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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Angerer, Silvia (IHS Carinthia); Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela (University of Innsbruck); Lergetporer, Philipp (Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Sutter, Matthias (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We present experimental evidence from a bilingual city in Northern Italy on whether the language spoken by a partner in a prisoner's dilemma game affects behavior and leads to discrimination. Running a framed field experiment with 828 six- to eleven-year old primary school children in the city of Meran, we find that cooperation generally increases with age, but that the gap between cooperation among in-group members and cooperation towards children speaking another language is considerable and increasing with age. This gap is due to both, in-group favoritism and language group discrimination. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, discrimination, language, children, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C93 D03 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9039&r=exp |
| By: | Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham); Huang, Lingbo (University of Nottingham); Sefton, Martin (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We introduce the "ball-catching task", a novel computerized real effort task, which combines “real” efforts with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ball-catching task combines the advantages of real effort with induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications. |
| Keywords: | experimental design, real effort task, induced values, incentives, piece-rate theory, team incentives, gift exchange, tournaments, online real effort experiments |
| JEL: | C91 C92 J41 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9041&r=exp |
| By: | Stephen Knowles (Department of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand); Maroš Servátka (Department of Economics and Finance, University of Canterbury, New Zealand); Trudy Sullivan (Department of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand) |
| Keywords: | charitable giving; deadline effects; procrastination; inattention; field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D64 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:otg:wpaper:1501&r=exp |
| By: | Altmann, Steffen (University of Copenhagen); Falk, Armin (University of Bonn); Jäger, Simon (Harvard University); Zimmermann, Florian (University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a large-scale field experiment in the German labor market to investigate how information provision affects job seekers' employment prospects and labor market outcomes. Individuals assigned to the treatment group of our experiment received a brochure that informed them about job search strategies and the consequences of unemployment, and motivated them to actively look for new employment. We study the causal impact of the brochure by comparing labor market outcomes of treated and untreated job seekers in administrative data containing comprehensive information on individuals' employment status and earnings. While our treatment yields overall positive effects, these tend to be concentrated among job seekers who are at risk of being unemployed for an extended period of time. Specifically, the treatment effects in our overall sample are moderately positive but mostly insignificant. At the same time, we do observe pronounced and statistically significant effects for individuals who exhibit an increased risk of long-term unemployment. For this group, the brochure increases employment and earnings in the year after the intervention by roughly 4%. Given the low cost of the intervention, our findings indicate that targeted information provision can be a highly effective policy tool in the labor market. |
| Keywords: | job search, information provision, unemployment, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D04 D83 J64 J68 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9040&r=exp |
| By: | Juan M. Benito-Ostolaza (Departamento de Econom´ıa.Universidad P´ublica de Navarra, Campus Arrosadia s/n. 31006 Pamplona. Navarra. Spain.); Pablo Brañas-Garza (Middlesex University London, Business School, London NW4 4BT, England.); Penélope Hern´andez (Departamento de An´alisis Econ´omico y ERI-CES, Facultad de Econom´ıa. Avda. dels Tarongers, s/n. 46022 Valencia. Spain.; ERI-CES and Department of Applied Economics II, University of Valencia. Facultad de Economía. Avenida dels Tarongers s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain.) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far from full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model, and find that the percentage of full segregated societies notably decreases with the cost of moving and that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of strategic subjects. |
| Keywords: | Subgame perfect equilibrium, segregation, experimental games |
| JEL: | C72 C9 R23 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eec:wpaper:1504&r=exp |
| By: | Michael Callen; Saad Gulzar; Ali Hasanain; Yasir Khan; Arman Rezaee |
| Abstract: | This paper provides evidence that the personality traits of policy actors matter for policy outcomes in the context of two large-scale experiments in Punjab, Pakistan. Three results support the relevance of personalities for policy outcomes. First, doctors with higher Big Five and Perry Public Sector Motivation scores attend work more and falsify inspection reports less. Second, health inspectors who score higher on these personality measures exhibit a larger treatment response to increased monitoring. Last, senior health officials with higher Big Five scores are more likely to respond to a report of an underperforming facility by compelling better subsequent staff attendance. |
| JEL: | C93 D02 D73 H11 O31 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21180&r=exp |
| By: | Emily Breza; Arun G. Chandrasekhar |
| Abstract: | We conduct a field experiment with 1,300 participants in India to measure whether individuals save more when information about their savings is regularly shared with another member of their village (a “monitor”). We focus on whether the monitor's effectiveness depends on her social network position, as central monitors may be better able to disseminate information, and more proximate monitors may be more likely to pass information to individuals who interact with the saver most frequently. In 30 villages, we randomly assign monitors to a subset of savers. An average monitor increases total savings by 35%. Increasing the monitor’s network centrality by one standard deviation increases savings by 14%, and increasing proximity from social distance three to two increases savings by 16%. Supporting the information-based mechanism, 63% of monitors report telling others about the saver’s progress. Further, over a year later, villagers are more likely to know if the saver exceeded her goal and to think that the saver is responsible if the saver was randomly assigned to a more central monitor. We also provide evidence that the increase in savings persists over a year after the intervention’s end, and that monitored savers can better respond to shocks. In the remaining 30 villages, savers choose their own monitors. We find that savers choose monitors who are both proximate and central in the network. Finally, we find evidence of spillovers from monitored savers onto their non-monitored friends, suggesting another channel through which social networks influence savings decisions. |
| JEL: | D14 D83 L14 O16 Z13 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21169&r=exp |
| By: | Diaz-Serrano, Luis (Universitat Rovira i Virgili); Meix-Llop, Enric (Universitat Rovira i Virgili) |
| Abstract: | The recognition of homosexual rights is a controversial issue in many countries. Spain was the third country in the world (after Netherlands and Belgium) to introduce a law recognizing homosexual marriage and adoption of children. In this paper, we examine for the first time whether schools are more hesitant to give feedback to homosexual parents during children's pre-registration period in Spain. In order to do that, we designed an internet field experiment to be conducted in schools. We created three types of fictitious couples; one heterosexual, one male homosexual and one female homosexual, and send emails to schools making sexual orientation explicit. Our results show that men homosexual couples had a significant lower probability to receive and answer than heterosexual couples (22.5 percentage points less). No statistically significant differences in the response rate were found between female homosexual and heterosexual couples. This result suggests that male homosexual couples might be penalized because of the lack of a maternal figure. |
| Keywords: | discrimination, field experiment, schools, homosexual rights |
| JEL: | H41 I20 K36 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9044&r=exp |
| By: | Böhm, Robert; Rusch, Hannes; Gürerk, Özgür |
| Abstract: | Although humans qualify as one of the most cooperative animal species, the scale of violent intergroup conflict among them is unparalleled. Explanations of the underlying motivation to participate in an intergroup conflict, however, remain unsatisfactory. While previous research shows that intergroup conflict increases ‘in-group love’, it fails to identify robust triggers of ‘out-group hate’. Here, we present a controlled laboratory experiment, which demonstrates that ‘out-group hate’ can be provoked systematically. We find direct and causal evidence that the intention to protect the in-group is not only a crucial motivator of ‘out-group hate’ in defensive reactions, but also promotes preemptive offensive actions against out-group threat. Hence, the strength of ‘out-group hate’ depends on whether the own group is perceived to be on the offensive or the defensive side of the conflict. This finding improves our understanding of the escalation of intergroup conflicts and may have important implications for their prevention, as we find in our experiment that removing out-group threat substantially reduces intergroup aggression, leading to full peace. |
| Keywords: | intergroup conflict; parochial altruism; in-group love; out-group hate; defense |
| JEL: | B52 C92 N40 |
| Date: | 2015–04–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:64373&r=exp |
| By: | Steffen Altmann; Armin Falk; Simon Jäger; Florian Zimmermann |
| Abstract: | We conduct a large-scale field experiment in the German labor market to investigate how information provision affects job seekers' employment prospects and labor market outcomes. Individuals assigned to the treatment group of our experiment received a brochure that informed them about job search strategies and the consequences of unemployment, and motivated them to actively look for new employment. We study the causal impact of the brochure by comparing labor market outcomes of treated and untreated job seekers in administrative data containing comprehensive information on individuals' employment status and earnings. While our treatment yields overall positive effects, these tend to be concentrated among job seekers who are at risk of being unemployed for an extended period of time. Specifically, the treatment effects in our overall sample are moderately positive but mostly insignificant. At the same time, we do observe pronounced and statistically significant effects for individuals who exhibit an increased risk of long-term unemployment. For this group, the brochure increases employment and earnings in the year after the intervention by roughly 4%. Given the low cost of the intervention, our findings indicate that targeted information provision can be a highly effective policy tool in the labor market. |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qsh:wpaper:254671&r=exp |
| By: | Doyle, Leonard; Schindler, David |
| Abstract: | μCap (muCap) is a software package (citeware) for economic experiments enabling experimenters to analyze emotional states of subjects using z-Tree and FaceReader™. μCap is able to create videos of subjects on client computers based on stimuli shown on screen and restrict recording material to relevant time frames. Another feature of μCap is the creation of time stamps in csv format at prespecified screens (or at prespecified points in time) during the experiment, measured on the client computer. The software makes it possible to import these markers into FaceReader™ easily. Until recently, connecting z-Tree and FaceReader™ was only possible using workarounds or by undertaking many successive actions manually. μCap is the first program that significantly simplifies this process with the additional benefit of extremely high precision. This paper describes the usage, underlying principles as well as advantages and limitations of μCap. Furthermore, we give a brief outlook of how μCap can be beneficial in other contexts. |
| Keywords: | Experiment; Software; FaceReader™; z-Tree |
| JEL: | C90 C91 C99 |
| Date: | 2015–05–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:24809&r=exp |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi; Samuele Centorrino; Ivan Moscati |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nys:sunysb:14-06&r=exp |
| By: | Koji Kotani (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology); Kenta Tanaka (Faculty of Economics, Musashi University); Shunsuke Managi (Departments of Urban and Environmental Engineering, School of Engineering, Kyushu University) |
| Abstract: | A marketable permit system (MPS) has been suggested as solutions to environmental problems. Whereas properties of MPSs in non-trader settings (each player becomes either a seller or a buyer) are well-documented, little is explored about how MPSs perform in trader settings (each player can be both a seller and a buyer). We instituted two auctions of trader settings in MPS experiments: double auction (DA) and uniform price auction (UPA), obtaining the following results: UPAs are more efficient and generate more stable prices than DAs; UPAs induce subjects to more truthfully reveal information about abatement costs for emissions; and a considerable proportion of trades in DAs consist of speculation. Thus, UPAs are likely to work better than DAs in trader settings. |
| Keywords: | marketable permits, economic experiments, double auction, uniform price auction, trader settings |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2015-17&r=exp |
| By: | Castellari, Elena; Berning, Joshua |
| Keywords: | Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Health Economics and Policy, |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaa143:202737&r=exp |