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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Davide Dragone (University of Bologna [Bologna]); Fabio Galeotti (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS); Raimondello Orsini (University of Bologna [Bologna]) |
| Abstract: | We conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of three pools of subjects: Undergraduate students, temporary workers and permanent workers. We find that students are more selfish and contribute less than workers. Temporary and permanent contract workers have similar other-regarding preferences and display analogous contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01179118&r=exp |
| By: | Attanasi, Giuseppe; Hopfensitz, Astrid; Lorini, Emiliano; Moisan, Frédéric |
| Keywords: | Social ties, Group identity, Coordination, Experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:29369&r=exp |
| By: | Goone Beekman (Wageningen University, Development Economics Group, P.O. Box 8130, 6700 EW Wageningen, Netherlands); Stephen Cheung (The University of Sydney, School of Economics, Merewether Building H04, Sydney NSW 2006, Australia); Ian Levely (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Smetanovo nábreží 6, 111 01 Prague 1, Czech Republic) |
| Abstract: | We study cooperation within and between groups in the laboratory, comparing treatments in which two groups have previously been (i) in conflict with one another, (ii) in conflict with a different group, or (iii) not previously exposed to con flict. We model conflict using an inter-group Tullock contest, and measure its effects upon cooperation using a multi-level public good game. We demonstrate that con flict increases cooperation within groups, while decreasing cooperation between groups. Moreover, we find that cooperation between groups increases in response to an increase in the effciency gains from cooperation only when the two groups have not previously interacted. |
| Keywords: | within- and between-group cooperation; inter-group confl ict; group identity; multi-level public good experiment; Tullock contest; other-regarding preferences |
| JEL: | C92 D64 D74 H41 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2015_16&r=exp |
| By: | Cubitt, Robin (University of Nottingham); Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham); Quercia, Simone (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject. We find that, among conditional cooperators, only those who expect others to contribute little to the public good are significantly betrayal averse, while there is no evidence of betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in public goods games, as the pessimistic conditional cooperators tend to avoid contribution to avoid exploitation, whereas the optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited. |
| Keywords: | exploitation aversion, betrayal aversion, trust, conditional cooperation, public goods game, free riding, experiments |
| JEL: | H41 C91 C72 D03 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9241&r=exp |
| By: | Maximilian Hoyer (CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - Universiteit van Amsterdam, Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam - Universiteit van Amsterdam); Nadège Bault (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Ben Loerakker (CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - Universiteit van Amsterdam, Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam - Universiteit van Amsterdam); Frans Van Winden (CREED - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making - Universiteit van Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment - like damaging public goods - is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%. Female subjects are found to be more inclined to use destructive decisions. Finally, subjects’ social value orientation turns out to be partly predictive of (at least initial) destructive choices. |
| Date: | 2014–12–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01090199&r=exp |
| By: | Jindrich Matousek (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Smetanovo nábreží 6, 111 01 Prague 1, Czech Republic); Lubomir Cingl (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Smetanovo nábreží 6, 111 01 Prague 1, Czech Republic) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally examine the attributes of two complex multi-unit auction mechanisms in the presence of an opportunity to collude among bidding participants due to a provision of a simple communication channel. The results suggest that the combinatorial bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Allowing for communication increases efficiency in both examined auction formats. Bidders are able to split the auctioned goods in a cheap-talk collusive agreement, which results in a better allocation compared to the auction formats without the communication channel. Combinatorial bidding on packages makes the decision-making problem of bidders hard to process and cause inefficiencies, especially for designs with the large number of auctioned goods. |
| Keywords: | Combinatorial Auction, Communication, Collusion, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D43 D44 L96 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2015_20&r=exp |
| By: | Cochard, François; Couprie, Hélène; Hopfensitz, Astrid |
| Keywords: | Experiment on couples, Time allocation, Work division |
| JEL: | C99 D13 J16 |
| Date: | 2015–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:29563&r=exp |
| By: | Jos Jansen (Aarhus Universtity and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Andreas Pollak (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor’s product-market strategy. Subsequently, we analyze the firms’ behavior in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects often use selective disclosure strategies, and this finding appears to be robust to changes in the information structure, the mode of competition, and the degree of product differentiation. Moreover, in our experiment, subjects’ product-market conduct is largely consistent with theoretical predictions. |
| Keywords: | common value, product differentiation, Asymmetry, Duopoly, information disclosure, skewed distribution, Incomplete Information, laboratory experiment, Cournot competition, Bertrand competition |
| JEL: | D82 L13 C92 D83 D22 M4 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2015_09&r=exp |
| By: | Astrid Gamba (University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy); Tobias Regner (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena) |
| Abstract: | We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the quality of information feedbacks provided after each play. If subjects rely only on their personal database, long run behavior resembles a Self-confirming equilibrium whereby less pro-social types take at earlier nodes due to prediction errors. Aggregate information release decreases heterogeneity of behavior by increasing the passing rates of pro-selfs and play moves towards Bayesian Nash equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | social preferences, learning, Self-confirming equilibrium, experiment |
| JEL: | C71 C73 C91 D83 |
| Date: | 2015–08–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2015-012&r=exp |
| By: | Romain Baeriswyl (Swiss National Bank - Swiss National Bank); Camille Cornand (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS) |
| Abstract: | In an experimental monetary general equilibrium economy, we assess two processes of monetary injection: credit expansion vs. lump-sum monetary transfers. In theory, both processes are neutral and exert no real effect on allocation. In the experiment, however, credit expansion leads to substantial distortions of real allocation and relative prices, and exerts a redistributive effect across subjects. By contrast, an increase in money through lump-sum transfers does not distort real allocation. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01161854&r=exp |
| By: | Giamattei, Marcus; Graf Lambsdorff, Johann |
| Abstract: | classEx is a novel software that allows lecturers to carry out experiments in the classroom with an instantaneous graphical illustration of findings. Standard experiments with multiple treatments, monetary incentives, roles, groups, rounds and stages are available in a ready-made format. A back end allows more sophisticated users to implement their own experiments. We present examples, describe the architecture and show how the design can be tailored to become useful for research. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Software,Classroom Experiments,Student Activation,Ex-Post Screening,Double-Blindness |
| JEL: | C9 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:upadvr:v6815&r=exp |
| By: | Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines) |
| Abstract: | Several experiments show that feedback transmission mechanisms mitigate opportunistic behavior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, nonetheless remains obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for channels by which feedback may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strategic signaling. The other involves aversion to others’ expressed disapproval. The presence of feedback is found to foster pro-social behavior. The data favour the non-monetary sanctioning explanation rather than the signaling hypothesis. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01098775&r=exp |
| By: | Gu, Yiquan; Wenzel, Tobias |
| Abstract: | The paper reports the results of an experiment where asymmetric sellers of a product can obfuscate the market. We show that policy measures may have unintended effects of increasing obfuscation incentives. We find that policies that limit the effectiveness of obfuscation and policies that promote parity between firms can lead less prominent firms to increase their obfuscation efforts. Despite this unintended effect, however, the former type of policies is effective in boosting consumer welfare. |
| Keywords: | Experiment,Obfuscation,Consumer Protection,Behavioural Industrial Organisation |
| JEL: | C91 D18 D43 L13 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:192&r=exp |
| By: | Marianne Lumeau (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Paris 13 - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité (USPC) - CNRS, CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1); David Masclet (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal, CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1); Thierry Penard (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1) |
| Abstract: | Several previous studies have highlighted the role of feedback mechanisms in the success of electronic marketplaces. This paper contends that the effectiveness of online feedback mechanisms passes through two channels, namely a ‘reputational’ effect that has been largely documented in the literature, but also a ‘(dis)approval’ effect that has received less attention. We attempt to isolate these two effects using an experimental approach. For this purpose, we compare two experimental feedback systems that differ in the set of information available to participants. In the first feedback system, each player can observe the feedback profile of the other party, whereas in the second feedback system, this information is private. Our findings indicate that both systems improve cooperation. However, we observe that private feedback is less efficient in enhancing trust and trustworthiness than systems in which rating profiles are observed by partners. This finding is due to both a reduction of the number of assigned ratings and a lower impact of private ratings on subsequent decisions. All these results suggest that even if social (dis)approval matters, rating observability–and thus reputation–remains critical to induce honest behavior and improve efficiency in markets characterized by imperfect information. |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01116889&r=exp |
| By: | Robin M. Hogarth (Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - CNRS) |
| Abstract: | When the assignment of incentives is uncertain, we study how the regularity and frequency of rewards and risk attitudes influence participation and effort. We contrast three incentive schemes in a real-effort experiment in which individuals decide when to quit : a continuous incentive scheme and two intermittent ones, fixed and random. In all treatments, we introduce a regime shift by withdrawing monetary rewards after the same unknown number of periods. In such an ambiguous environment, we show that less able and more risk averse players are less persistent in effort. Intermittent incentives lead to a greater persistence of effort, while continuous incentives entail exit as soon as payment stops. Randomness increases both earlier and later exiting. This selection effect in terms of ability and risk attitudes combined with the impact of intermittent rewards on persistence lead to an increase in mean performance after the regime shift when incentives are intermittent. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01098750&r=exp |
| By: | Yonghong An (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Yingyao Hu (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Johns Hopkins University); Pengfei Liu (Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates a structural model of private provision of public goods to provide some new empirical evidence on individuals' strategic contributing behaviors. In the model, individuals' contributing behaviors are allowed to be heterogenous and time-varying. We show that all the main components of the model including the number of different contributing strategies, functional form for each strategy, and how individuals adjust their strategies are identified from the revealed contribution choices of individuals. Further, the structural model is estimated using the data collected in a threshold public good experiment. The empirical results suggest that subjects in our experiment employ three contributing strategies, and they strategically respond to provision history by adjusting their preceding behavior. In addition, the response is heterogenous and dependent on subjects' contributing strategies. |
| Keywords: | Public Goods; Private Provision; Measurement Errors; Unobserved Heterogeneity; Nonparametric Identification and Estimation; Experimental Data |
| JEL: | H41 C14 |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:cemmap:18/15&r=exp |
| By: | David Masclet (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal, CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1); Emmanuel Peterle (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1); Sophie Larribeau (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1) |
| Abstract: | We present a new experiment that explores gender differences in both performance and compensation choices. While most of the previous studies have focused on tournament vs. piece-rate schemes, the originality of our study consists in examining the gender gap in the context of a flat wage scheme. Our data indicate that females exert a significantly higher effort than men in fixed payment schemes. We find however no gender difference in performance under the tournament scheme, due to a combination of two effects. On the one hand, men more significantly increase their effort when switching from a flat wage to a tournament scheme. On the other hand, when switching from the flat wage to a tournament scheme, women have less margin to increase performance since their effort was already relatively high with a flat wage. We also find that females are more likely than males to choose a flat-wage scheme than a tournament. This gap however narrows dramatically when feedback on previous experience is provided. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01105414&r=exp |
| By: | Vivian Lei (Department of Economics - University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee); David Masclet (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - UQAM - Université du Québec à Montréal, CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1); Filip Vesely (Department of Economics - University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) |
| Abstract: | Trust is fragile. It is hard to build but easy to destroy. In this paper, we explore the fragility of trust in a stylized laboratory environment. We ask whether transgression outside a direct send-and-return relationship destroys trust and, if so, whether a competition against outsiders or an apology for misdeeds helps restore it. We find that transgression significantly reduces trust and that the broken trust can be greatly restored by group competition. Communication via an apology, impersonal or not, has an insignificant impact. By contrast, offering explanations for misbehavior is as effective as group competition. |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01074083&r=exp |
| By: | Laura Metzger (ETH Zurich); Isabel Günther (ETH Zurich) |
| Abstract: | A considerable and increasing share of foreign aid stems from private donations. Hence, individual donors can increase social welfare in developing countries by directing their funds to the most effective NGOs. Surprisingly few studies have analyzed whether private donors care about aid effectiveness when they donate to an international charity. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate if private donors seek information about the exact impact of their donation to an international NGO before they donate. Furthermore, we investigate how relevant private donors find information about aid impact compared to information about administrative costs, and the recipient type who benefits from a donation. First, we find that a relatively small share of individuals makes a well-informed donation decision. Second, the demand for information about aid impact is lowest, and it is highest for information about the recipient type. Third, exact information about aid impact did not lead to a significant change in average donation levels, while information about the exact recipient type and administrative costs led to a significant change in donation levels. In the recipient type group, informed participants donated significantly more than uninformed participants because they “rewarded” the preferred recipient with higher-thanaverage transfers. In the administration costs group, informed participants donated significantly less than uninformed participants because they used the information to “punish” NGOs with high administration costs. |
| Keywords: | Charitable giving; aid impact; aid effectiveness; fairness; social preferences |
| JEL: | D64 L31 O12 |
| Date: | 2015–08–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:got:gotcrc:182&r=exp |
| By: | Diego Ubfal |
| Abstract: | This paper tests the commonly-used assumption that people apply a single discount rate to the utility from different sources of consumption. Using survey data from Uganda with both hypothetical and incentivized choices over different goods, we elicit time preferences from about 2,400 subjects. We reject the null of equal discount rates across goods; the average person in our sample is more impatient about sugar, meat and starchy plantains than about money and a list of other goods. We review theassumptions to recover discount rates from experimental choices for the case of goodspecific discounting. Consistently with the theoretical framework, we find convergence in discount rates across goods for two groups expected to engage in or think about arbitraging the rewards: traders and individuals with large quantities of the good at home. As an application, we evaluate empirically the conditions under which goodspecific discounting could predict a low-asset poverty trap. JEL Classification: D03, D90, O12, C90, D14 Keywords: time preferences, good-specific discounting, narrow-bracketing, selfcontrol problems, poverty traps. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:554&r=exp |
| By: | Katare, Bhagyashree; Beatty, Timothy |
| Abstract: | I investigate the effect of social norming and financial incentives on promoting physical exercise among randomly selected freshman students. Physical exercise is measured as the number of times an individual visits the recreation center. Social norming involves providing feedback to individuals on own and peers’ physical exercise behavior. The financial incentive allows individuals to win a gift card by having their names entered into a lottery. Previous studies show that social norming and financial incentive have been successful in modifying individual behavior. However, results from my studies using these tools have shown little effect in increasing the individuals’ frequency of physical exercise. The in-effectiveness of social norming can be explained by focus theory. It implies that social norming can instigate students to reduce their positive behavior and might lead to an unintended boomerang effect. |
| Keywords: | Physical Exercise, Randomized Control Trail, Health Economics and Policy, Labor and Human Capital, I1, I2, |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea15:206993&r=exp |
| By: | Ban,Radu; Gilligan,Michael J.; Rieger,Matthias |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how self-help groups?village-based organizations designed to encourage savings, household production and social cohesion among the poor?can promote economic and social capital. The paper uses survey data and a wide array of social capital measures to assess the impact of a pilot program that was randomly rolled out in rural villages in Cambodia. The study finds that the program encouraged savings and associations via self-help groups. However it did not improve social capital measured by household and network surveys and lab activities that gauge trust, trustworthiness and the willingness to contribute to public goods. The findings contradict recent work that has found significant positive impacts of such groups on social capital. This paper evaluates community-wide impacts while most previous studies focus on program participants. In addition, the empirical strategy is based on a broader array of social capital measures, including behavioral indicators, suggesting that finding impacts of such programs on social capital is sensitive to the measurement strategy. |
| Date: | 2015–07–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7382&r=exp |
| By: | Johan Vikström (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Geert Ridder (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University of Southern California); Martin Weidner (Institute for Fiscal Studies and cemmap and UCL) |
| Abstract: | This paper considers identification of treatment effects on conditional transition probabilities. We show that even under random assignment only the instantaneous average treatment effect is point identified. Because treated and control units drop out at different rates, randomization only ensures the comparability of treatment and controls at the time of randomization, so that long run average treatment effects are not point identified. Instead we derive informative bounds on these average treatment effects. Our bounds do not impose (semi)parametric restrictions, as e.g. proportional hazards. We also explore various assumptions such as monotone treatment response, common shocks and positively correlated outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Partial identification, duration model, randomized experiment, treatment effect |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:cemmap:01/15&r=exp |
| By: | Gary Charness (Department of Economics, University of California - University of California, Santa Barbara); David Masclet (Economie industrielle et économie comportementale - CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are informed about their relative performance. However, ranking feedback also favors disreputable behavior. Some individuals do not hesitate to incur a cost to improve their rank by sabotaging others’ work or by increasing artificially their own performance. Introducing sabotage opportunities has a strong detrimental effect on performance. Therefore, ranking incentives should be used with care. Inducing group identity discourages sabotage among peers but increases in-group rivalry. |
| Date: | 2014–12–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01090241&r=exp |
| By: | Adrien Bouguen (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics); Deon Filmer (Banque Mondiale - Centre de recherche de la Banque Mondiale - Banque Mondiale); Karen Macours (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics); Sophie Naudeau (Banque Mondiale - Centre de recherche de la Banque Mondiale - Banque Mondiale) |
| Abstract: | Interventions targeting early childhood development, such as investment in preschools, are often seen as promising mechanisms to increase human capital and to reduce the intergenerational transmission of poverty and inequality. This paper presents results from a randomized evaluation of a large scale preschool construction program in Cambodia, and indicates a cautionary tale. The overall impact of the program on a wide set of children’s early childhood outcomes was small and not statistically significant, and for the cohort with highest exposure the program led to a negative impact on early childhood cognition. Moreover, for this group, the intervention increased inequality as the negative impacts are largest for children of poorer and less educated parents. The results can be explained by the frequent occurrence of underage enrollment in primary school in the absence of preschools, stricter enforcement of the minimum age for primary school entry after the intervention, substitution between primary and preschool following intervention, and difference in demand responses of more and less educated parents to the new preschools. These results indicate that the design of ECD interventions needs to start from a good understanding of parental and teacher decisions pre-program. More generally, they show how implementation and demand-side constraints might not only limit positive impacts, but could even lead to perverse effects of early childhood interventions. |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-01090361&r=exp |
| By: | Tjaša Bjedov (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon); Thierry Madiès (Université de Fribourg, Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales - Université de Fribourg); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01139112&r=exp |
| By: | Pedro Carneiro (Institute for Fiscal Studies and cemmap and UCL); Oswald Koussihouèdé (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Nathalie Lahire (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Costas Meghir (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Yale University); Corina Mommaerts (Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | The impact of school resources on the quality of education in developing countries may depend crucially on whether resources are targeted efficiently. In this paper we use a randomized experiment to analyze the impact of a school grants program in Senegal, which decentralized a portion of the country's education budget. We find large positive effects on test scores at younger grades that persist at least two years. We show that these effects are concentrated among schools that focused funds on human resources improvements rather than school materials, suggesting that teachers and principals may be a central determinant of school quality. |
| Keywords: | Quality of education; Decentralization; School resources; Child Development; Clustered Randomized Control Trials |
| JEL: | H52 I22 I25 O15 |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:cemmap:15/15&r=exp |
| By: | Gabriella Conti (University College London); James J. Heckman (The University of Chicago); Rodrigo Pinto (The University of Chicago) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the long-term impacts on health and healthy behaviors of two of the oldest and most widely cited U.S. early childhood interventions evaluated by the method of randomization with long-term follow-up: the Perry Preschool Project (PPP) and the Carolina Abecedarian Project (ABC). There are pronounced gender effects strongly favoring boys, although there are also effects for girls. Dynamic mediation analyses show a significant role played by improved childhood traits, above and beyond the effects of experimentally enhanced adult socioeconomic status. These results show the potential of early life interventions for promoting health. |
| Keywords: | Health, early childhood intervention, social experiments, randomized trial, Abecedarian Project, Perry Preschool Project |
| JEL: | C12 C93 I12 I13 J13 J24 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2015-011&r=exp |
| By: | Angela Sutan (ESC Dijon Bourgogne - ESC Dijon Bourgogne); Radu Vranceanu (Economics Department - Essec Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat” role while the decision is made by the Proposer himself. In this imperfect information setting, the Proposer can send an unverifiable message declaring his delegation strategy. The most interesting strategy is “false delegation”, in which the Proposer makes the decision but claims to have delegated it. In our sample, the recourse to false delegation is significant, and a significant number of potential Delegates accept serving in the scapegoat role. However, there are many honest Proposers, and 20% of all Delegates will refuse to be the accomplices of a dishonest Proposer. Responders tend to more readily accept poor offers in a setup that permits lying about delegation; the acceptance rate of the poor offer is the highest when Delegates can refuse the scapegoat role. |
| Date: | 2015–01–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01109345&r=exp |
| By: | Vinayak DIXIT (rCITI - Research Centre for Integrated Transport Innovation (rCITI) - UNSW@ADFA - University of New South Wales - Australian Defence Force Academy - University of New South Wales); Laurent Denant-Boemont (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1) |
| Abstract: | The classical theory of transport equilibrium is based on the Wardrop's first principle that describes a Nash User Equilibrium (UE), where in no driver can unilaterally change routes to improve his/her travel times. A growing number of economic laboratory experiments aiming at testing Nash-Wardrop equilibrium have shown that the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) is not able to explain the observed strategic choices well. In addition even though Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) has been found to fit better the observed aggregate choices, it does not explain the variance in choices well. This study analyses choices made by users in three different experiments involving strategic interactions in endogenous congestion to evaluate equilibrium prediction. We compare the predictions of the PSNE, MSNE and Stochastic User Equilibrium (SUE). In SUE, the observed variations in choices are assumed to be due to perception errors. The study proposes a method to iteratively estimate SUE models on choice data with strategic interactions. Among the three sets of experimental data the SUE approach was found to accurately predict the average choices, as well as the variances in choices. The fact that the SUE model was found to accurately predict variances in choices, suggests its applicability for transport equilibrium models that attempt to evaluate reliability in transportation systems. This finding is fundamental in the effort to determining a behaviourally consistent paradigm to model equilibrium in transport networks. The study also finds that Fechner error which is the inverse of the scale parameter in the SUE model is affected by the group sizes and the complexity of the cost function. In fact, the larger group sizes and complexity of cost functions increased the variability in choices. Finally, from an experimental design standpoint we show that it is not possible to estimate a noise parameter associate to Fechner error in the case when the choices are equally probable. 2 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01103472&r=exp |
| By: | Enrico Rubaltelli; Sergio Agnoli; Michela Rancan; Tiziana Pozzoli |
| Abstract: | Previous work on investment decision-making suggested that emotions prevent investors from taking risks and from investing in a rational way, whereas other work found that there is great variability in people’s ability to manage and use emotional feedbacks. We hypothesized that people with high trait emotional intelligence should be more willing, than people with low trait emotional intelligence, to accept risks when making an investment. Data supported a model in which trait emotional intelligence predicted willingness to invest both when the expected value is positive and when it is negative. The effect of trait emotional intelligence was significant even controlling for other variables, like attitude toward economic risk and money attitude. We believe that these results help improving the understanding of how emotions influence investors’ behavior and show that their role is not always detrimental but depends on the interplay between individual differences and situational factors. |
| Keywords: | emotional intelligence, investment, money, risk |
| JEL: | G11 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:wcefin:15107&r=exp |
| By: | Wiktor Budziński (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Mikołaj Czajkowski (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Christian A. Vossler (Department of Economics, Howard H. Center for Public Policy, University of Tennessee); Aleksandra Wiśniewska (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Ewa Zawojska (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw) |
| Abstract: | An emerging theoretical literature focused on the incentive compatibility of stated preference surveys offers a new lens through which to view extant evidence on external validity, and provides guidance for practitioners. However, critical theoretical assumptions rest on latent respondent beliefs, such as the belief that respondents view surveys as potentially influencing policy (i.e., policy consequentiality), which gives rise to pressing empirical challenges. In this study, we develop a Hybrid Mixed Logit model capable of integrating multiple latent beliefs, and subjective measures of these beliefs, into discrete choice models of stated preferences. Further, we provide a split-sample test of the effects of exogenous information signals related to policy consequentiality. Our results suggest some potential for researchers to induce desired beliefs through simple information signals and, importantly, that latent beliefs and information signals significantly influence elicited willingness to pay. |
| Keywords: | discrete choice experiment; stated preferences; consequentiality; field experiment; hybrid mixed logit model |
| JEL: | C93 C35 H41 Q51 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:war:wpaper:2015-31&r=exp |