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on Experimental Economics |
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Issue of 2014‒08‒28
sixteen papers chosen by |
| By: | Ritwik Banerjee (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University, Denmark) |
| Abstract: | Past studies on laboratory corruption games have not been able to find consistent evidence that subjects make “immoral” decisions. A possible reason, and also a critique of laboratory corruption games, is that the experiment may fail to trigger the intended immorality frame in the minds of the participants, leading many to question the very raison d’être of laboratory corruption games. To test this idea, we compare behavior in a harassment bribery game with a strategically identical but neutrally framed ultimatum game. The results show that fewer people, both as briber and bribee, engage in corruption in the bribery frame than in the alternative, suggesting that moral costs are indeed at work. To provide further support that the bribery game does measure moral costs, we elicit the shared perceptions of appropriateness of the actions or social norm, under the two frames. We show that the social norm governing the bribery game frame and ultimatum game frame are indeed different and that the perceived sense of social appropriateness plays a crucial role in determining the actual behavior in the two frames. Finally, we comment on the external validity of behavior in lab corruption games. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Framing Effects, Social Norms, External Validity |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D03 |
| Date: | 2014–08–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2014-18&r=exp |
| By: | Breinbjerg, Jesper (Department of Business and Economics); Sebald, Alexander (Department of Economics); Østerdal, Lars Peter (Department of Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | We consider a class of three-player queuing games where players independently choose when to arrive at a bottleneck facility that serves only one at a time. Players are impatient for service but cannot arrive before the facility opens and they dislike time spent in queue. We derive the equilibrium arrivals under the first-in-first-out (FIFO), last-in-first-out (LIFO), and service-in-random-order (SIRO) queue disciplines and compare these equilibrium predictions to outcomes from a laboratory experiment. LIFO provides higher equilibrium welfare than FIFO and SIRO since the players arrive such that lower congestion is induced. Experimental evidence confirms that employing different queue disciplines indeed affects the strategic behavior of players and thereby the level of congestion. The experimental participants do not, however, behave as prescribed by the equilibrium predictions. They obtain significantly higher welfare than prescribed by equilibrium under all queue disciplines. Our results moreover suggest that people perceive LIFO as the most unfair of the three disciplines although the theoretical results suggest that it is welfare optimal. |
| Keywords: | Queue disciplines; congestion; equilibrium; experiments; fairness |
| JEL: | C72 D62 D63 R41 |
| Date: | 2014–08–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2014_012&r=exp |
| By: | Calford, Evan; Chakraborty, Anujit; Fenig, Guidon; Halevy, Yoram |
| Abstract: | We evaluate Andreoni and Sprenger's (2012) data for demand, wealth and impatience monotonicity. We find that violations for all three measures are concentrated in subjects who make interior choices and thereby take advantage of the novel feature of Andreoni and Sprenger's experimental design. Wealth monotonicity violations are more prevalent and pronounced than either demand or impatience monotonicity violations. We believe that the frequency and magnitude of monotonicity violations pose a challenge to rationalizing choices with a utility function whose corresponding demand satisfies the three monotonicity conditions. |
| Keywords: | design of experiments |
| JEL: | C91 D90 |
| Date: | 2014–08–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubc:pmicro:yoram_halevy-2014-37&r=exp |
| By: | Meissner, Thomas; Rostam-Afschar, Davud |
| Abstract: | This paper tests whether the Ricardian Equivalence proposition holds in a life cycle consumption laboratory experiment. This proposition is a fundamental assumption underlying numerous studies on intertemporal choice and has important implications for tax policy. Using nonparametric and panel data methods, we find that the Ricardian Equivalence proposition does not hold in general. Our results suggest that taxation has a significant and strong impact on consumption choice. Over the life cycle, a tax relief increases consumption on average by about 22% of the tax rebate. A tax increase causes consumption to decrease by about 30% of the tax increase. These results are robust with respect to variations in the difficulty to smooth consumption. In our experiment, we find the behavior of about 62% of our subjects to be inconsistent with the Ricardian proposition. Our results show dynamic effects; taxation inuences consumption beyond the current period. -- |
| Keywords: | Ricardian Equivalence,Taxation,Life Cycle,Consumption,Laboratory Experiment |
| JEL: | D91 E21 H24 C91 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201416&r=exp |
| By: | Dutta, Swati; Mukhopadhyay, Jyoti Prasad; Pingali, Viswanath |
| Abstract: | Behavioral experiments conducted so far to establish existence of endowment effect as propounded by prospect theorists typically endow subjects with a single good. In this paper we depart from this setting by giving subjects initial endowment bundles which consist of two goods: chocolates and pens and directly pit neo-classical theory against prospect theory by comparing divergence between willingness to pay (WTA) and willingness to accept (WTP). Using a novel experimental setting we examine the difference in such divergence for a group that is given physical bundles as endowment vis-�-vis a group which is asked to imagine the same initial endowment bundle in their possession. We find weak evidence of endowment effect. Moreover, we examine how endowment effect of a good changes when units of the other good in initial endowment bundle change. We find no statistically significant evidence of endowment effect of a good being sensitive to the number of units of the other good in initial endowment bundle. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iim:iimawp:12888&r=exp |
| By: | Alistair Wilson; Hong Wu |
| Abstract: | We experimentally examine repeated partnerships with imperfect monitoring, where participants can unilaterally sever partnerships at any time. The experiment examines effects from changes in the value of an outside-the-partnership option. We find four main results where partners have access to the same outside option: i) the presence of a dissolution option increases cooperation; ii) the use of dissolution is dictated by individual rationality; iii) where dissolution is used as a punishment, subjects increases lenient, but are still forgiving; iv) overall efficiency is non-monotone in the outside option. An extension examines asymmetric outside options finding: advantages to terminating first-movers creates highly inefficient outcomes; a last-mover advantage is less inefficient but reduces forgiveness; while an arbitrator-mechanism assigning higher payoffs to `more-deserving` parties increases efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Key words and phrases: Repeated Games, Endogenous Termination, Dissolution clauses, Imperfect public monitoring, Dynamic games |
| JEL: | C92 D01 D86 D90 |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:532&r=exp |
| By: | Zeynep B. Irfanoglu (Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University); Shakun D. Mago (Department of Economics, Robins School of Business, University of Richmond); Roman M. Sheremeta (Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University and the Economic Science Institute, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | This experimental study compares sequential and simultaneous election contests. Consistent with the theory, we find evidence of the “New Hampshire effect” in the sequential contests, i.e., the winner of the first electoral battle wins the overall contest with much higher probability than the loser of the first battle. However, contrary to the theory, sequential contests generate higher expenditure than the simultaneous contests. This is mainly because in the sequential contests losers of the first battle do not decrease their expenditure in the second battle while winners of the first battle increase (instead of decreasing) their expenditure in the second battle. We discuss the implications of our findings both for policy makers and social scientists. |
| Keywords: | election, sequential contests, simultaneous contests, experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C91 D72 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-15&r=exp |
| By: | Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena); M. Vittoria Levati (University of Verona and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena); Chiara Nardi (University of Verona); Ivan Soraperra (University of Verona) |
| Abstract: | We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allow- ing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative and strin- gent approach to type classification, we find that the overwhelming majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome- based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer's demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer, thereby suggesting a strong concern for integrity. |
| Keywords: | Ultimatum, Social preferences, Incomplete information, Experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D63 D74 |
| Date: | 2014–08–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-018&r=exp |
| By: | Judd B. Kessler; Alvin E. Roth |
| Abstract: | Over 10,000 people in the U.S. die each year while waiting for an organ. Attempts to increase organ transplantation have focused on changing the registration question from an opt-in frame to an active choice frame. We analyze this change in California and show it decreased registration rates. Similarly, a "field in the lab" experiment run on actual organ donor registration decisions finds no increase in registrations resulting from an active choice frame. In addition, individuals are more likely to support donating the organs of a deceased who did not opt-in than one who said "no" in an active choice frame. |
| JEL: | D02 D04 |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20378&r=exp |
| By: | Kondylis, Florence; Mueller, Valerie; Zhu, Siyao Jessica |
| Abstract: | Extension services are a keystone of information diffusion in agriculture. This paper exploits a large randomized controlled trial to track diffusion of a new technique in the classic Training and Visit (T&V) extension model, relative to a more direct training model. In both control and treatment communities, contact farmers (CFs) serve as points-of-contacts between agents and other farmers. The intervention (Treatment) aims to address two pitfalls of the T&V model: i) infrequent extension agent visits, and ii) poor quality information. Treatment CFs receive a direct, centralized training. Control communities are exposed to the classic T&V model. Information diffusion was tracked through two nodes: from agents to CFs, and from CFs to others. Directly training CFs leads to large gains in information diffusion and adoption, and CFs learn by doing. Diffusion to others is limited: other males adopt the technique perceived as labor saving, with an effect size of 75 percent. |
| Keywords: | Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems,Rural Development Knowledge&Information Systems,Crops and Crop Management Systems,Population Policies,Housing&Human Habitats |
| Date: | 2014–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7000&r=exp |
| By: | Donna Harris; Benedikt Herrmann; Andreas Kontoleon; Jonathan Newton |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour.� Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm.� We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is.� If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished.� If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished.� If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behavour.� Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies. |
| Keywords: | In-group Favouritism, Group Identity, Social Norms, In-group Punishment, Out-group Punishment, Third-party Punishment |
| JEL: | C92 D70 D73 |
| Date: | 2014–08–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:719&r=exp |
| By: | Anett John (née Hofmann) |
| Abstract: | Recent literature promotes commitment products as a new remedy for overcoming self-control problems and savings constraints. Committing to a welfare-improving contract requires knowledge about one's preferences, including biases and inconsistencies. If agents are imperfectly informed about their preferences, they may choose ill-suited commitment contracts. I designed a regular-instalment commitment savings product, intended to improve on pure withdrawal-restriction products by mimicking the fixed-instalment nature of loan repayment contracts. I conduct a randomised experiment in the Philippines, where individuals from a general low-income population were randomly offered to take up the product. Individuals chose the stakes of the contract (in the form of a default penalty) themselves. The result is that a majority appears to choose a harmful contract: While the intent-to-treat effect on bank savings for individuals assigned to the treatment group is four times that of a withdrawal-restriction product (offered as a control treatment), 55 percent of clients default on their savings contract. The explanation most strongly supported by the data is that the chosen stakes were too low (the commitment was too weak) to overcome clients' self-control problems. Moreover, both take-up and default are negatively predicted by measures of sophisticated hyperbolic discounting, suggesting that those who are fully aware of their bias realise the commitment is too weak for them, and avoid the product. The study suggests that research on new commitment products should carefully consider the risk of adverse welfare effects, particularly for naïve and partially sophisticated hyperbolic discounters. |
| Keywords: | commitment savings, hyperbolic discounting, partial sophistication, regular instalments, Philippines. |
| JEL: | D03 D14 O12 O16 |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stieop:55&r=exp |
| By: | Ernst Fehr; Michael Powell; Tom Wilkening |
| Abstract: | The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifiable. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted they undermine the foundations of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limitations. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that individuals - if given the choice - opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mechanisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally, robust to other-regarding preferences. |
| Keywords: | Implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments |
| JEL: | D23 D71 D86 C92 |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:171&r=exp |
| By: | Altman, Morris |
| Abstract: | I discuss some key issues raised by behavioral economics for better understanding the working of the labor market. Amongst the key points in this paper are: (i) a revised modeling of the labor supply curve, with a specific focus on the target income approach (ii) elaborating on the importance of effort variability for understanding labor supply, including a narrative on efficiency wage and x-efficiency theory (includes the importance of fairness) (iii) building upon x-efficiency and efficiency wage theory to better understand the demand side of the labor market (iv) discussing some of the cognitive/informational/institutional factors affecting decision-making, including modeling the role of errors or biases in labor market decisions for both the supply and demand side of the labor market (v) insights of experimental economics for labor market behavior (vi) the importance behavioral economics for better understanding the stylizing facts of labor markets. This paper also compares conventional to behavioral theoretical approaches labor markets, their different underlying assumptions, and analytical predictions, with implications for public policy and institutional design. Also compared are the errors and biases and the bounded rationality approaches labor market analysis. They produce different analytical predictions as well as having different implications for public policy and institutional design. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics, Bounded rationality, Efficiency wages, Effort discretion, Errors and biases, Fairness, Information asymmetries, Target income approach, Involuntary employment, |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vuw:vuwecf:3466&r=exp |
| By: | Suttner, Johannes R. |
| Abstract: | In this study, it was found that economists were sensitive to different commodities based on their attitudes in terms of fairness toward the price mechanism, whereas non-economists did not exhibit significant sensitivity. This sensitivity was so strong that no self-selection effect could be found in economists in the case of a survey of a basic commodity, whereas there was a clear self-selection effect with a luxury commodity. After one semester with intensive expo-sure to microeconomic theory, the market affinity of economists increased in both cases, but their sensitivity persisted. Surprisingly, it was the allocation mechanism of "first come, first served" and not the price mechanism that was affected more in terms of fairness. The latter reflects equal treatment in terms of general perceptions, thus this could be interpreted as an increased aversion to inequality among economists. -- |
| Keywords: | attitude change,economics teaching,fairness,selection |
| JEL: | A12 A13 A20 D63 R49 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:32014&r=exp |
| By: | Anna Dreber; Drew Fudenberg; David K Levine; David G Rand |
| Date: | 2014–08–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000962&r=exp |