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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2015‒01‒14
29 papers chosen by |
| By: | Jeannette Brosig-Koch; Nadja Kairies-Schwarz; Johanna Kokot |
| Abstract: | Most common physician payment schemes include some form of traditional capitation or fee-for-service payment. While health economics research often focuses on direct incentive effects of these payments, we demonstrate that the opportunity to sort into one’s preferred payment scheme may also significantly affect medical treatment. Our study is based on an experiment testing individual sorting into fee-for-service and capitation payment under controlled laboratory conditions. A sequential design allows differentiating between sorting and incentive effects. We find a strong preference for fee-for-service payment, independent of subjects’ prior experience with one of the two payment schemes. Our behavioral classification reveals that subjects who select into capitation deviate less from patient-optimal treatment than those who prefer fee-for-service payment. Moreover, comparing subjects’ behavior before and after introducing the choice option, we find that subjects preferring fee-for-service become even less patient-oriented after this introduction. As a result, the opportunity to choose a payment scheme does not improve, but - if at all - worsens patient treatment in our experiment. Our findings stress the importance of acknowledging potential sorting and incentive effects in the analysis of physician payment schemes. |
| Keywords: | Physician incentives; fee-for-service; capitation; payment choice; sorting effects; laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D84 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0529&r=exp |
| By: | Menno Pradhan; Daniel Suryadarma; Amanda Beatty; Maisy Wong; Arya Gaduh; Armida Alisjahbana; Rima Prama Artha |
| Abstract: | This study evaluates the effect of four randomized interventions aimed at strengthening school committees, and subsequently improving learning outcomes, in public primary schools in Indonesia. |
| Keywords: | Educational Quality, Indonesia, Randomized Field Experiment |
| JEL: | F Z |
| Date: | 2013–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:38bc71ea32554aa5b9eb77b3a45bc4d0&r=exp |
| By: | Abhijit Ramalingam (University of East Anglia); Sara Godoy (University of Essex); Antonio J. Morales (Universidad de Malaga); James M. Walker (Indiana University) |
| Abstract: | In a repeated public goods setting, we explore whether individuals, acting unilaterally, will provide an effective sanctioning institution. Subjects first choose unilaterally whether they will participate in a sanctioning stage that follows a contribution stage. Only those who gave themselves the “right†to punish can do so. We find that the effectiveness of the institution may not require provision of the institution at the level of the group. Individuals acting unilaterally are able to provide sanctioning institutions that effectively raise cooperation. The effectiveness of the institution, however, depends on whether the “right†to sanction entails a monetary cost or not. |
| Keywords: | public goods, experiment, punishment, institution formation, unilateral provision, cooperation |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D02 H41 |
| Date: | 2014–12–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:14-10&r=exp |
| By: | Danilov, Anastasia (University of Cologne); Harbring, Christine (RWTH Aachen University); Irlenbusch, Bernd (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We study, how help can be fostered under relative rewards by means of team bonus and corporate value statements. A simple model analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. As one potential measure to encourage help, we augment relative rewards with team rewards determined by the output of the whole team. This theoretical benchmark is tested in an experiment. Furthermore, we provide the first clean one-shot experimental test of the Lazear and Rosen (1981) tournament model. In a second experiment, we investigate the effectiveness of corporate value statements to encourage help. |
| Keywords: | help, relative rewards, team incentives, corporate value statements, experiment |
| JEL: | M52 J33 J41 L23 C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8707&r=exp |
| By: | Martin Dufwenberg |
| Abstract: | How can laboratory experiments help us understand banking crises, including the usefulness of various policy responses? After giving a concise introduction to the field of experimental economics more generally, I attempt to provide answers. I discuss methodological issues and survey relevant work that has been done. Keywords: banking crises, lab experiments JEL codes: C92, G21 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:534&r=exp |
| By: | Lutfunnahar Begum; Philip J. Grossman; Asadul Islam |
| Abstract: | Using experimental techniques, we identify parental attitudes toward different-gendered children in rural Bangladesh. We randomly selected households that had at least two school-age children (6–18 years) of different genders. Parents, either jointly or individually, were given endowments to allocate, freely or restricted, for the benefit of anonymous girls or boys at a nearby school. The results suggest that: 1) there is no systematic inherent bias in parental attitudes toward children of a specific gender; 2) neither parent is systematically biased; 3) there are no significant differences in parents’ behavior; and 4) tests suggest that subjects revealed their true preferences. |
| Keywords: | Household behavior, Gender bias, Children, Field experiment, Bangladesh |
| JEL: | D10 J16 J13 C93 D13 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2014-32&r=exp |
| By: | Steffen Altmann; Armin Falk; Paul Heidhues; Rajshri Jayaraman |
| Abstract: | We study how website defaults affect consumer behavior in the domain of charitable giving. In a field experiment that was conducted on a large platform for making charitable donations over the web, we exogenously vary the default options in two distinct choice dimensions. The first pertains to the primary donation decision, namely, how much to contribute to the charitable cause. The second relates to an “add-on" decision of how much to contribute to supporting the online platformitself. We find a strong impact of defaults on individual behavior: in each of our treatments, the modal positive contributions in both choice dimensions invariably correspond to the specified default amounts. Defaults, nevertheless, have no impact on aggregate donations. This is because defaults in the donation domain induce some people to donate more and others to donate less than they otherwise would have. In contrast, higher defaults in the secondary choice dimension unambiguously induce higher contributions to the online platform. |
| Keywords: | Default Options, Charitable Giving, Online Platforms, Field Experiment |
| JEL: | C93 D03 D64 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1430&r=exp |
| By: | Pablo Brañas-Garza (Middlesex University London, Business School); Matteo M. Galizzi (London School of Economics and Political Science, Behavioural Research Lab); Jeroen Nieboer (London School of Economics and Political Science, Behavioural Research Lab) |
| Abstract: | Using a large (n=543) multi-ethnic sample of laboratory subjects, we systematically investigate the link between the digit ratio (the ratio of the length of the index finger to the length of the ring finger, also called 2D:4D ratio) and two measures of individual risk taking: (i) risk preferences over lotteries with real monetary incentives and (ii) self-reported risk attitude. Previous studies have found that the digit ratio, a proxy for pre-natal testosterone exposure, correlates with risk taking in some subject samples, but not others. In our sample, we find, first, that the right-hand digit ratio is significantly associated with risk preferences: subjects with lower right-hand ratios tend to choose more risky lotteries. Second, the right-hand digit ratio is not associated with self-reported risk attitudes. Third, there is no statistically significant association between the left-hand digit ratio and either measure of individual risk taking. |
| Keywords: | Testosterone, 2D:4D ratio, risk preferences, risk attitudes |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D44 D81 D87 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-23&r=exp |
| By: | Mermer, A.G. (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management) |
| Abstract: | Behavioral Economics aims at understanding the decision of economic agents who are not necessarily monetary utility maximizers and accounts for the fact that agents may have other concerns next to economic gain. This thesis contributes to the literature by studying the behavior of economic agents who are not necessarily monetary utility maximizers in situations with strategic interaction. The second chapter solves a game-theoretic model of contests assuming that agents have reference-dependent preferences. The results help to explain behavior observed in recent experiments that is hard to reconcile with the assumption of standard preferences. The optimal price mechanism is derived which differs markedly from the one derived under the assumption of standard preferences. The third and fourth chapters use laboratory experimentation which allows for careful scrutinizing of behavioral assumptions made in economic models. The third chapter experimentally investigates agents’ cooperative behavior in indefinitely-repeated dilemma games with different strategic environments. It is reported that subjects play collusive choices significantly more often when actions exhibit strategic substitutability than when actions exhibit strategic complementarity. In Chapter 4 we experimentally study information acquisition in a social dilemma game. It is reported that in a twice-repeated trust game trustors choose to be informed about the type of the trustee in a setting where, theoretically, having such information is detrimental for cooperation and material payoffs. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiutis:eaadb29a-8041-4e76-a8d1-3adc17186ac7&r=exp |
| By: | Daniel A. Brent; Lata Gangadharan; Anke Leroux; Paul A. Raschky |
| Abstract: | We present a novel approach to address differences between stated and paid choices by incentivizing stated choices in a randomized field experiment. The treatment increases consequentiality in the field by making each decision financially relevant. Our results show that the treatment effect is small in aggregate. However, we find that the treatment increases estimates of the marginal utility of income, especially among low-income households. The treatment also affects estimates of preferences for specific attributes by reducing willingness to pay for attributes with indirect benefits. Respondents with greater self-reported environmental preferences are more susceptible to the treatment in attribute space. |
| Keywords: | Field experiment, non-market goods, stated preference, hypothetical bias |
| JEL: | Q51 C93 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2014-43&r=exp |
| By: | Marvin Deversi |
| Abstract: | In an experimental setting impulse-response behaviour in intuitive inflation forecasting is analysed. Participants were asked to forecast future values of inflation for a fictitious economy after receiving charts and lists of past values of inflation and output gap. Thirty periods were forecasted stepwise and feedback on performance was provided after each period. In a between subjects design, participants experienced a negative or positive supply shock. The results suggest that participants barely report rational forecasts. Instead, simple backward-looking rules describe stated forecast series. Forecasting is heterogeneous across agents and over time. Before the shock, most participants can be described by natural expectations. Due to the shocks 69% of participants are found to switch their forecasting rule. After the negative supply shock, subjects increase efficiency of forecasts. But, after a positive supply shock efficiency drops down to zero; this is evidence for a negativity bias. As a main result, macroeconomic shocks do alter the way experimental participants form intuitive inflation forecasts, however, to what extent depends on the shocks’ characteristics. |
| Keywords: | Macroeconomic experiment; inflation expectations; intuitive forecasting; shocks; heterogeneity |
| JEL: | C91 D84 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0528&r=exp |
| By: | Uzma Afzal; Giovanna d'Adda; Marcel Fafchamps; Simon Quinn; Farah Said |
| Abstract: | Standard models often predict that people should either demand to save or demand to borrow, but not both. We hypothesise instead that saving and borrowing among microfinance clients are substitutes, satisfying the same underlying demand: for a regular schedule of deposits and a lump-sum withdrawal. We test this using a framed field experiment among women participating in group lending arrangements in rural Pakistan. The experiment — inspired by the rotating structure of a ROSCA — involves randomly offering credit products and savings products to the same subject pool. We find high demand both for credit products and for savings products, with the same individuals often accepting both a credit product and a savings product over the three experiment waves. This behavior can be rationalised by a model in which individuals prefer lump-sum payments (for example, to finance a lumpy investment), and in which individuals struggle to hold savings over time. We complement our experimental estimates with a structural analysis, in which different ‘types’ of participants face different kinds of constraints. Our structural framework rationalises the behaviour of 75% of participants; of these ‘rationalised’ participants, we estimate that two-thirds have high demand for lump-sum payments coupled with savings difficulties. These results imply that the distinction between microlending and microsaving may be largely illusory; participants value a mechanism for regular deposits and lump-sum payments, whether that is structured in the credit or the debt domain. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csa:wpaper:2014-32&r=exp |
| By: | David Bardey; Philippe De Donder; César Mantilla |
| Abstract: | We develop a theoretical analysis of two widely used regulations of genetic tests, disclosure duty and consent law, and we run several experiments in order to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of policy-holders’ welfare under the two regulations. Disclosure Duty forces individuals to reveal their test results to their insurers, exposing them to the risk of having to pay a large premium in case they are discovered to have a high probability of developing a disease (a discrimination risk). Differently, Consent Law allows them to hide this detrimental information, creating asymmetric information and adverse selection. We obtain that the take-up rate of the genetic test is low under Disclosure Duty, larger and increasing with adverse selection under Consent Law. Also, the fraction of individuals who are prefer Disclosure Duty to Consent Law increases with the amount of adverse selection under the latter. These results are obtained for exogenous values of adverse selection under Consent Law, and the repeated interactions experiment devised has not resulted in convergence towards an equilibrium level of adverse selection. |
| Keywords: | disclosure duty, consent law, discrimination risk, informational value of test, personalized medicine, experiment. |
| JEL: | D82 I18 C91 |
| Date: | 2014–11–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:012341&r=exp |
| By: | Nicholas Beyler; Martha Bleeker; Susanne James-Burdumy; Jane Fortson; Rebecca A. London; Lisa Westrich; Katie Stokes-Guinan; Sebastian Castrechini |
| Keywords: | Experimental Evaluation, Playworks , Play , Physical Activity , Recess |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2013–05–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:614e85317990475b999d207175989554&r=exp |
| By: | Steven Glazerman; Ali Protik; Bing-ru Teh; Julie Bruch; Jeffrey Max |
| Abstract: | This report looks at the Talent Transfer Initiative, which offers a $20,000 incentive to high-performing teachers to move to low-performing schools. The intervention had positive effects on student test scores in math and reading in elementary schools—the equivalent of a 4 to 10 percentile point increase. |
| Keywords: | transfer incentives randomized controlled trial teacher effectiveness value added |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2013–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:4269bc8810414c8a8f64d3c36fde8211&r=exp |
| By: | Alec Brandon; John List; Steffen Andersen; Uri Gneezy |
| Abstract: | Perhaps the most powerful form of framing arises through reference dependence, wherein choices are made recognizing the starting point or a goal. In labor economics, for example, a form of reference dependence, income targeting, has been argued to represent a serious challenge to traditional economic models. We design a field experiment linked tightly to three popular economic models of labor supply-two behavioral variants and one simple neoclassical model--to deepen our understanding of the positive implications of our major theories. Consistent with neoclassical theory and reference--dependent preferences with endogenous reference points, workers (vendors in open air markets) supply more hours when presented with an expected transitory increase in hourly wages. In contrast with the prediction of behavioral models, however, when vendors earn an unexpected windfall early in the day, their labor supply does not respond. A key feature of our market in terms of parsing the theories is that vendors do not post prices rather they haggle with customers. In this way, our data also speak to the possibility of reference-dependent preferences over other dimensions. Our investigation again yields results that are in line with neoclassical theory, as bargaining patterns are unaffected by the unexpected windfall. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00392&r=exp |
| By: | Silvester Van Koten; Andreas Ortmann |
| Abstract: | Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset the market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Self-regulatory organizations, Governmental oversight |
| JEL: | C90 L44 G18 G28 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2014/114&r=exp |
| By: | Jane Fortson |
| Keywords: | Playworks Student, Healthy Behaviors, Randomized Controlled Trial, Education |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2013–11–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:b9317037a4ba4a7dabb1b8fee12b4ae9&r=exp |
| By: | Lutfunnahar Begum; Philip J. Grossman; Asadul Islam |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether parents’ inherent gender bias is associated with intrahousehold human capital investment among boys and girls. We conduct an artifactual field experiment to identify parents’ inherent gender bias and then attempt to examine how this attitude correlates with the actual decisions regarding schooling and health of their own children. We focus on five indicators for education, viz., years of schooling, grade for age, enrolment status, education expenditure, and test scores; and three indicators for health, viz., incidence of illness, and access to formal treatment and treatment cost, in case of illness. Although the game outcome suggests that on average, there is no systematic inherent bias among parents, yet inherently biased parents allocate resources in a discriminatory manner. The results suggest that boy-biased parents are more likely to have their boys enrolled in school and to spend more on their boys’ education; and also, less likely to enrol their girls in school and spend less on girls’ education. The boy-biased parents are also less likely to seek formal treatment and tend to spend less when a girl is sick. |
| Keywords: | Household behavior, Gender, Children, Field experiment, Bangladesh |
| JEL: | D10 J16 J13 C93 D13 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2014-30&r=exp |
| By: | Davide Morisi |
| Abstract: | In a context of expanded media choice, understanding how voters select and interpret information to make voting decisions acquires substantial relevance. Drawing on former research in political psy-chology and political behaviour, the present study explores how provision of information affects voting intentions in the context of the Scottish independence referendum, by adopting a between-subjects experimental design. Results show that provision of information a) reduces indecision about how to vote, especially when subjects are able to select the arguments to read; b) increases the likelihood to vote Yes, especially when subjects are confronted with a balanced set of arguments; c) interacts with individual-level elements and increases the likelihood to vote Yes especially among those who are more politically active and more emotionally involved in the issue of independence. Provision of information also slightly increases the likelihood to vote No, but this occurs in general only when subjects are able to select the arguments to read and only in a very few cases. At the the-oretical level, results provide further evidence supporting the mechanism of selective exposure and the so-called ‘prior attitude effect’, but highlight the need to interpret these mechanisms within a broader framework which takes into account individual-level mediating factors. |
| Date: | 2014–09–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0403&r=exp |
| By: | Chatterji, Aaron K. (Duke University); Findley, Michael (University of Texas at Austin); Jensen, Nathan M. (George Washington University); Meier, Stephan (Columbia University); Nielson, Daniel (Brigham Young University) |
| Abstract: | Strategy research often aims to empirically establish a causal relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable such as firm performance. For many important strategy research questions, however, traditional empirical techniques are not sufficient to establish causal effects with high confidence. We propose that field experiments have potential to be used more widely in strategy research, leveraging methodological innovations from other disciplines to address persistent puzzles in the literature. We first review the advantages and disadvantages of using field experiments to answer questions in strategy. We define two types of experiments, "strategy field experiments" and "process field experiments," and present an original example of each variety. The first study explores the liability of foreignness and the second study tests theories regarding corporate culture. |
| Keywords: | field experiments, research methods, culture, liability of foreignness, foreign direct investment, strategy research, corporate culture |
| JEL: | C93 D03 L10 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8705&r=exp |
| By: | Bizer, Kilian; Henger, Ralph; Meub, Lukas; Proeger, Till |
| Abstract: | Certificate trading schemes have been discussed as a cost-efficient means of reducing land use in Germany by capping and reallocating permissions to conduct building projects. However, in contrast to the established cap & trade systems for emissions, reputation-seeking politicians would be in charge of buying and trading certificates - an aspect not considered to date. We thus present a laboratory experiment that captures politician´s incentives connected to electoral cycles in a cap & trade scheme for land use, whereby tradable certificates are auctioned and grandfathered in equal shares. We find the cap & trade system to be efficient at large, yet there are several politically relevant distortions that are aggravated by self-serving incentives. Prices show high volatility, initially by far exceed fair values and are substantially biased by the endowment effect. Further, the timing and location of land use projects and the heterogeneity in income across municipalities are sensitive to the specifics of the system and politicians´ interests. We thus identify potential problems to a cap & trade system for land use that could substantially reduce both its assumed superior efficiency and its political feasibility. |
| Keywords: | economic experiment,land use,municipal actors,political business cycle,tradable certificates |
| JEL: | C91 Q58 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:225&r=exp |
| By: | Drydakis, Nick (Anglia Ruskin University) |
| Abstract: | Deviations from heteronormativity affect labour market dynamics. Hierarchies of sexual orientation can result in job dismissals, wage discrimination, and the failure to promote gay and lesbian individuals to top ranks. In this paper, I report on a field experiment (144 job-seekers and their correspondence with 5,549 firms) that tested the extent to which sexual orientation affects the labour market outcomes of gay and lesbian job-seekers in the United Kingdom. Their minority sexual orientations, as indicated by job-seekers' participation in gay and lesbian university student unions, negatively affected their workplace prospects. The probability of gay (lesbian) applicants receiving an invitation for an interview was 5.0% (5.1%) lower than that for heterosexual male (female) applicants. In addition, gays (lesbians) received invitations for interviews by firms that paid salaries that were 1.9% (1.2%) lower than those paid by firms that invited heterosexual male (female) applicants for interviews. In addition, in male- (female-) dominated occupations, gay men (lesbians) received fewer invitations for interviews than their non-gay (non-lesbian) counterparts. Furthermore, gay men (lesbians) also received fewer invitations to interview for positions in which masculine (feminine) personality traits were highlighted in job applications and at firms that did not provide written equal opportunity standards, suggesting that the level of discrimination depends partly on the personality traits that employers seek and on organisation-level hiring policies. I conclude that heteronormative discourse continues to reproduce and negatively affect the labour market prospects of gay men and lesbians. |
| Keywords: | field experiment, heteronormativity, interviews, selection, sexual orientation, wage offers |
| JEL: | C93 J7 J82 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8741&r=exp |
| By: | Orazio P. Attanasio; Camila Fernández; Emla O. A. Fitzsimons; Sally M. Grantham-McGregor; Costas Meghir; Marta Rubio-Codina |
| Abstract: | Using the infrastructure of a national welfare program we implemented the integrated early child development intervention on a large scale and showed its potential for improving children’s cognitive development. We found no effect of supplementation on developmental or health outcomes. Moreover, supplementation did not interact with stimulation. The implementation model for delivering stimulation suggests that it may serve as a promising blueprint for future policy on early childhood development. |
| Keywords: | Cash Transfer Program, Early Child Development, Colombia, Randomized Controlled Trial, International, Early Childhood |
| JEL: | I F Z |
| Date: | 2014–09–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:62cf429ea5b74678a945aa87bb6c5430&r=exp |
| By: | Lorenzo Moreno; Suzanne Felt-Lisk; Stacy Dale |
| Abstract: | This working paper reviews impacts of the Electronic Health Records Demonstration implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, finding that moderate incentive payments did not lead to universal electronic health record (EHR) adoption and use in a two-year time frame. However, the demonstration showed that incentives can influence physician use of EHRs. |
| Keywords: | Health, Financial, Electronic Records Experiment |
| Date: | 2013–09–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:22eef23eafe040969c53a9454343180f&r=exp |
| By: | Deja, Dominik; Karbowski, Adam; Zawisza, Mateusz |
| Abstract: | We study gender differences in preferences for mate characteristics such as perceived physical attractiveness and intelligence using data from a speed dating experiment. We have observed that women give greater weight to perceived physical attractiveness than intelligence in their mating decisions. Probability of women’s positive speed dating decision rises with men’s perceived physical attractiveness (in this case we observe increasing marginal effects) and intelligence (with diminishing marginal effects). Marginal rate of substitution of men’s perceived physical attractiveness for intelligence is the highest for low levels of men’s perceived intelligence and the lowest for high values of men’s perceived intelligence. Men also give greater weight to perceived physical attractiveness than intelligence in their mating choices. Probability of men’s positive decision rises with women’s perceived physical attractiveness (in this case we observe diminishing marginal effects). The relationship between probability of men’s positive decision and women’s perceived intelligence is non-monotonic. The optimal level of women’s intelligence in men’s perception exists. This optimal value rises with women’s perceived physical attractiveness. |
| Keywords: | Gender differences; Mate preferences; Speed dating experiment |
| JEL: | C1 D1 |
| Date: | 2014–12–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:60782&r=exp |
| By: | Ivan E. Lazarev (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Darya V. Molchanova (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Nikita A. Novikov (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Anastasia S. Antonenko (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Elena A. Arkhipova (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Galiya R. Khusyainova (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Boris V. Chernyshev (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Attentional lapses are usually viewed as a result of deterioration in cognitive control. Current theories suggest that deterioration in the cognitive control may be related to an increase in alpha rhythm power, although it is not clear whether this notion can be generalized outside of the visual task modality. In the current study power of prestimulus alpha-band oscillations was analyzed during performance of the modified auditory condensation task, which creates high attentional load. Prestimulus lower alpha-band power was found to decrease before erroneous responses, which can be viewed as attentional lapses related to decreased cognitive control, compared with correct responses. Prestimulus lower alpha-band power also gradually increased within continuous sequences of distractor stimuli separating adjacent target stimuli, thus reflecting gradual increase in the level of cognitive control mirroring increasing expectancy of the target stimuli. These findings demonstrate that the relation of alpha power to cognitive control level critically depends on the experimental task modality, and under conditions of the auditory attentional task higher alpha power may be an index of increased rather than decreased level of cognitive control |
| Keywords: | alpha oscillations, attention, electroencephalogram, prestimulus, cognitive control. |
| JEL: | Z |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:28psy2014&r=exp |
| By: | Sharon Lohr; Peter Z. Schochet; Elizabeth Sanders |
| Abstract: | This paper, commissioned by the National Center for Education Research, provides readers with an introduction to PN-RCTs and ways to design and analyze the results from them. This paper was written primarily for applied education researchers with introductory knowledge of quantitative impact evaluation methods. However, those with more advanced knowledge will also benefit from some of the technical examples and appendices. |
| Keywords: | RCTs, Randomized Controlled Trials, Education Research |
| JEL: | I |
| Date: | 2014–07–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:7dce2a40502a473eb80425d5ea970ae3&r=exp |
| By: | Pasche, Markus |
| Abstract: | This brief note rises doubts on the argument that nudging will help people to behave more rational in terms of their own preferences. This justification of soft paternalism overlooks some methodological problems of expected utility theory which are one of the roots of behavioral economics. |
| Keywords: | soft paternalism; nudging; behavioral economics, utility theory, rationality |
| JEL: | B4 D03 D04 |
| Date: | 2014–12–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:61140&r=exp |