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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Arun G. Chandrasekhar; Horacio Larreguy; Juan Pablo Xandri |
| Abstract: | Agents often use noisy signals from their neighbors to update their beliefs about a state of the world. The effectiveness of social learning relies on the details of how agents aggregate information from others. There are two prominent models of information aggregation in networks: (1) Bayesian learning, where agents use Bayes' rule to assess the state of the world and (2) DeGroot learning, where agents instead consider a weighted average of their neighbors' previous period opinions or actions. Agents who engage in DeGroot learning often double-count information and may not converge in the long run. We conduct a lab experiment in the field with 665 subjects across 19 villages in Karnataka, India, designed to structurally test which model best describes social learning. Seven subjects were placed into a network with common knowledge of the network structure. Subjects attempted to learn the underlying (binary) state of the world, having received independent identically distributed signals in the first period. Thereafter, in each period, subjects made guesses about the state of the world, and these guesses were transmitted to their neighbors at the beginning of the following round. We structurally estimate a model of Bayesian learning, relaxing common knowledge of Bayesian rationality by allowing agents to have incomplete information as to whether others are Bayesian or DeGroot. Our estimates show that, despite the flexibility in modeling learning in these networks, agents are robustly best described by DeGroot-learning models wherein they take a simple majority of previous guesses in their neighborhood. |
| JEL: | C91 C92 C93 D83 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21468&r=all |
| By: | Tor Eriksson (Department of economics - University of Aarhus); Lei Mao (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS, Central University of Finance and Economics); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS) |
| Abstract: | Are people willing to sacrifice resources to save one's and others' face? In a laboratory experiment, we study whether individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only their self-but also other group members' image. This behavior is frequent even in the absence of group identity. When group identity is more salient, individuals help regardless of whether the least performer is an in-group or an out-group. This suggests that saving others' face is a strong social norm. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01161750&r=all |
| By: | Jean-Pierre Dubé; Xueming Luo; Zheng Fang |
| Abstract: | We empirically test an information economics based theory of social preferences in which ego utility and self-signaling can potentially crowd out the effect of consumption utility on choices. Two large-scale, randomized controlled field experiments involving a consumer good and charitable donations are conducted using a subject pool of actual consumers. We find that bundling relatively large charitable donations with a consumer good can generate non-monotonic regions of demand. Consumers also self-report significantly lower ratings of “feeling good about themselves” when a large donation is bundled with a large price discount for the good. The combined evidence supports the self-signaling theory whereby price discounts crowd out a consumer’s self-inference of altruism from buying a good bundled with a charitable donation. Alternative theories of motivation crowding are unable to fit the non-monotonic moments in the data. A structural model of self-signaling is fit to the data to quantify the economic magnitude of ego utility and its role in driving consumer decisions. |
| JEL: | C7 C72 C9 C93 D03 D11 D12 D8 D81 M3 M30 M31 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21475&r=all |
| By: | Camille Cornand (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Romain Baeriswyl (Swiss National Bank - Swiss National Bank) |
| Abstract: | The weight assigned to public information in Keynesian beauty contest depends on the signal precision and on the degree of strategic complementarities. This experimental study shows that the response of subjects to changes in the signal precision and in the degree of strategic complementarities is qualitatively consistent with theoretical predictions, though quantitatively weaker. The weaker subjects’ response to changes in the signal precision, however, mainly drives the weight observed in the experiment, making strategic complementarities and overreaction an issue of second order. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01098772&r=all |
| By: | Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R |
| Abstract: | Most public goods are durable and have a significant dynamic component. In this paper, we report the results from a laboratory experiment designed explicitly to study the dynamics of free riding behavior in the accumulation of a durable public good that provides a stream of discounted benefits over a potentially infinite horizon. This dynamic free-rider problem differs from static ones in fundamental ways and implies several economically important predictions that are absent in static frameworks. We consider two cases: economies with reversibility (RIE), where the agents’ voluntary contributions to the public good can be positive or negative; and economies with irreversibility (IIE), where contributions are non negative. For both economies, we characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium. The evidence supports the main predictions from the theory: behavior is generally consistent with stationary, forward-looking behavior; both in RIE and IIE the accumulation path is inefficiently slow and the public good under-provided; and RIE induces significantly higher public good contributions than IIE. A number of interesting deviations from the theoretical predictions are observed: both in RIE and in IIE we have over-investment in the early rounds of the game; in RIE over-investment is followed by periods in which negative contributions correct the stock, bringing it back to the predicted steady state; in IIE over-investment tends to decline approaching zero. To test the Markovian assumption, we compare the predictions of the Markov equilibrium with the prediction of the most efficient subgame perfect equilibrium and propose a novel experimental methodology that relies on the comparison between the behavior in the dynamic game and the behavior in a one-period reduced-form version of the dynamic game. |
| Keywords: | durable public goods; experiments; voluntary contribution mechanism |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C78 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10788&r=all |
| By: | Duttle, Kai |
| Abstract: | This experimental study investigates the interaction of two influential factors of biased probability judgments. Results provide new insights on the preconditions for an application of either the gambler's fallacy or its exact opponent, the hot hand fallacy. The first factor is cognitive ability, measured in a cognitive reflection test. The second one is the level of perceived randomness in the observed outcomes. Probability judgments are found to vary significantly across salience of randomness treatments as well as across subgroups with high or low cognitive abilities. Like in previous research, subjects with higher cognitive skills are more likely to engage the gambler's fallacy, yet only if perception of sequential randomness is low. In a setting where randomness is very salient the exact opposite can be observed. Similarly surprising insights are revealed when controlling for cognitive abilities in the analysis of salience treatments. Past results are only confirmed for a subgroup with lower cognitive skills, while their peers' beliefs are completely opposite. |
| Abstract: | Diese experimentelle Studie untersucht die Interaktion zweier Einflussfaktoren auf fehlerhafte Wahrscheinlichkeitsschätzungen. Die Ergebnisse geben Einblick in die Voraussetzungen für eine Verhaltensanwendung der sogenannten Gambler's Fallacy einerseits, oder aber dem genauen Gegenstück, der Hot Hand Fallacy. Der erste Faktor ist die kognitive Fähigkeit, welche in einem Cognitive Reflection Test gemessen wird. Der zweite ist das Ausmaß der wahrgenommenen Zufälligkeit in den beobachteten Ausgängen. Wahrscheinlichkeitsschätzungen variieren signifikant sowohl über die Zufallswahrnehmungs-Treatments als auch über Gruppen mit guten respektive schlechteren kognitiven Fähigkeiten. Wie in früheren Studien wenden Teilnehmer mit hohen kognitiven Fähigkeiten eher die Gambler's Fallacy an, jedoch ausschließlich bei geringer Wahrnehmung sequentieller Zufälligkeit. Ist diese jedoch sehr offensichtlich, kann das genau gegenteilige Verhalten beobachtet werden. Ähnlich überraschende Ergebnisse bringt eine Analyse der Auswirkungen von Variationen in der Zufallswahrnehmung bei gleichzeitiger Kontrolle des Einflusses kognitiver Fähigkeiten. Ergebnisse bisheriger Forschung können lediglich für eine Gruppe mit schlechteren Fähigkeiten repliziert werden. Die Schätzungen der Teilnehmer mit besseren Fähigkeiten sind komplett gegensätzlich. |
| Keywords: | law of small numbers,gambler's fallacy,hot hand effect,cognitive reflection test |
| JEL: | C91 D84 J24 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:568&r=all |
| By: | Baert, Stijn (Ghent University); Norga, Jennifer (Ghent University); Thuy, Yannick (Ghent University); Van Hecke, Marieke (Ghent University) |
| Abstract: | This study presents a new field experimental approach for measuring age discrimination in hiring. In addition to the classical approach in which candidates' ages are randomly assigned within pairs of fictitious resumes that are sent to real vacancies, we randomly assign activities undertaken by the older candidates during their additional life years between these pairs. When applying this design to the Belgium case, we find that age discrimination is fundamentally heterogeneous by older candidates' career pattern. Older age affects call-back only (negatively) in case older candidates were inactive or employed in an out-of-field job during their additional post-educational years. |
| Keywords: | age discrimination, design of experiments, field experiments, difference in post-educational years problem, ageing, hiring discrimination |
| JEL: | C90 C93 J14 J71 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9289&r=all |
| By: | Nikos Nikiforakis (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Jörg Oechssler (Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Heidelberg - Universität Heidelberg (GERMANY)); Anwar Shah (Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad) |
| Abstract: | The power to coerce workers is important for the e¢ cient operation of hierarchically structured organizations. However, this power can also be used by managers to exploit their subordinates for their own benefit. We examine the relationship between the power to coerce and exploitation in a laboratory experiment where a senior and a junior player interact repeatedly for a finite number of periods. We find that senior players try repeatedly to use their power to exploit junior workers. These attempts are successful only when junior workers have incomplete information about how their e¤ort impacts on the earnings of senior players, but not when they have complete information. Evidence from an incentive-compatible questionnaire indicates that the social acceptability of exploitation depends on whether the junior worker can detect she is being exploited. We also show how a history of exploitation affects future interactions. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01098753&r=all |
| By: | Roland G. Fryer, Jr.; Steven D. Levitt; John A. List |
| Abstract: | This article describes a randomized field experiment in which parents were provided financial incentives to engage in behaviors designed to increase early childhood cognitive and executive function skills through a parent academy. Parents were rewarded for attendance at early childhood sessions, completing homework assignments with their children, and for their child’s demonstration of mastery on interim assessments. This intervention had large and statistically significant positive impacts on both cognitive and non-cognitive test scores of Hispanics and Whites, but no impact on Blacks. These differential outcomes across races are not attributable to differences in observable characteristics (e.g. family size, mother’s age, mother’s education) or to the intensity of engagement with the program. Children with above median (pre-treatment) non cognitive scores accrue the most benefits from treatment. |
| JEL: | I20 J01 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21477&r=all |
| By: | Angelucci, Manuela (University of Michigan); Prina, Silvia (Case Western Reserve University); Royer, Heather (University of California, Santa Barbara); Samek, Anya (University of Southern California) |
| Abstract: | How do peers influence the impact of incentives? Despite much work on incentives, little is known about the spillover effects of incentives. We investigate two mechanisms by which these effects can occur: through peers' actions and peers' incentives. In a field experiment on snack choice (grapes versus cookies), we randomize who receives incentives, the fraction of peers incentivized, and whether or not it can be observed that peers' choices are incentivized among over 1,500 children in the school lunchroom. Incentives increase the likelihood of initially choosing grapes. However, peer spillover effects can be large enough to undo these positive effects. |
| Keywords: | food choice, incentives, spillovers, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 I1 J13 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9288&r=all |
| By: | Gilles Grolleau (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - Centre international de hautes études agronomiques méditerranéennes [CIHEAM], ESC Dijon Bourgogne - ESC Dijon Bourgogne, Unité MIAJ - INRA - Mathématiques et Informatique Appliquées - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)); Guillermo Mateu (ESC Dijon Bourgogne - ESC Dijon Bourgogne); Angela Sutan (ESC Dijon Bourgogne - ESC Dijon Bourgogne, LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - Centre international de hautes études agronomiques méditerranéennes [CIHEAM]); Radu Vranceanu (Economics Department - Essec Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (to pledge) can increase their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely private, public and irrevocable ones, which differ in individual cost of not keeping a promise. Public pledges appear to be associated to lower donation levels. Irrevocable pledges ensure an amount of donations equal to donations in absence of pledges. Moreover, a significant number of individuals keep their promises, in presence of either private or public pledges. A higher risk attached to the endowment increases donations. |
| Date: | 2015–06–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01171156&r=all |
| By: | Giulietti, Corrado (IZA); Tonin, Mirco (University of Southampton); Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton) |
| Abstract: | Discrimination in access to public services can act as a major obstacle towards addressing racial inequality. We examine whether racial discrimination exists in access to a wide spectrum of public services in the US. We carry out an email correspondence study in which we pose simple queries to more than 19,000 local public service providers. We find that emails are less likely to receive a response if signed by a black-sounding name compared to a white-sounding name. Given a response rate of 72% for white senders, emails from putatively black senders are almost 4 percentage points less likely to receive an answer. We also find that responses to queries coming from black names are less likely to have a cordial tone. Further tests demonstrate that the differential in the likelihood of answering is due to animus towards blacks rather than inferring socioeconomic status from race. |
| Keywords: | discrimination, public services provision, school districts, libraries, sheriffs, field experiment, correspondence study |
| JEL: | D73 H41 J15 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9290&r=all |
| By: | Laurent Vilanova (COACTIS - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne); Nadège Marchand (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Walid Hichri (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | We test in the laboratory how entrepreneurs' skill perceptions influence the design of financing and advising contracts. Our theoretical framework proposes that selfconfident entrepreneurs prefer issuing debt whereas low self-confident ones prefer equity which induces strong investor assistance. The prevalence of overconfidence makes investors more reluctant to accept debt offers and constrains self-confident entrepreneurs to finance through mixed securities. Experimental results show that self-confident entrepreneurs issue more debt-like securities and receive less assistance. We also show that entrepreneurs learn not to offer pure debt and that initial ignorance of their own skills reinforces entrepreneurs' ability to learn through risky choices. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01154514&r=all |
| By: | Fischer, Greg (London School of Economics and Political Science); Karlan, Dean (Yale University and Innovations for Poverty Action); McConnell, Margaret (Harvard University); Raffler, Pia (Yale University) |
| Abstract: | In a field experiment in Uganda, we find that demand after a free distribution of three health products is lower than after a sale distribution. This contrasts with work on insecticide-treated bed nets, highlighting the importance of product characteristics in determining pricing policy. We put forward a model to illustrate the potential tension between two important factors, learning and anchoring, and then test this model with three products selected specifically for their variation in the scope for learning. We find the rank order of shifts in demand matches with the theoretical prediction, although the differences are not statistically significant. |
| JEL: | D11 D12 D83 I11 I18 O12 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:yaleco:133&r=all |
| By: | Beyene,Abebe D.; Bluffstone,Randall; Dissanayake,Sahan; Gebreegziabher,Zenebe; Martinsson,Peter; Mekonnen,Alemu; Toman,Michael A. |
| Abstract: | This paper provides field experiment?based evidence on the potential additional forest carbon sequestration that cleaner and more fuel-efficient cookstoves might generate. The paper focuses on the Mirt (meaning ?best?) cookstove, which is used to bake injera, the staple food in Ethiopia. The analysis finds that the technology generates per-meal fuel savings of 22 to 31 percent compared with a traditional three-stone stove with little or no increase in cooking time. Because approximately 88 percent of harvests from Ethiopian forests are unsustainable, these findings suggest that the Mirt stove, and potentially improved cookstoves more generally, can contribute to reduced forest degradation. These savings may be creditable under the United Nations Collaborative Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries. Because of the highly specific nature of the Mirt stove and the lack of refrigeration in rural Ethiopia, rebound effects are unlikely, but this analysis was unable completely to rule out such leakage. The conclusions are therefore indicative, pending evidence on the frequency of Mirt stove use in the field. The effects of six randomized behavioral treatments on fuelwood and cooking time outcomes were also evaluated, but limited effects were found. |
| Keywords: | Urban Environment,Energy Production and Transportation,Renewable Energy,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Environmental Economics&Policies |
| Date: | 2015–08–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7394&r=all |
| By: | NISHIMURA, Takeshi; OKADA, Akira; SHIRATA, Yasuhiro |
| Abstract: | Group formation is a fundamental activity in human society. Humans often exclude others from a group and divide the group benefit in a fair way only among group members. Such an allocation is called in-group fair. Does natural selection favor an in-group fair allocation? We investigate the evolution of fairness and group formation in a three-person Ultimatum Game (UG) in which the group value depends on its size. In a stochastic model of the frequency-dependent Moran process, natural selection favors the formation of a two-person subgroup in the low mutation limit if its group value exceeds a high proportion (0.7) of that of the largest group. Stochastic evolutionary game theory provides theoretical support to explain the behavior of human subjects in economic experiments of a three-person UG. |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:econdp:2015-06&r=all |
| By: | Julie Le Gallo (UMR CRESE - Université de Franche-Comté); Yannick L'Horty (TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS, ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12); Pascale Petit (TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS, ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12) |
| Abstract: | We assess the impact of lowering the cost of learning to drive in France by randomly assigning candidates to either of two groups of 18 to 25 years olds. Young people in the “test group” were given a €1000 voucher to pay for their driving lessons and were suported by a welfare centre throughout the time they were learning. Young people in the “control group” retained all the other welfare benefits for the underprivileged. The vouchers were given to 10 000 young people most of whom were not in education, employment or training. We investigate three types of outcome covering driving, housing and employment status. We analyse the specific role of local support in passing the driving test and we specifically take into account the possibility of spillover effects between treated and untreated individuals. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01100332&r=all |
| By: | Nicole Becker (TU Dortmund, Germany); Kirsten Häger (Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany); Jan Heufer (Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands) |
| Abstract: | In Becker et al. (2013a,b), we proposed a theory to explain giving behaviour in dictator experiments by a combination of selfishness and a notion of justice. The theory was tested using dictator, social planner, and veil of ignorance experiments. Here we analyse gender differences in preferences for giving and notions of justice in experiments using the same data. Similar to Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), we find some differences in giving behaviour. We find even stronger differences in the notion of justice between men and women; women tend to be far more egalitarian. Using our preference decomposition approach from Becker et al. (2013a) and parametric estimates, we show that differences in the giving behaviour between men and women in dictator experiments are explained by differences in their notion of justice and not by different levels of selfishness. We employ both parametric and non-parametric techniques, and both methods confirm the result. |
| Keywords: | Altruism; Dictator Games; Distribution; Experimental Economics; Gender Differences; Justice; Social Preferences |
| JEL: | C91 D12 D61 D63 D64 J16 |
| Date: | 2015–08–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150103&r=all |
| By: | Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano; Giulia Andrighetto |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study how people from different European countries would react, in terms of tax compliance, to institutional changes. We choose an experimental setting and we focus on two features of the tax system – efficiency and tax rate. We develop our analysis in three countries characterized by different systems: Italy, Sweden, UK. The main finding is that participants from different countries react with the same intensity to efficiency changes but not to increases in the tax rate. In all countries tax compliance decreases as tax rate increases, but the reaction is stronger in Italy and softer in UK. Policy implications – mostly focused on fiscal harmonization - follow. |
| Keywords: | tax compliance, fiscal harmonization, cross-country comparison, efficiency, tax rate |
| JEL: | C9 D31 H26 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:307&r=all |
| By: | John Beshears; James J. Choi; Christopher Harris; David Laibson; Brigitte C. Madrian; Jung Sakong |
| Abstract: | If individuals have self-control problems, they may take up commitment contracts that restrict their spending. We experimentally investigate how contract design affects the demand for commitment contracts. Each participant divides money between a liquid account, which permits unrestricted withdrawals, and a commitment account with withdrawal restrictions that are randomized across participants. When the two accounts pay the same interest rate, the most illiquid commitment account attracts more money than any of the other commitment accounts. We show theoretically that this pattern is consistent with the presence of sophisticated present-biased agents, who prefer more illiquid commitment accounts even if they are subject to uninsurable marginal utility shocks drawn from a broad class of distributions. When the commitment account pays a higher interest rate than the liquid account, the relationship between illiquidity and deposits is flat, suggesting that agents without present bias and/or naïve present-biased agents are also present in our sample. |
| JEL: | D03 D14 D91 |
| Date: | 2015–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21474&r=all |
| By: | Antoinette Baujard (GATE - GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Frédéric Gavrel (TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS, CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1); Herrade Igersheim (BETA - Bureau d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS - Université Nancy II - Université de Strasbourg); Jean-Francois Laslier (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS - Polytechnique - X); Isabelle Lebon (Economie publique et choix social - CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1) |
| Abstract: | Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2,340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons : the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule. |
| Date: | 2014–12–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01090234&r=all |