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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Takashi Yamada (Faculty of Global and Science Studies, Yamaguchi University); Nobuyuki Hanaki (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - CNRS) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study Lowest Unique Integer Games (LUIGs). In a LUIG, N (>= 3) players submit a positive integer up to M and the player choosing the smallest number not chosen by anyone else wins. LUIGs are simplified versions of real systems such as lottery games and Lowest/Highest Unique Bid Auctions that have been attracting attention from scholars, yet experimental studies are still scarce. Here, we consider four LUIGs with N={3,4} and M={3,4}. We find that (a) choices made by a majority of subjects over 50 rounds of a LUIG were not significantly different from that in the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSE) of the LUIG; however, (b) those subjects who behaved significantly differently from what the MSE predicts won the game more frequently than those who behaved similarly to what the MSE predicts. |
| Keywords: | Lowest Unique Integer Game, Laboratory Experiment |
| Date: | 2015–09–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01204814&r=all |
| By: | Pekkala Kerr, Sari (Wellesley College); Pekkarinen, Tuomas (Government Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki); Sarvimäki, Matti (Aalto University); Uusitalo, Roope (HECER) |
| Abstract: | We examine the impact of an information intervention offered to 97 randomly chosen high schools in Finland. Graduating students in treatment schools were surveyed and given information on the labor market prospects associated with detailed post-secondary programs. A third of the students report that the intervention led them to update their beliefs. Experimental estimates suggest that it also affected the application behavior of the least informed students. However, this group of affected students is not sufficiently large for the intervention to have an average impact on applications or enrollment. |
| Keywords: | education, information, earnings, randomized field experiments |
| JEL: | J24 I23 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9372&r=all |
| By: | Feess, Eberhard; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Schramm, Markus; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar |
| Abstract: | We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given. Equilibrium effects account for the interdependency of these decisions. This interdependency is important since, in the case of legal uncertainty, higher fines may reduce the willingness to punish, which in turn reduces the deterrence effect of high fines. Using a laboratory experiment, we identify these effects empirically by means of a strategy-method design in which potential violators can condition their behavior on the behavior of potential punishers and vice versa. All our experimental findings on both partial and equilibrium effects are in line with the hypotheses derived from the theory. |
| Keywords: | Deterrence; Punishment; Uncertainty; Fines; Partial and Equilibrium Effects; Lab Experiment |
| JEL: | K12 K42 C91 D64 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:526&r=all |
| By: | Ek, Claes (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | People can often contribute to prosocial causes by several means; for instance, environmentally friendly activities include sorting household waste, buying organic products, and donating to NGOs. Policy to encourage prosocial behavior is sometimes directed only towards a particular activity, however, and such policies may give rise to `behavioral spillovers', affecting efforts on other prosocial activities. We examine such spillovers in the lab. In a version of the dictator game, experimental subjects could donate to two different real-world charities, and to simulate activity-specific policy, the relative productivity of the charities varied. We hypothesize, first, that an increase in the productivity of one charity will `crowd out' contributions to the other charity. Second, we introduce several treatments to test whether crowding occurs even across (possibly very) dissimilar alternatives. Crowding-out occurs significantly in all cases, but the effect is systematically weaker, the more dissimilar are the charity alternatives. In our most dissimilar treatment, it is only half as large as when alternatives are very similar. |
| Keywords: | charitable giving; dictator game; public goods; prosocial behavior |
| JEL: | C91 D03 H41 |
| Date: | 2015–10–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2015_029&r=all |
| By: | Antoniou, Constantinos (University of Warwick); Harrison, Glenn (Georgia State University, CEAR); Lau, Morten (Copenhagen Business School); Read, Daniel (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We design an experiment to test the hypothesis that, in violation of Bayes Rule, some people respond more forcefully to the strength of information than to its weight. We provide incentives to motivate effort, use naturally occurring information, and control for risk attitude. We find that the strength-weight bias affects expectations, but that its magnitude is significantly lower than originally reported. Controls for non-linear utility further reduce the bias. Our results suggest that incentive compatibility and controls for risk attitude considerably affect inferences on errors in expectations. |
| Keywords: | behavioral biases, market efficiency, experimental finance |
| JEL: | D81 D84 G11 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9387&r=all |
| By: | Dominique Cappelletti; Luigi Mittone; Matteo Ploner |
| Abstract: | Language is one of the most salient dimensions of ethnocultural identity and clearly marks who is and who is not a member of the group. We conduct an experiment to investigate the role of language in intergroup discrimination in the creation of social capital, here operationalised as a measure encompassing trust, trustworthiness, cooperation, and coordination. We observe the behaviour of the members of a minority language community when they receive the instructions written in their own idiomatic language and when they receive them written in the surrounding language. We find a language effect on behaviour, but this effect is gender specific. When deciding in the surrounding language, participants do not treat ingroup and outgroup members differently. When deciding in their own idiomatic language, females show intergroup discrimination and treat ingroup members more favourably compared to how they treat them when deciding in the surrounding language. We also observe that the behaviour participants exhibit in the experiment positively correlates with their attitudes as measured by the standard trust survey question used as a proxy for social capital. |
| Keywords: | language, intergroup discrimination, social capital, experiment |
| JEL: | C9 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trn:utwpce:1504&r=all |
| By: | le Sage, Sander; van der Heijden, Eline (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results of a public good experiment with voting. The standard game in which subjects decide simultaneously on their contributions to a public good is extended by a second stage. In this stage, subjects can express agreement or disagreement with the contributions of their group members and the resulting payoff by voting yes or no. The treatment variable is the voting threshold, which specifies how many votes are at least needed to implement the outcome. We find that average contributions are higher with a voting system, but only if the required number of votes is sufficiently high. The higher average contribution level is mainly realized because subjects manage to avoid the typical pattern of declining contributions across periods. We argue that the higher and rather stable contributions observed under high threshold levels may be related to the fact that voting is seen as a legitimate instrument. Support for this claim is provided by results from a post-experimental questionnaire. |
| Keywords: | public goods; laboratory experiment; voting |
| JEL: | C92 H41 D72 D02 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a8688f86-b104-4add-b1bc-8fc47886e327&r=all |
| By: | Juan M. Benito-Ostolaza (Department of Economics, Universidad Pública de Navarra); Penélope Hernández (Universitat de València and ERICES, Spain); Juan A. Sanchis-Llopis (Universitat de València and ERICES, Spain) |
| Abstract: | This paper experimentally analyzes the relationship between cognitive abilities and strategic behavior. In our experiment, individuals play in a sequential game where computing the equilibrium is challenging. After playing the game, we measure the individual's cognitive ability using the Raven's test. The results we obtain reveal that the number of strategic decisions (played in the sequential game) increases signicantly among the individuals with higher cognitive ability (measured by the Raven's test), as compared to those with lower cognitive ability. These results conrm that individuals with higher cognitive abilities play more strategically. |
| Keywords: | Strategic Behavior, Cognitive abilities, Raven test, Experiments. |
| JEL: | A12 C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eec:wpaper:1507&r=all |
| By: | Gangadharan, Lata (Monash University); Nikiforakis, Nikos (New York University, Abu Dhabi); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE) |
| Abstract: | Mechanisms to overcome social dilemmas provide incentives to maximize efficiency. However, often – such as when agents are heterogeneous – there is a trade-off between efficiency and equality. Agents' concerns for equality in such instances can limit the ability of mechanisms to promote efficiency. We provide evidence for this from a public good experiment using a simple mechanism which allows individuals to communicate periodically with other group members and reward them for their actions. We show that, in homogeneous populations – where there is no tension between efficiency and equality – the mechanism permits group to obtain maximum efficiency. This is not the case in heterogeneous populations where individuals derive different benefits from cooperation. Although almost all heterogeneous groups agree to follow specific contribution rules with positive contributions, most of them either prioritize equality over efficiency or strike a compromise between the two. These findings suggest that equality concerns can impose limits on the ability of heterogeneous populations to reach efficient outcomes through self-governance. |
| Keywords: | communication, rewards, cooperation, normative conflict, heterogeneity |
| JEL: | C92 H41 D74 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9384&r=all |
| By: | Sutter, Matthias (University of Cologne); Angerer, Silvia (IHS Carinthia); Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela (University of Innsbruck); Lergetporer, Philipp (Ifo Institute for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | According to Chen's (2013) linguistic-savings hypothesis, languages which grammatically separate the future and the present (like English or Italian) induce less future-oriented behavior than languages in which speakers can refer to the future by using present tense (like German). We complement Chen's approach with experimentally elicited time preference data from a bilingual city in Northern Italy. We find that German-speaking primary school children are about 46% more likely than Italian-speaking children to delay gratification in an intertemporal choice experiment. The difference remains significant in several robustness checks and when controlling for a broad range of factors, including risk attitudes, IQ or family background. |
| Keywords: | intertemporal choice, language, children, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D90 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9383&r=all |
| By: | Rehwald, Kai (Aarhus University); Rosholm, Michael (Aarhus University); Svarer, Michael (Aarhus University) |
| Abstract: | This paper compares the effectiveness of public and private providers of employment services. Reporting from a randomized field experiment conducted in Denmark we assess empirically the case for contracting out employment services for a well-defined group of highly educated job-seekers (unemployed holding a university degree). Our findings suggest, first, that private providers deliver more intense, employment-oriented, and earlier services. Second, public and private provision of employment services are equally effective regarding subsequent labour market outcomes. And third, the two competing service delivery systems appear to be equally costly from a public spending perspective. |
| Keywords: | active labour market policies, job-search assistance, contracting out, private provision of employment services, treatment effect evaluation, randomized trial, cost-analysis |
| JEL: | J64 J68 H41 H43 H44 L33 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9365&r=all |
| By: | Fabio Galeotti (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Ecully, F-69130, France; Université Lyon 2, Lyon, F-69007, France); Daniel John Zizzo (Newcastle University Business School and BENC, 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 4SE, United Kingdom) |
| Abstract: | We set up an experiment to measure voter preferences trade-offs between competence and honesty. We measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their work. In the first stage, the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one randomly selected participant. In the second stage, subjects can select who will determine their earnings based on the first stage’s competence and honesty of the alternative candidates. We find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results in lower payoffs. |
| Keywords: | voting preferences, competence, honesty, election |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1520&r=all |
| By: | Herrera Prada, Luis Omar; Kugler, Adriana D.; Kugler, Maurice; Saavedra, Juan Esteban |
| Abstract: | We use administrative data to examine medium and long-term formal education and labor market impacts among participants and family members of a randomized vocational training program for disadvantaged youth in Colombia. In the Colombian program, vocational training and formal education are complementary investments: relative to non-participants, randomly selected participants are more likely to complete secondary school and to attend and persist in tertiary education eight years after random assignment. Complementarity is strongest among applicants with high baseline educational attainment. Training also has educational spillover effects on participants’ family members, who are more likely to enroll in tertiary education. Between three and eight years after randomization, participants are more likely to enter and remain in formal employment, and have formal sector earnings that are at least 11 percent higher than those of non-participants. |
| Keywords: | education complementarities; formal employment; long-term effects; randomized experiments; spillover effects; vocational training; youth employment |
| JEL: | C9 I2 J24 J68 O2 |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10859&r=all |
| By: | Hallsworth, Michael; Berry, Dan; Sanders, Michael; Sallis, Anna; King, Dominic; Vlaev, Ivo; Darzi, Ara |
| Abstract: | Background: Missed hospital appointments are a major cause of inefficiency worldwide. Healthcare providers are increasingly using Short Message Service reminders to reduce ‘Did Not Attend’ (DNA) rates. Systematic reviews show that sending such reminders is effective, but there is no evidence on whether their impact is affected by their content. Accordingly, we undertook two randomised controlled trials that tested the impact of rephrasing appointment reminders on DNA rates in the United Kingdom. Trial Methods Participants were outpatients with a valid mobile telephone number and an outpatient appointment between November 2013 and January 2014 (Trial One, 10,111 participants) or March and May 2014 (Trial Two, 9,848 participants). Appointments were randomly allocated to one of four reminder messages, which were issued five days in advance. Message assignment was then compared against appointment outcomes (appointment attendance, DNA, cancellation by patient). Results: In Trial One, a message including the cost of a missed appointment to the health system produced a DNA rate of 8.4%, compared to 11.1% for the existing message (OR 0.74, 95% CI 0.61–0.89, P<0.01). Trial Two replicated this effect (DNA rate 8.2%), but also found that expressing the same concept in general terms was significantly less effective (DNA rate 9.9%, OR 1.22, 95% CI 1.00–1.48, P<0.05). Moving from the existing reminder to the more effective costs message would result in 5,800 fewer missed appointments per year in the National Health Service Trust in question, at no additional cost. The study’s main limitations are that it took place in a single location in England, and that it required accurate phone records, which were only obtained for 20% of eligible patients. We conclude that missed appointments can be reduced, for no additional cost, by introducing persuasive messages to appointment reminders. Future studies could examine the impact of varying reminder messages in other health systems. Trial Registration Controlled-Trials.com 49432571 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hrv:hksfac:22856929&r=all |
| By: | Chen, Zhuoqiong; Ong, David; Sheremeta, Roman |
| Abstract: | We design an all-pay auction experiment in which we reveal the gender of the opponent. Using this design, we find that women bid higher than men, but only when bidding against other women. These findings, interpreted through a theoretical model incorporating differences in risk attitude and the value of winning, suggest that women have a higher value of winning than men. |
| Keywords: | experiments, all-pay auction, competitiveness, gender differences |
| JEL: | C91 J3 J7 |
| Date: | 2015–10–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:67098&r=all |
| By: | Michael Luca (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit); Timothy Wu (Columbia Law School); Sebastian Couvidat (Yelp.com); Daniel Frank (Yelp.com); William Seltzer (Yelp.com) |
| Abstract: | While Google is known primarily as a search engine, it has increasingly developed and promoted its own content as an alternative to results from other websites. By prominently displaying Google content in response to search queries, Google is able to use its dominance in search to gain customers for this content. This may reduce consumer welfare if the internal content is inferior to organic search results. In this paper, we provide a legal and empirical analysis of this practice in the domain of online reviews. We first identify the conditions under which universal search would be considered anticompetitive. We then empirically investigate the impact of this practice on consumer welfare. To investigate, we implement a randomized controlled trial in which we vary the search results that subjects are shown - comparing Google's current policy of favorable treatment of Google content to results in which external content is displayed. We find that users are roughly 40% more likely to engage with universal search results (which receive favored placement) when the results are organically determined relative to when they contain only Google content. To shed further light on the underlying mechanisms, we show that users are more likely to engage with the OneBox when there are more reviews, holding content constant. This suggests that Google is reducing consumer welfare by excluding reviews from other platforms in the OneBox. |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-035&r=all |
| By: | Becker, Nicole; Häger, Kirsten; Heufer, Jan |
| Abstract: | In Becker et al. (2013a,b), we proposed a theory to explain giving behaviour in dictator experiments by a combination of selfishness and a notion of justice. The theory was tested using dictator, social planner, and veil of ignorance experiments. Here we analyse gender differences in preferences for giving and notions of justice in experiments using the same data. Similar to Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), we find some differences in giving behaviour. We find even stronger differences in the notion of justice between men and women; women tend to be far more egalitarian. Using our preference decomposition approach from Becker et al. (2013a) and parametric estimates, we show that differences in the giving behaviour between men and women in dictator experiments are explained by differences in their notion of justice and not by different levels of selfishness. We employ both parametric and non-parametric techniques, and both methods confirm the result. |
| Abstract: | In Becker et al. (2013a,b) haben wir eine Theorie eingeführt, die das Verhalten in Diktatorspielen als Kombination aus Eigennutz und Gerechtigkeitsvorstellung erklärt. Die Theorie wurde mit Diktatorspielen, Sozialer-Planer-Spielen, und Schleier-der-Ignoranz-Spielen getestet. Hier analysieren wir jetzt Geschlechterunterschiede in den Präferenzen für das Abgeben von Geld und den Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen in Experimenten mit den selben Daten. Ähnlich wie bei Andreoni und Vesterlund (2001) finden wir einige Unterschiede im Verhalten beim Abgeben von Geld. Die Unterschiede in den Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen zwischen Männern und Frauen sind noch deutlicher: Frauen tendieren erheblich stärker zu Egalitarismus. Mit unserem Ansatz zur Zerlegung von Präferenzen aus Becker et al. (2013a) und parametrischen Schätzungen zeigen wir, dass Unterschiede im Verhalten beim Abgeben von Geld zwischen Männern und Frauen in Diktatorspielen durch Unterschiede in den Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen erklärt werden können, aber nicht durch unterschiedliche Grade an Eigennutz. Wir nutzen sowohl parametrische als auch nicht-parametrische Ansätze, welche beide das Ergebnis bestätigen. |
| Keywords: | altruism,dictator games,distribution,experimental economics,gender differences,justice,social preferences |
| JEL: | C91 D12 D61 D63 D64 J16 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:578&r=all |
| By: | Fosgerau, Mogens; Börjesson, Maria |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the design of a stated choice experiment intended to measure the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between cost and an attribute such as time using a conventional logit model. Focusing the experimental design on some target MRS will bias estimates towards that value. The paper shows why this happens. The resulting estimated MRS can then be manipulated by adapting the target MRS in the experimental design. |
| Keywords: | stated choice; willingness to pay; misspecification; experimental design |
| JEL: | C9 D10 Q51 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:67053&r=all |
| By: | Buser, Thomas (University of Amsterdam); Geijtenbeek, Lydia (University of Amsterdam); Plug, Erik (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | It is an established fact that gay men earn less than other men and lesbian women earn more than other women. In this paper we study whether differences in competitive preferences, which have emerged as a likely determinant of labour market differences between men and women, can provide a plausible explanation. We conduct an experiment on a Dutch online survey panel to measure the competitiveness of gay, lesbian and straight panel members. For differences in competitiveness to partially explain sexual orientation differences in earnings, gay men would need to be less competitive than other men and lesbian women more competitive than other women. Our findings confirm this competitiveness hypothesis for men, but not for women. Gay men compete less than other men, while lesbian women compete as much as other women. Linking our experimental measure to survey data, we show that competitiveness is a significant predictor of earnings. Differences in competitiveness can account for a significant portion of the gay earnings penalty, but cannot explain the lesbian premium. |
| Keywords: | experiments, sexual orientation, gender, competitiveness, education, earnings |
| JEL: | C90 J15 J16 J24 J31 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9382&r=all |
| By: | Weichselbaumer, Doris (University of Linz) |
| Abstract: | This paper experimentally examines the employment opportunities of Austrians with and without migration background who apply to job openings. Previous experiments have indicated ethnicity via the name of an applicant, however employers may not always correctly perceive this signal. This study uses a novel approach to signal ethnic background and employs carefully matched photos as distinct visual cues. While results document employment discrimination for all groups with migration background, it is most pronounced for applicants with an African background. To explain why and when discrimination occurs, a battery of firm and job specific characteristics are examined. These, however, help little to explain the level of employment discrimination in Austria. |
| Keywords: | migration, discrimination, hiring, correspondence testing |
| JEL: | C93 J15 J71 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9354&r=all |
| By: | Brice Corgnet (Economic Science Institute & Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); Mark DeSantis (Economic Science Institute & Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); David Porter (Economic Science Institute & Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | We study the determinants of individual trader performance by conducting a comprehensive analysis of a broad range of variables that have been studied separately in different strands of the literature (financial literacy, cognitive skills, behavioral biases and the theory of mind). We utilize an experimental trading environment that allows us to control information flows into the market and measure a large set of individual characteristics. We show that behavioral biases (such as overconfidence and the failure to understand random sampling) significantly explain trader performance whereas standard cognitive and theory of mind skills only have a marginal effect. These results support the recent effort to incorporate Behavioral Finance research findings into the financial training curriculum. |
| Keywords: | Experimental asset markets, behavioral finance, cognitive ability, financial education |
| JEL: | C92 G02 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:15-17&r=all |
| By: | Dimitri Dubois; Mathieu Desole; Stefano Farolfi; Mabel Tidball; Annie Hofstetter |
| Abstract: | We introduce illustration identifying environmental degradation or improvement into a 2x2 coordination game with two pareto-ranked equilibria. Our contribution focuses on the environmental nature of the information provided through the illustrations, and its effects on possible pro-environmental behaviour. Our findings have some important consequences in terms of public policies. Incentives based on sensitization campaigns for environmental issues can be an alternative to economic instruments for environmental management. |
| Date: | 2015–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lam:wpaper:15-12&r=all |
| By: | Pablo Hernandez (New York University AD); Dylan Minor (Harvard Business School, Strategy Unit); Dana Sisak (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study ways in which the social preferences of individuals and groups affect performance when faced with relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding workers tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish workers are nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a team of workers has complex consequences for organizational performance. |
| Keywords: | Social Preferences, Relative Performance, Collusion, Leadership |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-040&r=all |
| By: | Yury Lander (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Timofey Arkhangelskiy (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper describes a pilot experiment which was conducted by the authors with speakers of the polysynthetic West Circassian (Adyghe) language and aimed at investigating their ability to use complex verb forms that cross-reference several arguments introduced by applicative morphology. The results of the experiment support the view that complex polysynthetic words can be constructed in the course of speech and do not necessarily belong to any common inventory of word forms. In addition, we make several conclusions which concern productivity of applicatives and their order within the West Circassian verb. |
| Keywords: | West Circassian, Adyghe, polysynthesis, cross-reference, morphological complexity, morphological productivity, morpheme order, applicatives |
| JEL: | Z |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:23/lng/2015&r=all |
| By: | Alain Cohn; Michel André Maréchal |
| Abstract: | We study the external validity of a standard laboratory measure of cheating. The results show that cheating in the lab significantly predicts classroom misbehavior in middle and high school students. |
| Keywords: | Cheating, honesty, experiment, external validity, misbehavior |
| JEL: | C93 K42 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:205&r=all |
| By: | Lamiraud, Karine (ESSEC Business School and THEMA); Vranceanu , Radu (ESSEC Business School and THEMA) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses data collected in 2012 and 2013 at the ESSEC Business School from Kallystée, a proprietary mass-attendance business game. Company boards are simulated by groups of five students selected at random. We manipulate the gender composition of the management teams to allow for all possible gender combinations. We show that all-men and mixed teams with four women perform significantly better than all-women teams. However, when controlling for the average tolerance to risk of the teams, the performance advantage of all-men teams vanishes, while the “residual” economic performance of mixed-gender teams with a majority of women is still positive and strong. Further analysis of “actual” risk-taking behavior shows that in these mixed-gender teams a “risk shift” mechanism is at play, as they take risks beyond what their total tolerance to risk as a group would suggest. |
| Keywords: | group decision; gender studies; risk-taking; business game; performance; governance |
| JEL: | C93 D71 M14 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-15015&r=all |