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on Experimental Economics |
| By: | Fabio Galeotti (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France) |
| Abstract: | An important branch of economic research on emotions has used power-to-take game experiments to study the impact of negative emotions, such as anger, irritation and contempt, on the decision to punish. We investigate experimentally the role that the specific punishment technology adopted plays in this context, and test to what extent punishing behavior can be truly attributed to negative emotions. We find that a large part (around 70%) of the punishment behavior observed in previous PTTG studies is explained by the technology of punishment adopted instead of negative emotions. Once this effect is removed, negative emotions do still play an important role, but the efficiency costs associated to them are much smaller. |
| Keywords: | Emotions, punishment, power-to-take, experiment |
| JEL: | A12 C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1504&r=exp |
| By: | Wolf, Stephan; Dron, Cameron |
| Abstract: | [Introduction ...] The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we argue how a counterfactual “bargaining with future individuals” situation may be realized as an experimental setup. That way, we can test the behavior of real individuals in a setting which approximates Rawls’s Original Position in which people are ignorant to which generation they will belong. Section 3 first describes related intergenerational resource sharing experiments which all focus on the descriptive level. Then, we briefly explain Frohlich/Oppenheimer’ experimental approach for deriving intragenerational distributive norms in the lab. Our intermediate conclusion is that similar “intergenerational bargaining experiment” may contribute to the derivation of intergenerational distributive norms. Section 4 describes our own experimental design and the hypotheses we test. Section 5 presents our results; section 6 concludes. |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cenwps:012015&r=exp |
| By: | Michael Sanders; David Reinstein |
| Abstract: | Giving has been shown by many studies to be a social phenomenon. However, while people may desire to conform to the donation of others, it is unclear how fundraisers should take advantage of this. In this paper we conduct a field experiment in a workplace, in which employees are sent prominent messages from a colleague who is already a donor. We find that signups for workplace giving more than double when a picture of the existing donor is displayed, relative to a message without a picture. |
| Keywords: | Fundraising, charitable giving, peer effects; donations |
| JEL: | C93 D03 D64 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:cmpowp:14/324&r=exp |
| By: | Christian Keller; David Reinstein; Gerhard Riener; Michael Sanders |
| Abstract: | When and how should a fundraiser ask for a donation from an individual facing an uncertain bonus income? A standard model of expected utility over outcomes predicts that the individual’s before choice – her ex-ante commitment conditional on her income – will be the same as her choice after the income has been revealed. Deciding “if you win, how much will you donate?” involves a commitment (i) over a donation for a state of the world that may not be realized and (ii) over uncertain income. Models involving reference-dependent utility, tangibility, and self-signaling predict more giving before, while theories of affect predict more giving after. In our online field experiment at a UK university, as well as in our laboratory experiments in Germany, charitable giving was significantly larger in the Before treatment than in the After treatment for male subjects, with a significant gender differential. |
| JEL: | D64 C91 L30 D01 D84 |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:cmpowp:14/336&r=exp |
| By: | Michael Sanders |
| Abstract: | “Nudges" - small, usually cheap, interventions to alter the behaviour of individuals to improve their “health, wealth or happiness", are increasingly popular with governments and have thus far played a large role in the coalition government's attempts to encourage pro-social behaviour. The power of many of these nudges, such as the effect of priming in a trust-game type scenario, has been tested widely in the lab, but have proven difficult to replicate in the field. Although the laboratory allows a sterile environment, this is not always desirable - the real world is not sterile, and there are often many different factors competing for an individual's attention. We present the results of an experiment conducted during the course of a busy public engagement event at the University of Bristol, where members of the public, with little or no knowledge of economic theory, were invited to take part in a game during which they received incidental priming. We find that although the effect of... |
| Date: | 2014–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:cmpowp:14/330&r=exp |
| By: | Catrine Jacobsen (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen); Marco Piovesan (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we test whether increased salience of a tax charge increases dishonesty using a version of the die-under-cup paradigm. Participants earn money in proportion to the outcome reported and, thus, have an incentive to over-report. We find a significant increase in high outcomes in the presence of a tax frame suggesting that participants use the tax as an excuse to rationalize their dishonest act. In addition, we tested whether adding an explanation for the adoption of the tax would increase honesty. We find evidence for reversed dishonesty with participants reporting significantly more low outcomes. These results warn policy makers about the non-trivial relationship between taxation charges and dishonesty. |
| Keywords: | Dishonesty, Tax evasion, Deduction, Framing |
| JEL: | C9 D03 H26 |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:foi:wpaper:2015_05&r=exp |
| By: | Samuel Berlinski; Matías Busso |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results of an experiment with secondary school students designed to improve their ability to reason, argument, and communicate using mathematics. These goals are at the core of many educational reforms. A structured pedagogical intervention was created that fostered a more active role of students in the classroom. The intervention was implemented with high fidelity and was internally valid. Students in the control group learned significantly more than those who received treatment. A framework to interpret this result is provided in which learning is the result of student-teacher interaction. The quality of such interaction deteriorated during the intervention. |
| Keywords: | Primary & Secondary Education, Educational Assessment, Education, Active learning, Curricular reform, Technology, Field experiments |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:88335&r=exp |
| By: | Raj Chande; Michael Luca; Michael Sanders; Zhi Soon; Oana Borcan; Netta Barak-Corren; Elizabeth Linos; Elspeth Kirkman |
| Abstract: | Roughly 20% of adults in the OECD lack basic numeracy and literacy skills. In the UK, many colleges offer fully government subsidized adult education programs to improve these skills. Constructing a unique dataset consisting of weekly attendance records for 1179 students, we find that approximately 25% of learners stop attending these programs in the first ten weeks and that average attendance rates deteriorate by 20% in that time. We implement a large-scale field experiment in which we send encouraging text messages to students. Our initial results show that these simple text messages reduce the proportion of students that stop attending by 36% and lead to a 7% increase in average attendance relative to the control group. The effects on attendance rates persist through the three weeks of available data following the initial intervention. |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:cmpowp:14/335&r=exp |
| By: | Tjaša Bjedov (Université de Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 93, Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France; University of Fribourg, Bd de Pérolles 90 CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland); Thierry Madiès (University of Fribourg, Bd de Pérolles 90 CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland); Marie Claire Villeval (Université de Lyon, F-69007, France; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, 93, Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take-turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take-turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution even when a single pair member has the right to communicate. |
| Keywords: | Coordination, communication, turn taking, conflict, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D74 L15 H71 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1507&r=exp |
| By: | Maggian, Valeria (University of Milano Bicocca); Montinari, Natalia (Department of Economics, Lund University); Nicolò, Antonio (University of Manchester) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate the role of reciprocity in sustaining the emergence of implicit collusive agreements in hierarchical organizations. We conduct a laboratory experiment in which an agent hires, on behalf of the principal, one worker out of two candidates. The two candidates differ in their ability and, once employed, the worker chooses a level of non-contractible effort to exert in two tasks: one benefits the organization (that is both the principal and the agent) while the other one is less profitable, only benefits the agent and provides him with higher earnings. We provide evidence that: i) low ability workers are more likely to exert effort in the task that is exclusively beneficial to the agent; ii) as a consequence, agents distort the hiring process in favor of the low ability workers and iii) sharing a small part of the organization’s profits with the workers alleviates their effort distortion. |
| Keywords: | Conflict of Interest; Effort Distortion; Profit Sharing; and Reciprocity |
| JEL: | C91 J50 L14 M52 |
| Date: | 2015–04–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2015_010&r=exp |
| By: | Stein,Daniel Kevin; Tobacman,Jeremy |
| Abstract: | Better insurance against rainfall risk could improve the security of hundreds of millions of agricultural households around the world. However, customers have shown little demand for stand-alone insurance products. This paper theoretically and experimentally analyzes an innovative financial product called a Weather Insurance Savings Account (WISA), which combines savings and rainfall insurance. The paper uses a standard model of intertemporal insurance demand to study how customers'demand for a WISA varies with the amount of insurance offered. A laboratory experiment is then used to elicit participants'valuations of pure insurance, pure savings, and intermediate WISA types. Contrary to the standard model, within-subjects comparisons show that many participants prefer both pure insurance and pure savings to any interior mixture of the two, suggesting that market demand for a WISA is likely to be low. Additional experimental and observational evidence distinguishes between several alternative explanations. One possibility that survives the additional tests is diminishing sensitivity to losses, as in prospect theory. |
| Keywords: | Debt Markets,Financial Intermediation,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Hazard Risk Management,Emerging Markets |
| Date: | 2015–04–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7235&r=exp |
| By: | Ramalingam, Abhijit; Rojo Arjona, David; Schram, Arthur; Van Leeuwen, Boris |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemma settings. Groups of five players play either multi-player trust games or VCM-games on a fixed network. Power stems from having the authority to allocate funds raised through voluntary contributions by all members and/or from having a pivotal position in the network (centrality). We compare environments with and without ostracism by allowing players in some treatments to exclude others from further participation in the network. Our results show that power matters but that its effects hinge strongly on the type involved. Reminiscent of the literature on leadership, players with authority often act more cooperatively than those without such power. Nevertheless, when possible, they are quickly ostracized from the group. Thus, this kind of power is not tolerated by the powerless. In stark contrast, centrality leads to less cooperative behavior and this free riding is not punished; conditional on cooperativeness, players with power from centrality are less likely to be ostracized than those without. Hence, not only is this type of power tolerated, but so is the free riding it leads to. |
| Keywords: | power, cooperation, networks, public goods |
| JEL: | C91 D02 D03 H41 |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:29140&r=exp |
| By: | David Hugh-Jones and (University of East Anglia); Carlo Perroni (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We examine why heterogenous communities may fail to provide public goods. Current work characterizes sanctioning free-riders as an under-supplied public good. We argue that often free-riders can be punished by the coordinated action of a group. This punishment can be profitable, and need not be undersupplied. But the power to expropriate defectors can also be used to expropriate outgroups. Heterogenous societies may be inefficient because minorities, rather than free-riders, are expropriated. Even if this is not so, groups’ different beliefs about the reasons for expropriation may make the threat of punishment less effective at preventing free-riding. We illustrate our theory with evidence from California mining camps, contemporary India, and US schools. In a public goods experiment using minimal groups and a profitable punishment institution, outgroups were more likely to be punished, and reacted differently to punishment than ingroup members. |
| Keywords: | Group Coercion, Social Heterogeneity |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:224&r=exp |
| By: | Francesco Bogliacino; Laura Jiménez; Gianluca Grimalda |
| Abstract: | We report experimental results from three Colombian villages concerning the impact of a voting mechanism on interpersonal trust and trustworthiness. The vote is purely consultative in that participants are asked to declare in a secret ballot the most “appropriate” plan of action for individuals involved in a “Trust Game”. The plan of action that is most voted is then publicly announced. The mechanism is unbinding, as only the aggregate result of the voting is disclosed and it has no bearing on individual decisions. In spite of the strategic irrelevance of the announcement, we observe an increase in both trust and trustworthiness after the announcement is carried out, in comparison to the baseline case where no voting takes place. |
| Keywords: | Experiments, Trust, Voting. |
| JEL: | A13 C93 B49 D63 |
| Date: | 2015–04–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000178:012696&r=exp |
| By: | Delavallade, Clara (SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town and IFPRI) |
| Abstract: | Health care in developing countries is often unreliable and of poor quality, reducing incentives to use quality health services. Using data from a field experiment in India, I show that providing initial quality care improves the demand for quality health care by raising intended health insurance renewal and subsequent use of quality services. Randomly offering insurance policyholders a free consultation with a qualified doctor has a twofold effect: receiving this additional benefit raises willingness to pay to renew health insurance by 56 percent, exposed individuals are 11 percentage points more likely to consult a qualified practitioner when ill after the consultation. |
| Keywords: | access to and demand for quality healthcare, micro health insurance retention, willingness to pay, trust, poverty, India |
| JEL: | I13 I15 O15 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ldr:wpaper:143&r=exp |
| By: | Nikiforakis, Nikos; Oechssler, Jörg; Shah, Anwar |
| Abstract: | This study provides evidence from a laboratory experiment showing that managerial bonuses can affect adversely a manager’s subordinates. In our set up, managers compete to obtain a large bonus which depends partly on the effort exerted by their subordinates. Managers can suggest an effort level and coerce subordinates who disobey by punishing them. When managers compete for individual bonuses, we find that subordinates do not obey their demands. This doubles coercion rates relative to a control treatment without bonuses. In contrast, when managers compete for pooled bonuses which give managers discretionary power over the allocation of the bonus, most subordinates exert maximal effort. Although managers share a substantial fraction of the bonus, they are not worse off than they are with an individual bonus. A model in which agents care about inequality in earnings can account for the main findings in our experiment. |
| Keywords: | coercion; managerial incentives; disobedience; hierarchy; tournament. |
| Date: | 2015–04–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0589&r=exp |
| By: | Chung, Hui-Kuan ; Glimcher, Paul; Tymula, Agnieszka |
| Abstract: | Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), one of the most prominent models for valuation of goods and money, presumes that people have convex utility over gains and concave utility over losses; a discontinuity at something like the current wealth level or reference point. This reflects a behavioral pattern confirmed in hundreds of experimental studies where in lottery tasks people show decreasing marginal utility over gains (risk aversion) and increasing marginal utility (risk seeking) over losses relative to this ?reference?. Although it is widely assumed that a reference point is also required to describe riskless choices made over bundles of goods, there is less empirical evidence for this claim. In this paper, using incentive-compatible experimental methods, we challenge the generality of this assumption. We find that in riskless choice over bundles of goods in a canonical budget set experiment, gain-loss asymmetries are not observed even while in interleaved lottery tasks the reference point is observed, in the same subjects. Our results suggest a discontinuity between the value functions inferred from choices over standard lotteries and the utility functions inferred from indifference curves in riskless choice. |
| Keywords: | Indifference curve, Riskless Choice, Reflection effect; Reference point; Losses |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:syd:wpaper:2015-07&r=exp |
| By: | Delavallade, Clara (SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town and IFPRI); Dizon, Felipe (University of California Davis); Hill, Ruth (The World Bank); Petraud, Jean Paul (IMPAQ International) |
| Abstract: | Although there is fast-growing policy interest in offering financial products to help rural households manage risk, the literature is still scant as to which products are the most effective. This paper uses a randomized field experiment in Senegal and Burkina Faso to compare male and female farmers who are offered index-based agricultural insurance with those who are offered a variety of savings instruments. The paper finds that female farm managers were less likely to purchase agricultural insurance and more likely to invest in savings for emergencies, even controlling for access to informal insurance and differences in crop choice. It is hypothesized that this finding results from the fact that, although men and women are equally exposed to yield risk, women face additional sources of lifecycle risk—particularly health risks associated with fertility and childcare—that men do not. In essence, the basis risk associated with agricultural insurance products is higher for women. Purchasing insurance increased input spending and use more than savings. Those who purchased more insurance realized higher average yields and were better able to manage food insecurity and shocks. This finding suggests that gender differences in demand for financial products can have an impact on productivity, resilience, and welfare. |
| Keywords: | risk, insurance, savings, gender |
| JEL: | O12 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ldr:wpaper:142&r=exp |
| By: | Dean Karlan (Economic Growth Center, Yale University); James Berry (Cornell University); Menno Pradhan (VU University Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | We evaluate, using a randomized trial, two school-based financial literacy education programs in government-run primary and junior high schools in Ghana. One program integrated financial and social education, whereas the second program only offered financial education. Both programs included a voluntary after-school savings club that provided students with a locked money box. After nine months, both programs had significant impacts on savings behavior relative to the control group, mostly because children moved savings from home to school. We observed few other impacts. We do find that financial education, when not accompanied by social education, led children to work more compared to the control group, whereas no such effect is found for the integrated curriculum; however, the difference between the two treatment effects on child labor is not statistically significant. |
| Keywords: | financial literacy, youth finance, savings |
| JEL: | D14 J22 J24 O12 |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egc:wpaper:1048&r=exp |
| By: | Fiorella Benedetti; Pablo Ibarrarán; Patrick J. McEwan |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes a new Honduran conditional cash transfer experiment (Bono 10,000) in which 150 poor villages (of 300) were treated. The transfers were much larger in size than an earlier experiment (Galiani & McEwan, 2013), but yielded smaller full-sample effects on school enrollment, child labor participation, and measures of health service use. One explanation is that Bono 10,000 did not apply conditions to children: only one child in eligible households was subject to the education condition, and young children and mothers were only subject to health conditions in the absence of older children. Consistent with this, we find a large effect on enrollment (and a nearly off-setting one on child labor) among only children, and smaller and insignificant effects on children in larger households. We only find significant effects on health service use among children and mothers in the absence of older children (despite a much smaller household transfer). The heterogeneity does not appear to be driven by correlated variables such as household size, child age, or poverty. |
| Keywords: | Labor, Youth & Children, Conditional cash transfers, Women, Health Care, Conditional cash transfers, Impact evaluation, Conditionalities, Honduras |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:88213&r=exp |
| By: | Daniel Gingerich; Virginia Oliveros; Ana Corbacho; Mauricio Ruiz-Vega |
| Abstract: | An influential body of scholarship argues that corruption behaves as a selffulfilling prophecy. The idea of this work is that levels of corruption emerge endogenously as a result of a society-wide coordination game in which ther individual returns to corrupt behavior are a function of how disposed towards corruption the other members of society are perceived as being. An empirical implication of this logic is that if one were to exogenously perturb beliefs about societal levels of corruption upward, willingness to engage in corruption should increase as a consequence. The current paper evaluates this claim by utilizing an information experiment embedded in a large-scale household survey conducted in the Gran Área Metropolitana (GAM) of Costa Rica from October 2013 to April 2014 (n=4200). Changes in beliefs about corruption were induced via the random assignment of an informational display depicting the increasing percentage of Costa Ricans who have experienced or directly observed an act of corruption (from 2006 to 2011). The paper finds that, on average, assignment to this display (relative to the control condition) increased the probability that a respondent would be willing to pay a bribe to a police officer by approximately 0. 04 to 0. 08, thereby providing supporting evidence for the self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis. |
| Keywords: | Public Administration & Policy Making, Corruption, Corruption, Spillover effects, Survey experiments, Sensitive question techniques |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:88334&r=exp |
| By: | Michael Sanders; Sarah Smith |
| Abstract: | Using a unique field experiment we show that prompts to leave money to charity during the will-making process substantially increase the probability of making a bequest. Asking if the donor wants to leave money to charity doubles the proportion making a bequest; adding emotional and social cues trebles it. The responses are strongest among childless people. We compare the effects of the prompts to the effect of an estates tax. Our results suggest that both economic and non-pecuniary incentives similarly affect whether people leave money to charity, but are less effective where people have strong preferences for other bequests. |
| Keywords: | charitable giving; charitable bequests; prompts; social norms |
| JEL: | D64 H24 H41 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:cmpowp:14/326&r=exp |
| By: | Costas Meghir (Economics Deptartment, Yale University); Corina Momaerts (Economics Department, Yale University); Pedro Carneiro (University College London); Oswald Koussihouede (University Gaston Berger); Nathalie Lahire (World Bank) |
| Abstract: | The impact of school resources on the quality of education in developing countries may depend crucially on whether resources are targeted efficiently. In this paper we use a randomized experiment to analyze the impact of a school grants program in Senegal, which decentralized a portion of the country's education budget. We find large positive effects on test scores at younger grades that persist at least two years. We show that these effects are concentrated among schools that focused funds on human resources improvements rather than school materials, suggesting the teachers and principals may be a central determinant of school quality. |
| Keywords: | quality of education, decentralization, school resources, child development, clustered randomized control trials |
| JEL: | H52 I22 I25 O15 |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egc:wpaper:1047&r=exp |
| By: | Oechssler, Jörg; Roomets, Alex; Roth, Stefan |
| Abstract: | In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: while they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25 to 50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 firms none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays above the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that “four remain many” even with 1200 periods. |
| Keywords: | imitation; experiment. |
| Date: | 2015–04–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0588&r=exp |
| By: | Sarah R., Allred; L. Elizabeth, Crawford; Sean, Duffy; John, Smith |
| Abstract: | Previous work demonstrates that memory for simple stimuli can be biased by information about the category of which the stimulus is a member. Specifically, stimuli with values greater than the category’s average tend to be underestimated and stimuli with values less than the average are overestimated. This is referred to as the central tendency bias. This bias has been explained as an optimal use of both noisy sensory information and category information. In a largely separate literature, cognitive load experiments attempt to manipulate the available working memory of participants in order to observe its effect on choice or judgments. In three experiments, we demonstrate that participants under a high cognitive load exhibit a stronger central tendency bias than when under a low cognitive load. Although not anticipated at the outset, we also find that judgments exhibit an anchoring bias. |
| Keywords: | judgment; memory; anchoring; working memory; cognitive constraints; cognitive busyness |
| JEL: | C8 Z0 |
| Date: | 2015–04–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:63520&r=exp |
| By: | Erica Field; Seema Jayachandran; Rohini Pande; Natalia Rigol |
| Abstract: | Does the lack of peers contribute to the observed gender gap in entrepreneurial success, and is the constraint stronger for women facing more restrictive social norms? We offered two days of business counseling to a random sample of customers of India’s largest women’s bank. A random subsample was invited to attend with a friend. The intervention had a significant immediate impact on participants’ business activity, but only if they were trained in the presence of a friend. Four months later, those trained with a friend were more likely to have taken out business loans, were less likely to be housewives, and reported increased business activity and higher household income. The positive impacts of training with a friend were stronger among women from religious or caste groups with social norms that restrict female mobility. |
| JEL: | O0 |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21093&r=exp |