reputation. It can serve as collateral against opportunism in the absence of contract enforcement. |
| Keywords: | labor, personnel, contracts, online labor markets, job search, screening, reputation, online ratings |
| JEL: | L14 M55 J41 J2 L86 D82 K12 K42 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9501&r=exp |
| By: | L. Becchetti; V. Pelligra; S.F. Taurino |
| Abstract: | We measure satisfaction about experimental outcomes, personal and other participants’ behaviour after a multiperiod ‘hybrid contribution’ multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma (the Vote-with-the-Wallet game). Our work shows that participants who cooperated above median (which we define as strong cooperators) are significantly more satisfied with the game in proportion to their cooperative choice, irrespective of the material pay- off they obtain. On the contrary, their satisfaction for the other players’ behavior is negatively correlated with the extent of their own cooperative behavior and the non-cooperative behavior of the latter. The satisfaction of strong cooperators for their behavior in the game depends in turn on the share of their own cooperative choices. We document that a broader utility function including heterogeneity in expectations on other players’ behavior, other-regarding preferences, and a negative reciprocity argument may account for the combination of the behavioral and self-reported data. |
| Keywords: | Subjective Well-Being, social preferences, Vote-with-the-Wallet, lab experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 I31 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201514&r=exp |
| By: | Vardan, Baghdasaryan; Giovanna, Iannantuoni; Valeria, Maggian |
| Abstract: | In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. Minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exac- erbated when fraud is applied. Moreover, turnout increases with moderate level of fraud. However, with more extensive electoral fraud, theoretical predictions are not matched. Voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied. Finally, individual level regression analysis provides evidences of strategic voting. |
| Keywords: | Laboratory experiment, Framing, Voting, Ballot rigging and Voter turnout |
| JEL: | D72 C52 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2015–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:315&r=exp |
| By: | Junyi Shen (Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan); Hiromasa Takahashi (Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University) |
| Abstract: | In this study, we conducted a simple self-control investment experiment to investigate the tangibility effect of paper money and coin. We found that, compared to the non-cash condition, physically holding either paper money or coin made subjects significantly less likely to participate in the investment experiment and those who did participate invested significantly less. In addition, an aversion towards coins in small investments and a gender difference in investment decision were found. |
| Keywords: | Tangibility effect, Paper money, Coin, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2015-41&r=exp |
| By: | Heinz, Matthias; Schumacher, Heiner |
| Abstract: | We examine what an applicant’s vita signals to potential employers about her willingness to cooperate in teams. Intensive social engagement may credibly reveal that an applicant cares about the well-being of others and therefore is less likely to free-ride in teamwork situations. We find that contributions in a public goods game strongly increase in a subject’s degree of social engagement as indicated on her résumé (and rated by an independent third party). Engagement in other domains, such as student or sports associations, is not positively correlated with contributions. In a prediction experiment with human resource managers from various industries, we find that managers use résumé content effectively to predict relative differences in subjects’ willingness to cooperate. Thus, young professionals signal important behavioral characteristics to potential employers through the choice of their extracurricular activities. |
| Keywords: | extracurricular activities; labor market; public good; signaling |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D82 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10942&r=exp |
| By: | Christine L. Exley (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit); Jeffrey K. Naecker (Wesleyan University, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one's future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time-inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants could choose to give up money if they did not follow through with an action. If their commitment choice was made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates. |
| Keywords: | field experiment; commitment; signaling; time inconsistency |
| JEL: | C93 D91 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-064&r=exp |
| By: | Kai Rehwald (Aarhus University [Aarhus] - Aarhus University); Michael Rosholm (Aarhus University [Aarhus] - Aarhus University); Bénédicte Rouland (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - UN - Université de Nantes) |
| Abstract: | Using data from a large-scale randomized controlled trial conducted in Danish job centers, this paper investigates the effects of an intensification of mandatory return-to-work activities on the subsequent labor market outcomes for sick-listed workers. Using variations in local treatment strategies, both between job centers and between randomly assigned treatment and control groups within a given job center, we compare the relative effectiveness of alternative interventions. Our results show that the use of partial sick leave increases the length of time spent in regular employment and non-reliance on benefits, and also reduces the time spent in unemployment. Traditional active labor market programs and the use of paramedical care appear to have no effect at all, or even an adverse effect. |
| Keywords: | Long-term Sickness, Vocational Rehabilitation, Treatment Effects, Randomized Controlled Trial |
| Date: | 2015–11–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01228454&r=exp |
| By: | Banerjee, Debosree; Ibañez, Marcela; Riener, Gerhard; Wollni, Meike |
| Abstract: | Gender equity in the creation and enforcement of social norms is important not only as a normative principle but it can also support long term economic growth. Yet in most societies, coercive power is in the hands of men. We investigate whether this form of segregation is due to gender differences in the willingness to volunteer for take on positions of power. In order to study whether potential differences are innate or driven by social factors, we implement a public goods game with endogenous third-party punishment in matrilineal and patriarchal societies in India. Our findings indicate that segregation in coercive roles is due to conformity with pre-assigned gender roles in both cultures. We find that women in the matrilineal society are more willing to assume the role of norm enforcer than men while the opposite is true in the patriarchal society. Moreover, we find that changes in the institutional environment that are associated with a decrease in the exposure and retaliation against the norm enforcer, result in increased participation of the segregated gender. Our results suggest that the organizational environment can be adjusted to increase the representation of women in positions of power, and that it is critical to take the cultural context into account. |
| Keywords: | Gender,Norm enforcement,Segregation,Third party punisher,Public goods game |
| JEL: | C90 C92 C93 C92 D03 D70 D81 J16 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:204&r=exp |
| By: | Nobuyuki Hanaki (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS); Nicolas Jacquemet (BETA - Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée - CNRS - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics); Stéphane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille 3 - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille 2 - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université); Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines) |
| Abstract: | How is one's cognitive ability related to the way one responds to strategic uncertainty? We address this question by conducting a set of experiments in simple 2 x 2 dominance solvable coordination games. Our experiments involve two main treatments: one in which two human subjects interact, and another in which one human subject interacts with a computer program whose behavior is known. By making the behavior of the computer perfectly predictable, the latter treatment eliminates strategic uncertainty. We find that subjects with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty than those with lower cognitive ability. |
| Keywords: | Strategic Uncertainty, Bounded Rationality, Robot, Experiment |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01229612&r=exp |
| By: | Maltz, Amnon (Department of Economics, University of Haifa); Romagnoli, Giorgia (New York University) |
| Abstract: | We conduct an experiment to determine the effect of ambiguity on status quo bias. We find no evidence of the bias in the absence of ambiguity and when ambiguity is present both in the status quo option and the alternative. We do find evidence for status quo bias under asymmetric presence of ambiguity, i.e. when the status quo option is non-ambiguous and the alternative is, or when the status quo option is ambiguous and the alternative is not. These findings are not predicted by the existing models of choice with initial endowment, such as the loss aversion model by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the incomplete preferences model by Bewley (1986). Our results, combined with the evidence from the endowment effect literature, suggest that dissimilarity between options may be an important determinant of the status quo bias. |
| Keywords: | Status Quo Bias, Risk, Ambiguity, Reference Effects. |
| JEL: | C91 D11 D81 |
| Date: | 2015–10–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201505&r=exp |
| By: | Dmitry Ryvkin (Department of Economics, Florida State University); Anastasia Semykina (Department of Economics, Florida State University) |
| Abstract: | Many empirical studies investigate the relationships between economic development, inequality, and democracy survival; however, establishing causal links with naturally occurring cross-country data is problematic. We address this question in a laboratory experiment, where in democracy citizens can invest in profitable projects and vote on income taxation. In the alternative regime -- autocracy -- efficient investment levels and equitable redistribution are implemented exogenously, but there is a risk of resources being partially expropriated. Citizens can voluntarily switch from democracy to autocracy by a majority vote, which mimics recent historical examples, where voters voluntarily delegate political powers to an autocrat in exchange for a promise of high taxation and redistribution. We find that the likelihood of democracy breakdown increases with the degree of inequality but does not vary with productivity. The link between productivity and democracy survival depends critically on the degree of sophistication of the median voter. |
| Keywords: | democracy breakdown, economic productivity, inequality, voting, experiment |
| JEL: | D72 P48 C92 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2015_11_01&r=exp |
| By: | Christine L. Exley (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit) |
| Abstract: | Do monetary incentives encourage volunteering? Or, do they introduce a "greedy" signal and hence crowd out the motivation to volunteer? Since the strength of this greedy signal is normally unobserved, the answer is theoretically unclear, and corresponding empirical evidence is mixed. I overcome this ambiguity by examining individuals for whom the greedy signal strength is likely weak - those with public reputations about their past volunteer behavior. In a laboratory experiment, I show that crowd out in response to public incentives is much less likely among those with public, as opposed to private, reputations. |
| Keywords: | incentives; image motivation; volunteer; prosocial behavior; altruism; gender |
| JEL: | C91 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-063&r=exp |
| By: | Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Kujal, Praveen; Lenkei, Balint |
| Abstract: | We report the results of a meta-study of 118 Cognitive Reflection Test studies comprising of 44,558 participants across 21 countries. There is a negative correlation between being female and the overall,and individual, correct answers to CRT questions. Taking the test at the end of an experiment negatively impacts performance. Monetary incentives do not impact performance. Overall students perform better compared to non-student samples. Exposure to CRT over the years may impact outcomes, however, the effect is driven by online studies. We obtain mixed evidence on whether the sequence of questions matters. Finally, we find that computerized tests marginally improve results. |
| Keywords: | CRT, Experiments, Gender, Incentives, Glucose and Cognition. |
| JEL: | Z00 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68049&r=exp |
| By: | Wagner, Valentin; Riener, Gerhard |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the result of a field experiment on the effectiveness of non-monetary incentives on pupils' achievement on a mathematical multiple choice test. Our sample consists of 2113 pupils of deprived and high-achieving secondary schools in Germany. Based on a pre-study, we compare the effectiveness of (i) a medal (ii) a letter of praise to the parents and (iii) a delegation of choice over incentives. The effect of non-monetary incentives depends on pupils' socio-economic background. While they constitute a potentially cost-effective and easily implementable method of motivation in Non-High Schools, predetermined non-monetary incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation for pupils in High Schools. In contrast, the endogenous choice of the reward increases pupils' willingness to prepare for the test and mitigates the negative effect of predetermined external rewards in High Schools. Additionally, in the delegation treatment, we find that low-achieving pupils typically choose a reward with a higher signaling value to their parents, independent of the school type. |
| Keywords: | non-monetary incentives,field experiment,education,incentive choice,effort,socio-economic background |
| JEL: | C93 I20 I21 J1 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:203&r=exp |
| By: | Petrolia, Daniel; Interis, Matthew; Hwang, Joonghyun |
| Abstract: | This paper presents what we believe to be the most comprehensive suite of comparison criteria regarding multinomial discrete-choice experiment elicitation formats to date. We administer a choice experiment focused on ecosystem-service valuation to three independent samples: single-choice, repeated-choice, and best-worst elicitation. We test whether results differ by parameter estimates, scale factors, preference heterogeneity, status-quo/action bias, attribute non-attendance, and magnitude and precision of welfare measures. Overall, we find very limited evidence of differences in attribute parameter estimates, scale factors, and attribute increment values across elicitation treatments. However, we find significant differences in status-quo/action bias across elicitation treatments, with repeated-choice resulting in greater proportions of “Yes” votes, and consequently, higher program-level welfare estimates. Also, we find that single-choice yields drastically less-precise welfare estimates. Finally, we find significant differences in attribute non-attendance behavior across elicitation formats, although there appears to be little consistency in class shares even within a given elicitation treatment. |
| Keywords: | best-worst elicitation, choice experiment, contingent valuation, ecosystem-service valuation, stated preference, survey, willingness to pay, Environmental Economics and Policy, Q51, Q57, |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:misswp:212479&r=exp |
| By: | Da Silva, Sergio; Matsushita, Raul |
| Abstract: | The St. Petersburg paradox refers to a gamble of infinite expected value, where people are likely to spend only a small entrance fee for it. There is a huge volume of literature that mostly concentrates on the psychophysics of the game; experiments are scant. Here, rather than focusing on the psychophysics, we offer an experimental, “physical” solution as if robots played the game. After examining the time series formed by one billion plays, we: confirm that there is no characteristic scale for this game; explicitly formulate the implied power law; and identify the type of -stable distribution associated with the game. We find an and, thus, the underlying distribution of the game is a Cauchy flight, as hinted by Paul Samuelson. |
| Keywords: | St. Petersburg paradox, alpha-stable distributions, Cauchy flight, power laws |
| JEL: | G00 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:68075&r=exp |
| By: | Noémi Berlin (University of Edinburgh - School of Economics - University of Edinburgh); Jean-Louis Tavani (UP8 - Université Paris 8, Vincennes-Saint-Denis); Maud Beasançon (UP10 - Université Paris 10, Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate the link between schooling achievement and creativity scores, controlling for personality traits and other individual characteristics. Our study is based on field data collected in a secondary school situated in a Parisian suburb. Four scores of creativity were measured on 9th graders. Schooling achievement was measured by the test scores obtained by pupils in different subjects. We find that verbal divergent thinking, which is a subtype of creativity, negatively predicts the grades in most subjects, but that graphical integrative thinking is positively correlated with scientific grades.There is no significant correlation with the other measures of creativity, implying a low importance of creativity in school. In line with previous work, we find that conscientiousness and openness are positively associated with grades. Girls have higher grades than boys but do not have a higher probability of passing a national exam. |
| Keywords: | personality traits,Schooling achievement,creativity,eld data |
| Date: | 2015–11–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01227497&r=exp |
| By: | Feicht, Robert (Public Administration of Bavaria); Grimm, Veronika (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg); Rau, Holger A. (University of Göttingen); Stephan, Gesine (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg) |
| Abstract: | We conduct multi-person one-shot ultimatum games that reflect important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and two groups of three recipients each. She cannot discriminate within, but across groups. A committee with representatives from one or both groups takes acceptance decisions. In a 2x2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii), proposals are balanced only if both groups have veto power (iii) negotiations often fail if the decision environment gives insufficient guidance on what an appropriate proposal is and (iv) non-binding communication substantially reduces rejection rates and proposer shares. |
| Keywords: | multi person ultimatum game, dictator game, collective decisions, experiments |
| JEL: | C92 C72 C78 J31 J52 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9506&r=exp |
| By: | Michele Belot; Philipp Kircher; Paul Muller |
| Abstract: | Helping job seekers to identify suitable jobs is a key challenge for policy makers. We develop and evaluate experimentally a novel tool that provides tailored advice at low cost and thereby redesigns the process through which job seekers search for jobs. We invited 300 job seekers to our computer facilities for 12 consecutive weekly sessions. They searched for real jobs using our web interface. After 3 weeks, we introduced a manipulation of the interface for half of the sample: instead of relying on their own search criteria, we displayed relevant other occupations to them and the jobs that were available in these occupations. These suggestions were based on background information and readily available labor market data. We recorded search behavior on our site but also surveyed participants every week on their other search activities, applications and job interviews. We find that these suggestions broaden the set of jobs considered by the average participant. More importantly, we find that they are invited to significantly more job interviews. These effects are predominantly driven by job seekers who searched relatively narrowly initially and who have been unemployed for a few months. |
| Keywords: | Online job search, occupational broadness, search design |
| Date: | 2015–11–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:262&r=exp |
| By: | Cesarini, David (New York University); Lindqvist, Erik (Stockholm School of Economics); Notowidigdo, Matthew J. (Northwestern University); Östling, Robert (Institute for Interntional Economic Studies (IIES)) |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of wealth on labor supply using the randomized assignment of monetary prizes in a large sample of Swedish lottery players. We find winning a lottery prize modestly reduces labor earnings, with the reduction being immediate, persistent, and similar by age, education, and sex. A calibrated dynamic model of individual labor supply implies an average lifetime marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income of -0.11, and labor-supply elasticities in the lower range of previously reported estimates. The earnings response is stronger for winners than their spouses, which is inconsistent with unitary household labor supply models. |
| Keywords: | Labor supply; household labor supply; income effect; marginal propensity to earn; substitution effect; uncompensated elasticity; compensated elasticity; Frisch elasticity; household bargaining; unitary model of the household; self-employment; taxation |
| JEL: | H20 J12 J22 J24 J26 J62 |
| Date: | 2015–11–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1094&r=exp |
| By: | Lackner M.; Stracke R.; Sunde U.; Winter-Ebmer R. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates empirically whether decision makers are forward looking indynamic strategic interactions. In particular, we test whether decision makers in multistage tournaments take heterogeneity induced changes of continuation values and the ability of their immediate opponent into account when choosing effort. Usingdata from professional and semi-professional basketball tournaments, we find thateffort is negatively affected by the ability of the current opponent, consistent with thetheoretical prediction and previous evidence. More importantly, the results indicatethat the expected relative strength in future interactions does affect behavior in earlier stages, which provides support for the standard view that decision makers are forward looking in dynamic strategic interactions. |
| Keywords: | Expectations; Speculations; Intertemporal Choice and Growth: General; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods; Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions; |
| JEL: | D84 D90 M51 J33 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015037&r=exp |
| By: | David Hugh-Jones (University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | The honesty of resident nationals of 15 countries was measured in two experiments: reporting a coin flip with a reward for "heads", and an online quiz with the possibility of cheating. There are large differ- ences in honesty across countries. Average honesty correlates with per capita GDP: this relationship is driven mostly by GDP differences arising before 1950, rather than by GDP growth since 1950, suggesting that the growth-honesty relationship was more important in earlier periods than today. The experiment also elicited participants’ beliefs about honesty in different countries. Beliefs were not correlated with reality. Instead they appear to be driven by cognitive biases, including self-projection. |
| Date: | 2015–09–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:ueaeco:1&r=exp |
| By: | Pavel Krivenko (Stanford); Martin Schneider (Stanford University); Cosmin Ilut (Duke University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study models with heterogeneous ambiguity averse agents. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed015:1407&r=exp |
| By: | Ester Manna |
| Abstract: | Traditional economic theory assumes that individuals are self-interested. They only care about their own well-being and disregard the impact of their actions on the others. However, the assumption of selfish individuals is unable to explain a number of important phenomena and puzzles. Individuals frequently engage in actions that are costly to themselves with no<p>apparent reward. Behavioural economics provides plausible explanations for these actions.<p>Individuals can be “boundedly rational" (Simon, 1955, and Kahneman et al. 1982) and/or can be driven by altruistic, equity and reciprocity considerations (see for an overview Fehr<p>and Schmidt, 2006). Over the past decade, researchers have applied behavioural economics<p>models to the study of organisations and how contracts should be designed in the presence<p>of non-standard preferences and asymmetric information or incomplete contracts (see for<p>an overview of the literature Köszegi, 2014).<p>In my current research, I try to be at the forefront of these new behavioural economics<p>applications into traditional industrial organisation and contract theory themes. The usual prescriptions of standard models can be misleading if potential differences in the agents' preferences are overlooked. Behavioural economics can make great progress if it takes into proper accountmarket and organisational features. |
| Keywords: | Economics -- Mathematical models; Economie politique -- Modèles mathématiques; Motivated Individuals; Delegation; Teamwork; Spatial Competition; Behavioural Economics |
| Date: | 2014–09–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/209225&r=exp |
| By: | Christine L. Exley (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit); Stephen J. Terry (Boston University) |
| Abstract: | Volunteers provide a large source of labor in the United States, yet volunteer effort is often unresponsive to traditional incentives. To clarify the sources of this unresponsiveness within volunteering, we appeal to a classic explanation: targeting behavior. In particular, we provide a laboratory test of effort response to changes in wages, either accrued to individuals or to a charity, in the presence of expectations-based reference points or targets. When individuals earn money for themselves, higher wages lead to higher effort with relatively muted targeting behavior. When individuals earn money for a charity, higher wages instead lead to lower effort with substantial targeting behavior. For managers contemplating the use of performance goals or targets within nonprofit organizations, our results suggest careful consideration about the extent to which they may render other incentives less effective. |
| Keywords: | reference points; wage elasticities; labor supply; effort; volunteering; prosocial behavior |
| JEL: | D12 D64 D84 J22 H41 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-062&r=exp |
| By: | David K. Levine; Jie Zheng |
| Date: | 2015–11–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:786969000000001257&r=exp |