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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2014‒11‒07
24 papers chosen by |
| By: | Timo Heinrich; Thomas Mayrhofer |
| Abstract: | We study higher-order risk preferences, i.e. prudence and temperance, next to risk aversion in social settings. Previous experimental studies have shown that higher-order risk preferences affect the choices of individuals deciding privately on lotteries that only affect their own pay-off. Yet, most risky and financially relevant decisions in the field are made in the social settings of households or organizations. We aim to narrow the gap between laboratory and field evidence by creating a more realistic decision making environment in the laboratory that allows us to identify the influence of different social settings under controlled conditions. We elicit higher-order risk preferences of individuals and systematic ally vary how an individual’s decision is made (alone or while communicating with a partner) and who is affected by the decision (only the individual or the partner as well). In doing so, we can isolate the effects of other-regarding concerns and communication on choices. We observe that individuals become more risk-averse when the partner is able to communicate with the decision maker. However, we do not observe an influence of social settings on prudence and temperance. Our results reveal that the majority of choices are risk-averse, prudent, and temperate across social settings. |
| Keywords: | Experiment; individual decisions; group decisions; risk aversion; prudence; temperance |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D70 D81 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0508&r=exp |
| By: | Giovanni Ponti (Universidad de Alicante); Ismael Rodríguez Lara (Universidad de Alicante); Daniela Di Cagno (School of Government) |
| Abstract: | We report experimental evidence on the effects of social preferences on intertemporal decisions. To this aim, we set up an intertemporal Dictator Game and investigate whether (and how) subjects change theirchoices, compared with those they had taken in absence of any payoff externality in a previous stage of the experiment. We run two treatments -INFO and BELIEF, respectively- depending on whether Dictators know -or are asked to elicit- their assigned Recipients' risk and time preferences. We find that high (own) risk aversion is associated with low (own) discounting. We also find that (heterogeneous) socialtime preferences are significant determinants of choices, in that Dictators display a marked propensityto account for the Recipients' intertemporal concerns. |
| Keywords: | intertemporal decisions, time preferences, social preferences. |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2014-05&r=exp |
| By: | Gustavo Caballero (University of Calgary) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents evidence from a laboratory experiment regarding the effect of information about opportunities and effort in redistributive behaviour. In the experiment, individuals are randomly selected into one of two groups, each endowed with differing probabilities of earning $20. By exerting effort, individuals increase their probability of earning the $20 but conditional on effort the difference in probabilities remain constant so groups are determining opportunities. After initial earnings are determined, I examine redistribution using a dictator game where the dictator earned $20 and the receiver earned $0. Treatments vary the level of inequality of opportunities and information regarding receivers' opportunities and effort. I find dictators consistently rewarding receivers' high effort. However, dictators do not consider receivers' opportunities nor their own opportunities when redistributing. |
| Keywords: | Information, redistribution, inequality of opportunities, lab experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D6 |
| Date: | 2014–10–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clg:wpaper:2014-75&r=exp |
| By: | Subhasish M. Chowdhury (University of East Anglia); Joo Young Jeon (University of East Anglia); Bibhas Saha (Durham University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether a pure framing has any effect on the decisions made in a dictator game. We run a between subject dictator game with a giving and a taking frame whilst keeping the strategy space the same. Complying with the literature we find no overall difference in the amount allocated to the recipient across treatments. Contributing to the literature we further find that females are not only more altruistic than males; they also allocate significantly more to the recipient in the taking game compared to the giving game. Males do not show such behavior. A taking frame makes males significantly more selfish, but females significantly more egalitarian compared to a giving frame. |
| Keywords: | altruism, dictator game, taking game, framing, gender |
| JEL: | C91 D64 D84 J16 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:14-09&r=exp |
| By: | Dhillon, Amrita (King's College London); Peeters, Ronald (Maastricht University); Yuksel, Ayse Muge (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | The use of social networks in the workplace has been documented by many authors, although the reasons for their widespread prevalence are less well known. In this paper we present evidence based on a combined eld-laboratory experiment that social networks are used by employers to reduce worker moral hazard. The worker chooses an eort level given a xed wage under dierent settings of social proximity. Social proximity is captured using actual Facebook friendship information revealed anonymously to subjects once they have been recruited. Since employers themselves do not have access to social connections, they delegate the decision to referrers who can select among workers with dierent degrees of social proximity to themselves. We show that employers choose referrals over anonymous hiring about 80% of the time. In keeping with our predictions, referrers also choose workers with a greater social proximity to themselves and workers who are closer to referrers indeed pay back more to the referrer. The advantage of the lab setting is that we can isolate moral hazard and directed altruism as the main driving forces for these results. |
| Keywords: | Eciency wage contracts, Moral hazard, Dictator game, Referrals, Altruism, Reciprocity, Directed altruism, Social proximity, Facebook, Experiment, Social networks, Strength of ties, Spot market. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:206&r=exp |
| By: | Gilles Grandjean; Marco Mantovani; Ana Mauleon; Vincent Vannetelbosch |
| Abstract: | The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. According to our analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is public. When pairs of agents exchange messages privately, the players should play the Pareto dominated equilibrium and disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only when announcing to play it is credible. When private communication is allowed, lying is prevalent, and players converge to the Pareto-dominated equilibrium. Nevertheless, at the individual level, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages even when these are non-credible. |
| Keywords: | cheap talk, coordination, coalitions, experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D03 D83 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:285&r=exp |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Friederike Mengel (University of Essex and Maastricht University); Elias Tsakas (Maastricht University); Alexander Vostroknutov (Maastricht University and European University at St.Petersburg) |
| Abstract: | In a novel experimental design we study public good games with dynamic interdependencies. More precisely, each agent's income at the end of a period serves as her endowment in the following period. In this setting growth and inequality arise endogenously allowing us to address new questions regarding their interplay and effect on cooperation levels. In stark contrast to standard public good experiments, we find that contributions are increasing over time even in the absence of punishment possibilities. In both treatments (with and w/o punishment) inequality and group income are positively correlated for poor groups (below median income), but negatively correlated for rich groups. There is very strong path dependence: inequality in early periods is strongly negatively correlated with group income in later periods. These results give new insights into why people cooperate and should make us rethink previous results from the literature on repeated public good games regarding the decay of cooperation in the absence of punishment. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2014-10&r=exp |
| By: | Migheli, Matteo (University of Turin) |
| Abstract: | Several papers in experimental economics use reaction times (RTs) to assess whether a decision is instinctive or not. This paper analyses a field experiment (the behaviour of athletes at the World Swimming Championships) in three steps, where only the (expected) payoff changes (i.e. increases) from one step to the next. The payoff depends on the time of the race, of which the RT is part. Considering, for each competition, a homogeneous sample of swimmers, the paper shows that RTs decrease as the expected payoff increase. The observed reductions are comparable in magnitude to those observed in other experiments, where conscious/cognitive process are induced (or, at least, present). The paper concludes claiming that a share of the observed RTs is determined through a cognitive process, and therefore RTs are not pure measures of instinctiveness. |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:dipeco:201424&r=exp |
| By: | Sarah Baird (Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University); Aislinn Bohren (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania); Craig McIntosh (International Relations & Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego); Berk Ozler (Economic Research, World Bank, Wash DC) |
| Abstract: | This paper formalizes the design of experiments intended specifically to study spillover effects. By first randomizing the intensity of treatment within clusters and then randomly assigning individual treatment conditional on this cluster-level intensity, a novel set of treatment effects can be identified. We develop a formal framework for consistent estimation of these effects, and provide explicit expressions for power calculations. We show that the power to detect average treatment effects declines precisely with the quantity that identifies the novel treatment effects. A demonstration of the technique is provided using a cash transfer program in Malawi. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Design, Networks, Cash Transfers |
| JEL: | C93 O22 I25 |
| Date: | 2014–09–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:14-032&r=exp |
| By: | Sergio Beraldo (Università di Napoli Federico II and CSEF); Massimiliano Piacenza (Università di Torino); Gilberto Turati (Università di Torino) |
| Abstract: | This study designs a laboratory experiment to investigate the link between personal responsibility and individual preferences for redistribution. We contribute to the literature by considering two key insights: first, effort is costly; second, its fruits can be grasped only in the future. Participants face a crucial trade-off between providing a costly effort or free-riding on their fellows’ effort, playing in a context where the size and the distribution of the pie depend both on circumstances beyond their control, and on their choice of working hard and voting for redistribution. Our findings suggest that people tend to reward effort: the demand for redistribution decreases when the observed average effort in the society increases and the cost of effort is higher. Moreover, people ask for less redistribution the more they are interested in the future. These results hold controlling for a number of other possible determinants of the preferences for redistribution |
| Keywords: | income redistribution, personal responsibility, individual effort, social mobility, inter-temporal preferences |
| JEL: | C91 D63 D91 H24 H31 |
| Date: | 2014–10–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:377&r=exp |
| By: | Agnès Festré (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR7321 - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (UNS)); Garrouste Pierre (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR7321 - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (UNS)) |
| Abstract: | In this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and observation with feedback from a third-party, in a one-shot dictator game (DG). In addition to a baseline condition (DG), a third-party anonymous subject is introduced who either silently observes or observes and gives feedback by choosing one of seven messages consisting of varying degrees of (dis)satisfaction. We found that observation coupled with feedback significantly increases dictators' propositions, while no significant effect is found for observation-only. We conclude that regard by others matters only if it is linked to social factors such as communication. This complements the literature that argues that altruistic behavior is instrumental in serving other selfish (or non-purely altruistic) ends such as self-reputation or social approval. This experiment contributes to the growing literature aimed at decreasing the artificiality of DG designs, by increasing their practicability and external validity |
| Keywords: | social psychology; game theory; communication; beliefs; observation; altruistic behavior |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01069807&r=exp |
| By: | Sonja Brangewitz (University of Paderborn); Behnud Djawadi (University of Paderborn); Rene Fahr (University of Paderborn); Claus-Jochen Haake (University of Paderborn) |
| Abstract: | In internet transactions where customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously, a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about product quality. In this study we experimentally examine the impact of the customers' evaluation abilities on strategic quality choices of a service provider. Our study is motivated by a simple theoretical model where short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality of the service provider's product by providing ratings to a reputation system. A reputation profile informs about the ratings of the last three sales. This profile gives new customers an indicator for the quality they have to expect and determines the sales price of the product. From the theoretical model we derive that the service provider's dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that subjects in the role of the service provider deviate from optimal behavior and choose actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. In addition, increasing the probability of a negative rating and decreasing the probability of a positive rating both do not affect strategic quality choices. |
| Keywords: | Product Quality, Reputation Systems, Online Markets, Experimental Economics, Markovian Decision Process |
| JEL: | C73 C91 L12 L15 L86 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:ciepap:85&r=exp |
| By: | Elise Huillery (Département d'économie); Juliette Seban (Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | Performance-based financing becomes a common strategy to improve health sector quality. The findings of this paper imply that performance-based financing should take motivational effects and levels of provider capacity into account. Using a field experiment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, we find that financial incentives led to more effort from health workers on rewarded activities, without deterring effort on non-rewarded activities. We also find a shift from intrinsic to extrinsic motivation. Finally, the increased effort by health workers proved unsuccessful and led to a reduction in revenue, suggesting that health workers lacked the capacity to develop appropriate strategies to perform. |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/4pmvo3bm7m9claao2gl0337ip4&r=exp |
| By: | Ciril Bosch-Rosa; ; ; |
| Abstract: | We present a three-player game in which a proposer makes a suggestion on how to split $10 with a passive responder. The oer is accepted or rejected depending on the strategy prole of a neutral third-party whose payos are independent from his decisions. If the oer is accepted the split takes place as suggested, if rejected, then both proposer and receiver get $0. Our results show a decision-maker whose main concern is to reduce the inequality between proposer and responder and who, in order to do so, is willing to reject both selsh and generous oers.This pattern of rejections is robust through a series of treatments which include changing the at-fee payo of the decision-maker, introducing a monetary cost for the decision-maker in case the oer ends up in a rejection, or letting a computer replace the proposer to randomly make the splitting suggestion between proposer and responder. Further, through these dierent treatments we are able to show that decision- makers ignore the intentions behind the proposers suggestions, as well as ignoring their own relative payos, two surprising results given the existing literature. |
| Keywords: | Ultimatum game, experiment, fairness, third party |
| JEL: | C92 D71 D63 D31 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2014-057&r=exp |
| By: | Thomas Meissner; Davud Rostam-Afschar; ; |
| Abstract: | This paper tests whether the Ricardian Equivalence proposition holds in a life cycle consumption laboratory experiment. This proposition is a fundamental assumption underlying numerous studies on intertemporal choice and has important implications for tax policy. Using nonparametric and panel data methods, we nd that the Ricardian Equivalence proposition does not hold in general. Our results suggest that taxation has a signicant and strong impact on consumption choice. Over the life cycle, a tax relief increases consumption on average by about 22% of the tax rebate. A tax increase causes consumption to decrease by about 30% of the tax increase. These results are robust with respect to variations in the diculty to smooth consumption. In our experiment, we nd the behavior of about 62% of our subjects to be inconsistent with the Ricardian proposition. Our results show dynamic eects; taxation in uences consumption beyond the current period. |
| Keywords: | Ricardian Equivalence, Taxation, Life Cycle, Consumption, Laboratory Experiment |
| JEL: | H55 H21 E30 E32 E60 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2014-062&r=exp |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Robert-Vincent Joule (LPS-AIX - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale - Université de Provence - Aix-Marseille I : EA849); Stephane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR7316); Jason Shogren (Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Eliciting sincere preferences for non-market goods remain a challenge due to the discrepency between hypothetical and real behavior and false zeros. The gap arises because people either overstate hypothetical values or understate real commitments or a combination of both. Herein we examine whether the traditional real-world institution of the solemn oath can improve preference elicitation. Applying the social psychology theory on the oath as a truth-telling-commitment device, we ask our bidders to swear on their honour to give honest answers prior to participating in an incentive-compatible second-price auction. The oath is an ancillary mechanism to commit bidders to bid sincerely in a second-price auction. Results from our induced valuation testbed treatments suggest that the oath-only auctions outperform all our other auctions (real and hypothetical). In our homegrown valuation treatments eliciting preferences for dolphin protection, the oath-only design induced people to treat as binding both their experimental budget constraint (i.e., lower values on the high end of the value distribution) and participation constraint (i.e., positive values in place of the zero bids used to opt-out of auction). Based on companion treatments, we show the oath works through an increase in the willingness to tell the truth, due to a strengthening of the intrinsic motivation to do so. |
| Keywords: | Oath; Commitment; Vickrey auction; Hypothetical bias; Induced values; Homegrown values |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00731244&r=exp |
| By: | Jordi Brandts (Institutd'AnalisiEconomica(CSIC); Barcelona GSE); Ayça Ebru Giritligil (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies; İstanbul Bilgi University); Roberto A. Weber (Department of Economics, University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | In many areas of social life individuals receive information about a particular issue of interest from multiple sources. When these sources are connected through a network then proper aggregation of this information by an individual involves taking into account the structure of this network. The inability to aggregate properly may lead to various types of distortions. In our experiment a number of agents all want to find out the value of a particular parameter unknown to all. Agents receive private signals about the parameter and agents can communicate their estimates of the parameter repeatedly through a network, the structure of which is known by all players. We present results from experiments with four different networks. We find that the information of agents who have more outgoing links in a network gets more weight in the information aggregation of the other agents than it optimally should. Our results are consistent with the model of “persuasion bias” of De Marzo et al. (2003) and at odds with an alternative heuristic according to which the most influential agents are those with more incoming links. |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:beb:wpbels:201403&r=exp |
| By: | Gautam Rao |
| Abstract: | I exploit a natural experiment in India to identify how mixing rich and poor students in schools affects social preferences and behaviors. A policy change in 2007 forced many private schools in Delhi to meet a quota of poor children in admissions. This led to a sharp increase in the presence of poor children in new cohorts in those schools, but not in older cohorts or in other schools. Exploiting this variation, and using a combination of field and lab experiments, administrative data and test scores, I study impacts on three classes of outcomes: (i) prosocial behavior, (ii) social interactions and discrimination, and (iii) academic outcomes. First, I find that having poor classmates makes wealthy students more prosocial and generous. They become more likely to volunteer for a charity at school, more generous towards both rich and poor students in dictator games, and choose more equitable distributions of payoffs in the lab. Second, having poor classmates makes wealthy students discriminate less against poor children, measured by their teammate choice in an incentivized sports contest. Consistent with this, they become more willing to socialize with poor children outside school. Third, I find marginally significant negative effects on test scores in English, but no effect on Hindi or Math. Overall, I conclude that mixing in schools had substantial positive effects on the social behaviors of wealthy students, at the cost of negative but arguably modest impacts on academic achievement. To shed light on mechanisms, I exploit idiosyncratic assignment of students to study groups and find that the effects on social behaviors are largely driven by personal interactions between wealthy and poor students, rather than by changes in teacher behavior or curriculum. |
| Date: | 2014–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qsh:wpaper:183756&r=exp |
| By: | Ioannou, Christos A.; Golshirazi, Farnoush |
| Abstract: | We investigate experimentally the impact of cognitive and affective empathy on behavior. A novelty of the study is that we do so directly without invoking responses to questionnaires, but by manipulating the state of hunger of participants in the single-shot Dictator game during the holy month of Ramadan. Our sample consists of male workers in the Sepaahaan (car battery) manufacturing factory in the city of Isfahan in Iran. We find that, only, affective empathy amplifies altruistic behavior. More specifically, hungry dictators transfer more money to hungry recipients than fed dictators. The difference is statistically as well as economically significant. |
| Date: | 2014–09–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stn:sotoec:1421&r=exp |
| By: | Daly, Michael; Delaney, Liam; Doyle, Orla M; Fitzpatrick, Nick; O'Farrelly, Christine |
| Abstract: | Many authors have proposed incorporating measures of well-being into evaluations of public policy. Yet few evaluations use experimental design or examine multiple aspects of well-being, thus the causal impact of public policies on well-being is largely unknown. In this paper we examine the effect of an intensive early intervention program on maternal well-being in a targeted disadvantaged community. Using a randomized controlled trial design we estimate and compare treatment effects on global well-being using measures of life satisfaction, experienced well-being using both the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) and a measure of mood yesterday, and also a standardized measure of parenting stress. The intervention has no significant impact on negative measures of well-being, such as experienced negative affect as measured by the DRM and global measures of well-being such as life satisfaction or a global measure of parenting stress. Significant treatment effects are observed on experienced measures of positive affect using the DRM, and a measure of mood yesterday. The DRM treatment effects are primarily concentrated during times spent without the target child which may reflect the increased effort and burden associated with additional parental investment. Our findings suggest that a maternal-focused intervention may produce meaningful improvements in experienced well-being. Incorporating measures of experienced affect may thus alter cost-benefit calculations for public policies. |
| Keywords: | Early Intervention; Randomised Controlled Trial; Well-Being |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:stl:stledp:2014-10&r=exp |
| By: | Crosetto, P.; Gaudeul, A. |
| Abstract: | We run a market experiment where subjects take the role of firms and can choose not only their price but also whether to present comparable offers. Firms are faced with artificial demand whereby consumers make mistakes in assessing the net value of products on the market. Some of those consumers are however able to identify the best of the comparable offers if some offers are comparable, and favor that offer vs. non-comparable offers. We vary the portion of such consumers and the strength of their preferences for the best of the comparable offers. In treatments where firms observe the past decisions of their competitors, firms learn to collude in not presenting comparable offers. This occurs after initial periods with strong competition. Collusion lowers welfare for all consumers and is most frequent when many consumers prefer comparable offers. In treatments where firms cannot monitor competitors however, firms respond to the preference of a portion of consumers for comparable offers. This leads to an improvement in welfare for all consumers. |
| Keywords: | ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE;ATTRACTION EFFECT;COLLUSION;COMPETITION;CONFUSOPOLY;EXPERIMENT;FRAMING;INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION; OBFUSCATION;OLIGOPOLY;PRICE COMPARISON;SHROUDING;SPURIOUS COMPLEXITY;STANDARDIZATION;TRANSPARENCY |
| JEL: | C92 D18 D43 L13 L15 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2014-08&r=exp |
| By: | Michael Daly (Stirling University); Liam Delaney (Stirling University); Orla Doyle (University College Dublin); Nick Fitzpatrick (University College Dublin); Christine O’Farrelly (University College Dublin) |
| Abstract: | Many authors have proposed incorporating measures of well-being into evaluations of public policy. Yet few evaluations use experimental design or examine multiple aspects of well-being, thus the causal impact of public policies on well-being is largely unknown. In this paper we examine the effect of an intensive early intervention program on maternal well-being in a targeted disadvantaged community. Using a randomized controlled trial design we estimate and compare treatment effects on global well-being using measures of life satisfaction, experienced well-being using both the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) and a measure of mood yesterday, and also a standardized measure of parenting stress. The intervention has no significant impact on negative measures of well-being, such as experienced negative affect as measured by the DRM and global measures of well-being such as life satisfaction or a global measure of parenting stress. Significant treatment effects are observed on experienced measures of positive affect using the DRM, and a measure of mood yesterday. The DRM treatment effects are primarily concentrated during times spent without the target child which may reflect the increased effort and burden associated with additional parental investment. Our findings suggest that a maternal-focused intervention may produce meaningful improvements in experienced well-being. Incorporating measures of experienced affect may thus alter cost-benefit calculations for public policies. |
| Keywords: | Well-Being, Randomised Controlled Trial, Early Intervention |
| JEL: | I00 I39 |
| Date: | 2014–10–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucn:wpaper:201415&r=exp |
| By: | Montiel Olea, J. L.; Strzalecki, Tomasz |
| Abstract: | This article provides an axiomatic characterization of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and a more general class of semi-hyperbolic preferences. We impose consistency restrictions directly on the intertemporal trade-offs by relying on what we call “annuity compensations.†Our axiomatization leads naturally to an experimental design that disentangles discounting from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In a pilot experiment we use the partial identification approach to estimate bounds for the distributions of discount factors in the subject pool. Consistent with previous studies, we find evidence for both present and future bias. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hrv:faseco:12967840&r=exp |
| By: | Harou, Aurélie; Liu, Yanyan; Barrett, Christopher B.; You, Liangzhi |
| Abstract: | Despite the rise of targeted input subsidy programs in Africa over the last decade, several questions remain as to whether low and variable soil fertility, frequent drought, and high fertilizer prices render fertilizer unprofitable for large subpopulations of African farmers. To examine these questions, we use large-scale, panel experimental data from maize field trials throughout Malawi to estimate the expected physical returns to fertilizer use conditional on a range of agronomic factors and weather conditions. Using these estimated returns and historical price and weather data, we simulate the expected profitability of fertilizer application over space and time. We find that the fertilizer bundles distributed under Malawi’s subsidy program are almost always profitable in expectation, although our results may be reasonably interpreted as upper-bound estimates among more skilled farmers given that the experimental subjects were not randomly selected. |
| Keywords: | Fertilizers, subsidies, Agricultural development, productivity, farm inputs, poverty alleviation, |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1373&r=exp |